3 1761 06353742 7

MILITARY BOOKS

Published by Authority.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

And to be purchased, either directly or through any Bookseller, from
WYMAN AND SONS, LTD., FETTER LANE, E.C.; or
OLIVER AND BOYD, TWEEDDALE COURT, EDINBURGH; or
E. PONSONBY, 116, GRAFTON STREET, DUBLIN.

ABYSSINIA. Expedition to. 2 vols. and maps. 1870. Half Mor., £5 5*s.* Cloth, £4 4*s.*

ACCOUNTANTS AND OFFICERS COMMANDING UNITS. Instructions for the Guidance of. November, 1907. 2*d.*

AFRICA. British Central. Protectorate. Précis of Information concerning the, with notes on Adjoining Territory. 1899. 3*s.* 6*d.*

AFRICA. British East. Protectorate, and Zanzibar. 1900. 3*s.*

AFRICA. Continent of. Geology of. Notes on. 1906. 3*s.*

AMMUNITION. Treatise on. 1905. 3*s.*

ANIMAL MANAGEMENT, 1908. 1*s.* 6*d.*

ARABIC GRAMMAR. Two parts. 1887. (*Sold to Officers only*). 10*s.*

ARMOURERS. Instructions for. 1904. 1*s.* 6*d.*

ARMY BOOK FOR THE BRITISH EMPIRE. (*Under revision*)

ARMY LIST. The Official Quarterly. Each 15*s.*

ARMY LIST. Monthly. Each 1*s.* 6*d.*

ARMY CIRCULARS AND ARMY ORDERS. Issued before Dec. 31, 1892, which are still in force and required for reference. Reprint of. May, 1896. 3*d.*

ARMY ORDERS. Monthly. Each 3*d.*

ARMY ORDERS. Covers for. 9*d.*

ARMY Pay, Appointment, Promotion, and Non-Effective Pay. Royal Warrant 1907. 1*s.*

ARMY ALLOWANCES Regns. 1907. 1*s.*

ARMY ENTRANCE Regns.:—
R.M. Academy. Admission to. 1907. 1*d.*
R.M. College. Ditto. 1907. 1*d.*
Militia and Imperial Yeomanry. Officers of. 1907. 1*d.*
University Candidates. 1907. 1*d.*
Colonial Military Forces. Officers of. 1907. 1*d.*
See also Commission; Medical Corps; Veterinary Corps.

ARMY SERVICE CORPS:—
Training. 1903. Provisional. 1*s.*
Regimental Standing Orders. 1906. 6*d.*
Supply Handbook. 1*s.* 6*d.*

ARTIFICERS. Military. Handbook. Eighth edition. 1899. 1*s.* 6*d.*

ARTILLERY. Royal:—
Practice. Instructions:—
Garrison. Seawards. 1908–9. 3*d.*
Horse, Field, and Heavy. 1908. 6*d.*
Siege. 1908. 3*d.*
Standing Orders for:—
Brigade of Mounted Artillery. 2*d.*
Lieut.-Colonel's Command (Dismounted Services). 2*d.*
Training—
Field. 1906. 1*s.* (*Under revision*)
Do. Amendments. May 1907, March 1908. Each 2*d.*
Garrison—
Vol. I. Coast Defence. 1905. 6*d.*
Ditto. Amendments. June, 1907. 2*d.*
Vol. II. Siege and Movable Armament. 1906. 9*d.*
Vol. III. 1905. 1*s.*

(Wt. 11036 6000 5 | 08—H & S 3505)

ARTILLERY COLLEGE. Report upon the 14th to 18th Senior Classes. (*See also* Ordnance College). Each 1*s.*

ARTILLERY COMPANY. The Honourable. Regns. 1895. 3*s.* 6*d.* (*Under revision*)

ARTILLERY. Field. The Tactics of. (*Von Schell*). Translated. 1900. 1*s.*

ARTILLERY MUSEUM in the Rotunda Woolwich. Official Catalogue. 1906 (*Sold at the Rotunda.* 1*s.* 6*d.*)

ARTILLERY AND RIFLE RANGES ACT, 1885, and MILITARY LANDS ACT, 1892. Byelaws under:—
Aldeburgh, 1896; Ash (Aldershot Camp), 1887; Finborough, 1901; Hythe, 1894; Inchkeith Battery, 1896; Kinghornness, 1896; Landguard, 1887; Lydd—Dungeness, 1895; Middlewick, 1890; Millbrook, 1888; Orchard Portman, 1896; Paull Point Battery, 1896; Scarborough, 1902; Scraps Gate, 1886; Shoebury-ness, 1895; Southwold, 1896; Strensall, 1900; Warden Point Battery and Hurst Castle, 1889; Wash, 1891; Whitehaven Battery (Cumberland), 1896; each 1*d.* Salisbury Plain, 1900, 4*d.*

ARTILLERY STORE ACCOUNTS AND THE SUPERVISION OF A R.G.A. SUB-DISTRICT. Notes on. June 1, 1907. 1*s.* 6*d.*

BALLOONING. Military. Manual of. Part I. 1905. 1*s.*

BARRACKS. Care of. Instruction in. 1901. 9*d.*

BASHFORTH CHRONOGRAPH. Experiments with, to determine the resistance of the air to the motion of projectiles. Report on. 1870. 1*s.*

BAYONET FIGHTING. Instruction in. 1*d.*

BELGIAN ARMY. Handbook. 9*d.*

BICYCLES. Military. Care and Preservation of. Instructions for the, and Notes for the Guidance of Armourers. 1905. 2*d.*

BRITISH MINOR EXPEDITIONS, 1746 to 1814. 1884. 2*s.* 6*d.*

CARRIAGES. Military. And Stores connected with them. Treatise on. Sixth Edition. Corrected to April, 1902. With volume of plates. 10*s.* 6*d.*

CAVALRY TRAINING. 1907. 1*s.*

CHINO-JAPANESE WAR, 1894-95. Epitome of. 1*s.* 3*d.*

CHIROPODY. Manual of. 2*d.*

CIVILIAN SUBORDINATES, General Stores Inspection Division, Woolwich. Rules for. 1906. 2*d.*

CLUBS. Regulation. Exercises for the. 1863. (*Reprinted* 1887). 3*d.*

CLOTHING AND NECESSARIES (including Materials). Priced Vocabulary of. 1907. 1*s.* 6*d.*
Ditto. Amendments. Dec., 1907. 1*d.*
Ditto. Part III. Sec. IX. Rates for Worn-out Clothing. 2*d.*

CLOTHING Regns. 1904:—
Part I. Regular Army. 1*s.* (*Under revision*)
Part II. Militia. 6*d.*
Part III. Mobilization, Field Service, and Demobilization. 3*d.*

COMMAND. WESTERN. Standing Orders of the. Sept. 1907. 2*d.*

COMMANDS, Military, and Staff in the United Kingdom. Reorganization of. (Special A.O., Jan. 6, 1905, with alterations to date. Issued with Special A.O., Nov. 11, 1907). 3*d.*

COMMISSION IN H.M. REGULAR FORCES. Short Guide to the various ways of obtaining a; &c., &c. April, 1906. 4*d.* (*Under revision*)

CONVEYANCE OF TROOPS AND ISSUE OF TRAVELLING WARRANTS. Instructions. 1906. 2*d.*

COOKING. Military. Manual. Reprinted with amendments, Feb., 1904. 6*d.*

CYCLIST TRAINING. 1902. Provisional. 2*d.*

DIVISION ORDERS. Extracts from. 1880. 2*s.* 6*d.*

DRAINAGE MANUAL. 1907. 2*s.* 6*d.*

DRAWING PLATES. Military:—
Attack of Dufor's Countermines or 2nd plate of Mines; Carnot's First System; Detached Forts; Concealed Defences, 1, 2, 3, 4; Printing Plate, A, B, C, &c.; Detail Plate, No. 1; Do., No. 2; Neighbourhood of Woolwich; Village and Surrounding Ground. Each 2*d.*
Attack of Fortress—Preliminary Operations; Do., Distant Attack; Do., Close Attack; Neighbourhood of Metz. Each 3*d.*
Woods and Villages. 6 plates. Each 6*d.*
Neighbourhood of Woolwich. Southern Side. 1*s.* 6*d.*

DRESS REGULATIONS. 1904. 3*s.* 6*d.*

Ditto, Amendments. Aug. 1906, June 1907. Each 1*d.*

DRUM AND FLUTE DUTY for the Infantry, with Instructions for the Training of Drummers and Flautists. 1887. 2*s.*

DUTCH ARMY (Home and Colonial). Handbook. 1896. 9*d.*

ELECTRICITY AND MAGNETISM. Text Book on. For use at the R.M. Academy. 1902. 9*s.*

ELECTRICITY. Notes on. For use of the Garrison Artillery. 1907. 1*s.* 6*d.*

ELECTRIC LIGHTING. Military. Manual. 1902. 3*s.* (*Under revision*)

ENGINEER SERVICES Regns. (*Under revision*)

ENGINEERING. Military:—
Part I. Field Defences. (*Under revision*)
Part II. Attack and Defence of Fortresses. 1896. 1*s.* 3*d.* (*Do.*)
Part III. Military Bridging and Use of Spars. Corrected to Jan., 1902. 1*s.* 6*d.* (*Under revision*)
Part IV. Mining and Demolitions. 1901. 1*s.* 6*d.*
Part V. Miscellaneous. 1907. 1*s.* 3*d.*
Part VI. Military Railways. 1898. (*Reprinted* 1904). 4*s.*
Manual of. 1905. 1*s.*

ENGINEERS. Royal. Catechisms for Mounted N.C.O. and Recruit Drivers. 1906. 1*d.*

ENGINEERS. ROYAL. TRAINING. 1907. 6*d.*

EQUIPMENT OF THE ARMY. Including the Auxiliary Forces. Regns.:—
Part I. 1906. 1*s.* (*Under revision*)
Part II. Details—

Secs. I. Infantry. 1906. 4*d.* (*Under revision*); I*a*. Mounted Infantry. 1907. 6*d.*; II. Cavalry. 1907. 6*d.*; III. Army Service Corps. 1906. 3*d.*; IV., IV*a*, and IV*b*. Army Ordnance Corps. Army Pay Corps. Army Veterinary Corps. 1907. 2*d.*; V. Royal Army Medical Corps. 1908. 2*d.*; VI.–IX. R.M. Academy; R.M. and Staff Colleges; School of Signalling; Garrison Staff, Schools of Instruction, and Staff Clerks; Military Prisons, Detention Barracks and Military Provost Staff Corps. 1907. 2*d.*; X. Engineers. 1902. 6*d.*; XI*a*. Horse Artillery. Q.F. 13-pr. 1907. 1*s.*; XI*b*. Field Artillery. Q.F. 18-pr. 1907. 9*d.*; XI*c*. Field Artillery. B.L. 5-in. Howitzer. 1907. 6*d.*; XI*d*. Horse and Field Artillery. Staff and Depôts. Q.F. 13 and 18-pr. Equipments, Riding Establishment, School of Gunnery (Horse and Field), and Mounted Band. 1907. 6*d.*; XII*a*. Royal Garrison Artillery. 1904. 2*s.* 6*d.*; XII*b*. Royal Garrison Artillery, Siege Artillery, and Movable Armament. 1906. (Provisional). 1*s.* 3*d.*; XII*c*. Heavy Artillery. B.L. 60-pr. 1907. 9*d.*; XIII. Headquarters Units (War). 1907. 2*d.*; XIV. Base Remount Depôt and Advanced Remount Depôt, War only. 1907. 2*d.*; XVI. Militia. 1905. 6*d.*; XVII. Imperial Yeomanry 1906. 3*d.*; XVIII. Volunteers. 1905. 6*d.*

Amendments to Parts I. and II. Jan. 1907, Feb. 1907, April 1907, May 1907, Aug. 1907, Sept. 1907, Dec. 1907, March 1908. Each 1*d.*

ESTABLISHMENTS. War. 1907–8. (Provisional). 8*d.*

EXAMINATION PAPERS. Military:—
Qualifying Certificates. 1905 Sept., 1906 March, Sept., 1907 March., Sept. Each 6*d.*
Entrance: 1, R.M. Academy; 2, R.M. College. 1905 Nov.-Dec., 1906 June-July, Nov.-Dec., 1907 June-July, Nov.-Dec. Each 1*s.*
R.M. Academy, Fourth Class; and R.M. College, Fourth, Third, and Second Divisions. 1904 July, Dec., 1905 June. Each 1*s.*
R.M. Academy, Fourth Class; and R.M. College, Senior Division. 1905 Dec., 1906 June, Dec., 1907 July, Dec. Each 1*s.*
Staff College. Admission. 1892 May, 1894 May, 1906 Aug., 1907 Aug. Each 1*s.*

61490

THE

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

Ontario.
Japan
R.

REPORTS

FROM

BRITISH OFFICERS

ATTACHED TO THE

JAPANESE AND RUSSIAN FORCES IN THE FIELD.

Vol. II.

Ontario.


LONDON:
PRINTED FOR HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE,
BY EYRE AND SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.

And to be purchased, either directly or through any Bookseller, from
WYMAN AND SONS, LTD., FETTER LANE, E.C. ; or
OLIVER AND BOYD, TWEEDDALE COURT, EDINBURGH ; or
E. PONSONBY, 116, GRAFTON STREET, DUBLIN.

1908.

Price, with Vols. I. and III., Twenty-one Shillings.

brief
D
00554
vol 2



Presented to the

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
LIBRARY

by the

ONTARIO LEGISLATIVE
LIBRARY

1980

027
411

THE


RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

REPORTS FROM BRITISH OFFICERS ATTACHED TO THE JAPANESE FORCES IN THE FIELD.

Vol. II.

General Staff,
War Office,
July 1907.

[A. 1060.]



NOTE.

This volume contains the reports upon the operations of the Japanese forces engaged at the battle of Hei-kou-tai, those of the First, Second and Third Japanese Armies at the battle of Mukden, and the operations of the Third Japanese Army at Port Arthur. A number of papers dealing with minor operations, tactics and technical matters are also included.

In the course of editing it has been found necessary to add certain footnotes; these are distinguished from the footnotes of the writers of the reports by being without initials.

LIBRARY
MAY
1
1981
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

Reports from British Officers attached to the Japanese Forces in the Field.

Vol. II.

CONTENTS.

	Page
Note on Manchurian Place Names	x
Order of Battle of the Japanese Forces	xiii
Diary of the War	xviii

SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF 1905, AND BATTLE OF HEI-KOU-TAI.

(1) The Second Japanese Army.—The Defensive Line of the 3rd and 6th Divisions on the Sha Ho, February 1905; by Captain D. S. Robertson	1
(2) Second Japanese Army.—Operations from 20th October 1904 to 29th January 1905, including General Mishchenko's Raid and the Battle of Hei-kou-tai; by Lieut.-Colonel A. L. Haldane, D.S.O., General Staff	11
(3) Battle of Hei-kou-tai; by Lieut.-General Sir Ian Hamilton, K.C.B., D.S.O.	54
(4) A Japanese Cavalry Raid before the Battle of Mukden; by Captain J. B. Jardine, D.S.O.	59
(5) Japanese Cavalry Raid against the Russian Line of Communication in January, February, and March 1905; by Lieut.-Colonel A. L. Haldane, D.S.O., General Staff	66

THE BATTLE OF MUKDEN.

(6) The Battle of Mukden. Operations of the Second Japanese Army; by Lieut.-Colonel A. L. Haldane, D.S.O., General Staff	83
(7) The Battle of Mukden. Operations of the 5th Division, Second Japanese Army; by Captain A. H. S. Hart-Synnot, D.S.O.	148
(8) The Battle of Mukden. Operations of the 8th Division, Second Japanese Army; by Captain D. S. Robertson	181
(9) The Battle of Mukden. Operations of the Third Japanese Army; by Colonel W. H. Birkbeck, C.B.	219
(10) The Battle of Mukden. Action of the Cavalry of the Third Japanese Army; by Colonel W. H. Birkbeck, C.B.	231

E (3)50294. 2000.—3/08. Wt. 9302. E. & S. a 3

Page

(11) The Battle of Mukden, with special reference to the First Japanese Army; by Lieut.-Colonel C. V. Hume, D.S.O., R.A. 234

(12) The Battle of Mukden. Operations of the 2nd Division, First Japanese Army; by Captain B. Vincent, R.A. - 260

(13) The Battle of Mukden. Operations of the 12th Division, First Japanese Army; by Captain J. B. Jardine, D.S.O. - 295

SIEGE OF PORT ARTHUR.

(14) Operations in the Kuang-tung Peninsula from 26th May to 31st July 1904; by Captain C. A. L. Yate - - - 348

(15) Epitome of Operations of the Third Japanese Army from the Battle of Nan Shan on 26th May 1904, to the end of the Siege; by Colonel W. Apsley Smith, C.B., R.F.A. - 360

(16) Diary of the Officers attached to the Third Japanese Army from 29th July 1904 to the Fall of the Fortress; by Major C. M. Crawford - - - - - - 370

(17) The Attack and Capture of Ta-ku Shan and Hsiao-ku Shan by the 11th Japanese Division, 7th and 8th August 1904; by Major C. M. Crawford - - - - - 416

(18) Operations of the 1st Japanese Division from 13th to 22nd August 1904; by Captain C. A. L. Yate - - - 419

(19) Operations of 9th Japanese Division, 19th–31st August 1904; by Captain C. A. L. Yate - - - - - 421

(20) Attack and Capture of Fort Kuropatkin, 19th August to 19th September 1904; with Description of the Fort; by Captain Sir A. Bannerman, Bart., R.E. - - - - 426

(21) Japanese Operations on their Right Wing and in Centre, 19th to 22nd September 1904; by Captain C. A. L. Yate - 432

(22) The Employment of the Artillery in the Centre Attack on 19th September 1904; by Colonel W. Apsley Smith, C.B., R.F.A. - - - - - - - - 439

(23) The Operations in October 1904. Attack on Chi-kuan Shan Works; by Captain C. A. L. Yate - - - - 442

(24) The Siege Operations from the end of October to the Fall of the Fortress; by Captain C. A. L. Yate - - - 457

MISCELLANEOUS.

(25) Russian Cavalry Reconnaissance on the Japanese Left Flank, May 1905; by Colonel W. H. Birkbeck, C.B. - - - 474

(26) Third Japanese Army. Operations from the 11th March 1905 to the Conclusion of Hostilities; by Colonel W. H. Birkbeck, C.B. - - - - - - - - 478

(27) The Expedition to Saghalien; by Captain C. A. L. Yate - 484

(28) Russian Notes on Japanese Tactics; by Major C. M. Crawford 487

(29) A Russian Study of Japanese Tactics; by Major C. M. Crawford - - - - - - - - - 489

(30) Russian Notes on the Japanese Forces; by Captain J. B. Jardine, D.S.O. - - - - - - - 493

(31) The Japanese Infantry Attack; by Lieut.-Colonel A. L. Haldane, D.S.O., General Staff - - - - - 501

(32) Night Attacks; by Lieut.-Colonel A. L. Haldane, D.S.O., General Staff - - - - - - - - 520

Page

(33) The Japanese Cavalry in the Field; by Captain J. B. Jardine, D.S.O. - - - - - - - - - 526

(34) Japanese Cavalry; by Colonel W. H. Birkbeck, C.B. - - 542

(35) Field Artillery; by Lieut.-Colonel C. V. Hume, D.S.O., R.A., and Captain B. Vincent, R.A. - - - - - - 566

(36) Artillery: with special reference to the Battle of Mukden; by Lieut.-Colonel C. V. Hume, D.S.O., R.A. - - - 603

(37) Russian Defence Works, from Nan Shan to Liao-yang; by Colonel J. W. G. Tulloch - - - - - - 624

(38) The Defence Works of the Second Japanese Army North of Tieh-ling; by Colonel J. W. G. Tulloch - - - 629

(39) Russian and Japanese Field Defences; by Lieut.-Colonel E. Agar, R.E. - - - - - - - - 633

(40) Port Arthur: Japanese Siege Trenches; by Captain Sir A. Bannerman, Bart., R.E. - - - - - - - 643

(41) Port Arthur: Evolution of Russian Trenches; by Captain Sir A. Bannerman, Bart., R.E. - - - - - 650

(42) Duties of a Japanese Civil Governor in the Theatre; by Lieut.-General Sir C. J. Burnett, K.C.B. - - - 652

(43) Proclamations and Notices issued by the Japanese Military Authorities to the Chinese in Manchuria; by Lieut.-General Sir W. G. Nicholson, K.C.B. - - - 658

(44) Powers of Punishment in the Japanese Army and Statistics of Crime; by Lieut.-General Sir C. J. Burnett, K.C.B. - 660

(45) Daily Life of a Japanese Infantry Soldier in Time of War; by Lieut.-General Sir C. J. Burnett, K.C.B. - - - 662

(46) Japanese Infantry Soldier's Kit; by Colonel J. W. G. Tulloch 666

(47) Japanese Physical Exercises; by Lieut.-Colonel A. L. Haldane, D.S.O., General Staff - - - - - - 670

(48) Japanese Clothing; by Lieut.-Colonel C. V. Hume, D.S.O., R.A. - - - - - - - - - - 673

(49) System of Pay in the Field; by Colonel W. Apsley Smith, C.B., R.F.A. - - - - - - - - 677

(50) Japanese Reports and Staff Diaries; by Lieut.-Colonel A. L. Haldane, D.S.O., General Staff - - - - - 678

MAPS AND SKETCHES.

(In separate case.)

MAPS.

	Map
Japanese defensive line on the Sha Ho	47
General Mishchenko's raid	48
Russian attack on Niu-chia-tun	49
Battle of Hei-kou-tai	50
Line of Russian defensive works opposite Second Japanese Army, 1st to 15th February 1905	51
Battle of Hei-kou-tai; situation on 27th January 1905	52
Japanese Cavalry raid under Major Hasegawa during January, February and March 1905	53
Japanese Cavalry raid under Lieut.-Colonel Naganuma during January, February and March 1905	54
Battle of Mukden:—	
Positions of the Second Japanese Army	55
The attack on Yu-hung-tun	56
The attack on Hsiao Kuei-hsing-pu	57
Operations of the 8th Japanese Division, 1st March	58
The attack by the 8th Japanese Division, on Yang-shih-tun and Kan-kuan-tun	59
Operations of the Third Japanese Army	60
General map showing positions of all the Japanese Armies	61
Operations of the 29th Regiment of Wan-pu-chieh	62
The action at Fu-shun, 10th March	63
Operations of the 30th Regiment on the Fan Ho	64
Position of the 2nd Division, 14th March	65
Position of centre column of 12th Division, 2nd March	66
Attack of right column of 12th Division, 10th March	67
Kuan-tung Peninsula	68
Port Arthur:—	
Environs	69
Operations of the 11th Division against Ta-ku Shan and Hsiao-ku Shan	70
General map	71
Operations during November and December 1904	72
Attack on Fort Kuropatkin	73
Operations 19th to 22nd September 1904	74
Works south of Shui-shih-ying	75
Trenches and approaches constructed between Sung-shu Shan and "Q" work	76
East Chi-kuan Shan defences	77
Plan of East Chi-kuan Shan Fort	78
„ „ Erh-lung Shan Fort	79
„ „ Sung-shu Shan Fort	80
Russian cavalry reconnaissance, May 1905	81
Third Japanese Army. Operations from 11th March 1905 to the end of the war	82
Battle of Hei-kou-tai; attack of 5th Division	83 and 83A
„ „ Mukden; attack of Chang-tan	84
Japanese Cavalry raids	85
Sketch of a portion of the Sha Ho Valley	86
Liao-yang defences; Russian redoubt	87
Russian defensive position near Tieh-ling	88

PANORAMAS.

	Panorama
Battle of Mukden; Yu-hung-tun and Three-house hamlet	8
Port Arthur; Namako-yama and 203 Metre Hill	9
,, (*a*) fighting on the 9th and 16th October 1904	10
,, (*b*) East Chi-kuan Shan	10
,, 203 Metre Hill	11

(Bound in text.)

	To face page
Destruction of Hsin-kai Ho bridge	75
Attack on Chang-chia-pu	76
Kan-kuan-tun	198
Japanese Infantry equipment	210
Saghalien	484
Attack of the 41st Infantry Regiment on Ta-chang-ho	514
Japanese field gun epaulment	580
Japanese method of laying out lines of fire	602
Japanese fieldworks, 1–15	632
Russian trenches	650
Japanese cooking outfit	664
Japanese infantry equipment in action	666

NOTE ON MANCHURIAN PLACE NAMES.

The Manchurian place names mentioned in this volume are given in nearly every case in Chinese: transliterated on the Wade system, but without its aspirates or accents. The Chinese syllables forming the names have been divided by hyphens. On the other hand, the Korean place names, and a few Japanese forms which it was thought desirable to preserve, are printed in one word, *e.g.*, in Chiao-tou (Kyoto), the first name is Chinese, and that in brackets the Japanese form. A few geographical terms, however, which constantly form the terminal words of place names, have been printed in the Chinese rendering unconnected by a hyphen and with an initial capital letter, *e.g.*, Shan (hill), Ling (pass, or mountain), Ho (river); and in the Japanese transliteration separated by a hyphen, *e.g.*, Okasaki-yama (General Okasaki's hill), Yoshi-rei (Yoshi Pass). There is an apparent exception to this rule where such words form the integral part of a place name as in Tieh-ling, "Iron-mount" (*cf.* Red Hill and Redhill). Adjectives and points of the compass which serve to distinguish villages of similar name have also been printed as separate words to assist the eye, *e.g.*, Tung (east) Pa-li-chuang, Hsi (west) Pa-li-chuang, Ta (great) Hsi-kou, Hsiao (little) Hsi-kou.

The names of Chinese villages are very frequently taken from the surname of the principal family residing in them, *e.g.*, Yang-chia-tun, "Yang family village"; Chin-chia-wo-peng, "Chin family huts"; or from some natural or artificial feature, as: Tuan-shan-chi, "Round-top hill hamlet"; Ta-shih-chiao, "Great stone bridge." Combinations of good omen, like Fu-shun, "Peace and harmony," Ping-tai-tzu, "Peace and eminence," are also common. Size is sometimes indicated, as in Ssu-chia-tun, "Four house village"; Ta-tien-tzu, "Large inn village"; Chiu-lien-cheng, "Nine part city"; or distance from some large town, as Pa-li-chuang, "Eight mile village"; Shih-li-ho, "Ten mile stream." Descriptive names are naturally common, *e.g.*, Chi-kuan Shan, "Cockscomb Hill"; Yu-tai Shan, "Beautiful Hill"; Lien-tao-wan, "Connected-island bend" (on the Tai-tzu River).

In some, however, the origin of the name is less obvious, as in Tai-tzu Ho, "Emperor's Son river"; Liao Ho, "Distant river"; Hai-cheng, the "City on the Sea" (which is 30 miles off); Feng-huang-cheng, "Male phœnix and female phœnix city."

The following are the significations of some of the other names which occur most frequently in the reports:—

Hei-kou-tai	Black ravine eminence.
Hun Ho	Muddy river.
Liao-yang	Distant light or sun.
Mo-tien Ling	Touch heaven pass.
Nan Shan	South Mountain.
Niu-chuang	Cattle farm.
Pen-hsi-hu	Source stream lake.
Pi-tzu-wo	Fox cub den.
Sha Ho	Sandy river.
Shou-shan pu	Chief hill village.
Ta-lien Wan	Great connected bay.
Te-li-ssu	Obtain advantage temple.
Tien-shui-tien	Sweet water village.
Ya-lu	Wild duck.
Yen-tai	Opium eminence.
Ying-kou	Camp mouth.

Mukden is a Manchu form, meaning "Flourishing City"; in Chinese it is called Feng-tien Fu or Shen-ching, "Heaven Born" or "Affluent City."

The most constantly recurring syllables have the attached meanings :—

Chia	a family or house.
Pu	a police post or small village.
Tun	a village.
Tzu	a diminutive or suffix without special meaning.
Wo-peng	a collection of huts.

The following appear frequently—

(*a*) at the beginning of place names :—

Ta	great.	Hsiao	little.
Pei	north.	Nan	south.
Tung	east.	Hsi	west.
Shang	upper.	Hsia	lower.
Chien	front.	Hou	back.
Yu	right hand.	Tso	left hand.
Chung	middle.		

(*b*) at the end of names :—

Shan	mountain.	Ling	pass.
Ho	river.	Kou	ravine, mouth, &c.
Chuang	village.	Chiao	bridge.
Kuang	village in a village.	Fang	house.
Tan	village.	Lou	tower.
Tien	village with inn.	Miao	temple.
Tsun	village.	Ssu	,,
Tai	eminence.		

The colours are—

Hei	black.	Pai	white.
Lan	blue.	Hung	red.
Huang	yellow.		

The numerals—

Yi	one.	Liu	six.
Erh	two.	Chi	seven.
San	three.	Pa	eight.
Ssu	four.	Chiu	nine.
Wu	five.	Shih	ten.

A list of the commoner Chinese words in geographical use is given below in the hope that the meanings may aid the memory in retaining the names of localities. It must, however, be understood that these syllables have the meaning attached to them only when they represent the ideograms by which the words would be written by a Chinaman, or are pronounced in the exact "tone" by which they are distinguished when spoken, *e.g.*, Feng, which is translated "a mountain peak," "wind," and "phœnix," is represented by three separate Chinese ideograms, and there are many other *feng* in the language. The aspirants and accents have been inserted to make the list more generally useful.

Ai *or* yai, *a bank.*
An, *peace, or peaceful.*
Cha, *a canal lock.*
Ch'a, *tea, a fork.*
Chai, *a small fort or post, a walled enclosure.*
Chan, *a stage or halting-place, to divide.*
Chang, *a common surname.*
Ch'ang, *long, joyful, a plain.*
Chao, *shining, illuminating, a surname.*
Ch'ao, *the tide.*
Chên, *a market town or village.*
Chêng, *a walled city.*
Chia, *a family, a surname.*
Chiang, *a river, a surname.*
Chiao, *a bridge.*
Chieh, *a boundary, a street.*
Chien, *a mountain stream, a ravine.*
Ch'ien, *front, money, a surname.*
Ch'i, *seven, a village, ridge.*
Ch'ih, *a small pond, often artificial, reddish.*
Chin, *gold, near, a ford.*
Ch'ing, *clear, pure, grey, or dark-green.*
Ching, *a thorn bush, a well.*
Chiu, *wine, nine.*
Chou, *a district city, a surname.*

Chu, *a pig, bamboo.*
Chuan, *a spring.*
Chuang, *a village.*
Chung, *middle.*
Erh, *two, a diminutive particle of sound.*
Fang, *a house, a region.*
Fei, *a goddess.*
Fên, *dividing, grave.*
Fêng, *a mountain peak, wind, phœnix.*
Fu, *a prefectural city, happiness, a surname.*
Hai, *the sea.*
Hei, *black.*
Ho, *a river.*
Hou, *back, behind.*
Hsi, *west, good luck, stream.*
Hsia, *below, a surname.*
Hsiang, *a scent, a bye-street or lane.*
Hsiao, *small.*
Hsien, *a district or district city, thread.*
Hsin, *new.*
Hu, *a large lake, a tiger.*
Hua, *flowers, words, or language.*
Huai, *a tree like the ash.*
Huang, *yellow.*
Hui, *beauty, a society, ashes, to return or come back.*
Hun, *dull or muddy.*
Hung, *red.*
Jih, *sun or day, post station.*
Kao, *high, a surname.*
Kou, *a ditch or drain, canal, ravine, valley or nullah, dog.*
K'ou, *a mouth, a mountain pass, a bay, a place where two roads cross.*
Ku, *a drum, a girl, ancient, poor, a valley, grain, a surname.*
K'u, *bitter, dried-up, to weep.*
Kuan, *a barrier, a mountain pass, an officer or official.*
K'uang, *a village in a valley, a basket.*
Kung, *a duke.*
K'ung, *empty, a surname.*
La, *wax, wax-tree.*
Lai, *to come, a surname.*
Lan, *blue.*
Lang, *a wolf, a wave.*
Lao, *old, difficult.*
Li, *a plum or pear, inside, a surname, the Chinese measure of distance—one third of a mile.*
Lia, *two.*
Liang, *two, cool, a surname.*
Liao, *distant.*
Lien, *joined or connected, the lotus.*
Lin, *a grove of trees, near to.*
Ling, *a mountain, a mountain pass, a tomb.*
Liu, *six, flowing, a common surname.*
Lo, *joy or happiness, to lower or let fall.*
Lou, *a tower.*
Lu, *a road or way.*
Lü, *donkey.*
Lung, *a dragon.*
Ma, *a horse, a surname.*
Mai, *wheat, to buy, to sell, to bury.*
Mao, *a cat, an anchor, a surname.*
Ma-t'ou, (*horse-head*) *a pier or jetty.*
Mei, *coal, plums, a surname.*
Mên, *a door, gate, or entrance.*
Miao, *a temple, a surname.*
Mien, *flour, face or side.*
Ming, *bright.*
Mo, *a mill.*
Mu, *mother, a surname.*
Nan, *south, difficult.*
Ni, *mud.*
Ning, *peace, safety or tranquility, a surname.*
Niu, *a cow.*
Nü, *a woman.*
Pa, *eight.*
Pai, *white.*
Pan, *half, a board or plank.*
P'ang, *a surname.*
Pao, *to protect.*
Pei, *north.*
Pên, *a source.*
Pêng, *a shed.*
P'ing, *level, peace or peaceful.*
Po, *a small lake, a gate.*
P'u, *a police post or station, a shop or small village.*
San, *three.*
Sang, *the mulberry.*
Sha, *sand.*
Shan, *hill or mountain.*
Shang, *over or upon, trade or commerce.*
Shên, *a god or spirit.*
Shih, *ten, stone.*
Shou, *life-long, a hand.*
Shu, *a tree, a book.*
Shuang, *a pear.*
Shui, *water.*
So, *a place, a lock.*
Ssŭ, *a temple, four.*
Sung, *fir or pine.*
Ta, *large.*
T'a, *pagoda, otter.*
Tai, *a terrace, an eminence.*
Tan, *single.*
T'an, *a village, a waterfall, rapids.*
Tang, *a dry river bed wet in rain, a spring, a pond, sugar.*
Tao, *an island or promontory, a road.*
T'ao, *a peach.*
Tê, *virtue.*
Ti, *embankment, earth.*
T'ieh, *iron.*

Tien, *an inn, a* ***village.***
T'ien, *heaven,* ***sun,*** *day,* ***a field,*** *a surname.*
Ting, ***a*** *nail, a summit, a departmental city.*
T'o, ***a camel.***
Tou, *a* ***bean,*** *a surname.*
T'ou, *head.*
Tsang, *a* ***granary.***
Tsao, *a* ***date*** *(fruit).*
Ts'ao, ***straw or grass.***
Tso, *left-hand.*
Tsui, *a* ***beak,*** *very, exceedingly.*
Ts'un, *a* ***village.***
Tu, *a ferry, a surname.*
T'u, *a hare.*
T'un, *a village.*
Tung, *east.*
Tzŭ, *marshy ground, a son, a* ***diminutive particle*** *of sound.*
Wa, *a tile, a swamp or marsh, a* ***hamlet,*** *a* ***depression.***
Wan, ***a bay,*** *a bend in road or* ***river.***
Wang, *king,* ***a common surname,*** *to hope,* ***a net.***
Wei, *a small sea-side fortified post, a tail, a surname.*
Wên, *warm, literature, classical.*
Wo, *a nest or collection, a cave.*
Wu, *five, military, a surname.*
Ya, *a* ***tooth.***
Yai *or* ai, *a* ***bank.***
Yao, *a* ***brick or other kiln.***
Yang, *the ocean, the poplar tree, a surname, a sheep,*
Yeh, *wild.*
Yen, *salt, smoke, tobacco, a swallow, a wild goose.*
Yi, *one.*
Yin, *shade.*
Ying, *a "camp," military unit or barrack, a grave or graveyard.*
Yu, *right-hand.*
Yü, ***fish*** *or rain.*
Yuan, *a spring, a yard or garden, far-off, a surname.*
Yün, *clouds or cloudy.*

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE JAPANESE FORCES.

IN JAPAN.

Commander-in-Chief - - - -	H.M. the Emperor.
Chief of Staff at General Head-Quarters -	Field-Marshal Marquis Yamagata.
Sub-Chief of Staff at General Head-Quarters -	Major-General Nagaoka.

IN MANCHURIA.

Commander-in-Chief - - - - -	Field-Marshal Marquis Oyama.
Chief of Staff - - - - - -	General Baron Kodama.

FIRST ARMY.

General Baron Kuroki.

Guard Division.
2nd ,,
12th ,,

After the battle of the Ya-lu it was joined by the Guard Mixed Reserve Brigade.

SECOND ARMY.

General Baron Oku.

At Nan Shan this Army consisted of the—

1st Division.
3rd ,,
4th ,,

At Te-li-ssu of the—

3rd Division.
4th ,,
5th ,,

At Ta-shih-chiao of the—

3rd Division.
4th ,,
5th ,,
6th ,,

At Liao-yang and the Sha Ho of the—

3rd Division.
4th ,,
6th ,,

At Mukden of the—

3rd Division.
4th ,,
5th ,,
8th ,,

Various reserve units were also at different times attached to the Army.

Third Army.

General Baron Nogi.

This Army at first consisted of—

1st Division.
11th ,,
A reserve brigade.
A naval ,,

It was joined in July 1904 by—

9th Division.
A reserve brigade.

And in November 1904 by the—

7th Division.

On the conclusion of the siege of Port Arthur the 11th Division was transferred to the Fifth or Ya-lu Army.

Fourth Army.

General Count Nodzu.

This at first consisted only of the—

10th Division.

It was joined in July 1904 by—

5th Division (from the Second Army).
A reserve brigade.

At the battle of Mukden it consisted of the—

6th Division.
10th ,,

Fifth (or Ya-lu) Army.

General Kawamura.

This Army, which was formed during the winter of 1904–5, consisted of the—

11th Division.
A reserve division.

THE DIVISIONS.

Guard Division (General Baron Hashegawa, succeeded by Lieut.-General N. Asada) :—

1st Guard Infantry Brigade (Major-General N. Asada, succeeded by Major-General Izaki).
1st Guard Infantry Regiment.
2nd ,, ,, ,,
2nd Guard Infantry Brigade (Major-General A. Watanabe).
3rd Guard Infantry Regiment.
4th ,, ,, ,,
Guard Cavalry Regiment.
,, Artillery ,,
,, Engineer Battalion, &c.

1*st Division* (Lieut.-General Prince Fushimi, succeeded by Lieut.-General M. Matsumura) :—

1st Infantry Brigade (Major-General M. Matsumura, succeeded by Major-General Osako).
1st Infantry Regiment.
15th ,, ,,
2nd Infantry Brigade (Major-General S. Nakamura).
2nd Infantry Regiment.
3rd ,, ,,
1st Cavalry Regiment.
,, Artillery ,,
,, Engineer Battalion, &c.

2*nd Division* (General Baron Nishi, succeeded by Lieut.-General S. Nishijima) :—

3rd Infantry Brigade (Major-General M. Matsunaga).
4th Infantry Regiment.
39th ,, ,,
15th Infantry Brigade (Major-General S. Okasaki).
16th Infantry Regiment.
30th ,, ,,
2nd Cavalry Regiment.
,, Artillery ,,
,, Engineer Battalion, &c.

3*rd Division* (Lieut.-General Baron Y. Oshima) :—

5th Infantry Brigade (Major-General K. Yamaguchi).
6th Infantry Regiment.
33rd ,, ,,
17th Infantry Brigade (Major-General J. Kodama).
18th Infantry Regiment.
34th ,, ,,
3rd Cavalry Regiment.
,, Artillery ,,
,, Engineer Battalion, &c.

4*th Division* (Lieut.-General Baron Ogawa, succeeded by Lieut.-General K. Tsukamoto) :—

7th Infantry Brigade (Major-General S. Nishijima, succeeded by Lieut.-General K. Tsukamoto).
8th Infantry Regiment.
37th ,, ,,
19th Infantry Brigade (Major-General S. Ando, succeeded by Major-General Hayashi).
9th Infantry Regiment.
38th ,, ,,
4th Cavalry Regiment.
,, Artillery ,,
,, Engineer Battalion, &c.

5th Division (Lieut.-General Ueda, succeeded by Major-General Kigoshi):—
9th Infantry Brigade (Major-General Yamada, succeeded by Major-General Surizawa).
11th Infantry Regiment.
41st ,, ,,
21st Infantry Brigade (Major-General K. Tsukamoto, succeeded by Major-General Murayama).
21st Infantry Regiment.
42nd ,, ,,
5th Cavalry Regiment.
,, Artillery ,, (mountain guns).
,, Engineer Battalion, &c.

6th Division (Lieut.-General Okubo):—
11th Infantry Brigade (Major-General S. Iida).
13th Infantry Regiment.
45th ,, ,,
24th Infantry Brigade (Major-General Y. Kigoshi, succeeded by Major-General Koidzume).
23rd Infantry Regiment.
48th ,, ,,
6th Cavalry Regiment.
,, Artillery ,,
,, Engineer Battalion, &c.

7th Division (Lieut.-General Tsameshima):—
13th Infantry Brigade (Major-General S. Yoshida).
25th Infantry Regiment.
26th ,, ,,
14th Infantry Brigade (Major-General T. Saito).
27th Infantry Regiment.
28th ,, ,,
7th Cavalry Regiment.
,, Artillery ,, *
,, Engineer Battalion, &c.

8th Division (Lieut.-General Baron Tatsumi):—
4th Infantry Brigade (Major-General M. Tanabe).
5th Infantry Regiment.
31st ,, ,,
16th Infantry Brigade (Major-General A. Kimura).
17th Infantry Regiment.
32nd ,, ,,
8th Cavalry Regiment.
,, Artillery ,, (mountain guns).
,, Engineer Battalion.
,, Train Battalion, &c.

9th Division (Lieut.-General Baron H. Oshima):—
6th Infantry Brigade (Major-General H. Ichinohe).
7th Infantry Regiment.
35th ,, ,,
18th Infantry Brigade (Major-General Hirata).
19th Infantry Regiment.
36th ,, ,,
9th Cavalry Regiment.
,, Artillery ,, (mountain guns).
,, Engineer Battalion, &c.

10th Division (Lieut.-General Baron Kawamura, succeeded by Lieut.-General S. Ando):—
8th Infantry Brigade (Major-General H. Tojo).
10th Infantry Regiment.
40th ,, ,,

---

* This Regiment contained only four batteries, two field and two mountain.

10*th Division*—cont.
20th Infantry Brigade (Major-General M. Marui).
20th Infantry Regiment.
39th ,, ,,
10th Cavalry Regiment.
,, Artillery ,, (mountain guns).
,, Engineer Battalion, &c.

11*th Division* (Lieut.-General Baron Tuschiya):—
22nd Infantry Brigade (Major-General T. Kamiso).
12th Infantry Regiment.
43rd ,, ,,
10th Infantry Brigade (Major-General N. Yamanaka).
22nd Infantry Regiment.
44th ,, ,,
11th Cavalry Regiment.
,, Artillery ,, (mountain guns).
,, Engineer Battalion, &c.

12*th Division* (Lieut.-General Baron Inouye):—
12th Infantry Brigade (Major-General N. Sasaki, succeeded by Shimamura).
14th Infantry Regiment.
47th ,, ,,
23rd Infantry Brigade (Major-General Kigoshi, succeeded by Imamura).
24th Infantry Regiment.
46th ,, ,,
12th Cavalry Regiment.
,, Artillery ,, (mountain guns).
,, Engineer Battalion, &c.

The 13th and 14th Divisions were formed in April 1905, and the 15th and 16th Divisions in July 1905; they were in the process of being sent to the left of the Japanese line when the war came to an end.

INDEPENDENT CAVALRY.

1st Cavalry Brigade (Major-General Akiyama):—
13th Cavalry Regiment.
14th ,, ,,
2nd Cavalry Brigade (Major-General Prince Kannin, succeeded by Major-General Tamura):—
15th Cavalry Regiment.
16th ,, ,,

Each regiment consisted of 4 squadrons.

INDEPENDENT ARTILLERY.

1st Artillery Brigade:—
13th Artillery Regiment.
14th ,, ,,
15th ,, ,,
2nd Artillery Brigade:—
16th Artillery Regiment.
17th ,, ,,
18th ,, ,,

Each regiment was formed of 2 battalions of 3 field batteries each.

RESERVE FORMATIONS.

In a certain number of divisional districts reserve brigades were formed and sent to the front; some of these were mixed brigades, others consisted of infantry only.

DIARY OF THE WAR.*

1904.

5 February.—Diplomatic relations broken off by the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg.

8 February.—Japanese Squadron under Admiral Uriu, escorting three transports with four infantry battalions, arrives at Chemulpo.

8 February.—Attack by Japanese Squadron under Admiral Togo on Port Arthur. Two Russian battleships and one cruiser torpedoed.

9 February.—Naval attack at Port Arthur renewed. One Russian battleship and three cruisers injured.
Japanese destroy Russian cruiser "Variag" and gunboat "Koretz" at Chemulpo.

14 February.—Attack on Port Arthur by Japanese destroyers. Russian cruiser torpedoed.

16 February.—The Japanese cruisers "Nisshin" and "Kasuga" arrive at Yokosuka from Genoa.
12th Division commences to disembark at Chemulpo.

17 February.—Admiral Makarov appointed to supersede Admiral Starck.

21 February.—General Kuropatkin appointed Commander-in-Chief of Russian forces in Manchuria.

24 February.—First attempt to block the entrance to Port Arthur.

27 February.—12th Division completes its disembarkation at Chemulpo.

28 February.—Japanese and Russians in touch near Pingyang.

29 February.—Japanese take possession of Hai-yun Tao, one of the Elliot Islands.

4 March.—Guard and 2nd Divisions complete their mobilization and concentrate at Hiroshima.

6 March.—Admiral Kamimura bombards Vladivostok.

12 March.—General Kuropatkin leaves St. Petersburg.

13 March.—Disembarkation of the Guard and 2nd Divisions at Chinampo commences.

21–22 March.—Naval bombardment of Port Arthur. Russian Fleet takes up a position at the entrance of the harbour.

27 March.—Second attempt to block the entrance to Port Arthur.
General Kuropatkin reaches Harbin.

28 March.—Guard and 2nd Divisions complete disembarkation at Chinampo.

1 April.—1st and 3rd Divisions concentrated at Hiroshima.
4th Division completes mobilization at Osaka.

13 April.—Asada Detachment of the First Army reaches Wiju.
Admiral Makarov comes out from Port Arthur. On the return of the Russian Squadron the "Petropavlovsk" is sunk by a mine, and Admiral Makarov drowned.

15 April.—The cruisers "Kasuga" and "Nisshin" bombard Port Arthur by high-angle fire from Pigeon Bay.

20 April.—Sasaki Detachment arrives on the Ya-lu, 15 miles east of Wiju.

21 April.—First Army concentrated at Wiju.

26 April.—Japanese transport "Kinshiu Maru" sunk by two Russian torpedo boats.

---

* First Army, 1st Division, &c., refer to the Japanese Forces.

27 April.—Third attempt to block the entrance to Port Arthur.

30 April and 1 May.—Battle of the Ya-lu. The First Army, under Kuroki, defeats Russians under Zasulich.

1 May.—Japanese renew their attempts to block entrance to Port Arthur.

4 May.—Second Army (1st, 3rd, and 4th Divisions) sails from Chinampo.

5 May.—Second Army commences landing near Pi-tzu-wo.

6 May.—First Army occupies Feng-huang-cheng.

8 May.—Second Army cuts the railway at Pu-lan-tien.

10 May.—Cossacks unsuccessfully attack Anju.

11 May.—Greater part of fighting troops of Second Army and first line transport complete landing.

12 May.—Japanese Fleet, under Admiral Kataoka, bombards Ta-lien-wan.

14 May.—Japanese occupy Pu-lan-tien.

15 May.—The cruiser "Yoshino" sunk in collision with cruiser "Kasuga." The battleship "Hatsuse" sunk by a mine near Port Arthur. 5th Division and 1st Cavalry Brigade commence landing near Pi-tzu-wo.

16 May.—Second Army moves on Chin-chou.

19 May.—10th Division Fourth Army commences landing at Ta-ku-shan.

21 May.—11th Division commences landing at Yen-ta-wan, 18 miles east of Chin-chou.

27 May.—Battle of Nan Shan. Admiral Togo establishes blockade of south end of Liao-tung Peninsula.

30 May.—Japanese occupy Dalny. Stakelberg's corps despatched to relieve Port Arthur, in touch with Japanese at Wa-fang-kou.

7 June.—First Army begins to advance from Feng-huang-cheng. Action at Sai-ma-chi.

8 June.—Japanese occupy Hsiu-yen.

11 June.—Japanese blockade Ying-kou.

13 June.—6th Division commences landing at Kerr Bay (next bay east of Ta-lien Bay).

14–15 June.—Battle of Te-li-ssu. Russians retire on Kai-ping with a loss of 7,000 men and 16 guns.

15 June.—Vladivostok squadron sinks two Japanese transports, "Hitachi Maru" and the "Sado Maru."

20 June.—General Kuropatkin arrives at Kai-ping and inspects General Stakelberg's troops.

21 June.—Second Army occupies Hsiung-yueh-cheng, 30 miles north of Te-li-ssu.

22 June.—Action at Ai-yang-cheng.

23 June.—The Russian Fleet comes out of Port Arthur, but is driven back again with loss by Togo. Kuropatkin takes command of the Russian Army in person.

26 June.—The two armies face to face, Russians holding the line Kai-ping, Ta-shih-chiao, Liao-yang; Japanese: south of Kai-ping, Line-shan-kuan, Sai-ma-chi.
Third Army approaches Port Arthur from the land side and captures Chien Shan.

27 June.—First Army seizes the Mo-tien Ling and Fourth Army captures the Fen-shui Ling.

3, 4, 5 July.—At Port Arthur General Stessel attempts to recapture the Chien Shan line.

6 July.—Marshal Oyama, Commander-in-Chief, leaves Tokio for the front.

9 July.—Second Army occupies Kai-ping.

9th Division begins to arrive at Dalny from Japan.

13 July.—British ss. "Malacca" stopped by "Peterburg" in Red Sea, and taken back to Suez.

17 July.—Unsuccessful attack by General Count Keller on the Mo-tien Ling position.

25–26 July.—Battle of Ta-shih-chiao.—Second Army after failure by day drives the Russians back from their entrenched positions on Ta-shih-chiao by a night attack. Japanese occupy Ying-kou.

26–30 July.—At Port Arthur the Third Army capture Ta-po Shan—An-tzu Ling line, and General Stessel falls back towards Port Arthur.

31 July.—General advance of First, Second, and Fourth Armies. Japanese drive Russians back all along the line, on Yu-shu-lin-tzu, Yang-tzu Ling, Hsi-mu-cheng, and Hai-cheng. Investment of Port Arthur begun.

3 August.—Second Army occupies Hai-cheng and Niu-chuang town. Russians at Port Arthur driven back on to the forts.

8 August.—Combined land and sea attack on Port Arthur ends in capture of Ta Ku Shan and Hsiao Ku Shan.

10 August.—Sortie of the Port Arthur fleet. Admiral Togo attacks and disperses them. Some Russian vessels take refuge in the neutral ports of Shang-hai, Chifu, and Kiaochou, but the majority are driven back into Port Arthur.

12 August. — Japanese board and capture Russian destroyer "Reshitelni" in Chifu harbour.

13 August.—Admiral Rojestvenski assumes command of Baltic Fleet.

14 August. — Admiral Kamimura engages Vladivostok squadron 40 miles north-east of Tsu-shima and sinks cruiser "Rurik."

19–24 August.—First Assault of Port Arthur.

22 August.—Port Arthur, East and West Pan-lung Shan Forts captured.

23 August.—General Kuroki's left column, the Guard Division, commences the movement on Liao-yang.

24 August.—Failure of first general attack on Port Arthur.

25 August–4 September.—Battle of Liao-yang.

25 August.—General Japanese advance on Liao-yang begun.

25–26 August.—Kuroki's right column, the 12th Division, carries Russian position at Hung-sha Ling. Second and Fourth Armies arrive at the An-shan-tien position.

28 August.—Russians, having lost all advanced positions, fall back upon Liao-yang. Kuroki gains right bank of Tang Ho and effects junction with Second and Fourth Armies.

29–30 August.—Japanese attack Liao-yang position, but make no material impression on the defence.

31 August.—Second and Fourth Armies resume their attack on Liao-yang position, and make progress in the direction of Hsin-li-tun and Shou-shan-pu.

1 September.—Russian right and centre fall back towards second line of defences round Liao-yang. First Army captures Manju-yama.

2–3 September.—First, Second, and Fourth Armies continue their attacks on Liao-yang.

3 September.—General retreat of the Russians from Liao-yang.

4 September.—Russian rear guard, after delaying Japanese for two days, finally evacuates Liao-yang.
The Japanese enter Liao-yang at 3 a.m.

4–5 September.—The Russian army in retreat fights rear guard actions with the First Army, which occupies Yen-tai coal mines.

7 September.—Kuropatkin arrives at Mukden.

19–20 September.—Port Arthur: Capture of Fort Kuropatkin and the Shui-shih-ying redoubts.

20 September.—Port Arthur: Capture of Namako-yama.

21 September.—Port Arthur: Japanese obtain a footing on 203 Metre Hill, but are subsequently obliged to retire.

25 September.—General Grippenberg appointed to command Second Manchurian Army.

26 September.—Circum-Baikal Railway opened.

29 September.—Service in the Japanese Second Reserve increased from 5 to 10 years.

2 October.—Publication of Kuropatkin's order of the day, declaring the Manchurian Army to be strong enough to begin a forward movement.

9–14 October.—Battle of the Sha Ho.

9 October.—Russians cross Tai-tzu Ho and attack the Japanese First Army.
8th Division commences disembarkation at Dalny.

10–11 October.—First Army attacked at Ming Shan, Shih Shan, and Ta Ling, near Pen-hsi-hu.

12, 13, 14 October.—Russians are gradually driven back over the Sha Ho.

15 October.—Baltic Fleet leaves Libau.

16 October.—Port Arthur: Japanese capture Hachimaki-yama (near Erh-lung Shan).

21–22 October.—Baltic Fleet at midnight fires on Hull fishing fleet.

26 October.—Port Arthur: Japanese seize advanced trenches in front of Erh-lung Shan and Sung-shu Shan.

30 October.—Second Assault, on northern half of the eastern defences of Port Arthur.

31 October.—Port Arthur: Japanese gain possession of the glacis crests of Erh-lung Shan, Sung-shu Shan, and the North Fort of East Chi-kuan Shan.

5 November.—General Lenevich appointed to command First and General Kaulbars appointed to command Third Manchurian Army.

16 November.—7th Division commences arriving at Dalny from Japan.

26 November.—Port Arthur: Assault on Erh-lung Shan and Sung-shu Shan fails.

30 November.—Capture of 203 Metre Hill.

6 December.—Port Arthur: Japanese occupy Akasaka-yama.

18 December.—Port Arthur: East Chi-kuan Shan Fort taken.

28 December.—Port Arthur: Capture of Erh-lung Shan.

31 December.—Port Arthur: Capture of Sung-shu Shan.

1905.

1 January.—General Stessel proposes surrender of Port Arthur.
Rojestvenski arrives at Ile Sante Marie, off Madagascar.

2 January.—Port Arthur capitulation agreement signed.

3 January. — Admiral Fölkersam arrives at Passandava Bay, Madagascar.

5 January.—Meeting of Nogi and Stessel.
Official report by General Nogi, reckoning the surrendered garrison at 32,207 prisoners and over 15,000 sick and wounded.

11–12 January.—General Mishchenko makes a raid to the south, attacks old Niu-chuang and cuts railway line, but is forced to retire.

13 January.—Baltic Fleet at Diego Suarez.

25–29 January.—Battle of Hei-kou-tai. Russians cross the Hun Ho and attack Japanese left wing. Heavy fighting, at the conclusion of which Russians are forced to retire.

15 February.—Third Baltic Squadron (Admiral Nebogatov) leaves Libau.

23 February.—Ya-lu Army (right wing) opens the Battle of Mukden.

24 February.—First Army (right centre) begins to operate.

27 February.—Fourth Army (centre) begins three days' bombardment of the Russian positions.

28 February.—Second Army (left centre) begins to advance.
Ya-lu Army occupies Ma-chun-tun.

1 March.—Third Army (left wing) enters Hsin-min-tun.

2–6 March.—Fourth Army dislodges Russians from outworks south of the Sha Ho.

5 March.—First Army forces the left of the Russian entrenchments on the Sha Ho.

6 March.—Progress of Second Army checked.

7 March.—Kuropatkin orders a retreat.

8 March.—Third Army cuts the railway north of Mukden.

10 March.—First Army carries Fu-shun position.
Japanese enter Mukden.

16 March.—Japanese enter Tieh-ling.

17 March.—Kuropatkin is relieved of his command, and succeeded by Lenevich.
Baltic Fleet leaves Nossi Bé.

19 March.—Japanese occupy Kai-yuan.
Kuropatkin assumes command of First Russian Army under Lenevich.

21 March.—Japanese occupy Chang-tu Fu.

24 March.—Admiral Nebogatov at Port Said.

2 April.—Japanese driven out of Hai-hsin-kou, 33 miles N.E. of Kai-yuen.

3–4 April.—Russian force driven out of Tzu-lu-shu, 20 miles north of Chang-tu.

8 April.—Baltic Fleet sighted off Singapore.

12 April.—Russian force defeated at Erh-lo-hu by Japanese advancing on Hai-lung line.

12–14 April.—Rojestvenski arrives in Kamranh Bay.

15 April.—Japanese occupy Tung-hua, 50 miles east of Sheng-keng.

22 April.—Rojestvenski leaves Kamranh Bay.

24 April.—Russian attack on Chang-tu and Kai-yuen repulsed.
Rojestvenski returns to Kamranh Bay.

26 April.—Rojestvenski again leaves Kamranh Bay.

27 April.—Nebogatov reported off Penang.

1 May.—Japanese reach Tiao-yu-tai, 28 miles north of Tung-hua.

2 May.—Russian Fleet reported at Honkohe Bay.

5 May.—Nebogatov passes Singapore.

9 May.—Rojestvenski leaves Honkohe Bay.
Nebogatov off Cape St. James.
Russians repulsed at Ying-pien-mun.

12 May.—Rojestvenski returns to Honkohe Bay.

14 May.—The Baltic Fleet leaves Honkohe Bay for the north.

27-28 May.—Battle of the Sea of Japan begins at about 2 p.m. on 27 May. On that day and the next Togo destroys the Baltic Fleet.

8 June.—President Roosevelt sends identic despatch to Japanese and Russian Governments urging them to negotiate for peace.

8 July.—Japanese land on Saghalien.

9 August.—First Session of the Peace Conference.

29 August.—Final Session of the Peace Conference.

5 September.—Treaty of peace signed.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

(1) The Second Japanese Army.—The Defensive Line of the 3rd and 6th Divisions on the Sha Ho, February 1905.

REPORT by Captain D. S. ROBERTSON, Royal Scots Fusiliers.
Manchuria, 10th February 1905.

Plates.

Line of Japanese Armies, January 1905 -	Sketch 1	Map 47.
Defensive Line of 3rd Division - -	„ 2	
Defensive Line of 6th Division - -	„ 3	
Defensive Line of Second Army - -	„ 4	

On the 14th January 1905 the first line of defence of the Second Army extended, as shown in Sketch 1, from Ku-chia-tzu on the right to Ta-tai on the left, a distance of about ten miles.

On the east of the Mukden, or Imperial Mandarin Road, the country is slightly undulating, with low hills gradually rising towards the east to join the western slopes of the Ta Ling range. Two mountains stand out clearly from this range, Huang Shan and Ta Shan, both crowned with towers. The latter is, I believe, General Kuropatkin's Head-Quarters Observation Station. Still nearer to the Japanese line is Wan-pao Shan, called formerly by the Russians "Lonely Tree Hill," the scene of the loss of General Yamada's guns at the battle of the Sha Ho. The Russians have since re-named it Putilov Hill.

West of the Mandarin road the country changes to the dull monotony of the Liao Ho plain. In this plain there is not an atom of cover to be had with the exception of the river beds and nullahs branching out of them, the villages and the Chinese graveyards, which, consisting of a few mounds of earth surrounded by clumps of trees and some stone pillars, are a noticeable feature of the landscape. The cultivation is chiefly a kind of tall millet called *kaoliang*. Its stalks are used by the Chinese for all kinds of domestic purposes, and the Japanese have found them invaluable in their defensive works. This *kaoliang* when full grown is 10 to 12 feet high, and gives cover from view even for cavalry. The trees have nearly all gone, cut by the Japanese for fuel. One small wood of fir trees at La-mu-tun alone remains, forming the most conspicuous landmark in the line of defence of the Second Army.

The Sha Ho, or Sand River, crossing the line of the Second Army near the railway is, during the dry season, a shallow and

fairly rapid stream about thirty to forty feet broad, nearly everywhere fordable by infantry, though owing to a muddy bottom and steep banks it is only passable for carts at the fords, one or two of which are generally to be found at the villages on its banks. Two streams joining the Sha Ho about six miles below Lin-sheng-pu form obstacles to an advance along the Mandarin Road. Bridges appear to have been scarce before the war, but the Japanese have now erected pile bridges at most of the villages on the river banks. All the rivers are at present frozen hard, and the steady stream of carts at the fords has made firm roads of frozen mud across the ice.

Owing to our visit having been very short it was not possible to take accurate measurements of trenches, &c., and we were not provided with plans of the defences, though we were allowed to look for a few minutes at a plan of the defensive works at Wu-chia-wa-tzu, showing the general arrangements. The following notes are therefore very general, and may require modifying after a more detailed inspection, should we have an opportunity of making one when the troops have vacated the trenches:—

The section of country from Ku-chia-tzu* on the left of the Fourth Army to the west of Wu-chia-wa-tzu is defended by the 3rd Division under General Oshima. The head-quarters of the division are at Chang-yu-tien, with one brigade (17th) at Ku-chia-tzu, and the other, the 5th Brigade, at Wu-chia-wa-tzu.

The divisional artillery is in emplacements between Ku-chia-tzu and Wu-chia-wa-tzu, with an observation station on a small hill to its left. A searchlight station is placed north of the village of Chang-yu-tien.

The 6th Division carries on the defensive line to Lin-sheng-pu. Divisional head-quarters are in Pa-chia-tzu, with the 11th Brigade in La-mu-tun and the 24th Brigade in Lin-sheng-pu, but with its head-quarters in Shu-lin-tzu. A battery of four howitzers captured from the Russians is in Hui-tsai-pao. The 4th Division is, I understand, in Hung-ling-pu and San-chia-tzu, but I have not had an opportunity of visiting it.

The 1st Cavalry Brigade under Major-General Akiyama is in the village of Li-ta-jen-tun, supported by a battalion of infantry detached from the 4th Division.

We did not visit the brigade at Ku-chia-tzu, but went by an approach trench, about a mile and a half long, to the village of Wu-chia-wa-tzu,† where Major-General Nambo commanding the 5th Brigade had his head-quarters. The village was divided into two sections of defence, the left section being allotted to the 6th Regiment and the right to the 33rd. Each regiment had two battalions, or eight companies, in the front line, while the remaining battalion of the regiment was in reserve. That

* *See* Map 47, Sketch 4. † *See* Map 47, Sketch 2.

of the 6th Regiment formed a local reserve immediately behind the village, and that of the 33rd two miles in rear in the Head-Quarters village. The three battalions of each regiment relieved each other in regular rotation under regimental arrangements, each battalion having a tour, as a rule, of one month in the trenches, and a fortnight in reserve.

Each sector of the parapet was allotted to one company, and notices were put up all along the parapet showing exactly where the companies were located. As a general rule they had two groups (or half section, about thirty men) under arms as inlying piquet, the remaining two and a half sections of the company being in shelters in rear of the parapet. Thus one-sixth of the company was always under arms. One sentry per company by day and two at night, was the usual arrangement, though it varied in different sections of the defence.

In the 5th Brigade the shelters for the inlying piquets were cut out in the rear face of the trench, roofed with a layer of *kaoliang* stalks covered by about a foot and a half of earth, with the side which opened into the trench made of several layers of this material, supported by branches. The floor was covered with the coarse matting of the country. The entrances to the shelters were protected from wind by a section of the portable tent carried by the men, and the shelters were arranged to hold one group each, the rifles of the group being stacked against the parapet in a frame made of wood or of *kaoliang* stalks, and covered by sections of the portable tent. These shelters were by no means bombproof, and Major-General Nambo informed me that he had made them on this plan purposely, so that the inlying piquet occupying them would find the parapet safer than the shelters, and would therefore line the former whenever a bombardment began.

The shelters for the remaining two and a half sections of the company were built on an entirely different plan. They were about ten yards or so in the rear of the parapet, were larger and more comfortable than the shelters for the inlying piquet, and were bombproof.

A line of shelters belonging to a company was usually divided up into sections of about twenty yards in length with a passage at the end, each section being allotted to one group of about fifteen men, and labelled with the number of the group. Each group had its own passage opening directly into its own section of the parapet where its rifles were stacked. The shelters were very comfortable and warm, and were kept extremely clean, the men taking off their boots before entering, according to the universal custom in Japan. I noticed, however, that food left over from the men's meals, dirt and rubbish of all sorts, had merely been thrown on to the ground above the shelters and not taken away, and I should think that these villages will be very unhealthy if still occupied when the warm weather comes. The men's kits were hung up out of the way

on pegs driven into the walls, and their blankets were spread on the matting. Charcoal braziers had been made out of tin ammunition boxes, and even with thirty or forty degrees of frost these shelters were kept warm. Light was admitted by the passages, and through paper windows let in in rear of the shelters.

"Dug-outs" for the officers were constructed near those of the men, on much the same principle. Some of them had been made extremely comfortable, one in particular, that of one of the battalion commanders, being an exact imitation of the interior of a Japanese house.

The four companies in reserve in the village had much larger quarters than the "dug-outs" already described. They were situated, as a rule, just behind the walls of houses in the rear part of the village. The heating was usually done on the principle of the *kang* or stove bed, seen in every house in Manchuria; that is to say, the smoke and heat from the fire outside, before reaching the chimney, passed under a raised platform in the shelter on which the men slept, and thus warmed the whole shelter. High chimneys were made of Chinese matting covered with mud. Small paper windows were let in in rear, and steps were cut to gain admission. These shelters varied a good deal in plan and size, a shelter to hold a section of sixty men being about the largest I saw. Cooking, washing, &c., was done in the open behind walls and houses. Except during bombardment, the rear of the village was comparatively safe. In the front line, however, the enemy was so close that it was dangerous to leave the trenches. Cooking was therefore done in "dug-outs" cut in rear of the shelters, and water, obtained from the village wells and from extra wells dug by the engineers, was stored in tubs and large Chinese jars, near by. The latrines consisted of small pits not very far from the shelters, with communication trenches leading to them. In the rear part of the village the latrines were out in the open, screened by Chinese matting.

Ammunition was stored in boxes in dug-out recesses near the parapet. I did not see any extra ammunition stored ready for the men actually in the firing line, as at La-mu-tun.

Communication trenches, about three feet deep, and the same measurement across, were made to ensure free movement in the defensive line, both laterally and from front to rear. The earth excavated from the trench was piled up on the side nearest the enemy. One of these trenches, over one and a half miles long, led from near Chang-yu-tien to the front line, while Ku-chia-tzu, the Artillery Observation Station, Hou-tai, and Chang-yu-tien were all joined by them.

The trace followed roughly the outskirts of the village, being bent back at intervals to allow of flanking fire from rifles and machine guns, and being also traced so as to form traverses, as in the sketch. The parapet was low and very inconspicuous. In some cases the line followed the broken down

walls of the village, in other cases the trench was advanced to thirty or forty yards in front of the village. Bricks were largely used in building the parapet, as a plentiful supply could be got from the village, the temple and the better class of houses being solidly built. All outbuildings, &c., which interfered with the field of fire had been levelled, and I saw no dead ground in front of the parapet. A double line of high wire entanglement (not barbed) and abattis extended across the front at about fifty yards distance. This was not continuous, as gaps were left to allow of counter-attacks, these gaps being protected by one of the lines overlapping. The parapet was, as a general rule, revetted with sandbags, *kaoliang* stalks, or bricks, these materials being also used for making head-cover and for loopholes. The bags used for this purpose were empty rice bags, and filled with earth they made an excellent revetment or parapet. The parapet was not shellproof, and I noticed that several shells had passed through lately, as the holes had not been patched up. One shell in fact struck the parapet while we were there and burst inside. Head-cover was formed by sandbags, but I did not see any examples of overhead cover as in the trenches belonging to the 6th Division.

Look-out stations for sentries were constructed at intervals. They were not blinded. There was an advanced post of six men, under a non-commissioned officer, forty yards in front of the parapet, with a communication trench leading up to it.

In this section of defence the ground sloped gradually down to the Sha Ho, and then up again on the other side, so that the Russian lines at Sha-ho-pu were clearly visible. The field of fire was thus as good as could be wished. A machine gun was placed at each flank as well as at two places in the front line. The right flank was bent back slightly, and the trench did not appear to be continued to the right to join the brigade at Ku-chia-tzu, though a trench was in process of construction from the Artillery Observation Station to the village.

A small hill about half a mile* east of the village was used as an observation station for the artillery of this section of defence. From here the Russians could be clearly seen moving about on the other side of the Sha Ho, and bringing their horses down to water. While we were there the Japanese batteries on the east of the hill fired a few rounds at about 4,500 yards, making very good practice. The Russians from Putilov Hill, however, had the range of the observation station exactly, their shots in reply landing just beneath the station, which being under cover was safe, except from high angle fire. Colonel Kawashima, the inventor of the smokeless powder used in the army, was in command of the observation station, and directed the fire by megaphone. The station merely consisted of a short and deep trench on the top of the hill, in which was placed a hyposcope mounted on a tripod. The instrument was of German make and very

* Half a mile on Sketch 4, but 1,900 yards on Sketch 2.

powerful, and it enabled the officer in command to watch the enemy without the necessity of raising his head above the parapet. Overhead cover had not yet been provided. A communication trench was in course of construction from this hill to Wu-chia-wa-tzu, and another led back to Chang-yu-tien, the Head-Quarters village, through the village of Hou-tai, which was in ruins. This trench was wide enough to allow ammunition carts for the batteries to pass. Near Hou-tai a searchlight station was being erected, made of sandbags.

The line from the left of the 3rd Division was carried on by the 6th Division as shown on Sketches 3 and 4. The head-quarters, under General Okobu, were at Pa-chia-tzu, with the 24th Brigade in Lin-sheng-pu (head-quarters in Shu-lin-tzu), and the 11th Brigade in La-mu-tun. The divisional artillery was west of Sha-ho-pu Station. A communication trench ran from Shu-lin-tzu to Lin-sheng-pu, and another from La-mu-tun for about 1,500 yards towards Pa-chia-tzu. The ground did not slope in the same way in this section as at Wu-chia-wa-tzu, and was therefore less exposed, but on the other hand the enemy was very much closer than at the 3rd Division defensive line. At Lin-sheng-pu, for example, one of the outlying houses is in possession of the Russians, and near the Sha Ho railway bridge a Japanese sentry is posted on one side of the embankment and a Russian sentry on the other.

The 11th Brigade under General Iida occupied the line from the left of the 5th Brigade at Wu-chia-wa-tzu to the railway bridge over the Sha Ho.* At La-mu-tun, the defensive line crossed the river so as to include the fir wood and the village on the right bank. But neither Japanese nor Russians are willing to leave the other in possession of the railway bridge over the Sha Ho, and the latter have held on stubbornly to the right bank of the river, just west of the embankment. The Japanese line, therefore, recrosses the river east of the bridge, where it is taken up by the 24th Brigade.

The defensive line at La-mu-tun consisted of a parapet enclosing the village on the left or southern bank. On the right of this parapet a strong redoubt had been constructed, in which two machine guns had been mounted, protecting the right flank and rear. A smaller work guarded the left flank and rear, and a sunken caponier for four machine guns at the centre flanked the whole line. In advance of this, defensive works were constructed at the brick kilns beside the railway bridge, with an emplacement for two machine guns under construction. The village and fir wood on the northern bank were held also by an advanced post, with a sentry on the east side of the embankment.

The 45th Regiment defended the right section of this defensive line with one battalion in the front line, and two battalions in reserve at Pa-chia-tzu, the Head-Quarters village, and Hui-tsai-pao in rear of it. The left section was allotted to the

* *See* Map 47, Sketch 3.

13th Regiment, which had two battalions in the trenches and one in local reserve in rear of La-mu-tun village. The general internal company arrangements were in principle the same as with the 5th Brigade in Wu-chia-wa-tzu, but the inlying piquets were under cover from high angle fire. In each section of the parapet a small plan, in one place a hand-sketch, was put up to show the exact ranges from the parapet to prominent objects in front. I only saw traverses in one place in the whole defensive line. They were built of bricks, 5 feet thick, and about 15 yards apart. In other parts of the line the trace of the parapet did away with the necessity for traverses.

Overhead cover was provided in most of the trenches, the parapet being undercut and supported by branches of trees and *kaoliang* stalks. The parapets, as well as banquette steps, were revetted with *kaoliang* stalks and bricks, but it did not look very strong, and I think it would be destroyed by a few days of heavy rain. The defensive works, in fact, appear to have been made for dry weather only, and for a Manchurian winter, in which rain is unknown, they are very well adapted.

Obstacles were constructed, as in Wu-chia-wa-tzu, at about fifty yards distance from the parapet. They consisted of abattis and high wire entanglement, as well as an entanglement of branches rather resembling *chevaux-de-frise*. Wire entanglement only was used in the bed of the river. It had been put up before the frost came, and was now frozen hard into the ice.

The sunken caponier for machine guns was a very solidly built work of bricks, with a roof of iron rails, covered with sleepers and completely bombproof, except against siege guns. The loopholes were blinded with iron plates. Near the railway bridge was a brick kiln, and a quantity of railway plant had been stored there by the Russians. In addition to this a small branch railway ran from the bridge to the Mukden road, so that there was abundant material at hand for constructing defences. One use I saw these rails put to was the construction of a bulletproof look-out in a tree. The original look-out had merely consisted of a small platform on the tree, with a ladder leading to it, but advantage was being taken of a foggy day to make both platform and ladder bulletproof. The work had only just been begun, so we did not see the mode of construction.

The spare ammunition for men in the front line at La-mu-tun was kept in small recesses cut out every few yards in the parapet. Each recess contained a box already opened. The men firing had thus an extra supply at hand, without having to be specially reinforced. In addition to this, ammunition "dug-outs," as in the other sections of defence, were constructed in rear of the firing line.

General Koidzume, commanding the 24th Brigade, had his head-quarters in a house in the village of Shu-lin-tzu.* One regiment, the 23rd, occupied the village of Lin-sheng-pu, on the

* *See* Map 47, Sketch 3.

right bank of the river, while the 48th Regiment continued the line through the village on the left bank to the line of the 11th Brigade at the railway bridge. The approach trench began at Shu-lin-tzu and led up to Lin-sheng-pu village, a distance of about one mile.

The mass of shapeless ruins, which is all that is left of the village of Lin-sheng-pu, gives an impression of complete desolation, as wedged in close to the enemy's line it has been battered out of all recognition. The only building left standing is the village temple, one wall of which has been destroyed, disclosing a row of hideous life-size Chinese gods. The village is honeycombed with trenches leading almost up to the Russian lines. One part of the village, in fact, standing about eighty yards away from the north-western end, is still in the hands of the Russians, and from the Japanese sentry post we could see the Russian loopholes eighty yards off with the greatest clearness. At that distance they made a perfect target, but apparently by mutual consent few shots were being exchanged. Square boards, backed with iron ⅜-inch thick, with two small square holes cut in them, were used by the Japanese as eyeholes for the sentries in the look-out posts, though in some cases circular Chinese millstones were used. These stones, about six inches thick, with a hole of three inches diameter in the centre, resembled the regulation target of the rifle range closely enough to make a tempting mark at that range for a Russian rifleman, and the coating of lead on the inside of the eyeholes testified to the scoring of many a bull's-eye. Looking through one of those one could see first the Japanese entanglements, then, not many yards further on, the Russian entanglements, and at a short distance still further on, the Russian loopholes. The dead bodies of the men of both sides were still lying on the ground between the lines, neither side having been able to bring them in.

There was little in the defensive works to call for special remark after seeing the works of the other brigades. The general arrangements and types of works were very similar. What struck me most of all in Lin-sheng-pu was the extraordinary proximity of the two forces facing each other for months, at a distance varying from eighty yards to five hundred, and except for occasional attacks on both sides, the comparative absence of firing. One point I noticed in Lin-sheng-pu was the blinding of the loopholes. In La-mu-tun this was not generally done, and I saw no cases of it at all in Wu-chia-wa-tzu. In the latter village too the men moved about pretty freely in the rear part of the village, but in Lin-sheng-pu no one seemed to leave the trenches. This latter village, it is true, was within close rifle range of the Russians, but the rear portion of Wu-chia-wa-tzu was within one thousand two hundred yards, and yet the men went about as if no Russians were within three miles. It looked as if either the Russians only used their rifles at decisive ranges, or else the Japanese did not believe in the accuracy of the Russian fire

beyond these ranges. I noticed this also when visiting Li-ta-jen-tun, where the 1st Cavalry Brigade was stationed. The Russians were in occupation of Fu-chia-chuang, about one thousand yards off, where we could see them walking about quite regardless of cover. The commander of the battalion of infantry quartered in Li-ta-jen-tun took us across the open to inspect the works, though there was a communication trench beside us, a thing he would not have done if he had thought there was the slightest risk from Russian rifle fire. The reason may, of course, be, not that long-range firing is never employed, but that both sides have found it better not to keep up irritating fire when no attack is in progress.

There was no place in the whole defensive line where a successful attack by the Russians looked practicable, unless the works were first destroyed by heavy artillery. A frontal attack across the open on any of these villages in face of the steady fire of the Japanese infantry, and both direct and flanking fire of numerous machine guns, with rows of abattis and wire entanglements to cross, would entail enormous losses, and I do not think it could succeed. I did not visit the villages on the right or left flanks, so am unable to say how well these flanks are defended.

The parapets of the defensive line were low and well concealed, and the trace allowed of a strong field of fire both to the front and to the flanks. There were no strong salients except the western side of Lin-sheng-pu, which was rather wedged into the Russian lines. The defensive works on the right bank of the Sha Ho at La-mu-tun might also be regarded as a salient, though really an advanced post, to the main line of defence on the left bank. I believe that both these places are frequently attacked by the Russians, and I think the former place is probably the weakest point in the line.

It is difficult to estimate the proportion of men per yard without knowing the effective strength of the units and the extent of the line, but taking the actual defensive line occupied by each brigade, exclusive of the trenches joining the villages, at about one mile, and the battalion at eight hundred men, the proportion works out at five battalions per mile, or over two men per yard, exclusive of the general reserve.

The communication trenches were a remarkable feature of the defensive line, and no trouble seems to have been too much to take to make them as perfect as possible. Not only was free movement in every direction possible in the defensive line, but reliefs could be brought up in safety from villages more than a mile in rear. I calculated that, exclusive of communication trenches actually in the defensive line, over five miles of trenches for bringing up reserves had been cut in the sections of defence of the 3rd and 6th Divisions.

The villages had been mapped out in sections for defence in a most methodical manner. Everything appears to have been

carefully thought out and provided. For example, the shelters, officers' quarters, brigade and regimental orderly rooms, ammunition stores, water supply, hospital arrangements, &c., were all carefully labelled with the number of unit, &c., to which they belonged. Each section of the parapet was similarly labelled with the number of the section occupying it. Fresh troops coming up in relief, reinforcements, &c., would thus be able to find their way about at once without confusion.

The arrangements for the men's comfort during the Manchurian winter were most admirable. The articles of winter clothing provided were as perfect as possible both in shape and material, and most complete, and in addition to this clothing, extra articles were issued, such as straw boots imported from Japan, and Chinese sandals, as well as flannel coverings for the rifles. Except when a north wind is blowing the climate of Manchuria is delightful in the middle of the day, and the men do not seem to feel the cold, going about very often without overcoats. At night, however, the temperature very often goes down to 30 or 40 degrees of frost, and if careful arrangements were not made for the men's comfort a good deal of sickness would, I should think, be certain to occur. But the men looked as healthy as possible, and all the shelters I went into were well warmed and comfortable. The men looked contented, and did not seem to find life in the trenches disagreeable.

The trenches and "dug-outs" as at present constructed would, I think, be quite untenable in wet weather. The soil is very loamy and very friable, soon crumbling down with rain and turning into a very sticky form of mud. The "dug-outs" would be difficult to drain. While we were visiting the trenches the men were busily engaged in replacing the *kaoliang* revetments by sandbags, but whether this was in anticipation of the trenches being occupied when the rains come, or merely to strengthen the parapet, I am unable to tell.

(2) Second Japanese Army.—Operations from 20th October 1904 to 29th January 1905, including General Mishchenko's Raid and the Battle of Hei-kou-tai.

REPORT by Lieut.-Colonel A. L. HALDANE, D.S.O., General Staff. Mukden, 3rd May 1905; with remarks by Colonel J. W. G. TULLOCH, Indian Army.

Appendices.

Japanese Order of Battle - - -	Appendix 1
Japanese Casualties at the Battle of Hei-kou-tai -	„ 2
The attack of the 5th Japanese Division -	„ 3

Plates.

Map illustrating General Mishchenko's raid - -	Map 48
Russian attack on Niu-chuang - - -	„ 49
Battle of Hei-kou-tai—General map - - -	„ 50
Russian defensive works opposite Second Japanese Army - - - - - -	„ 51
Battle of Hei-kou-tai—Situation on 17th January 1905 - - - - - -	„ 52

(1) *Remarks by Colonel J. W. G. Tulloch.*

Every military critic of the Japanese Army will concur in the comments passed by Lieut.-Colonel Haldane in the opening paragraphs of this note on the magnetic influence of bullets, not only on Japanese generals, but also on the individual infantry soldier, and it would be difficult to find better examples than those given by him: in the first case, in the tactics of the battle of Hei-kou-tai, which disclose the greatest strength of their forces as being massed against the village of that name, and in the second, in the action of the company commanders of the 41st and 42nd Regiments in reinforcing their first line at 1,200 yards from the enemy, because it came under fire, and not on account of its suffering heavy losses.

With the battle of Hei-kou-tai a different system of infantry formations has been introduced among the units of its western

divisions. Hitherto they have extended to one or two paces only, and have trusted to the rapidity with which they make their rushes to escape from serious losses. In this way they were so far successful that I personally formed the opinion that after all an attack could be launched without preliminary wide extensions. The Japanese have, however, found that this was wrong, but they have still to learn that they defeat the object of extended lines if they reinforce them at medium ranges merely because they come under infantry fire, and not because the first line is losing heavily.

A combination of the rapidity with which they make their rushes with a self-restraint which prevents premature reinforcing will, I venture to state, make them more formidable in the future than they have ever been in the past. Such restraint, however, is contrary to their national character and will be difficult for them to attain.

I fully concur in all Lieut.-Colonel Haldane has said regarding the inefficiency of indirect laying against advancing infantry. The Russians have rushed to the opposite extreme since Te-li-ssu, and, from advertising their gun positions on the summits of rising ground, have taken to placing their artillery in such positions that it cannot be employed with full effect. This is very noticeable where attacks have been made over very level ground, where, as Lieut.-Colonel Haldane states, the Japanese infantry have been able to get up to close quarters with but small losses.

This war has so far undoubtedly proved that determined assaulting infantry will eventually have to use the bayonet against stubborn defenders before they can gain their objective; it has also proved that, when opposing forces are in close contact, night attacks are feasible, and, in the majority of cases, when carried out with determination, successful. These facts, I submit, make the questions of re-adopting swords for officers, and of retaining as long a combined rifle and bayonet as are possessed by our possible enemies, worthy of consideration. The Japanese successes with the bayonet are due to personal activity on the part of the infantry soldier, a quality which is not to be found developed to nearly so high a degree in any European army, including our own.

I understand that the issue to the United States Army of the stiletto bayonet has been stopped on account of the experience gained in the present war.

(2) *Report by Lieut.-Colonel A. L. Haldane, D.S.O.*

Introductory Remarks.

I have the honour to submit a report upon the operations of the Second Japanese Army from 20th October 1904 to the 29th January 1905, a period which embraces General Mishchenko's attack against the Japanese line of communication and the battle

of Hei-kou-tai. Although these two occurrences do not properly form a part of the operations of the Second Army, it has been decided to include them under that heading for the following reasons :—

The Second Army, up to the battle of Mukden, has always held the post of left wing of the Manchurian Field Force, and the cavalry on that flank has been largely drawn from the mounted troops of its divisions. General Mishchenko's raid was made round the extreme left, and a fortnight later an attack in force was directed against that flank, and although this attack did not involve the Second Army to any great extent, the garrisons of certain villages, in which were portions of its troops, played an important part in preserving the integrity of the right flank of the troops heavily engaged to the south.

In the report now forwarded there are a few points which seem to deserve attention* :

(1) A raid, to be successful, must be carried out with secrecy, celerity, and resolution, and, for the second of these objects, cavalry alone or cavalry with horse artillery, is essential, yet, in the attack on the Japanese line of communication, General Mishchenko appears to have been accompanied by an infantry regiment, and its presence probably accounts for the slow rate of march which characterizes the movement from Mukden to Ying-kou. Leaving the former place, on or about the 8th January, he appeared upon the railway line between Ta-shih-chiao and Niu-chia-tun (*i.e.*, not the main line) on the morning of the 12th, some four days later, having in that time covered a distance of between 80 and 100 miles. That he depended upon his enterprise remaining secret till he arrived as far south as the point where the Hun and Liao Rivers meet, was presumably the case, otherwise it seems unlikely that, after accomplishing some 60 miles from the starting point, he should have wasted precious time by halting at Niu-chuang. An unpardonable error there occurred in allowing a single man of the small garrison to escape and spread the tale of his coming. As that garrison was composed of infantry, there should have been no difficulty in surrounding and capturing it. The raiders were accompanied by a flock of sheep as well as a herd of cattle, for the Japanese took eighty of the former and one hundred and ten of the latter at San-chia-kou on the 14th, and, although the region through which the intruders travelled is not capable of feeding a force of their numbers, it seems inexcusable that so immobile a method of supply should have been used. Possibly, however, the infantry came up to San-chia-kou with the live stock, following in the wake of the mounted troops; but if this be so, the leisurely advance of the latter is all the more reprehensible.

The raid was well planned as regards its object and direction, but the same cannot be said of its execution, which was faulty in several respects and did not rise above the commonplace.

* *See* Map 48.

(2) The only point in the battle of Hei-kou-tai where success in the attack attended the Japanese arms was that opposite the 5th Division. Its capture of Liu-tiao-kou and Chao-to-tzu* on the 28th—points not far removed from the Russian line of retreat—probably had the effect of inducing the commander on the northern side to withdraw from Hei-kou-tai that night, and had the troops of the 2nd Division—or a part of them—been sent in the direction of the 5th Division, pressure on the Japanese left might have been more quickly lessened. As it was, the eight battalions of the 2nd Division were despatched to the left, where, though they outnumbered the enemy, their presence did not help to win the battle.

The decisive point was, I venture to think, not Hei-kou-tai, against which the Japanese should have directed only a vigorous containing attack, but the ground between that place and the Second Army, where with a little assistance the 5th Division might have broken through early on the 28th. Again, in this battle we see the effect which a strongly held position exercises on the Japanese, and their uncontrollable desire to capture it, instead of seeking a weak and vulnerable spot, where greater results are gained with smaller effort. Strongly held places are rarely the decisive point, where superiority can alone win a great victory, yet it will be noticed that in most of the battles fought by the Japanese in Manchuria this principle has been ignored, and its neglect is to a great degree responsible for the comparatively barren nature of the results.

(3) When adequately supported by artillery the Japanese infantry is, if not uniformly at least frequently, successful in making local frontal attacks—as distinct from general attacks, in which the employment of large forces is involved and of which turning movements necessarily form a part. These attacks, in which the men are moderately extended—more so than in the earlier battles of the Second Army—are carried out by rapid rushes, and whether it be that the Russian infantry soldier is not a first-rate shot or that the moral effect of artillery and a quick onset of infantry shakes his nerves, the object is attained without enormous loss. One cause of success is, however, probably due to the use of indirect fire by the Russian artillery since the battle of Te-li-ssu—where their guns, greatly exposed, suffered severely—a method which is ill-suited for checking rapidly advancing infantry.

The attack of the six battalions of the 5th Division on Liu-tiao-kou and Chao-to-tzu* on the 27th-28th January exemplifies the preceding remarks regarding frontal attacks, and a reference to the casualty table (*see* Appendix 2) bears out the statement that the losses are not necessarily excessive. In the case of the 8th Division, however, it will be noticed that its success, if it can be called such, was in inverse proportion

* Both south of Chang-tan (Map 50).

to its casualties, which were very great. This was due in part to lack of superiority in artillery, and probably also to the fact that the division fought on the lines on which it had been trained in peace time. The battle of Hei-kou-tai was the first time it was engaged as a whole in Manchuria, and, from the remarks of a staff officer of that division* and the map of the field† it seems that its line was less extended than that of the 5th Division, and thus its losses were proportionately greater.

The Japanese on the left of the Manchurian Field Force have at length learnt the advantage of opening out their infantry in the attack, to a reasonable extent (five to six paces as a maximum), but they are still inclined, when the enemy opens infantry fire, to thicken the front line by throwing in reinforcements too soon, instead of advancing to from 600 to 900 yards and then filling up the spaces. The thickening of the line too early in the attack of the 5th Division (*see* Appendix 3) led to losses which might have been minimized had the supports been held back for a short time longer, and the firing line—which had at that time suffered few casualties—been permitted to continue its advance as originally extended.

(4) The fights for localities, which have been a feature of the battles in Manchuria, clearly point to the necessity of making men expert in the use of the bayonet. Of late years I am told that this matter has been somewhat overlooked by the Japanese, but it is now held that bayonet fighting must be regarded in future as an important part of an infantry soldier's training. During the winter months of 1904-5 company officers might frequently be seen, near the village in which the British attachés with the Second Army were, practising their men in this exercise—with the naked weapon—and making them charge an imaginary Russian over a mound or trench, if one were available. The Japanese infantry officers are themselves armed with a sword—I have not seen one with a revolver—are generally experts in its use, and are rarely to be seen without it. In the British Army, which has discarded the sword in favour of the rifle for its officers when on service, it would seem a matter for consideration whether, from the experience gained in the present war, the rifle should not be replaced by the sword, or, if the former continues to be carried, whether a bayonet should not be added to the officer's equipment, already cumbrous enough.

That the Japanese officers are less easy to distinguish from their men than are our own must be admitted, but the carrying of a sword has not, I believe, led to a high percentage of casualties among them, while the arming of officers with a rifle not only deprives them of the time-honoured emblem of their office, but frequently leads to their firing on the enemy instead of devoting all their attention to their men. I have no

* *See* footnote, page 34. † *See* Map 52.

detail of casualties for the battle of Hei-kou-tai, but for the battle of Mukden I may adduce the following in support of what has been said :—

	Killed and wounded.
Officers - - - -	37 per cent.
Non-commissioned officers and men -	32 „
Proportion of officers killed and wounded to non-commissioned officers and men killed and wounded - -	1 in 32.

The above are calculated on the known strength of the Second Army at the beginning of the battle, and, as a portion was engaged in fighting of a most desperate character in which personal combats took place, it cannot be said that, armed with the sword, their losses were excessive.

(5) Hand-grenades were, I think, used in the field for the first time during the battle of Hei-kou-tai, though they were constantly employed at the siege of Port Arthur. The difficulty of preventing a determined enemy from approaching close to the walls of a village at night and there massing for assault has led to their employment, and in one instance at Ya-pa-tai it is claimed that they were responsible for causing the Russians to retire. Such a destructive form of missile—the Russian form especially being easy of carriage—might be of service not only in a war with a civilized people, but particularly against a savage foe. For instance, had our troops possessed a few at the disastrous action of Gumburru in Somaliland—in which campaign, unfortunately, soft-nosed bullets were not issued —their appalling effect would probably have prevented the enemy from closing with and annihilating our men. Information regarding their nature and use in the present war is being collected, and a specimen of a Russian one has been secured.

(6) It will be noted in the map showing the situation on the 27th at Hei-kou-tai* that the general officer commanding the 8th Division brought a portion of the baggage of the division close to the front—so close that many horses were disabled. Although on the map this baggage is shown as "light baggage," there were with it certain comforts for the troops, probably blankets and food. General Tatsumi, I am told, maintains that the losses to animals was more than compensated for by the advantages which accrued to the men by its proximity in the cold weather which prevailed.

Under this heading might come the question of frost-bite, regarding which some information has been obtained, but Lieut.-Colonel Macpherson, R.A.M.C., is dealing in detail with that subject, which lies more in his province than in mine.†

* See Map 32.

† Lieut.-Colonel Macpherson's Reports will be found in *The Russo-Japanese War, Reports from British Officers attached to the Japanese Forces in the Field, Medical Volume.*

Narrative.

The commander of the Japanese Armies in North Manchuria had now arrived at a short distance to the south of Mukden, where the exhaustion caused by the severe and protracted battle of the Sha Ho, together with the lack of numbers adequate to maintain the struggle against an enemy firmly settled in defensive works prepared in advance for his reception, compelled him to halt and await the fall of Port Arthur. His original intention had been to force General Kuropatkin north of the Manchu capital, but the strength of the Russian position and the efficiency of the Siberian railway in bringing up reinforcements called for a considerable addition to the assailants' force before a plan of such magnitude could be carried out, and, until the arrival of General Nogi's besieging army, the requisite troops would not be forthcoming. Had it been possible to occupy Mukden and the country lying north of it as far as Tieh-ling, the Russians would have lost an area from which a great part of their supplies was gathered, and been deprived of that valuable military artery the Hsin-min-tun railway; but to have done so was, for the moment, out of the question, and as winter was at hand, in which season prolonged operations in Manchuria are impracticable, no course remained but to maintain a defensive attitude and prepare for the campaign which must open with the approach of spring. The losses which the Russians had sustained drove them to adopt a course which, if not actuated by similar motives, was practically analogous to that forced by circumstances upon the Japanese; and thus came to be witnessed the extraordinary spectacle of two hostile armies, numbering in all a little less than half a million men, both directly covering their communications, and both stretching many miles to the east and west, divided by no obstacles of great natural strength, though hedged in behind the artificial ones of earth and wire, facing each other for several months at a distance, in places, amounting only to some scores of yards.

No sooner had the battle of the Sha Ho terminated than the Japanese began their preparations for the winter housing and security of their troops, and of the long front which the First, Fourth, and Second Armies held, the portion allotted to the latter army was as follows:—*

3rd Division.—Starting at the village of Ku-chia-tzu† the line ran westward over the northern slopes of the little hill of Kachi-yama,‡ and thence to the village of Wu-chia-wa-tzu, which stands astride the Mukden highway. This section was

---

* *See* Map. 50.

† This name is applied to numerous villages in the sphere of operations. The one referred to here is about four miles east of Sha Ho railway station.—A. H.

‡ Or, *Hill of Victory*, so called because 24 guns were captured by the 3rd Division on 14th October 1904.—A. H.

guarded by the troops of the 3rd Division, the 17th Brigade on the right at Ku-chia-tzu, and the 5th Brigade on the left at Wu-chia-wa-tzu, while in rear Lieut.-General Oshima, the divisional commander, had his head-quarters at Chang-yu-tien, north of which village was a searchlight station.

6th Division.—From the Mukden highway the line gradually trended north-westward till it struck the left bank of the Sha Ho, a little to the east of La-mu-tun, opposite which village, on the northern bank, was a little hamlet in a clump of trees. Passing through La-mu-tun, and still keeping to the left bank, the line traversed the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway, immediately south of the girder bridge spanning the river, and continued westward till it crossed the stream at the sharp bend opposite Lin-sheng-pu. At La-mu-tun were the 11th Brigade and its head-quarters, and at Lin-sheng-pu the 24th Brigade with head-quarters at Shu-lin-tzu. Both of these brigades formed part of the 6th Division, whose commander, Lieut.-General Okobu, occupied the village of Pa-chia-tzu, east of the railway line.

4th Division.—At Lin-sheng-pu* the line took a bend towards the south-west till it skirted San-chia-tzu, whence it ran due west to Ma-chia-wei. There another bend carried it to Wan-chia-yuan-tzu, from which village it turned again to the south-west, maintaining that direction till Li-ta-jen-tun was reached. On the left of the 24th Brigade, holding the line through San-chia-tzu and Chang-liang-pu, and a little further westward was the 7th Brigade of the 4th Division. Thence the 19th Brigade of the same division stretched through Ma-chia-wei, Pao-tzu-yen, and Hsiao Huang-ti to the south-west of Wan-chia-yuan-tzu. This last brigade, besides holding Ta-tai with a detachment, had a body of troops in reserve at Hung-ling-pu, where were also brigade and divisional head-quarters.

Such was the general line held by the Second Army, subject from time to time to inconsiderable variations, when one portion was slightly advanced or another retired, according as the circumstances of the case demanded.

1st Cavalry Brigade.—On the left of the Second Army was Major-General Akiyama's cavalry brigade, still supported by two battalions of the 4th Division and augmented by the main part of the divisional cavalry of the 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 5th† Divisions, which occupied Li-ta-jen-tun — where were brigade head-quarters—Shen-tan-pu, and Hei-kou-tai as reconnoitring bases, with detachments quartered in the intervening villages. Chang-tan, a large straggling village on the right bank of the Hun Ho—which, before the advance to the Sha Ho,

---

* *See* Map 51.

† The 5th Division was in reserve in the vicinity of Shih-li-ho and was under the direct orders of Marshal Oyama.—A. H.

received constant visits from the mounted forces of both sides—was held by the Japanese as a flying post.

The defences made by the Japanese were simple in character, and, at the villages, consisted of a breastwork with head-cover, constructed with earth taken from a deeply-dug trench, while between the villages were strong shelter trenches with low command. In front, at distances varying from twenty to eighty yards, was a line of barbed or telegraph wire entanglement, abattis or *chevaux-de-frise*, wire being interlaced to render the last two obstacles difficult of removal or passage. Houses and walls were loopholed; but the defensive line was kept outside the former, which merely served as traps for high-explosive shells. From Ku-chia-tzu to the west, as far as Wan-chia-yuan-tzu, the defences were continuous, but beyond that point only the villages and their immediate vicinity were held. The guns were placed behind or between the villages in pits with alternative positions, whence frontal or enfilade fire could be employed at will.

The troops allotted to the defence of each section lived in bombproof* shelters close behind the line, which, in the event of attack, they would man, and so excellent were the arrangements made for fuel, food, and clothing that, despite the rigour of Manchurian winter nights, they suffered little, if any, discomfort.

The Russian arrangements, on the other hand, besides being far more elaborate as regards defence, were devoid of that air of comfort and cleanliness which pervaded the Japanese lines. The men were lodged in rudely-constructed, airless, underground huts, generally placed behind the villages, and little regard seems to have been paid to the sanitary condition of their surroundings. Not satisfied with one strong line—which followed the line of villages immediately north of those held by the Japanese—well-covered by efficient obstacles, they created a veritable labyrinth of works, expending immense labour on making redoubts, mines, and military pits, and constructing miles of deep approaches.† Indeed, it may be said that the works of both sides exemplify, in a singular manner, the military characteristics of the two nations: those of the Russians built solely for defence, their many lines encouraging the inclination to retire; those of the Japanese mere footholds, whence to spring forward when the moment came.

The points where the two opposing armies came close together were naturally those where the highest state of tension

---

* Although the Russians fired with light and heavy guns throughout the winter with great regularity, kept up a frequent rifle fire, and made many minor attacks of one or two companies, the losses of the Second Army from 17th October 1904 to 29th January 1905, including those which occurred during the battle of Hei-kou-tai, only amounted to some 1,200 all ranks, killed and wounded.—A. H.

† *See* Map 51.

existed, and where the vigilance of both sides was at its greatest. At Lin-sheng-pu a small portion of the northern extremity of the village, linked with the main line by approaches, was held by the Russians as an outpost. Here the sentry, through a blinded sandbag loophole built in the wall surrounding a demolished building, watched the main line of the Japanese, distant only 80 yards, whence through a perforated iron plate or granite millstone covering a hole made in the ruined brick enclosure of a Buddhist temple, a no less watchful eye kept constant vigil. But at the railway bridge the situation was more interesting, though the space between the sentries of both sides was twice as great. At this point the Japanese trenches east and west of the railway were close to the steep bank of the Sha Ho and connected by a low gallery driven through the high embankment of the line. Across the river—here 150 yards wide—and directly opposite the Japanese machine gun breastwork was a Russian advanced trench connected by a deep approach with several parallel trenches and the main line in rear. East of the railway and about one hundred paces north of the Russian advanced trench on the western side was a straggling grove of fir trees, where the Japanese, utilizing a trench and parapet made by the enemy at the time of the Sha Ho battle, had built a breastwork. In front of this outwork or semi-bridgehead were a few strands of wire—all the obstacle that could be erected, on account of its dangerous proximity to the hostile ground. On the left flank, snugly ensconced in a cut made in the side of the embankment whence the Russian approach upon the western side could be watched, was the lonely sentry post. North of this spot—which was practically within the opposing lines—and 160 yards up the railway, was a Russian trench and the Russian sentry post. Not satisfied with watching the western side of the railway, and in order to escape the risk of crossing the track to the east at such a short range, a manhole had been driven through the embankment, and a second at the next trench to the north. From the first of these trenches to the Japanese sentry near the fir grove was a distance of 160 yards, and though at first the posts on both sides were posts of danger, as time wore on each side mutually ceased to stalk and shoot the other, provided that the relief came up alone. The fir grove itself was a constant bone of contention, and the ground around it bore many a trace of the attacks made upon it and the sallies from it before the Russians finally fell back to the north.

That minor frays throughout the winter were frequent after dark is not surprising, for both armies by day and night improved their works, and each side was tempted to prevent the other from progressing. Rarely a day passed that the Russians did not try their skill at the Japanese defences, often wasting ammunition on supply convoys and mounted orderlies. Little damage was caused, and the futile cannonade, to which

the Japanese replied occasionally with studied moderation, at times went on for several hours after the sun had set.

Thus the remaining months of the year that saw the outbreak of the war passed by, and 1905 was ushered in with the long-hoped-for, long-deferred capitulation of Port Arthur, whereby the Japanese would soon be able materially to increase their field army and turn the wide extended works before them. But in the concluding months of 1904 both sides received reinforcements, and before the arrival of General Nogi's Army from the south events were to take place which, under abler generalship, might possibly have changed the aspect of the war.

The 8th Division, which had sailed from Japan shortly before the Sha Ho operations, landed at Dalny about the 9th October. On the 10th part marched and part went north by rail, the first troops reaching Lan-chi—2 miles south-west of Yen-tai station—on the 11th, and the whole assembling there by the 30th. With it came a reserve brigade of six battalions, which was sent north-westward to the neighbourhood of Lang-tung-kou,* where it was equidistant from Shen-tan-pu and Hei-kou-tai and about four miles from both. One battalion was sent from Liao-yang—the I./5th R.†—to Hsiao-pei-ho,‡ on the Hun, and the cavalry of the division, which was of no service at head-quarters, was, with the exception of a small detachment, added to the extreme left at Hei-kou-tai. Other reserve brigades arrived at the front, and their presence allowed of the replacement of portions of the troops then in the first line. Those infantry battalions also which had not had their ranks completed before the battle in October or had therein suffered heavy losses were made up to a normal strength of 800 privates, so that the troops facing the Russians, though not materially increased by fresh divisions, were considerably stronger than in September.

The Russians, too, had added to their numbers the following units, which had arrived in whole or part :—8th and 16th Army Corps, three European rifle brigades, and the Don Cossack Division; for, unlike the Japanese, drafts to complete *cadres* already at the front had not been despatched from Russia, so that a vast medley of battalions, some four hundred in number, of varying strength, were under General Kuropatkin's hand. The whole force had been organized by him into three armies, under Generals Grippenberg, Kaulbars, and Lenevich, the first on the Russian right, the last on the left, and General Kaulbars in the centre, while west of the line was General Mishchenko's cavalry and east of it that of General Rennenkampf. The division of the unwieldy army into three distinct organisms under generals of repute, the fall of Port Arthur,

* *See* Map 50.

† In this report I./5th R. stands for 1st Battalion 5th Reserve Regiment.—A. H.

‡ Hsiao-pei-ho is near the confluence of the Tai-tzu Ho and Hun Ho (14 miles south-west of Hei-kou-tai).

and the growing political agitation in Russia, all served as incentives to active measures on General Kuropatkin's part before troops and heavy guns from the south could reach the neighbourhood of Yen-tai. One strong objection to active measures arose from the climate of Manchuria, which, in the month of January, through low temperature and few hours of daylight, makes military operations both difficult and costly. To engage in battle—battle which may be prolonged for days and nights together—under such conditions is to submit troops to the utmost hardships and privations, and, moreover, on account of the impossibility of making hasty entrenchments where the soil is frozen two feet deep, expose them without a hope of cover to the full fire of the enemy's guns and rifles. Nevertheless the Russian general, doubtless deeming his men more hardy and inured to cold than the soldiers of Japan, resolved on such an enterprise, and, as a preliminary, despatched General Mishchenko's cavalry on a raid to disturb the Japanese communications and discover whether General Nogi's troops were moving from the south, and at the same time destroy the large store of supplies known to be collected at Ying-kou.* That place, some 30 miles south of Niu-chuang, is situated on the left bank of the Liao Ho, about 13 miles above the bar. North of it, some 3 miles up stream and on the same bank, is Niu-chia-tun, where the branch line of the Russian railway from Ta-shih-chiao, about 14 miles to the east, terminates. Close to the station, in sheds and in the open, were stores for several months for the whole Japanese force in Manchuria. The bait was a tempting one, but the Russian raider was not a Stonewall Jackson or a Stuart, and the Armies of Japan were handled by a man of different character to Pope.

Signs were not wanting that such a movement might be made. Up to the middle of December the 1st Cavalry Brigade had had before it a division and a half of Cossacks from Orenberg and Ussuri, which held the line from Meng-ta-pu† to Chang-tan across the Hun, whence a small force of infantry watched the ground for a short distance to the west. No sooner had the Cossacks of the Don arrived than more infantry was noticed and some activity displayed from Chang-tan westward, while the troops which had arrived from Russia gradually moved south from Mukden and approached the neighbourhood of the defensive line. Aware of the growing strength of the Russians, and recognizing that General Kuropatkin was a free agent from the date of Port Arthur's fall, the Japanese, despite the iron hardness of the ground, continued to improve their works, ready for any eventuality that might arise. Compared with the front defended by the infantry, the villages held by

---

* *See* Map 48. Ying-kou is erroneously called "Niu-chuang" by the European inhabitants. The station at Niu-chia-tun, and not Ying-kou itself, was attacked by the Russians.—A. H.

† *See* Map 50, Meng-ta-pu is 3½ miles north of Li-ta-jen-tun.

Major-General Akiyama's cavalry had not received so much attention. In order, therefore, to augment their resisting power some engineers were added to the brigade, and orders issued that the posts must, if surrounded, be maintained to the very last. Should the enemy penetrate the line he would be met by the reserve brigade quartered at Ku-cheng-tzu supported by the rest of the 8th Division still posted in reserve two miles south-west from Yen-tai station.

At the beginning of the New Year a minor raid of some thirty Russians dressed in Chinese clothes was made upon the railway line between An-shan-tien and Hai-cheng.* The damage done by them was slight and rapidly repaired, but prisoners were taken from whom the information was extracted that General Mishchenko was near Mukden and on the point of moving westward.

On what date that general's march began is not precisely known, but some of the wounded left by him when falling back informed their captors that a portion of the force left the environs of Mukden on the 8th January.

Rumours of some movement reached the Second Army on the following day, but nothing definite was known, for General Mishchenko kept his force well to the west, if indeed he did not cross the Liao into neutral ground. **8th Jan.**

In August of the previous year, when the Japanese Armies lay around Hai-cheng and the rivers were not frozen, a cavalry brigade had watched the left and guarded Ying-kou from aggression, but now that they had moved some sixty miles towards the north, and mounted troops could no longer be spared to protect that side up to the Liao Ho, from Chang-tan to the south the flank was open to attack. It is true that along the Hun there were a few posts held by companies of line of communication troops, but nought else lay between the raiders and the railway, and when, therefore, part of the Russian force, whose total strength was something between 5,000 and 10,000 men, with half a dozen batteries, arrived on the 10th before To-tai-tzu, the 1st Cavalry Regiment, stationed there, fell back at once towards Hai-cheng. Continuing their march, the Russians reached Niu-chuang early next day, took that place and drove forth the little garrison—4th Company 33rd Reserve Regiment—part of it falling back on Hai-cheng, and part on Niu-chia-tun. Major-General Mishchenko now divided his force, sending a portion against the two last places, and a body towards An-shan-tien. From several directions reports of the hostile movement had come into Manchurian Army Head-Quarters, and on the 11th, as it seemed certain that the enemy was in earnest, the 8th Division at Lan-chi was directed to despatch to the threatened point without delay a force of three battalions.† **11th Jan.**

* *See* Map 48.

† A battalion and a battery were also ordered to proceed from Liao-yang, but this was afterwards counter-ordered.—A. H.

Meantime, Niu-chia-tun* had not been free of rumours and reports, and Major Miyasaki, the post commandant at that place, fully realizing the situation, prepared to give the Russians, should they come, a suitable reception. As early as the latter part of November steps had been taken to meet a hostile raid, and in the neighbourhood of Niu-chia-tun, round the railway station and the adjacent sheds, entrenchments had been made, while to guard the approaches from the west across the frozen Liao, barbed wire entanglement had been used. But by the 10th January the works were not complete, for the ground was hard, and labour, needed for more urgent purposes, could not be spared to finish them. Hearing on the evening of that day that the enemy was coming on, the commandant determined to be ready for him by the 12th, and despatched all available men and coolies to work on the defences, at the same time removing everything of special value to a place safe from the fire of shells. On the afternoon of the 11th news came that Niu-chuang had fallen, and that a strong hostile force was moving on Hai-cheng, and by 8 p.m. little groups of men, exhausted by their arduous retreat, straggled in from the former place. The enemy had not left them unmolested, and it was with difficulty that they escaped to tell the tale. Within an hour their story was confirmed by a band of scouts who had been forced to retire from a village 8 miles north-east on the road to Niu-chuang. The enemy was now not far distant and attack might be expected at latest on the following day. To hold him off and save the stores from falling into his hands there were, including the company from Niu-chuang, the I./33rd R., two squads of cavalry, and 200 armed men of the transport train. Besides these, there were some companies of the auxiliary train, useful for removing stores should sheds be set on fire.

During the night of the 11th–12th no time was lost in carrying perishable goods within the defensive line, on which work was continued without intermission; but towards morning, hearing the sound of firing, the Chinese coolies threw down their spades and fled, after which digging was suspended and bags of grain and boxes were used to raise the parapet.

12th Jan. At 7 a.m. a loud explosion from the direction of Ta-shih-chiao was heard, and shortly after Chinese spies reported that the railway between that place and Niu-chia-tun had suffered damage. Judging that help could only reach him by that route, Major Miyasaki boldly resolved to mend the line, and despatched a party for that purpose. The next step taken was to clear the field of fire from everything that could impede the view, and place the unarmed men where they were safe from fire.

Several hours passed and still no enemy appeared, but at 2 p.m. a scout in Hou-chia-yu-fang reported that in front of him was a screen of horsemen, behind whom rode a solid mass

* *See* Map 49.

Another hour passed, and cavalry was seen in Fu-chia-tun advancing thence on Hou-chia-yu-fang, while within the space of half an hour, from the direction of Ho-chia-wo-pu, yet more appeared, the two forces numbering together some 3,000 men. The little garrison had now before it more than thrice its strength, but reinforcements were at hand, and, from an observation post at 4 p.m. the distant smoke of an approaching train speeding along under artillery fire was seen. An anxious half-hour passed, and at the end of it the train, carrying three companies of the 8th Reserve Regiment—some 700 men—steamed into the station,* a proof that the party sent to repair the line had done its work. The journey from Ta-shih-chiao, though short, had been exciting, for the enemy, finding that communication was restored, brought up his guns and ineffectually tried to wreck the train. This timely reinforcement—which had been diverted from proceeding north and sent on the responsibility of the post commandant of Ta-shih-chiao†—now took its place within the lines, where the enemy was calmly awaited.

At 4.30 p.m. a single battery, supported later by more guns, opened fire upon the storehouse near the station, which offered a conspicuous and easy mark. The expected attack was for a time deferred, and it was thought that the enemy, concluding that the place would be but lightly defended, proposed to devote his attention to the work of destruction without coming to closer quarters. Thus the defenders were for some hours engaged in watching lest a fire broke out, instead of keeping him, as had been anticipated, at arm's length with their bullets. At 6 p.m. a large storehouse filled with straw‡ caught fire, and the numerous figures hurrying to and fro trying to overcome the flames deceived the enemy, and made him think that something greatly valued was in danger of destruction. Most of the guns were therefore directed to the spot, and shell after shell fell harmlessly into the middle of the flaming mass. It was now quite dark except for the light emitted by the burning straw, but after a time the fire was got under and the bombardment ceased.

At half-past seven shouts of "*Hurrah!*" were heard, followed by a heavy fire of rifles, and by the light of the rising moon fifty mounted scouts were plainly visible close to the old church. Fearing the effect of the guns, should the enemy remain another day before Niu-chia-tun, Major Miyasaki determined to capture them, if possible, and with this object despatched two parties, one by Ta-kuan-tun, the other by Hou-chia-yu-fang. Hardly had the last man left the entrenchment than the scouts reported that a strong force of infantry

* No sooner had the driver of the train—a civilian—delivered his charge than he returned at full speed to Ta-shih-chiao, in case he should be wanted to bring up more troops, but the enemy again cut the line after he had passed. The wires were also cut.—A. H.

† Both he and Major Miyasaki received the decoration of the "Golden Kite."—A. H.

‡ The straw was for boat coverings in wet weather.—A. H.

and cavalry was coming towards the latter place. The men were therefore ordered to retire and man the works again. After some minutes a body of 400 men came towards the church, but, meeting with a heavy fire, they went south and joined the force approaching from Hou-chia-yu-fang, in the direction of the canteen. Allowing them to reach 100 yards from the defensive line, the Japanese infantry opened fire, and the force, thrown into disorder, fled back whence it came. Later on two attempts to approach were made, one in the same direction by 500 men, the other towards the old Russian hospital, but both were driven off, and at 9 p.m. the garrison was left in peace.

13th Jan. Next day, the 13th, before dawn, word was brought that Hou-chia-yu-fang and Ta-kuan-tun were both deserted. Thinking, however, that the enemy might attack again at daylight, all preparations to resist him were made ; but at half-past nine it was found that he had decamped and retired towards Niu-chuang, and by 2 p.m. the tail of the rear guard had disappeared from view. Niu-chia-tun was now considered safe, and, on the ground before it being searched, 58 dead and 6 wounded were found. From the latter it was gathered that the force which had made so futile an attempt was under Major-General Stefanov, and consisted of the 51st and 52nd Dragoons, some Cossacks, the 3rd Siberian Rifles, and 10 to 20 guns. Before retreating, they had carried off all the dead and wounded within reach. It was further elicited from the same source that the Russian commander had supposed that in the bombardment of the 12th the Japanese had suffered heavily and had left the neighbourhood of the station, and, unaware that defensive works had been prepared,* he attacked without first reconnoitring the position.†

While the events above related were taking place near Ying-kou, the troops despatched by the 8th Division, under Colonel Tsugawa, were approaching the scene of action, where they were to arrive only in time to engage the rear guard of Major-General Mishchenko's force, now in full retreat from all directions. Leaving Lan-chi‡ by train on the night of the 11th, Colonel Tsugawa went beyond An-shan-tien with the intention of assembling at Keng-chuang-tzu, and before reaching that place he was joined by two batteries on their way north from Port Arthur, and the 1st Cavalry Regiment, which, hearing that a pursuing force had started, now came up from the direction of Hai-cheng.

---

* The three villages outside the lines at Niu-chia-tun were not prepared for defence, as it was not expected that a sufficiently large garrison would be available to defend so extended a line.—A. H.

† Ying-kou was known to be full of Russian spies throughout the winter, but the administrator, Major Yokura—who had been much in China—succeeded in preventing information regarding the defensive works and the strength of the garrison from leaking out.—A. H.

‡ *See* Map 48.

From Keng-chuang-tzu, where the force arrived on the 12th, the cavalry and III./31st were sent to To-tai-tzu, where they drove back a small force across the Liao Ho and arrived at night at Liu-tai-tzu. With the two battalions of the 5th Regiment and the guns, Colonel Tsugawa left Keng-chuang-tzu at 7.30 a.m., next day intending to proceed through Hsiao-nien-miao to San-chia-kou, and at 5.30 a.m. on the 14th he reached Pa-chia-tzu. On the way thither he sent a company to garrison Niu-chuang and another to follow a force of the enemy reported to be moving northward from Ying-kou between the Liao and himself. **14th Jan.**

Meantime the troops in Liu-tai-tzu, finding before them a hostile force, endeavoured to communicate with Colonel Tsugawa, but the enemy's cavalry prevented messengers from getting through to him. When he arrived at Pa-chia-tzu the inhabitants stated that a column 20,000 strong, accompanied by guns, had taken eight hours in passing through the village on the previous night, and after crossing the Liao Ho had proceeded north through San-chia-kou.

At 7.30 a.m. he decided to advance, and found a force with guns holding the southern corner of San-chia-kou. With some difficulty, owing to the precipitous nature of the banks, the infantry succeeded in crossing the Liao, and at 9 a.m. took the village and fired upon the Russian guns then limbering up 1,000 yards in rear. The Japanese artillery was at this time firing on a body of cavalry 3,000 strong which was flying northward from the village in confusion, its retreat and that of the infantry being hastened by the presence of the troops in Liu-tai-tzu, the sound of whose rifles was distinctly heard. Colonel Tsugawa's force was now all across the Liao, and it was found that the enemy had left behind him 53 dead. To pursue with the small force of cavalry was looked upon as useless, and the main body assembled in Pa-chia-tzu, while the III./31st was sent to To-tai-tzu and the cavalry to Niu-chuang.

The losses of the Japanese infantry in the affair at Liu-tai-tzu and at San-chia-kou amounted to 12 killed and 62 wounded, while the artillery had two men wounded and the cavalry none.

Major-General Mishchenko, with the main body of his force, had succeeded in making good his escape—but, it is stated, with a loss of 3,000 men—and reassembled to the south-west of Chang-tan, the rear guard, with which Colonel Tsugawa had been engaged, covering him some six miles to the south.

The raid had failed in two objects out of three. Communication on a branch line had been temporarily cut, but the main line had escaped, while Ying-kou, proving stronger than expected, had more than held its own. But the mystery connected with the movement of the Third Army had been cleared up, and it was now known that General Nogi's troops had not yet

reinforced the Armies north of Liao-yang. This knowledge, though bought with a heavy price, was probably the main-spring of the motive power which hastened on the next attempt against Marshal Oyama's left.

From the 13th January some movements were observed in the enemy's lines, and, from that date onwards, more particularly about the 17th and 18th, the right of his army was prolonged to the west so as to include the village of Ssu-fang-tai,* where Major-General Mishchenko's cavalry, once again at the front, had its head-quarters. The artillery at this period became more active, throwing shells further into the Japanese position and sometimes firing late into the night. The balloon, too, which had generally been raised from the vicinity of Sha-ho-pu, was now taken well to the west, as if to gauge the strength of the Japanese garrisons on the left. On the 24th, six Russian soldiers surrendered to as many different units of the Japanese, and all, when separately interrogated, agreed in stating that for the 26th an attack, which would be heralded by a bombardment, had been arranged. This attack would be delivered against the Japanese left. But this was not all, for one of the prisoners went so far as to declare that he had seen instructions from General Kuropatkin ordering that when the advance began, village after village must be seized and strongly held.

Meanwhile the defences of the Second Army had attained to such a satisfactory condition that, desirous of affording it a reserve amounting to a third of its whole strength and uninfluenced by rumours of attack, Marshal Oyama issued orders† **21st Jan.** on the 21st for the 3rd Division to be withdrawn to the vicinity of Yang-chia-wan on the Sha Ho, close to its junction with the Shih-li Ho, a village prominent in the fighting of the 11th and 12th October. Its place, in that part of the line which it had held for full three months, was to be taken by the 6th Division, whose right would be extended east to Wu-chia-wa-tzu, the remainder of the gap being filled by the reserve brigades of the Fourth Army, which would prolong their left to the Mukden road. A manœuvre such as this could only be carried into effect gradually and under cover of darkness, and from the 23rd the troops and guns were secretly withdrawn and as secretly replaced. Before this date, however, the blow had fallen, and a force, amounting to some seven divisions under General Grippenberg, was in movement to attempt to overwhelm the Japanese left. The transfer of these troops to the Russian right and their supply had been greatly facilitated by a branch, twenty-five miles long, from the main southern line, which had been thrown out south-west as far as Ta-wang-chien-pu. From this line a network of light railways supplied the troops in all directions.

---

* *See* Map 50.

† These orders were not issued in anticipation of a Russian attack on the left, but had been contemplated for some time.—A. H.

What was the precise object of the movement is uncertain, but it would seem that the temptation to strike the slender flank of the Japanese before the arrival of General Nogi's Army and cut their communications had been too strong for General Kuropatkin or the subordinate commander on the right. Should success attend the flank attack, and the Japanese be drawn to weaken their front, that portion and the right of the line would also be assaulted. The Japanese believe that a minor feature of the operation was the destruction of their provision store at Lang-tung-kou, and from the persistent pressure of the Cossacks in that direction this would seem probable. Whether a movement of such magnitude was foreseen by Manchurian Army Head-Quarters is likewise veiled in doubt, but that Marshal Oyama had no intention of playing into Russian hands by depleting his front, and was prepared to retort by a bold attack from that direction should General Kuropatkin on his side do so, is beyond dispute.

On the morning of the 25th three regiments of Russian cavalry were in position from Ka-li-ma to A-ssu-niu,* and on the previous evening about one and a half brigades of infantry with guns came up apparently from Ssu-fang-tai, and, crossing the frozen Hun then and on the following morning, between Fei-tsai-ho-tzu and Hei-kou-tai, moved in a south-easterly direction. At the same time the enemy in front of Li-ta-jen-tun and Shen-tan-pu displayed some tokens of activity. The cavalry patrols, which, as usual, had been sent to the front of these villages to reconnoitre, were, after a slight skirmish, withdrawn, and the movements of the enemy reported to Manchurian Army Head-Quarters. Thereupon Marshal Oyama ordered the two brigades of the 8th Division with its artillery† to move at once from Lan-chi‡ to oppose the enemy coming from Ssu-fang-tai, and placed the garrison of Hei-kou-tai—which consisted of three and a half squadrons 5th and 8th Cavalry, one-third of the 2nd Reserve Regiment, and four guns§—under Lieut.-General Tatsumi, the commander of the division. That officer received the order to march at noon, but, privately informed that he and his men were wanted in the west, had already put them in motion at 11 a.m., and was now on his way to the scene of the approaching conflict. On this division the brunt of the desperate fighting round Hei-kou-tai was to fall, and that village, which speedier reinforcement might have saved, was for three days and nights to baffle some of the bravest soldiers of

25th Jan.

* Ka-li-ma is on the Liao 21 miles due west of Chang-tan, and A-ssu-niu is 18 miles west of Chang-tan and 3 east of Ka-li-ma.—A. H.

† One regiment of 36 guns and one captured Q.F. field battery of 6 guns.—A. H.

‡ Not on Map 50, is near Yen-tai (6 miles south of Shih-li-ho).

§ Four of the above-mentioned Russian guns were in Hei-kou-tai. They were sent there on the 20th November 1904.—A. H.

Japan, and, perhaps, the most dashing of her leaders,* costing many lives before it was recaptured.

Hei-kou-tai stands close to the left bank of the Hun, there some two hundred yards in width, and is surrounded, like many villages in this region, with a mud wall four feet high, and ditch some twenty feet in breadth and three to six feet deep, the last an obstacle of small consideration. To the north-east, south-east, and south are several sandhills† rising eight to twelve feet above the plain, the furthest hill distant from the village about one mile. Those on the south-east and south formed excellent infantry positions for the Russians, and were only taken after repeated charges and heavy loss. Others, more remote from the field of action, served as valuable points for observation. The whole district lying south of the villages held by the Japanese is singularly flat and open, the only features above the level of the plain being the villages, two thousand to three thousand yards apart, a few trees scattered here and there, and occasional series of low mounds denoting Chinese burial-grounds. The frozen walls of the houses and those around the villages gave good cover, being, in winter, impenetrable to shrapnel shell and rifle bullet. On the river side, between Hei-kou-tai and Chang-tan, are a few small woods useful for hiding troops advancing from the west. The banks of the Hun are steep, and ten to twenty feet above the frozen stream, and therefore difficult for all arms to pass, except at certain places which exist between the villages abutting on it. Through Hei-kou-tai a frozen rivulet, shut in between sloping banks some twelve feet high—easy of passage for infantry, but difficult in most places for artillery—stretches south past San-chien-pao,‡ where it bends sharply to the west. Another similar, though slightly broader, stream marks the route from Lao-chiao to Su-ma-pu, beyond which village it sweeps round in a direction generally south. These river-beds were very useful to both Russians and Japanese, serving as cover for reserves, horses, mounted messengers, and carts. Up and down them, in almost perfect safety, the wounded could be borne to the dressing stations at the villages in rear, and behind the bank nearest to the enemy fires lighted and cooking carried on at the rare intervals when the stress of battle allowed. The first of these natural covered ways remained for the fight in Russian hands; the second, too far in advance for them to hold in strength, was utilized by the Japanese.

* Lieut.-General Tatsumi, who was in personal command of all the troops, exclusive of those of the Second Army, engaged in the battle of Hei-kou-tai, greatly distinguished himself in the war of restoration of 1868 between the present Emperor of Japan and the Tokugawa Shoguns. He was present at most of the actions then fought, and distinguished himself again in the China-Japan war.—A. H.

† None of these hills were entrenched, but they afforded good cover.—A.H.

‡ *See* Map 52.

The weather up to the 23rd had not been specially severe, but on that date the wind changed to the north, and during the battle the thermometer averaged at night some 45 degrees of frost, and seldom registered less than 15 degrees by day.* The air, too, became moist, and dull foggy weather, lasting most of the day and much obstructing distant vision, prevailed. **Jan. 25th.**

In such, almost arctic, weather the opening battle of 1905 began.

It has been said that Lieut.-General Tatsumi's division marched at 11 a.m., and that one brigade was already quartered near Lang-tung-kou.† Of this brigade,‡ the 31st Reserve Regiment of two battalions had been sent on the 22nd to the village of Ku-cheng-tzu, some two miles distant to the north-west, and there received urgent requests from the commanders of the garrisons of Hei-kou-tai and Shen-tan-pu to come to their assistance. The II./31st R. was despatched to the former place, and the 1st Battalion to Shen-tan-pu, where it remained until the Russians, after their defeat, retired across the Hun. What had occurred to necessitate these appeals for help from two directions was the development of the Russian attack. General Grippenberg, commanding the centre column, with the cavalry on his right and General Kaulbars passive on his left, had sent a force of nearly a division, with guns, against Hei-kou-tai, while another force of equal strength was in the neighbourhood of Shen-tan-pu. The former village had been under attack since 8.30 a.m., and though the enemy at first made no serious efforts to dislodge the meagre garrison, towards afternoon a force of all arms came upon the scene and its position grew precarious, and before nightfall the place was partially surrounded.

Before proceeding to the west, Lieut.-General Tatsumi had been told that if the village on the extreme left of the Japanese were in danger of being taken, the defenders should retire towards the south-east, and, as the II./31st R. did not arrive in time to be of service, Colonel Tanada, who commanded there, after suffering forty casualties, withdrew his men at 9 p.m., and, meeting the reinforcement on the way, the whole arrived some hours later at Ku-cheng-tzu.§ To meet the plan of Marshal Oyama it had been intended that the retirement should have been towards the south-east, but the enveloping attack compelled Tanada to move nearly due east. At this time it was thought that the Russians were making for the provision store at Lang-tung-kou, and the Japanese purposed to place no obstacle to their passage of the Hun, but rather to entice them on, and then, with the 8th Division, hurl them back towards the west. The

* This is a rough estimate.

† *See* Map 50.

‡ The three regiments of the reserve brigade had each two battalions. —A. H.

§ The garrison was mainly composed of cavalry with carbines and no bayonets. The village is not easily defensible from the west and can be approached under cover from near Tung Yen-tai-tzu (north-west of it).—A. H.

Hei-kou-tai garrison, therefore, had been warned how they were to act to meet this case; but the Russian mission was more serious than the mere destruction of some sacks of grain and rice, and Colonel Tanada found himself in imminent peril, and only with difficulty, and the exercise of great coolness and good judgment, threaded his way through the meshes of the net spread for him.

In the direction of Shen-tan-pu nothing serious had occurred, but General Oku, with his usual foresight, recognizing that his own left would probably become the object of attack, instructed the troops in the villages of Li-ta-jen-tun, westward, to make a vigorous defence, and ordered the 3rd Division, then assembling from the front near Yang-chia-wan (south-east of Li-ta-jen-tun), to concentrate and hold itself in readiness for a move.

Such were the events of the 25th January; and during that day Lieut.-General Tatsumi, who, under Marshal Oyama's orders was to hold the chief command in the approaching battle, moved his artillery and two brigades (4th and 16th) towards Lang-tung-kou, where they arrived at night. There, reasoning that the Russians, by the time that he could reach as far as Hei-kou-tai, would be well across the Hun, Lieut.-General Tatsumi decided that the proper course was to strike their rear.

The movement of the Russians had so far succeeded, but only a small portion of the force destined to be engaged had passed the river, scarce sufficient to have justified it in moving further east.

26th Jan. During the night, the wind, which had been in the north the day before, shifted a few points towards the east, and brought with it a heavy fall of snow. This change, far from moderating the already glacial cold, only added to it, and greatly aggravated the discomfort of men doomed to pass the day and night mainly lying in the open, continuously exposed to a galling fire.

By 7 a.m. the 8th Division was assembled, the Reserve and 16th Brigades and the artillery in the neighbourhood of Ku-cheng-tzu and the 4th Brigade at Chin-chia-pu-tzu. By that hour it was known that the enemy, a portion of whose troops had occupied Hei-kou-tai at 10 o'clock on the previous night, and still was there, had disposed his advanced forces on the following line. Starting from a point a little to the south-west of Su-ma-pu (south of Hei-kou-tai), he held that village and extended thence to Lao-chiao and Ya-tzu-pao. As Lieut.-General Tatsumi knew that the troops at Hei-kou-tai were not merely an advanced guard of cavalry, but comprised all arms and perhaps numbered a division, he judged that it was a covering force sent in advance to guard the main body in its somewhat difficult passage of the Hun. The best course, he therefore thought, would be to strike a blow before the enemy arrived in greater strength, and, with this object, he divided his force as follows:—

The reserve brigade of four battalions* forming the right wing was directed to attack Hei-kou-tai from the direction of Lao-chiao.

The 4th Brigade, detailed as left wing, had orders to proceed from Chin-chia-pu-tzu to Su-ma-pu and Tou-pao and assault Hei-kou-tai from the south-west.

As at this time a division, which had shown itself in part on the previous day coming from the direction of Chang-tan and threatening Shen-tan-pu—a village whose tenure was of vital importance to the Second Army—was still a dangerous factor in the field, the 16th Brigade was ordered to remain at Ku-cheng-tzu within easy reach of the menaced point.

The divisional artillery moved into position on a sandhill south of Lao-chiao, the Russian captured battery, with greater range, coming into action south-west of Ku-cheng-tzu, and all directing their fire on Hei-kou-tai and the guns in its vicinity.

The cavalry moved to the line from San-chien-pao to Ta-tu-tzu.

4th Brigade.—Leaving Chin-chia-pu-tzu at 11.40 a.m., the 4th Brigade marched in fighting formation and took a route which would bring it to a point between Su-ma-pu and Tou-pao. The sky was darkened by the falling snow, which deadened sound and made the view obscure. But these advantages were not entirely on the side of the Japanese, for though they were enabled to approach the enemy unperceived, they twice lost the way. At length, however, the advanced guard of the brigade arrived on a line from Su-ma-pu† to Hou Wu-chia-tzu, where it suddenly came under fire of musketry from the left front. Instantly the men deployed and faced the fort-like village of Tou-pao, in which were several machine guns, whence the shots had come. A break in the drifting clouds now caused the snow to fall less thickly for a short time, and it was seen that the enemy not only held Tou-pao but stretched some distance to the south, for Major-General Mishchenko's cavalry, in considerable force and accompanied by guns, had crossed the ice-bound Hun the evening before near Huang-la-sha-tzu‡ and was now heading for Niu-chu. The movement on that place, which was held by a battalion of the 2nd Reserve Regiment, was a direct threat on the Japanese rear, and not only jeopardized Lang-tung-kou with its depôt of supplies, but went far towards surrounding the 4th Brigade. Its commander, Major-General Yoda, forthwith sent two companies of the 31st Regiment into Hou Wu-chia-tzu, whence they would protect the arrival of the remainder, but finding that the enemy's infantry south of Tou-pao was in force and anxious to secure his left, he despatched two companies to

* The I./5th R. was at Hsiao-pei-ho (5 miles south-west of the south-west corner of Map 50), on the Hun and the I./31st R. at Shen-tan-pu.—A. H.

† *See* Map 52. When the enemy saw the Japanese advancing in force he partly fell back from the Su-ma-pu–Lao-chiao line.—A. H.

‡ *See* Map 50.

Chien Wu-chia-tzu. The position of the 4th Brigade shortly after this was as follows :—Forming the left wing along the line Chien Wu-chia-tzu through Hou Wu-chia-tzu to the river bed—which was held by the Russians—were three battalions 31st Regiment, while the right wing, consisting of the I. and II./5th, was stationed to the north-east of Su-ma-pu, and between the wings stood the III./5th.*

Reserve Brigade.—Meanwhile the right wing of the 8th Division, deploying west of Ku-cheng-tzu, found in its front a hostile body of infantry, some one and a half battalions, moving eastward from Lao-chiao. These troops were quickly repulsed and the river line secured. The brigade now took the following position : the I. and II./17th R. north of the Lao-chiao–Hei-kou-tai road ; the II./31st R. with the II./5th R. prolonging to the left south of that road, and in the river bed some companies in reserve.

At this time thirty Russian guns were counted, of which eight were on the high ground on the right bank of the Hun, eight north-east, eight east, and six south-east of Hei-kou-tai. In front of them, holding the sand hillocks which fringe the village on the south and south-east and posted some five hundred, six hundred, and in places one thousand yards before the guns, was the Russian infantry. Against it the right wing was ordered to advance, and emerging from the river bed, deployed for the attack, rushed for a short distance to the front, but meeting with a heavy rifle fire and oblique fire from artillery, it was forced to halt. The extension of the 4th Brigade as far as Chien Wu-chia-tzu had attenuated the front of the division and made a gap of nearly a mile between it and the left of the reserve brigade. This vacant space was hidden by the falling snow, rendering co-operation difficult, so that the Russians, lying behind cover, could concentrate their fire from many points on the Reserve troops. Matters thus remained at a standstill until about 5 p.m., when the right flank of the I./17th R. was threatened by the advance of two hostile battalions coming from the direction of Fei-tsai-ho-tzu. Upon this the commander of the brigade ordered up a portion of his

* The G.O.C. 4th Brigade has been criticized in my presence for extending so much to the west, and it was stated that he should not have gone further west than the west of Su-ma-pu. This criticism was probably inspired, and it was the first time that I have heard one Japanese officer blame another. It was added that the G.O.C. would have done better if he had kept one and a half battalions in reserve in the river bed south of Su-ma-pu and with the main body of the brigade deployed north of that village and the Su-ma-pu—Hei-kou-tai road, where he would have suffered little from fire coming from Tou-pao. It will be noted further on that one consequence of the prolongation of the 4th Brigade to the left was that it was deprived of assistance from the divisional artillery ; on the other hand, it might be argued that the difference in range between the Japanese and Russian artillery and the impossibility of the former protecting the infantry in all parts of the field against a superior number of guns—the Russians brought up 60 during the day—necessitated steps being taken to capture Tou-pao in order to secure the left flank.—A. H.

small reserve, and by its assistance the enemy's approach was checked.

16th Brigade.—During this time the 16th Brigade, left in reserve at Ku-cheng-tzu with the view of covering the right of Lieut.-General Tatsumi's force from the menaces of a Russian division near Chang-tan, had not been altogether idle. A little after noon the enemy appeared moving in the direction of Liu-tiao-kou and Ta-tai, with the probable intention of pushing south of Shen-tan-pu and attacking that place from the rear. The artillery there lost no time in directing a fire against his flank, and the intruding force—which amounted to a division—turning back, retraced its steps along the route which it had come. But the guns in Shen-tan-pu were not entirely responsible for the retirement of so large a force. Some cavalry scouts of the 8th Division, watching the country to the north-west of Ta-tai, had brought a report that the enemy had advanced towards the former village and was sending a force against the right. On this the brigadier, taking four of his battalions, deployed them on the north side of Ta-tai, a manœuvre which, together with the artillery fire from Shen-tan-pu, led to the retirement of the Russian force. No exchange of fire took place, and at sunset the four battalions of the 16th Brigade covered Ta-tai from the north, whence they were within easy reach of Shen-tan-pu and at the same time guarded the right of the division from attack.

4th Brigade.—While these movements of the 16th and Reserve Brigades were in progress, matters with the 4th Brigade had assumed a threatening aspect. The Russians, who in the morning had brought up thirty guns, increased that number as the hours went by, so that by the evening they had in action thirty more. These they had placed as follows:—West of Hei-kou-tai eight guns, and still further to the west four more; west of Tou-pao six guns in one place and four in another; about one thousand five hundred yards from Chien Wu-chia-tzu eight guns. To meet the hail of shells that poured upon it, the 4th Brigade had not a single gun, for the artillery of the division, placed south of Lao-chiao, was too far off to give assistance. Consequently the Russians, whose batteries up to this time had been well hidden, finding that they could advance with safety, moved their guns forward to much closer range and fired upon the infantry from exposed positions. To add to the embarrassment of the 4th Brigade, Major-General Mishchenko's cavalry, which hung upon its flank all day and had succeeded in expelling the small garrison of reserve troops in Niu-chu, gave indications of an advance on Hsiu-erh-pu, an operation which, if carried out, would place the ill-starred left wing in still greater peril. Opposed to that wing and the four battalions of the reserve brigade—ten battalions in all—from Niu-chu to Hei-kou-tai by way of San-chuang-tzu* was a force of two

* North-east corner of Map 52.

divisions, for the 16th Brigade was required to fill the gap between the 8th Division and the Second Army, and was thus not free to share in the unequal struggle. Its energies might be called upon at any moment to oppose the movement of the division coming south from Chang-tan, and, as events proved, what was anticipated in that respect occurred. The threat of that division induced General Oku to send from the 3rd Division to Shen-tan-pu two battalions of the 33rd Regiment, a battery of artillery, and some machine guns, and at 12.40 p.m. orders were sent to Yang-chia-wan directing General Oshima to despatch these troops forthwith. The garrison of the village about to be reinforced, as well as that of Li-ta-jen-tun, had been subjected since 10.30 a.m. to a heavy cannonade, to which, on account of their small force of artillery, they had practically to submit in silence. The guns, forty in number, which had been directed against them, were disposed on a front parallel to, but in the rear of, the villages of Chin-shan-tai, Huang-ti, and Pei-tai-tzu, which were held by a brigade of infantry. At 4 p.m., after several hours' bombardment, this brigade deployed and began its movement against Shen-tan-pu. Pushing on with great determination, it drove the small garrison from Hsiao-shu-tzu,* and thereby gained a foothold only four hundred yards north-west of the object of attack. Thence an assault was made on the hamlet lying a short distance south-west of Shen-tan-pu, with which it is connected by some straggling houses. This also fell, and the Russians, encouraged by the small success—a rare feature in any of their attacks against the Japanese—sent forward two companies to Pei-tai-tzu, a village north-east of Shen-tan-pu and within easy rifle shot of it. The situation of the latter village was becoming serious for the two battalions, and the guns sent from the 3rd Division were still labouring through the snow on their nine mile march, and it seemed doubtful whether they would arrive in time to save disaster. Shen-tan-pu is a large village with well-built houses, but the garrison, like that of Hei-kou-tai, was mainly cavalry, too weak for the perimeter held, the defences of which were at this time incomplete. The enemy, too, in possession of the hamlet to the south-west and Pei-tai-tzu to the north-east, could sweep all sides of it with fire, thus rendering the operation of throwing in reinforcements—and more particularly guns—both difficult and hazardous. Nevertheless, this was accomplished, though with loss, and about 6.30 p.m., helped by the darkness, the detachment from the 3rd Division passed through the seething barrier of bursting shells and flying bullets, and reached the welcome shelter of its battered walls and roofless houses, the guns taking up position within the village itself.† Great was the relief of the beleaguered garrison,

* Just north-west of Shen-tan-pu.

† The infantry was dribbled up, while the guns, kept in a slightly hollow road, moved in as opportunity offered.—A. H.

combined with gratitude to General Oku, when so substantial a force arrived to rescue them, for hope of help had almost been abandoned, and the defenders—ordered by their general to fight "to the last man"—had steeled themselves to obey his orders to the letter.

From Wan-chia-yuan-tzu towards the north-east, along the front of the divisions of the Second Army, nothing beyond a deliberate cannonade from the Russian guns occurred all day. In this portion of the field only the vibration caused by the struggle on the left was felt, while there the Russians had shown beyond the shadow of a doubt how serious was their move across the Hun. Fully grasping the situation, Marshal Oyama issued orders for reinforcements to be sent, and informed Lieut.-General Tatsumi that on the afternoon of the morrow, at latest, he should have under his command the main part of the 5th Division with its guns. The latter commander, though he found himself for the first time facing the Russians, had already weighed the merits of his own and their troops in the balance, and had decided that with three brigades intact he could meet them at least on level terms, provided they had only twice that force. The despatch of reinforcements to the right would free the 16th Brigade and place at his disposal the force requisite to carry out his plan of attack on Hei-kou-tai from the east of Su-ma-pu. This had been his original intention, and for this reason the guns were posted south of Lao-chiao, but the extension to the left of the 4th Brigade had robbed of troops the limits fixed for the attack, and consequently that attack had failed. To repair the mischief done and fill the gap between the right and left a central column was required, and for this purpose the 16th Brigade from Ku-cheng-tzu and Ta-tai* would be employed next day.

Meantime the 5th Division, quartered in the eastern part of Shih-li-ho and in the villages lying east between that place and the hill of Hung-pao Shan, had been assembling, and at 9 p.m. urgent orders were received directing it—less the head-quarters, 9th Brigade and the 11th Regiment—to march to Lang-tung-kou. At midnight the column, with Lieut.-General Kigoshi at its head, left Shih-li-ho on its march of 18 miles, and after following for a while the main road south towards Liao-yang, struck off towards the west. The ground was covered with snow, and during the night more fell at intervals, so that the footmarks of those in front were soon obliterated, and no track remained for those behind. From time to time the moon, then in her third quarter, shone dimly forth, lighting the moving mass of men and horses steadily tramping over the snow, which, softened by the moisture in the air, balled upon their shoes and much impeded progress. The night was cold, made more so by the damp, and though many men, exhausted with the strain, dropped behind, unable to keep up, the advanced guard entered Lang-tung-kou at 8 a.m. on the 27th, whence the sound of guns

* South by west of Shen-tan-pu.

in front was plainly heard. The garrison of that place—line of communication troops—was much relieved by the arrival of the 5th Division, for rumours of Major-General Mishchenko's advance had been received, and an attack upon the feebly-guarded store depôt was momentarily expected.

During the night heavy fighting had occurred at Shen-tan-pu, and against that village the enemy had brought up nearly a division and thirty guns. In the place itself were the horses of the cavalry and guns, some seven to eight hundred in all, and, as it was impossible to provide cover for so large a number, many were killed and wounded, while others, terrified by the bursting shells, broke loose and added to the confusion by galloping madly to the rear. The battery of the 3rd Division—less one gun damaged and unfit for use—together with the four horse artillery guns had fired throughout the night, but when morning came the commander of the garrison, who kept his post though wounded in the head, ordered Hsiao-shu-tzu,* as well as the hamlet to the south-west, to be retaken. By a bold dash at dawn these two objects were secured, and the hamlet added to the line of defence of Shen-tan-pu. Hsiao-shu-tzu, where the Russians left several prisoners behind, was not, however, permanently occupied; but after collecting the wounded of both sides, the Japanese withdrew, while the enemy, who had fallen back a short distance towards the north, maintained a heavy cannonade on Shen-tan-pu and Chang-chuang-tzu.

On the 26th the smaller villages between Li-ta-jen-tun and Shen-tan-pu had not been subjected to so fierce a bombardment as had the larger, and no assault had yet been made upon them; but on the 27th the enemy, who had spent his wrath in vain on Shen-tan-pu, devoted his attention to the strong points on the line further west, and while increasing his force,† kept up a fire of forty guns upon them. This change of plan being reported to General Oku, who had moved his head-quarters at 8 a.m. from Shih-li-ho to Yang-chia-wan, he despatched a battalion of the 3rd Division—one from the 18th Regiment—to San-tai-tzu, a village two miles and a half south-west of Li-ta-jen-tun, whence it could speedily reinforce a threatened point.

27th Jan. The main line of the Second Army, west of the railway, was under a deliberate fire of guns all day—no unaccustomed thing—and less anxiety was felt than on the 26th, for the defences were strong, while to the westward the enemy had apparently developed all the force he intended to bring up, and the necessary reinforcements had been sent in time to render his attacks in that direction abortive.

In front of Hei-kou-tai affairs were not in such a satisfactory condition, for the enemy had increased his artillery, and by the afternoon had ninety guns in action. As soon as Lieut.-General Tatsumi, owing to the approach of the 5th Division, could

* Just north-west of Shen-tan-pu.

† On 27th the single brigade of infantry in front was increased.—A. H.

safely withdraw that part of the 16th Brigade which was posted north of Ta-tai, he directed four battalions—II. and III./17th and I. and II./32nd—to be sent to fill the space between the II./5th R. and the 4th Brigade, and constituted it into a central column with its left resting on Su-ma-pu. The remaining battalions—I./17th and III./32nd—were retained at Ku-cheng-tzu, as the enemy's cavalry still threatened the left and rear, and until the 5th Division assembled a reserve was necessary.

Between 9 and 10 a.m. a Russian cavalry brigade from the south of Hu-chia-wo-peng made as if to move on Ku-cheng-tzu, and a company of infantry with the six captured Russian guns was sent to endeavour to repel it, but, fortunately, after advancing for some distance, the force halted and showed no inclination to come on.

On the right of the 8th Division the reserve brigade attempted from an early hour to advance, but conditions were unfavourable, and though some progress was made it was extremely small. Again its right flank was threatened by a force of two battalions, but the movement was checked by the I./17th R., which was turned against them.

The 16th Brigade, forming the central column, moved betimes from Ku-cheng-tzu towards its appointed place in the line, and on reaching Ho-tou-tzu* deployed, the I. and II./32nd on the right, and on the left the II. and III./17th. There being no reserve with these battalions, each regimental commander kept about two companies in the river bed north-west of Su-ma-pu, while the remainder took position behind a three-foot bank west of the road which skirts the frozen river on that side. Here they were within eight hundred yards of the Russian infantry holding the sandhills at their front, while some of the enemy were posted on a sandhill even nearer. Gallant attempts were made to push forward, and the nearest sandhill was captured by the III./17th, which lost its commander and many men.

Further to the left the situation of the 4th Brigade remained unchanged. On one side it still held San-chien-pao, Chien and Hou Wu-chia-tzu, while on the other its troops stretched from the north of Su-ma-pu westward to the river bed. The northern portion of that frozen feature was held by the Russians, who tenaciously clung to it, interrupting free communication between the right and left and causing a gap between the regiments amounting to nearly one thousand yards. Under the withering fire from Tou-pao and the incessant shelling from the guns west of that place no advance was possible, and all that the brigade could do was to hold on to the position which it now occupied.

Thus the 8th Division† —even with the addition of four battalions of the 16th Brigade—had not materially improved

---

* *See also* Map 52.

† Map 52 gives the exact situation of the 8th Division on 27th January. —A. H.

its position, and the presence of the 5th Division in the field had not yet had an appreciable effect.

To that division Lieut.-General Tatsumi had sent orders to move two regiments and five batteries to Ta-tai, from which place it was intended to attack the enemy holding the line from Liu-tiao-kou to Chao-to-tzu. Some pressure exerted in that direction might have the effect of relieving the situation before Hei-kou-tai, while at the same time threatening to cut the enemy's retreat when forced eventually to re-cross the Hun.

At 10.30 a.m., with scarcely any time for rest and none for cooking, these troops marched off towards the appointed place, while fifteen minutes earlier the 21st Regiment, accompanied by its brigade commander, Major-General Murayama, and one mountain battery, had gone in a south-westerly direction to check the cavalry coming on towards Hsiu-erh-pu and guard the left wing of the army. At that village the enemy, after taking Niu-chu on the previous night, had arrived and was rapidly working round the rear of the 8th Division. Hurrying towards the threatened point, the 21st drove back the enemy's advanced troops, and by nightfall had repulsed the main body consisting of two regiments and twelve guns, after which they took up quarters in the village of Wo-peng. Here they were still too far distant to be of service to the 4th Brigade, whose difficulties were upon the ascending scale, for during the day the whole of the 1st Siberian Army Corps had come up and the 31st Regiment was now surrounded on three sides. The Russians in the river bed, emboldened by the perilous position of the troops with whom they were engaged, moved somewhat south and threatened to encircle the left and right of the brigade. From the excellent cover which this spot afforded they inflicted heavy losses on both wings, and most of the officers of the 5th Regiment north-west of Su-ma-pu were either killed or wounded. At nightfall the three battalions of the right wing fell back within the shelter of the western edge, thus losing all the ground that had been gained towards Tou-pao and severing communication with the 31st Regiment with which was the brigade commander.

Leaving the 8th Division, whose general condition was worse than on the 26th, and opposite whom were now some four divisions, it is necessary to turn to the main body of the 5th Division, which had reached Ta-tai and was preparing to attack. The ground over which it must advance was a dead level for three thousand yards and singularly bare, while between it and the villages against which it was to move the Russians held the Hung Ho river bed, where almost nothing could be seen of them.

Lieut.-General Kigoshi ordered the left wing, consisting of the 42nd Regiment, to advance along the line from Ta-tai towards Wang-chia-wo-peng while the I./41st as right wing was directed to move through Hsiao-tien-tzu on Liu-tiao-kou and the II. and III./41st were kept as a reserve to the south of

Hsiao-tien-tzu. Following the left wing came the five batteries of mountain guns, and as soon as the infantry had cleared Ta-tai they took post on the north side of that place. While the deployment was proceeding, snow fell, obscuring the view, and the troops advanced, unperceived, to two thousand yards from the Russians. No sooner had they reached that point than three batteries in position near Wang-chia-wo-peng opened fire, and in a few seconds the line was deluged with a shower of shells. Without losing a moment, the mountain guns replied, and the commander of the 42nd, whose men, as ordered, had lain down when the Russian guns began to fire, gave the order to advance by rapid rushes. Thus the wings pressed on, coming under infantry fire at one thousand two hundred yards, and reached a point from eight hundred to nine hundred yards from the enemy. Meanwhile, at 3.30 p.m. the II./41st had been despatched to help the right, and the guns, following up the advancing line for twelve hundred yards, came into action again at 4.45 p.m. No further advance was made that afternoon, and in spite of the sleepless night on the 26th, the troops spent five hours making entrenchments, as best they could, in the iron-like ground.

As it was known that the 8th Division was in difficulties, and realized that the more the 5th pressed the more the situation would improve, Lieut.-General Kigoshi ordered up the III. 41st, which was to form a reserve for the right wing, and ordered the attack to be resumed at an early hour next day.

Night of the 27th-28th January.

No counter-attack of importance was made at night by the Russians on the 5th Division, but a portion of the line immediately to the left of that held by the Second Army and part of the 8th Division were made the objects of determined assault.

In the front held by the Second Army between Li-ta-jen-tun and Shen-tan-pu are several small villages, one of which, called Ya-pa-tai, had been severely shelled throughout the 27th. This village, which is divided into two parts by an inconsiderable stream, consists of a few houses, in places enclosed within walls from four to five feet high. Its defence was entrusted to a garrison of two sections of cavalry and two of engineers and a section of the 1st Company 9th Regiment, a force quite inadequate for the perimeter of the place. The village, too, is not compact, but straggling, and some houses, one hundred yards from the northern edge, were not included in the defensive line, which, though regarded as verging on completion, was scarcely satisfactory. Four trenches on an arc from north to west, with beyond them a narrow strip of wire entanglement, covered the village from beyond the walls.

About 4 p.m. the artillery force opposite it increased, and about 5.20 p.m. the cannonade reached its height, when three companies of infantry appeared on the southern side of Huang-ti and opened fire. Thereupon the defenders of the trenches, unable to maintain their ground, fell back behind the

walls, but were replaced by the engineers, who, leaving their work within the village, occupied the western trench. The sun now set, and as the enemy's fire began to slacken it was thought that he had drawn his men off from the attack. A company of the 18th Regiment next came up and took position in the trenches, while those who had retired at first re-occupied their ground, but sent the engineer section within the walls.

At 8.30 p.m. the Russians re-appeared, this time in greater force, and, driving the defenders from the trenches, surrounded the village on three sides, and "compassing the walls like prowling wolves," strove to gain admittance. But the Japanese, using the loopholes, thrust at them with sword and bayonet, which weapons were at times grasped by thickly gloved hands outside. A small party of the most daring of the assailants at length climbed the walls, but to a man they perished. The village seemed doomed, for the Russians were increasing, when an officer of engineers, hastily preparing hand-grenades, himself hurled them on the crowded mass outside. Joined by another officer, the united efforts of these two had such effect that at 9.30 p.m. the enemy, who had lost about one hundred killed, fell back, pursued by the infantry of the garrison, whose safety was shortly afterwards assured by the arrival of three more companies of the 18th Regiment from San-tai-tzu. But the Russians* were not to be diverted from their purpose, and at a later hour again attempted, unavailingly, to storm the village. The line in the vicinity to the east and west of Ya-pa-tai had likewise been exposed to assault, but no village was captured by the Russians that night, although on the extreme left of the 8th Division one was yielded up.

Of that division, half of the 4th Brigade in Hou Wu-chia-tzu was dangerously far from the troops situated to its right, and if Su-ma-pu were captured its isolation would be complete. An opportunity so favourable for counter-attack was not lost sight of by the Russians, and before midnight two groups, each of a regiment, were launched against the western border of the latter village. Within it was the left wing of the 16th Brigade and three battalions of the 4th, portions of which soon found themselves engaged in a deadly hand-to-hand struggle with the enemy. Supports were hurried forward to maintain the fight, and at length the Russians, after suffering and inflicting heavy loss, were driven back, but not all, for several hundreds, unknown to the Japanese, remained behind and held some outlying houses on the southern side.†

Meanwhile the enemy facing Hou Wu-chia-tzu was not quiescent, and the situation of the three battalions of the 4th Brigade was growing worse. Cut off from the rest of

* About four battalions of the 31st and 61st Divisions and 8th Army Corps attacked. There were probably only volunteers of the battalions in the attack.—A. H.

† The greater part were killed next day, and 1,300 Russians are buried in the vicinity of the village as well as several hundred Japanese.—A. H.

the division since the 26th, no orders had been received, and cartridges and food were running short. Every attempt to send ammunition under cover of night had been frustrated, for Cossacks haunted the track between the villages, and the horses carrying it were always killed. At last, nine carts, each drawn by a single horse, were sent, and though two got through, the rest were captured. Emboldened by the continued isolation of these troops, the little village of San-chien-pao was the next object of attack. Within it was a dressing station where some 400 wounded had been collected. Conceiving that the Red Cross flag might prove an insufficient protection, the slightly wounded and the auxiliary train, backed by half a company of infantry, manned the walls, and, under a major who happened to be there,* strove to keep the place inviolate. The cavalry, however, forced a way in, and the defenders took to the houses, but no misadventure befell the wounded, for the assailants rode through the street and disappeared. This incident had occurred without the knowledge of the brigade commander in Hou Wu-chia-tzu, who, deciding that to remain longer there was but to court disaster, withdrew his men at 3 a.m.

Although the distance to San-chien-pao is but one thousand yards, the little force took full three hours to cover it, for the brigadier, driven to retire, did so with great deliberation, first transporting to the rear the wounded and the dead.

On the 27th the crisis of the battle had been reached. Every man at General Grippenberg's disposal had been brought up and the situation was such that, unless the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army in Manchuria chose to send reinforcement and that speedily, the pendulum would shortly swing the other way. But no additional troops came to press the advantages already gained. On his part, Marshal Oyama, without moving a man from the front line, had issued orders which would place at Lieut.-General Tatsumi's disposal sufficient men and guns to turn the scale, as yet unfavourable to the Japanese.

The remaining regiment of the 5th Division—the 11th—and three batteries of the 17th Regiment—2nd Artillery Brigade—the whole under Major-General Suizama, reached Lang-tung-kou on the evening of the 27th, and eight battalions, a company of engineers, a squadron and three batteries of the 2nd Division had orders to assemble there on the morning of the 28th. The latter troops formed part of the general reserve, and, in anticipation of aggression on the left, replaced the 8th Division at Lan-chi† on the 25th, ready to move westward if required.

The despatch of these additional troops, in support of those engaged, was due to the anxiety which the prolonged and obstinate nature of the fighting round Hei-kou-tai was causing at Manchurian Army Head-Quarters. There it was felt that if

* This officer was on duty in connection with the arms of the wounded.—A. H.

† Near Yen-tai, on Map 48.

the Russians were not quickly forced across the Hun, a situation might arise which, besides endangering the safety of the whole field force, might greatly hamper future plans. Lieut.-General Tatsumi was therefore ordered to press the enemy on the 28th, when the force under his command would nearly number three divisions, but that commander had already recognized that prompt action must be taken and had given orders to continue the attack.

28th Jan. The weather still remained bitterly cold, and though the wind had to some extent abated, the moisture of the atmosphere had increased.

On the northern border of the battle ground, the Russians opened a heavy artillery fire against Hsiao-tai-tzu, Ya-pa-tai, and Han-shan-tai, but their infantry, glutted with the efforts of the night before, was held aloof.

When this alteration in procedure was brought to General Oku's notice, the inference he drew was that the Russians, having failed to overcome his left, were now moving or about to move troops to join those pressing Lieut.-General Tatsumi near Hei-kou-tai, a course which might gravely imperil the already strained situation there. He therefore issued orders at 11.20 a.m. that the artillery of the Second Army, along the whole front from the Mukden turnpike westward as far as Wan-chia-yuan-tzu (north-east of Li-ta-jen-tun) should open fire. This, he judged, would have the effect of making the enemy hesitate before transferring force from a part of his line possibly about to be attacked. To strengthen the delusion he ordered up the five batteries of the 13th Artillery Regiment*—then in reserve—directing them to open fire from a position close to Han-shan-tai, and, further, sent the 3rd Division, at Yang-chia-wan, westward six miles to Hsiao Kuan-yin-kou.

A little before noon the guns opened, and the Russians—ever ready to fire upon the least pretext—instantly retorted. A close watch from the Japanese observation stations was being kept, and it was seen that the enemy's infantry were taken by surprise. Small parties, making hastily for the front trenches, followed by supports, were plainly visible, and the number and position of the hostile guns were noted. In the vicinity of the railway line and on both sides of it eighty guns were counted, and west of them as far as Meng-ta-pu, north of Li-ta-jen-tun—besides howitzers—were ninety more.

Between 1 and 2 p.m. orders were given to stop the cannonade, by which time it was evident that no reduction in artillery before the Second Army had been made.† The ruse had been successful, and to strengthen it, just before sundown the guns reopened fire, and, in places where the hostile lines

* This regiment of the 1st Artillery Brigade had one battery supporting the cavalry brigade.—A. H.

† It seems reasonable to conclude that General Kuropatkin, in refusing to help General Grippenberg with troops from General Kaulbars's command, was influenced by General Oku's action.—A. H.

approached each other, rifle fire was brisk. After a brief bombardment, for the second time, the order came to cease, but the Russians, now thoroughly disturbed and perhaps fearing an attack, continued firing heavily till 9 p.m. From that hour onwards through the night they fired deliberately, and mostly so from the neighbourhood of the railway line, whence star shells were occasionally discharged.

During the day General Oku, perceiving that the enemy's infantry showed some restlessness before Li-ta-jen-tun, had taken two battalions of the 18th Regiment and sent them to strengthen the villages of Ta-tai,* Hsiao-tai, and Tai-ping-chuang.

North-west of Ta-tai† on the line of Shen-tan-pu and Hei-kou-tai, the 5th Division, starting its attack at an early hour, had obstinately advanced towards the River Hun, and though as obstinately opposed, its strenuous efforts proved to be the turning point in the hard-fought battle. The right wing, reinforced by the III./41st, was enabled to extend its line some distance towards the right, and occupied the bed of the river running west of Li-chia-wo-peng. Gaining some cover therefrom, they made their preparations for the final rush, and Liu-tiao-kou was taken at half-past nine. The left wing, however, directing its energies against Chao-to-tzu, was met by the fire of machine guns, and so open was the ground before it that the advance was slow. The divisional artillery, still in position north of Ta-tai, kept up a heavy fire on the object of attack, and during the morning three batteries of the 17th Regiment coming up, joined in the cannonade. It had been Lieut.-General Tatsumi's intention that these three batteries, which had accompanied the 11th Regiment to its place of assembly the night before, should continue with it on the 28th, but by some mistake they went to the right and joined the main body of the 5th Division north-west of Ta-tai.‡ The united efforts of these 48 guns at length prevailed, and at 3 p.m. Chao-to-tzu fell, and a portion of the artillery was sent to help the 8th Division.

At 9 a.m. the centre of that division was reinforced at Su-ma-pu by the 11th Regiment from Lang-tung-kou. As soon as it came up, preparations to resume the attack, as ordered on the previous night, were made, and joining the firing line of the 16th Brigade the line advanced against the enemy, who was still in occupation of a sandhill east of the road from Su-ma-pu to Hei-kou-tai. No sooner had the forward rush begun than men began to fall by bullets coming from the rear. The line halted, and two companies of the 16th Brigade and

* This Ta-tai is about 3 miles east by north of Li-ta-jen-tun.—A. H.

† This Ta-tai is that south by west of Shen-tan-pu.—A. H.

‡ The order regarding these batteries was miswritten or misread. Many ideograms in the Japanese language are so alike that if written indistinctly mistakes may occur. I believe that this was the cause of the error.—A. H.

one of the 4th turned round and faced the village whence the unexpected fire had come. Some of the Russians who had taken refuge in the houses after the counter-attack on the night before had made their way up to the front, and, risking the storm that certainly would fall upon them when discovered, were firing heavily into the backs of the attacking infantry. Finding it useless to reply, the Japanese rushed back, and, forcing a way within the walls, engaged them with the bayonet. A bloody fight ensued, which terminated in the surrender of two hundred Russians after three hundred others had been killed. Having secured their rear from further interruption, the line advanced again, and by 3 p.m. had gained three hundred yards, and, together with the reserve brigade on the right, occupied the enemy's first line. But Hei-kou-tai, some distance to the north, was yet untaken, and though several attempts against its walls were made by night, they failed.

The position of the 4th Brigade, so critical for many hours, was this day re-established by the arrival of the troops sent by Marshal Oyama from Lan-chi. The 2nd Division had reached Lang-tung-kou early in the morning and was resting after its march, when, at 11 a.m., an order came directing it to join the left of the 8th Division.

At this time the 21st Regiment of the 5th Division, which had passed the night in the little village of Wo-peng after holding back the enemy before it, was moving against Hsiu-erh-pu, which it occupied at 3 p.m. Beyond this point some troops, consisting of a regiment of infantry, a brigade of cavalry, twelve horse artillery guns,* and four machine guns, held the line from Pa-huang-ti to Hua-chia-wo-peng—a force too powerful for those sent against it to cope with. The 21st endeavoured to advance, but lost severely, and every officer of the single battery with it, which fought most boldly, was killed. The only troops available to give assistance were those of the 2nd Division, then on their way to join the 4th Brigade, and at 3 p.m their advanced guard entered San-chien-pao, whence it was to have been directed on Hou Wu-chia-tzu. But to attack the latter place with Pa-huang-ti held was impossible. Orders were therefore sent by Lieut.-General Tatsumi that the enemy to the south must first be driven back, and the three batteries of the 2nd Division took position on the eastern side of San-chien-pao and fired on Pa-huang-ti, while the infantry, joining the 21st Regiment, forced the enemy from the latter place and halted for the night in Ta-tu-tzu. Hearing of the arrival of reinforcements to the rear, the left of the 4th Brigade, which had been obliged to retire from Hou Wu-chia-tzu at 3 a.m., burned to attack again, and being led against the place, retook and occupied it. Not satisfied with this exploit, and elated with success, they went beyond the village under cover of night

* Eight guns north of Pa-huang-ti and four south of Ha-la-pu (not marked on map).—A. H.

and tried to take Tou-pao, but meeting there superior forces, were driven back.

The whole situation was now changing in favour of the Japanese, and the Russians, at every point, were being more than merely checked. Fresh troops, too, were coming up, for at 11 a.m. Marshal Oyama had ordered a reserve brigade to proceed to Ta-tung-shan-pu—some two miles south-west of Yang-chia-wan—where an order reached them at 10 p.m., directing them to march without delay on Ta-tai to the north, which place was reached at 5 a.m. next day (29th).

The continued occupation of Hei-kou-tai, despite the pressure exerted by the 5th Division, now led Marshal Oyama to exhort his gallant troops to make yet one more effort on the 29th to wrest it from the Russians.

29th Jan. The night of the 28th–29th passed in comparative quietness, and orders for an attack before dawn were issued, but the enemy, whose position was becoming untenable, had already decided to withdraw. The pressure of the 5th Division, now not far from his line of retreat, and the disquietude caused by the Second Army's guns, combined to make General Grippenberg decide that the moment had come to break off the action, and during the hours of darkness he began withdrawing his troops across the Hun. Nothing unusual was noticed by the Japanese outposts beyond the fact that one half-hearted counter-attack was made by some two battalions about 5 a.m. At that time the 8th and 2nd Divisions were preparing to attack, and shortly afterwards the advance began. Rushing up to the walls of Hei-kou-tai, they forced an entrance, and bayonet fighting on the west and northern sides took place. At half-past nine the enemy was driven forth, and the village that for three days had baffled every effort of the Japanese to approach was once more occupied by them. The troops now followed up, the 8th Division crossing the Hun behind the village and hurrying from Tung Yen-tai-tzu to Tu-tai-tzu. On its left the 2nd Division marched direct to Huang-la-sha-tzu, and the 21st Regiment struck the river further south. At the same time the main body of the 5th Division, which, in co-operation with the reserve brigade from Ta-tai, had at an early hour driven back a rear guard and occupied Fei-tsai-ho-tzu, crossed the river a little to the north of the latter village, and, bearing somewhat to its right, arrived in front of Yueh-pu-tzu. The enemy meantime was making good his retreat, falling back through Ssu-fang-tai on Pai-yin-tai, and from Chang-tan on Nien-yu-pao. To follow him with infantry was useless, and to prolong the action was contrary to the wishes of Marshal Oyama, and might lead to further serious fighting. Lieut.-General Tatsumi therefore issued orders for the troops to take possession of the following line:—

The 5th Division from Liu-tiao-kou through Chang-i-tao, Ya-tzu-pao, and Ma-lan-ku to Fei-tsai-ho-tzu.

The 8th Division from the latter village through Tung Yen-tai-tzu to a position on the river about a mile west of that place.

The 2nd Division continued to the west through Huang-la-sha-tzu, and thence to Huang-chia-wo-peng, beyond which the line was carried by the 21st Regiment to Kuan-chia-wo-peng.

In front of the Second Army the enemy seemed to be disheartened, for though General Oku ordered his guns to open when the haze cleared at 9 a.m., the reply came with much less vigour than on the 28th, and, after a brief space, both sides ceased the vain expenditure of ammunition.

The battle everywhere was over, and each side could count what losses had befallen it.

Of the Japanese, over nine thousand men had fallen, but the Russian casualties are more difficult to estimate, though from the number of dead buried, and from prisoners' statements, it is thought that the total number falls little short of twenty thousand, including four hundred prisoners.

Engaged against the three Japanese divisions were the following troops :—

First Siberian Army Corps.
Part of the Eighth and Tenth Army Corps.
61st Siberian Reserve Division.
Two or three European rifle brigades.
Major-General Mishchenko's cavalry, consisting of one division, one regiment of infantry, and twelve guns.

The total Russian force reached nearly seven divisions, or about twice the strength of the Japanese engaged.

The battle, with the exception of Nan Shan, had been the hardest struggle of the war, for the enemy's position had an absolutely uninterrupted field of fire for many hundred yards, and his artillery—especially on the 26th and 27th—was in greater force. Rarely, if ever, have troops fought under such terrible conditions. Not only were the days and nights intensely cold, but the biting wind generally blew straight in the teeth of the Japanese, and the ground was so hard frozen that to make cover was impossible. The Russians may have thought that their enemy, coming from a country endowed with a climate far less trying than their own, would fail to bear the trials of a winter fight, but here, as in many other points, they erred. Apart from the natural hardiness of the Japanese, due to his simple and parsimonious bringing up, his training in time of peace had included marches and manœuvres under conditions which, though not as arduous as those prevailing in Manchuria, were yet severe enough to add to his endurance. The lessons, too, of the winter of 1894–5 had not been lost, and though the burly Russian soldier may be more at home in frost and snow than sun and rain, his sufferings at Hei-kou-tai exceeded those of his diminutive foe.

The battle, probably the direct outcome of Major-General Mishchenko's raid, had cost the Russians many men and gained them nothing. The troops had come too slowly, and it seems improbable that they moved at night as much as did the Japanese. Despite the fact that little secrecy was observed as to the intended operation, yet it came as a surprise, and for a time the Japanese left was in imminent peril. However, the rapid orders of their chief and the superiority of his troops soon restored the balance, and though brave men fell in thousands at Hei-kou-tai, the victory, far from being a barren one, was the direct cause of the greater one that shortly followed.

APPENDIX 1.

Order of Battle.

8th Division.—Lieut.-General Tatsumi commanding :—

4th Brigade.—Major-General Yoda commanding. I., II. and III./5th Regiment, and I., II. and III./31st Regiment.

16th Brigade.—Major-General Kamada commanding. I. II. and III./17th Regiment, and I., II. and III./32nd Regiment.

8th Artillery Regiment.—Six field batteries and one battery of captured Russian field guns (six).

8th Cavalry Regiment and *8th Engineer Battalion.*

5th Division.—Lieut.-General Kigoshi commanding :—

9th Brigade.—Major-General Suizama commanding. I., II. and III./11th Regiment, and I., II. and III./41st Regiment.

21st Brigade.—Major-General Murayama commanding. I., II. and III./21st Regiment, and I., II. and III./42nd Regiment.

5th Artillery Regiment.—Six mountain batteries.

5th Cavalry Regiment and *5th Engineer Battalion.*

2nd Division.—Eight battalions of infantry, three batteries, one squadron of cavalry, and one company of engineers.

In addition to the above there were the following troops :—

A reserve brigade with the 8th Division (but not belonging to it) composed as follows :—I. and II./15th, I. and II./17th, and I. and II./31st Regiments. (The I. 15th Regiment was not present in the action.)

A second reserve brigade, probably of four battalions, was sent on the 28th January to join the 5th Division.

Three batteries 17th Artillery Regiment came up with the 11th Regiment on the 28th January.

N.B.—No troops of the Second Army are included in the above.

APPENDIX 2.

Casualties at the Battle of Hei-kou-tai.

The casualties are always very difficult to obtain accurately, but it is believed that the following are approximately correct.

The total number of casualties in the whole force engaged from the 25th to the 29th January 1905 is stated by the Japanese to be as follows :—

Officers.		Other ranks.		
Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
81	218	1,648	6,773	8,720
		Add for Second Army	-	400
		Grand Total	-	9,120

The following is the detail by divisions so far as can be ascertained :—

	Officers.		Other ranks.			
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
8th Division -	63	166	1,473	5,294	89*	7,085
5th Division -	9	41	135	1,046†	—	1,231
						8,316
		Add for Second Army		-	-	400
						8,716
		Add for 2nd Division		-	-	404
						9,120

In the last total given above the losses of the 2nd Division have been conjectured. The division was not heavily engaged, and its losses probably make up the difference between 8,720 and 8,316.

---

* Mostly rejoined.—A. H.

† Injuries from frost-bite are included in the whole of the figures given above, and would seem to be large in the 5th Division.—A. H.

As the 8th Division went into action with 17 battalions (this includes the five battalions of the reserve brigade engaged), and as it had no troops in action—except in the pursuit after Major-General Mishchenko — its strength was probably 800 multiplied by 17, or 13,600 infantry, 433 cavalry, 1,230 artillery, and 470 engineers, or altogether 15,733 men. Its losses were, therefore, nearly 50 per cent.

In the above figures no allowance has been made for the extra battery with the 8th Division.

APPENDIX 3.

The Attack of the 5th Division on the 27th and 28th January 1905.

Right Wing.—At the beginning of the action—3,000 yards from the enemy—the I./41st was deployed as right wing, and it was followed by the II./41st.

At first two companies were in front line and two in rear of the right flank in echelon.

The front line companies had each two sections extended at five paces interval for the firing line, and one section each, 100 yards in rear, similarly extended.

Advance under Shell Fire.—Without receiving any specific order the men lay down immediately the Russians shelled them, and directly a pause occurred they rushed forward, and so came to 1,200 yards from the enemy.*

Advance under Rifle Fire.—At 1,200 yards distance the enemy opened rifle fire, and the supports immediately rushed into the gaps in the firing line, which replied and went forward by rushes.

By rushes, a position from 800 to 900 yards from the enemy was reached. The firing line now consisted of three companies of I./41st and two of II./41st which had been sent up. The latter battalion had one company as battalion reserve and one as regimental reserve. The latter company was in rear of the right. The two companies II./41st came up with small loss, being covered by the fire of the guns north of Ta-tai.

Situation at Night.—For five hours the infantry dug trenches. The work was difficult, but the furrows of the *kaoliang* helped, and so did a Chinese burial-ground with a few mounds, and some sandbags. During the night a strong outpost line was placed in front. The temptation among the men to sleep was very great, and the officers had continually to go round their companies waking them up and exhorting them to try and

* It is an understood thing what the men shall do.—A. H.

keep awake on account of the great cold. The men were made to change their leather shoes for Chinese straw boots, &c. The right wing men were more frost-bitten than the left, as they were disturbed by some slight counter-attacks which prevented them from protecting themselves so well from the cold. Charcoal was brought up to the trenches and fires lighted, which were highly appreciated.

Communication to the rear was kept up by files.

Left Wing. — The first deployment consisted of the III. and II./42nd Regiment. The I./42nd was in echelon on the left rear.

The first line deployed as follows:—Each company formed column of sections (the companies were probably in fours up to this time). Each section had its men extended at four paces and was 150 yards behind the one in front of it.

The second line was at first in line two deep, but when the enemy's guns opened soon after leaving Ta-tai, the men extended to four paces with a distance between companies of from 100 to 150 yards. (I think the companies were in column of sections two companies abreast, but it is very difficult to get clear translations or explanations regarding Japanese formations.)

When the shell fire began, rushes of 50 to 80 yards were made, but these were halved when rifle fire was opened. When 1,200 yards was reached the supports of the II. and III./42nd filled the gaps in the first line, one company being kept as regimental reserve. Before rifle fire began scouts had been sent forward as far as possible. The I./42nd—second line—advanced in line of company sections, 100 to 150 yards between sections and the men extended at one to two paces.

Mountain Batteries.—The artillery—five batteries—came into action at 3,000 yards range, except one battery, which did not fire from the first position, there not being time for it to get there from column of route before the guns advanced to the second position. As the infantry advanced and left a gap between themselves and the guns, a second position was selected. At 3.50 p.m. battery after battery advanced 1,200 yards to that position, and fire was reopened at 4.45 p.m. at a range of 1,800 yards. The left batteries (two) moved first, and then the three on the right.

The infantry advance was greatly helped by the artillery fire and by the guns coming forward in support.

The two batteries on the left advanced in column of route, both moving parallel to each other. The three on the right changed position in echelon, the guns of each battery moving in line. The guns were drawn on wheels and not carried on pack transport. The ammunition ponies after delivering their ammunition, as well as the gun ponies, went back to Ta-tai for cover. The casualties in the five batteries on this date were all ranks killed and wounded 49, ponies killed and wounded 25.

The Russians on this day used both direct and indirect fire.

Casualties by shell and rifle fire during the advance up to 800 or 900 yards:—

	Killed and wounded (By shell fire).	Killed and wounded (By rifle fire).	
Right wing - -	3	91	
Left wing - - -	115	369	
	118	460	Total 578

(Rifle fire includes machine-gun fire.)

Comparison of losses during rushes and when halted:—

	Killed and wounded.		Killed and wounded.	
Right wing during rushes	18	When halted	76	
Left wing „ „	128	„ „	356	
	146		432	Total 578

From the above lists it appears that when the enemy is shelling on open ground, to hesitate in the advance causes losses and to go quickly forward to decisive range is the best policy. It is apparent that the Russian shrapnel fire is not greatly to be feared. At first they had three and later five batteries, and eight battalions of infantry.

I have frequently noticed that a number of men get killed, shot in the head lying down—more especially in the late operations, when digging was impossible—showing that the slightest cover is of value.

28*th January*.—On the 28th the advance was continued in the same way, *i.e.*, by rushes, but the rather more open ground opposite the left wing made its attack difficult, whereas the right wing got some cover in the frozen bed of a stream. The losses in the right wing this day were 146, and in the left wing 161. The losses are extraordinarily small when it is considered that the Russians had a clear field of fire and that their infantry was posted in the bed of a stream with a dead level in front, so that they had merely to keep their rifles parallel to the ground and scarcely expose themselves to view. As usual, an immense number of empty zinc ammunition boxes—300 rounds in each are the contents when full—were lying about when I visited the ground on 5th April, showing that the Russians had fired much.

(3) The Battle of Hei-kou-tai.

ACCOUNT by Lieut.-General SIR IAN HAMILTON, K.C.B., D.S.O., on 29th January 1904.

(*See* Map 50.)

Covering Letter.

I do not dignify the following short story by the name of report, as I was unable before I left to collect sufficient materials for making a serious study of the operations centring about Hei-kou-tai. No doubt full details will in due course be furnished by the British officers, with the Second Army, who were better placed than I was to make personal observations.* But although the foundation of facts I have been able to gather together does not justify me in basing anything more than a very slender story upon it, yet such as it is I think it worth giving, if only for the reason that it emanates from Generals Kuroki and Fujii. General Fujii gave me the narrative in the presence of General Kuroki, who sometimes added a remark.

Narrative furnished by Generals Kuroki and Fujii.

Field-Marshal Oyama learnt on the 24th, at noon, that some unusual movement had taken place at Mukden during the 23rd January. His spies reported that the tendency of the movement was to the south. The Commander-in-Chief paid but little attention to these reports, as other information had predisposed him against believing in any serious imminent Russian advance. However, sure enough, on the 25th the enemy began to cross the Hun River, and on that same date it was ascertained that one of his detachments was advancing southwards from Yen-tai-tzu, whilst another was crossing lower down and beginning to appear before Hsiu-erh-pu.

The enemy's force engaged in the operations which were about to begin amounted to more than four divisions, namely, the 8th Army Corps, a part of the 5th Siberian Army Corps, and two brigades of sharpshooters. At first this was not at all realized by Manchurian Army Head-Quarters, who thought they had to deal with a much smaller force. On the 26th January, Marshal Oyama ascertained that the enemy was approaching Hei-kou-tai, on the left bank of the Hun Ho, 36 miles south-west of Mukden, and that another column was

* No foreign officers were present at the battle of Hei-kou-tai.

advancing on Huang-chia-wo-peng, some 5 miles still further south-west along the river. Yet another column was marching through Chang-tan, 5 miles north-east of Hei-kou-tai, on the west bank of the river. Thus there were in all three columns on the move about our extreme left, the main force being directed upon Hei-kou-tai. In addition there were several Russian detachments marching due south and making for the gap between the Japanese left wing and the river, which was very weakly held. At this stage it began to be realized that something serious was in the wind, and the idea gained ground that the force of the enemy might amount to as much as two divisions. But Manchurian Army Head-Quarters, as well as we ourselves, were sorely puzzled, and quite unable to imagine whether this movement was merely a local demonstration, or attempt to gain a local advantage, or whether it was the preliminary to a general advance. We were unanimous in our conviction that if General Kuropatkin meant serious business he would not confine his attention to one point only; therefore, as nothing happened elsewhere, we assumed that the advance against our left could not in the meantime possibly develop into a serious attack. But we made preparations to meet an assault and furious battle along our whole line. However, even twelve hours after the enemy had crossed the Hun River, we were entirely unable to detect the smallest sign of an attack on the main positions held by our army.

Now, as news began to come in of an apparently serious advance to the east of the Hun Ho, we were driven to ask ourselves, "If, after all, the Russians confine themselves to "attacking our extreme left, then what on earth can be their "object?" Nothing could be less opportune, it seemed to us, from their point of view, than the period they had selected: several weeks had passed since the fall of Port Arthur, and the enemy must have understood that by this time part of the besieging Third Army had arrived at the front. If Mishchenko's raid had done no other good, surely it had enabled him to report at least so much to his commander-in-chief?

Indeed, it is not necessary to emphasize the obvious by insisting that a grand attack by the Russians should either have occurred whilst Port Arthur was holding out, or, if that was impossilbe, within a week of its fall. Otherwise, according to theory, it should have been indefinitely postponed; nevertheless, when we came to look back upon the previous political battle of the Sha Ho, it seemed conceivable, nay, even probable, that this was going to be another instance of Kuropatkin being forced to do something merely on account of political troubles in Russia. When politics intrude upon the battlefield the most inconceivable things become possible. Therefore we made up our minds to stand prepared to fight either an empty, meaningless, partial action, on our left, or a great general action; but we began now to think the former most likely.

Accordingly, the general reserve, the 8th Division, was sent to Hei-kou-tai. It was only recently that I was telling you of this division and its bad fortune in seeing no fighting yet.* It comes from Sendai, the home also of our well-known 2nd Division, and I think you will find when we get details they have done as well as their comrades, perhaps even better. They made a fine beginning anyway by marching 18 miles in this awful weather. The 5th Division from the Fourth Army followed them and then our own 2nd Division.† Last of all, two reserve brigades were despatched, making a grand total of four Japanese divisions of infantry, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, and three field batteries. This was our maximum. We know no details yet. We have heard only that whilst the 8th Division was attacking Hei-kou-tai, a detachment of Russians advanced against them from Hsiu-erh-pu, which is four miles due south of Hei-kou-tai. They faced in two directions therefore and fought with their two lines forming an acute angle. Fortunately, before this had gone on for very long, the 2nd Division came up and attacked the enemy from the south. The 5th Division attacked the enemy at Liu-tiao-kou, three miles north-east of Hei-kou-tai, and occupied that place. The enemy's detachments coming down south into the weakly held gap between our left and the river Hun, attacked the Japanese posts which were stationed in entrenchments with machine guns at Shen-tan-pu and Li-ta-jen-tun, which are, respectively, about 5 and 9 miles due east of Hei-kou-tai. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade was sent to Hsiao-pei-ho‡ where the Tai-tzu and the Hun Rivers meet. They had been withdrawn some little time previously from the extreme right of the army, as the country there was too mountainous for their effective use.

The first success scored was the expulsion of the Russians from Liu-tiao-kou by the 5th Division. At Hou Wu-chia-tzu, 2½ miles south-west from Hei-kou-tai, the 2nd Division obtained the next advantage by driving out the enemy after some heavy fighting. At Shen-tan-pu the enemy made no less than five determined attacks against our entrenchment and its machine gun, and were repulsed each time. The machine gun did great execution, and we have heard, but this is not yet verified, that there were a thousand dead Russians left before it. At Li-ta-jen-tun the enemy could make no headway at all against our guns, and was beaten back each time directly he tried to advance. But the Russians were in force at Hei-kou-tai and stuck it out well there. The reason they held on so stubbornly was, no doubt, that if we had succeeded in capturing this place, then all the Russians to the south of it must have been cut off from their line of retreat. The 8th Division made some fine attacks upon Hei-kou-tai, but were each time repulsed mainly

* The 8th Division was not sent to the theatre of war until October 1904.

† Kuroki's army was formed of the Guard, 2nd and 12th Divisions.

‡ Eight miles south-west of the south-west corner of Map 50.

by the fire of the Russian machine guns. The 8th Division attacked from the east and, as I have explained already, had to defend themselves at the same time from the south. Had the enemy from the south pushed on more vigorously and faster, the situation of the 8th Division must have passed from its actual dangerous state into one which could only be characterized as desperate. Fortunately they took it easy, and so the 2nd Division had time to cut in. Had our division been less good than the 8th, which as you know is recruited from the north-east of Japan, then perhaps things would not have ended quite so well as they did actually. Curiously the reserve brigade with the 8th Division were also men from the north-east, so the Russians at Hei-kou-tai were in bad luck. Early this morning the enemy were found to have evacuated Hei-kou-tai, leaving only a rear guard of skirmishers, and so we have now occupied it with but little resistance. If the enemy had made a demonstration along our front we could not have spared so many troops as we did to meet their flank attack, and thus it seems to me the Russians would have had a much better chance.

It is quite true that I had assured Marshal Oyama (General Kuroki is speaking) that I could spare the 2nd Division whatever happened, provided we stuck to our own lines and were not ordered to attack the Russian lines. Still I think there might have been a little delay in despatching them had the Russians been active in our front, and it is possible even that I might have relieved them of a battalion or two before I sent them off, under such conditions.

Once more I must say we can none of us imagine why Kuropatkin did not try this attack before the arrival of the Third Army from Port Arthur. To have been quite perfect for us he might have postponed it just a few days longer; but after all we could not have selected a much better date ourselves, and we had been ready enough for at least a week, whenever they chose to come on. There is a Japanese proverb which says that so soon as an attack is made upon a man it is essential he should attack in turn with all his vigour, even if he is much the weaker person of the two. We always try to act on this proverb. Some have spoken as if the battle of Hei-kou-tai was a Russian reconnaissance in force, but it has been too big an affair to be placed in that category. Our prisoners tell us that Kuropatkin had determined to wait until he found whether this flanking force sent against our left could maintain itself in its threatening position. Had it been able to do so he would then have come down in great force on the left of our army, and against that weakly held section, without many entrenchments which extended between our left and the Hun River. The enemy's main force is still encamped opposite our left on the right bank of the Hun Ho.

We have estimated the Russian general reserve at six or seven divisions, so Kuropatkin must have employed them all on

this attempt against our left, for although the weight of the fighting fell on the four Russian divisions I have already given you, there were at least two divisions backing them up. At the very most Kuropatkin cannot now have more than two divisions in rear of his centre. Our great object must now be to keep the Russian force distributed as at present, and I think if we leave our troops there the Russians will also keep theirs watching them. The more Kuropatkin shifts his troops to his right the more favourable will the situation be for us should we decide to make the next advance by Sai-ma-chi—Ping-tai-tzu in the direction of Kan-sho. On so greatly extended a line it takes a long time for either side to bring up reserves to the threatened points, and it is not practically possible to shift troops from one flank to the other once fighting has begun. The Japanese admire the Russians because they fought very bravely at Hei-kou-tai. It was a case of fresh troops on either side. The new reserves fought splendidly. One company went into action 210 strong and lost all its officers and men except 30, and these 30 still stood their ground. This company was destroyed by Russian machine guns.

Here ends the story as told by the Commander of the First Army and the Chief of the Staff.

(4) A Japanese Cavalry Raid before the Battle of Mukden.*

REPORT by Captain J. B. JARDINE, 5th Lancers.
Tokio, 19th July 1905.

Plate.

Sketch Map - - - - Plate 53.

The following account of a remarkable raid made by the Japanese cavalry on the Russian lines of communication exemplifies thorough preparation and endurance on the part of the former, and illustrates the inferiority of their enemy. I would beg to point out that a raid of such a kind by a small body can only be possible under certain conditions. The inhabitants may be considered to have been for the most part neutral and disinterested. This frame of mind in the average Chinaman is by means of money readily converted into one of cordiality and goodwill. The nature of the country at that time of the year was most favourable, for the going was good and the rivers no obstacle. I think this raid deserves the highest praise. One wonders how long this war would have lasted had the cavalry conditions been reversed at its outset, *i.e.*, had the Japanese possessed the superior numbers and the Russians the inferior. This raid is of a very different calibre to Mishchenko's, when he managed to reach Ying-kou. I have it from the British and American consuls of that place that it was practically without defence, although it contained very large stores. Yet Mishchenko arrived, hesitated, and was lost, for reinforcements had time to come up.

This raid by the Japanese cavalry was determined on owing to valuable information obtained by two or three successful reconnaissances made by officers' patrols. These passing through the enemy's cavalry lines were some days riding about the country to his rear. I regret I have not had an opportunity of meeting these officers, but I have heard from others of some incidents of their journeys. From these it is seen how, when dealing with an enemy as ignorant as the Russian Cossack, boldness and effrontery, nine times out of ten, are the best courses. One one occasion an officer's patrol, after

* Accounts of other raids will be found in Report 5 and in the appendices of Report 39, "Japanese Cavalry."

reconnoitring the enemy's line, saw that the best place to pass through it was at a small bridge on which a sentry was posted. Putting up the collars of their coats to hide their faces, they rode up to the bridge in single file, the officer leading. On reaching it, they dismounted and led their horses. The sentry, who never challenged them, came forward, and taking the officer's horse, led it across. All having remounted on the other side, the sentry for some reason or other had his suspicions aroused and would not let go the officer's reins. The latter at once shot him with his revolver, and the patrol galloped on. They eventually, a few days later, regained their lines in safety.

The expedition was organized at Hsiao-pei-ho—a village west of Liao-yang at the junction of the Tai-tzu and the Hun.*

The situation of the opposing armies was as it had been all the winter, but about the middle of January Mishchenko became active on the Japanese left.

The troops were divided into two bodies, which I will term A and B, each to act independently. A was composed of two squadrons, *i.e.*, a total of 200 men odd, under Lieut.-Colonel Naganuma, and it started a week before B. I regret that I was unable to obtain an account of the operations of A,† but know that it succeeded in cutting the railway west of Harbin, and eventually rejoined the Japanese Armies a few days before the end of the battle of Mukden. B force was under the command of Major Hasegawa (of the 1st Cavalry Brigade)—an officer specially selected. His force was composed of 104 non-commissioned officers and men of the First Cavalry Brigade, and of the 3rd, 6th, and 9th Cavalry Regiments. The non-commissioned officers and men were specially selected for their good constitutions, as well as other qualities. It may be mentioned here that not a man was left behind owing to sickness throughout the journey. The horses were chosen—the best that could be obtained from the regiments concerned. All were Government bred, except a few ridden by men of the 6th Regiment (Kiushu horses, usually not the best in Japan). A veterinary surgeon, doctor, Chinese interpreter, and financial officer accompanied the force. At the start five Chinese carts accompanied them, lightly loaded, for the amount they carried was equal to the amount that would be ordinarily carried by two carts.

For some days before they started, the horses were given the kind of food they were likely to get on the journey, *i.e.*, *kaoliang* seeds and stalks, straw and bean cake, to accustom them to it. Felt boots and winter overcoats were worn. The goatskin waistcoat was not worn, as it was judged too conspicuous. Other than this there was no change in the men's clothing. The men

* No junction is shown on the map although the two rivers approach very closely at this point.

† *See* Report 5, page 66.

started with four days' rations on the saddle—two of rice and two of biscuit. No forage for the horses was carried. The financial officer had charge of 10,000 *yen* (more than £1,000) in army notes and cash. This sum was at the disposal of Major Hasegawa for food, forage, making good loss of horseflesh, bribery, &c., and was almost exhausted when the expedition came to an end. The amount of ammunition carried was not great. After abandoning the Chinese carts, each man carried 200 rounds. To sum up, no care was omitted in order to make the little force fit and suitable for thebusiness in hand.

The country north of Fa-ku-men is flat and sometimes slightly undulating; villages are numerous. As soon as Mongolia was entered, fuel, forage, food and water became scarce. The villages, which contain a pastural population, are few and far between. They rarely consist of more than ten houses. There is no farming class, so crops are scarce. The banks of the I-tung are well populated. It was the practice of Major Hasegawa to march his men quietly along without throwing out scouts or flanking parties of any kind. He himself rode as a rule a little ahead of the squadrons. This he did in order not to attract attention, *i.e.*, to cause people a little way off to suppose that his men were merely a body of Russians on the march. His information he got entirely from the Chinese. No Chinese bandits accompanied him. Houses being scarce at times during their journey, they occasionally had to bivouac, and at such times fuel was invariably difficult to obtain. It may be imagined how the men suffered from cold and sleepless nights. He almost invariably chose a small village to sleep in, in preference to a large one, because the latter was difficult to guard. On arrival of the squadron at a village, sentries were at once put round it and no Chinaman allowed to leave it. Any inhabitant of a neighbouring village entering it was forced to remain until the Japanese left. On arriving at a village where a halt of even a short duration was intended, information was asked for and men under promise of money sent out to watch the neighbourhood and get additional information. The going was never heavy throughout the raid, for the frost was not yet out of the ground. The force at one time got within 40 miles of Harbin.

Itinerary.

15th Jan. On the 15th January the force under Major Hasegawa was equipped and ready to start.

The orders given him were few but explicit, viz. (1) To move on Ta-wang (north west of Hsiao-pei-ho, on the left bank of the Liao Ho) and sever Mishchenko's communications. (2) To get behind the enemy's line and disturbing his flanks and rear, doing as much damage as possible.

19th Jan. Ta-wang was reached on the 16th, where it was discovered that Mishchenko had already gone north. On the 19th they

started again after hiring five local Chinese soldiers as guides. Moving west of Hsin-min-tun and avoiding villages, marching sometimes by night and sometimes by day, they got to Shin-liu-tun (12 miles north-west of Chang-tu Fu), *i.e.*, 100 miles in six days. The population was simple and well disposed, and, as a rule, did not distinguish them from Russians, whose scouts, even when they met them, apparently took no notice of them. At this place the weather got much colder, and they were obliged to buy fur and Chinese caps. The men wore the Chinese cap under their own, and the khaki hood over both. They also obtained fur wristlets and had their stirrups covered with fur.

27th Jan. Shin-liu-tun was left on 27th January, with the intention of getting to the railway, but information from the Chinese disclosed that the enemy had posts at Feng-hua and Pa-men-cheng, so Major Hasegawa determined to move westwards.

1st Feb. On 1st February, they reached Ha-ra-to-kai (36 miles north-west by west of Shin-liu-tun). Leaving that place on the same date, they reached Shou-lo-fu-tun (50 miles north-west of Tei-ja-tun, which is a village due north of Shin-liu-tun). Here they learnt from the natives that south of Chi-chi-ha-ru, and on the road between that place and Pei-tu-ne, there were 700 or 800 Cossacks, while in and about Pei-tu-ne there were about 1,000 of the enemy. Added to this, at Nung-an (42 miles north of Chang-chun Fu) there were 300 or 400 Cossacks and brigands. So the line of the railway apparently was fairly well guarded. Meanwhile, the further they went north the more pro-Russian the natives became. From information received it seemed that there were fewer of the enemy in the neighbourhood of Nung-an than elsewhere, so it was determined to destroy the railway not far from that place. Leaving Shou-lo-fu-tun, where they dismissed their Chinese carts, on the 13th, they passed Nung-an in the night without discovery, and reached the neighbourhood of Han-chia-wan-tzu railway station (50 miles north of Chang-chun and 15 miles

18th Feb. east of Nung-an) at 4 a.m., 18th February. Dawn being near at hand, and as no Russians were met with, they pushed on to a point on the line one and a quarter miles north of the station, where they blew up the roadway and destroyed the telegraph wires and several telegraph poles. While this was being done, part of the force approached within 1,200 yards of the station and opened fire on it. At 5.30 a.m. they left, and going rapidly north for six miles, arrived at Chao-chia-hu-tun (west of the railway) as it was getting light. Resting here until 10 a.m., they moved north-west, and reached Huan-hi-lin (village on the left bank of the I-tung River) where they halted for the night. While halted at Chao-chia-hu-tun, some Cossack scouts appeared in the distance following them from the railway, but they soon withdrew. At Huan-hi-lin they discovered that the right bank of the I-tung was patrolled by the enemy, whose numbers were uncertain, so they decided on going north towards Harbin.

On 20th February, the force crossed the Sungari and reached Chia-chen-tzu (a few miles north of the river on its right bank), where the report they had received of the Russians at Pei-tu-ne was corroborated. In addition they learnt that there were 150 of the enemy at Sha-li-tien railway station (east of Chia-chen-tzu). An attack was decided on. At 8 p.m., therefore, they moved off. At midnight the Japanese reached a hill south-west of the station and halted. After a short delay ten men were sent forward, each carrying a grenade, to creep up, and avoiding the sentries explode them in the buildings or defence works. Each grenade was to be thrown one after the other, that is to say, successively, in order to cause the maximum of confusion and disorder. Meanwhile the remainder of the force was to follow, and dismounting at a suitable spot open a hot fire on the place. All took place as arranged. The enemy opened fire after the explosions but it was noticeable how few did so: certainly not more than twenty, so it is supposed the remainder ran off. The Japanese opened a hot fire in return at 400 yards, and about 2 a.m., as the enemy had apparently all gone, an attempt was made to fire the huts and station. Unfortunately the explosives had so excited some of the horses that seventeen broke away, and headed for Chia-chen-tzu. This interfered with the proceedings, as the horses had to be recaptured if possible, but only four were secured, the rest crossing the Sungari, and making off south. The day was passed at Chia-chen-tzu, where Chinese horses were bought in lieu of those that had been lost. This *contretemps* prevented the Japanese from blowing up the line. While at Chia-chen-tzu, some Chinese who were sent out ascertained that there had been 120 Russians at the station prior to the attack, and their casualties amounted to 17 killed and wounded. The Japanese had no casualties. **20th Feb.**

The 21st was spent at Chia-chen-tzu. On the morning of the 22nd 200 Cossacks came from the direction of Sha-li-tien, but did not attack, contenting themselves with watching Chia-chen-tzu from a hill north-east of it. Fresh information from the Chinese was to the effect that at Chan-chun-lin (25 miles north-east of Chia-chen-tzu) there was a mixed force of the enemy, so a more eastward move was out of the question. Retirement to the left bank of the Sungari was decided on. The 200 Cossacks followed, but touch was lost before the Japanese reached the river. **21st Feb.**

After crossing, the force on the 24th reached Tong-hua-kuai (18 miles north of Nung-an) most of the marching being done at night. Here they heard that there were from 200 to 300 Cossacks at Kao-chi-ten (on the right bank of the I-tung). To cut the railway anywhere in this district would be very difficult, so they pushed on to Shin-shuan-shou (25 miles north-west of Huai-tê; Huai-tê is 25 miles west of Chang-chun Fu), where they arrived on the 28th. The Chinese magistrate of **24th Feb.**

this place told them that Lieut.-Colonel Naganuma (who was on his way back after destroying the railway west of Harbin),* had met, ten days before, a superior force of the enemy a few miles to the east, and after some casualties had retired south-west, also that the colonel's instructions had been to go to Tei-ja-tun, where he proposed waiting for Major Hasegawa. The magistrate also said there were considerable bodies of the enemy at Nung-an and Huai-tê who patrolled constantly to the south. Major Hasegawa, on receiving this information, again dismissed any thought of cutting the railway, and leaving Shin-

1st Mar. shuan-shou on 1st March, arrived on the 3rd at Tei-ja-tun. Here the information was that the colonel had passed through the village ten days before, and fought with the enemy west of Liao-yang-ka-tou (33 miles south of Tei-ja-tun), after which he had moved on south. This, Major Hasegawa thought, would be an opportunity of cutting the railway, for in all probability most of the Cossacks had gone south in pursuit of Colonel Naganuma. He chose Ssu-ping-kai railway station as his objective, but as first move he left Tei-ja-tun and went to a small village 12 miles south of it, Tei-ja-tun being too large

4th Mar. a place to stop in. All the 4th he remained at the small village, and did not leave it until the night 6th–7th. During this stay he got the following information :—"Bodies of the enemy are defending a line from Feng-hua to Fa-ku-men. It is a strong line, and at the latter place there are about 6,000 men. The troops at the former place have some guns. There are troops also along the railway itself." It seems the Russians must have imagined that large forces of the Japanese cavalry were threatening the railway. It is an interesting fact that a correspondent on the Russian side writing to a German newspaper stated that just before the battle of Mukden, Kuropatkin sent an infantry brigade north to guard the railway, owing to the Japanese cavalry raids. During the night 6th–7th the squadron marched 18 miles in a south-east direction to Pa-chia-tzu. On the way the natives were hostilely inclined, and at first refusing to provide guides, were eventually compelled to do so. These men did their best to escape. This behaviour on the part of the Chinese led Major Hasegawa to think that the enemy's force must be near at hand, and strong, so on the night 7th–8th he went back to the small village he had occupied on the 4th, 5th and 6th.

8th Mar. It was now more than fifty days since the force had started with four days' rations, and the Chinese food was telling on men and animals. The former were thin and the latter weak. On this account Hasegawa divided his force into two parties of about fifty each, one of strong men and horses, and one of weak men and horses. Up to this date they had had no casualties. On the night 9th–10th he despatched the weaker party to

* The railway south of Harbin only was cut by this party, *see* Report 5, page 66.

Shin-liu-tun, where they were to await him, while he himself with the stronger party moved on Ssu-ping-kai station. At 10 a.m, 10th March, they reached Pao-li-pao (north-east of Pa-chia-tzu). Here they were surrounded suddenly by 300 Cossacks, who, keeping at a fairly safe distance, opened fire, which they returned from the village. After fighting for some time, a force of the enemy's infantry was seen in the distance advancing from the north-east. Hasegawa quickly saw that there was nothing to be done but make a bolt for it, so he brought all his men to the south side of the village and ordered them to fire as rapidly as possible for a few minutes, to clear the way. Then, jumping on their horses, the Japanese drew their swords and charged out of the village. The Cossacks in front, *i.e.*, on the south side, did not care to meet them, but some of the Japanese rode at those who were nearest, and if they did not kill any, wounded a few. There was no time to enquire. The party then galloped off to the south. Four Japanese were slightly wounded, but got away. Five owing to their horses being weak were left behind. Their fate is unknown. The enemy never came on boldly, although the whole affair lasted forty minutes after the first shot was fired. It was a fortunate thing for the Japanese that the two parties had separated a few hours before. Had it been otherwise their casualties would have been great. After going 18 miles in a southerly direction as fast as they could without utterly knocking up the horses, they lost sight of the Cossacks, and at 8 p.m. reached a village 6 miles south of Liao-yang-ka-tou. Just before reaching it they caught up the other party. Here the force halted for a few hours. **10th Mar.**

It was clear to Major Hasegawa that any further attempts against the enemy's line of communication were out of the question. He had done a great deal by drawing off the enemy north. Small though his force was it had apparently afforded the Russians guarding the railway some anxiety. After a few hours' rest he started for Hsin-min-tun, and making a detour west of Fa-ku-men, during which he met with no enemy, he reached the Japanese lines on the 16th March, just as the battle of Mukden was being concluded. **16th Mar.**

The casualties were 9 men wounded and missing; 21 horses were lost. Many horses were lame at the end of the expedition, but hardly one was not as sound as ever after treatment and a rest. Most of the money was spent.

(5) Japanese Cavalry Raid against the Russian Lines of Communication in January, February, and March 1905.

REPORT by Lieut.-Colonel A. L. HALDANE, D.S.O., General Staff. Tokio, 3rd October 1905.

Plates.

General map - - - - Map 54
Destruction of Hsin-kai Ho bridge - - } In text
Attack on Chang-chia-pu - - - }

Appendix.

Articles carried on the horse.

Covering Letter.

I have the honour to submit an account of a raid carried out against the Russian lines of communication north of Mukden in the early months of 1905, by a party of Japanese cavalry under Lieut.-Colonel Naganuma, commanding the 8th Cavalry Regiment.

I would point out, that in spite of the destructive work of the raid having invariably been undertaken by night and in pitch darkness, no mishap occurred, a fact which is no doubt due to the precise knowledge previously imparted to each officer and man of the part he had to play. That no rumour of the projected movement (so far as is known) reached the Russians on the Sha Ho—a movement which must, through the nature of the organization of the force, have been known or suspected by several thousand officers and men—speaks well for the reticence of the Japanese army.

Some of the names on the maps forwarded, more especially those in Mongolia, are probably not transliterated into correct Anglicized Chinese, but the maps from which they were copied were in manuscript, and the Chinese characters extremely difficult to decipher.

Narrative.

General Condition of the Russian and Japanese Armies prior to the Raid.

The month of December 1904 saw the Russian and Japanese armies facing each other at close distance along the line of the Sha Ho, under such climatic conditions as seemed likely, for a time, to debar either side from embarking upon operations of an extensive or protracted nature. Yet the opportunity for minor enterprises on the flanks was favourable; for the rivers, being frozen, offered no obstacle to free movement, and the troops which services of this order demand, were precisely those that could then best be spared. Both Russians and Japanese contemplated cavalry action in the area lying west of their respective forces, where the ground, being level and open, is far more suitable for the purpose than that which is to be found on the eastern flank. The result of deliberations on the one hand gave birth to Major-General Mishchenko's raid on Ying-kou, while those on the other, with which we are at present concerned, led to the bold dash of Major-General Akiyama's cavalry against the railway near Chang-chun Fu.

The 1st Japanese Cavalry Brigade, under the latter general (the same brigade that had covered the left of the Second Army from the battle of Ta-shih-chiao onwards) was at this time holding a line from Li-ta-jen-tun (B 6) westward through Shen-tan-pu (B 6) to Hei-kou-tai (B 6), and attached to it were the mounted troops of several infantry divisions. To employ the whole of this force (whose numbers probably did not equal those led by Major-General Mishchenko in his abortive effort to the south) against the Russian rear did not enter into the Japanese plan, for to have done so would have not only seriously weakened the left of the Second Army and shown that weakness to the enemy, but would have also minimized mobility, a factor upon which success mainly depended.

The Object, Organization, and Strength of the Expedition.

The general object of the expedition, the preparations for which were entrusted by Major-General Akiyama to the officer selected by him to take command, were to cut the railway and telegraph lines at a point well to the north of the Manchu capital. This was, if possible, to be effected at some unguarded or weakly-guarded spot, but, as it could scarcely be expected that any bridge of importance (where damage done would give the best results) would be found without protection, the garrison of the place must be driven off or held in check while those deputed to lay and fire explosives did their work. To meet these requirements it was necessary that the force detailed should have some fighting value, but as small bodies move more quickly, are more easily supplied and readily hidden than

larger ones, it was deemed of first importance to keep its numbers within certain limits. These considerations led to the following organization :—

Officer in Command.

Lieut.-Colonel Naganuma (Commanding 8th Cavalry Regiment).

Staff.

Captain Miyauchi, 8th Cavalry Regiment.
2nd Lieut. Numata „ „
1st „ Gunchi „ „ (medical officer).
14 N.C.O.'s and men and a few interpreters.
Total—4 officers, 14 N.C.O.'s and men, and interpreters.

No. 1 Squadron.

Captain Asano.

No. 1 Section.	No. 2 Section.	No. 3 Section.
1st Lieut. Sakuma.	2nd Lieut. Kotsutsumi.	2nd Lieut. Uchida.

Total 4 officers, 73* N.C.O.'s and men, and a few interpreters.

No. 2 Squadron.

No. 1 Section.	No. 2 Section.	No. 3 Section.
1st Lieut. Oikawa.	2nd Lieut. Kurita.	2nd Lieut. Tamura.

Total—4 officers, 73* N.C.O.'s and men, and a few interpreters.

General total—12 officers, 160 N.C.O.'s and men, and interpreters.

Chinese spies (and probably Japanese disguised as Chinese) accompanied the force.

Supplies for men and horses were to be obtained by purchase from the inhabitants of the country, and neither carts nor pack animals were taken.

The officer appointed to command the expedition was directed to choose his own staff, and the remainder of the force was drawn from and selected by the officers commanding the 5th, 8th, 13th, and 14th Cavalry Regiments, the latter two of which formed the 1st Cavalry Brigade.

On the 30th December Lieut.-Colonel Naganuma assembled the whole of the officers who were to accompany him, and addressed them as follows :—

"1. I have had the honour to be appointed to command the expedition which is about to take place, and that you officers have been chosen to form part thereof reflects

* Includes 1 intendance sergeant for supply duties.—A.H.

honour upon you; indeed, in my opinion, the service in which we are about to be engaged offers a greater opportunity for distinction than almost any other that has occurred during the present campaign. You officers have been picked from amongst many others for valour, sagacity, and energy, and I rely absolutely upon you to strain every nerve so that our united efforts may bring the greatest possible benefit to the Japanese army. Recollect that while honour is to be derived from responsibility, responsibility involves hard work, and again, that hard work, when combined with daring, demands that the body be physically strong. I desire, therefore, at the present time, to impress upon you the necessity of keeping in view what I have said, and the great responsibility which, as officers of this expedition, you must bear.

"2. There will be no admixture of men and horses from different regiments in the sections of which each squadron is composed, but each section will be organized from one of the units chosen to furnish its quota. In selecting men and horses the following points will be kept in view:—(*a*) Non-commissioned officer's and men. These must be possessed of great physical strength and endurance. Where men combine these attributes with activity, sagacity, and boldness, they will be taken, but physical strength and endurance are to be the basis of selection. (*b*) Horses. It is preferable that men should ride their own horses, but those that are not good feeders, and will not eat any kind of forage, and also those given to neighing will be rejected. In selecting horses, preference will be given to such as are small compared to the height of the riders.

"3. It is anticipated that the duration of the expedition will be one month, but it is possible that that period may be exceeded.

"4. The equipment, &c., to be taken, and amount of money to be carried for expenses, are shown on the attached table."*

Major-General Akiyama was present while Lieut.-Colonel Naganuma was giving the above instructions, and added remarks to the following effect:—

"In the performance of the service for which you have been selected you must be prepared to face dangers and submit to hardships, but the latter can be overcome by patience and physical endurance. If you carry out your duty, you will cut the enemy's communications and cause him great inconvenience, and, even if you should fail, the

* *See* Appendix, p. 81.

mere fact of your appearance in his rear will produce great effect and lead to the withdrawal of troops from the first line in order to guard against you. Let every officer remember that on this occasion the cavalry is about to assist the whole army, and whether you succeed or fail you go forth as the representatives of the Cavalry of Japan."

4th Jan. By the 4th January 1905 the raiding party was organized and had assembled at Su-ma-pu (B 6),* and from that date to the 8th the officers and non-commissioned officers engaged in pistol, and the men in carbine, practice, the latter being instructed in the methods of cooking the various kinds of millet and other grain on which the party would have to subsist during the time of its absence in the north. The horses, too, in order to accustom them in some degree to the change of diet which would shortly begin, were fed on forage such as the Chinese are in the habit of giving to their animals.

Plan of March.

As both officers and men were unacquainted with the region through which they would pass, no exact plan could be laid down as to the villages through which they would proceed, and the arrangements, which were consequently liable to alteration, were generally as follows:—

The primary object was to arrive at Pa-la-tao-kai (A 4), but, as to reach that place by the shortest route from Su-ma-pu (B 6) would expose the party to almost certain discovery by the Russian cavalry, it was decided that the Hun should be crossed in the neighbourhood of Hsiao-pei-ho (B 6), and the Liao at Tien-chia-ta (A 6). From the latter village the hill of Hsiao-pei Shan (A 5) would be gained and the willow pallisade traversed in the environs of Hsin-liu-tun (A 5).

After reaching Pa-la-tao-kai (A 4), it was proposed to move to Chang-lin-tzu (C 1), but ample latitude was left to Lieut.-Colonel Naganuma in deciding whether that place or some other in its vicinity should be made the second goal of his party. In any case it was determined that he must endeavour to arrive in the neighbourhood of Chang-chun Fu (E 1), on the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway, 44 miles south of Harbin and 198 north of Mukden, and destroy a portion of the line, but should this be found to be impracticable, the military stores collected at Chang-chun Fu were to be burnt. Either of these purposes carried out, the party was to withdraw and interrupt the traffic between Harbin† and Tsitsihar.* It had originally been proposed that the bridge over the To-man Ho,† near Yao-men,† which is some 47 miles north of Chang-chun Fu,

---

* *See* Map 54. † These places are not shown on Plate 54.

should serve as the object of attack, but, as it proved to be protected by a considerable guard, another such vulnerable point nearer that place was finally selected.

The best way of inflicting a maximum of damage in a minimum of time to the bridge, telegraph wires, rolling stock, if met with, and stores was carefully considered, for, as rapid action was an essential element in the scheme of the raid, it was undesirable that a single moment should be lost at some critical juncture through ignorance or indecision. But a problem which was far more difficult to solve satisfactorily than the route to be followed or the destruction to be done, lay in the question of maintaining communication with the rear. To leave posts for this purpose, here and there in the villages along the line of march, would not only reduce the numbers of the small force to an undesirable degree, but might possibly disclose the trail of the raiders and make their eventual retreat far from secure. After much discussion it was decided that orderlies sent with messages must make their way to the nearest friendly troops, and that, in the earlier days of the march, they should, if possible, rejoin the raiding party, bringing with them as much ammunition and as large a quantity of explosives* as they could carry. Lastly, it was resolved that sick and wounded should be sent to the rear by Chinese carts, impressed for the purpose when required, but that if distance made such a scheme impracticable, they should be carried by those means to villages beyond the radius of Russian visitations, and the inhabitants thereof well-paid for taking care of them.

First Period of Movement.

9th January to 6th February.

(During this period the force hid from the enemy, and moved to the place near which damage to the railway was to be effected.)

9th Jan. On the 9th January Lieut.-Colonel Naganuma marched his force without incident from Su-ma-pu (B 6) to Ma-chang (B 6) a few miles south of Hsiao-pei-ho.

10th Jan. On the 10th, information was received at Tien-chia-ta (A 6) at 6 p.m., to the effect that the enemy's cavalry had that day passed the Hun and come into collision with the Japanese mounted troops, for the Russians, under Major-General Mishchenko, were now moving south towards Ying-kou, and, had the Japanese left Su-ma-pu one day earlier, they would have found that general barring their pathway to the west. At 7.30 p.m., an officer's patrol was despatched with orders to

* Ammunition and explosives represented the "life of the raid," and as much as possible of both was carried. *Vide* Appendix.—A. H.

get in touch with the retreating Japanese cavalry on the Hun,* and bring back information regarding the hostile movement.

11th Jan. At 3 a.m. on the 11th it returned, and the officer reported that the cavalry had fallen back so far that he had not been able to come up with it, but that some infantry whom he had met stated that the enemy's mounted troops numbered some 10,000 men, divided into three parties, of which two were already east of the Hun moving in a southerly direction, before whose rear guard the Japanese cavalry had been forced to retire. Further information had been elicited by this officer from some Chinese to the effect that the Russians had from 600 to 700 carts in Cha-chia-erh (A 7), and that a part of their troops was halted in a village west of that place. No sooner was this report delivered than Lieut.-Colonel Naganuma moved his force to Chieh-chia-tzu (A 6), first sending back a message to the nearest cavalry of the Second Army, in which he repeated the information just received and added that he was now advancing on Pa-chiao-tai (A 6). To escape notice as far as possible at this time, and later, side tracks only were followed and highways frequented by Chinese carts avoided, while villages of inconsiderable size were selected for quartering the troops.

12th Jan. Leaving Chieh-chia-tzu in the morning, the advance was resumed towards Hsiao-pei Shan (A 5), and on the way thither, while passing Pei-kou—a village close to Shih-tai-tzu (A 6)—some Chinese troops† opened fire, but were speedily made to retreat without loss on either side. The night of this date was passed at Shih-tai-tzu.

13th-18th Jan. The march was continued at 9 a.m., the Hsin-min-tun railway being crossed and Pa-la-tao-kai (A 4) reached at 4 p.m. on the 16th, where a halt, preparatory to the further advance to the north, was made on the 17th and 18th. Rations and forage sufficient to feed the force for five days were here collected and loaded on Chinese carts, for it was known that the villages further on were poor and incapable of feeding the party, and a report describing what had occurred since the last was made was despatched to the rear. In this report it was stated that the force would move to Hsin-chieh-chiao (C/D 1), where supplies were reported to be more abundant than at Chang-lin-tzu (C 1), whither it was originally intended that the party should have gone.

19th Jan. On the 19th Ta-tang-ying-tzu (A 4) was reached, beyond which village is a great plain. Here it was decided to leave a small communicating post in charge of a warrant officer, whose duty, besides transmitting reports to the rear, was to burn

* The 1st Cavalry Regiment was guarding the Hun, as well as some line of communication infantry.—A. H.

† This happened frequently during the raid, the Chinese or Mongolian soldiers being on the look-out for bandits, and mistaking the Japanese in their khaki greatcoats for these disturbers of the peace.—A. H.

supplies bought in the village, on behalf of the Russians, by Chinese contractors. This place, like many others where supplies were collected for General Kuropatkin's army, was rarely visited by his troops, and thus the post ran little risk of discovery for some time to come.

On the 20th Ta-tang-ying-tzu was left, and marching northwards daily, Ta-huang (B 1) was reached on the 27th, where the villagers stated that about one month earlier the enemy had come to Tei-chia-tun (B 2), and made large purchases of cows and oxen, and that some of his men were still there for that purpose. **20th-27th Jan.**

On the 28th the force proceeded to Sha-tai (B 1), and on leaving it a few rifle shots were heard. A patrol was at once despatched to ascertain if they came from a hostile force, and it soon reported that about one hundred Mongolian troops were attacking the supply carts, which, under escort of 2nd Lieut. Tamura's section, were coming on behind. Captain Asano's squadron was immediately detached to assist, but found that the carts had fallen back, and that the escort was protecting them from the walls of Ho-lu-mo-to.* In a brief space, and without loss, the road was cleared, and 2nd Lieut. Kotsutsumi's section sent in pursuit of the now flying Mongols. The march was then continued, and Lieut.-Colonel Naganuma proceeded with Captain Nakaya's squadron to Wu-tien-hua (B 1), while the carts and the remainder of the force halted at Hou-liu-tun (B 1). **28th Jan.**

On the 29th the force pursued its way to Ha-la-mo-to (B 1), which was found to be situated on the highway from Chi-chi-ha* to Tei-chia-tun (B 2), and, as this was considered a dangerous place for a halt, the night was passed at Ta-la-ho (B 1). **29th Jan.**

On the 30th Ta-yuan-chih (C 1) was reached, where the force remained till the 6th February. Here the sick were handed over to the care of the inhabitants, and arrangements were made regarding the equipment of the horses in the coming dash against the railway. The distribution of the several parties, into which the force must necessarily be divided in that operation, was also decided upon, and the men were practised in laying and firing explosives. **30th Jan.-6th Feb.**

Second Period.

7th to 10th February.

(This period embraces the advance to the railway line, the destruction of a bridge, and retreat therefrom.)

On the 7th February Ta-yuan-chih (B–C 1) was left, and Ku-chia-tzu (C 1) reached. **7th Feb.**

---

* This place is not on Map 54, it is south of Sha-tai (B 1).

9th Feb. On the 9th the force moved to La-la-tun (D 1). There spies, who had been sent on in advance, returned, and after hearing their report the final arrangements regarding the destruction of the railway bridge over the Hsin-kai Ho (E 2) were made.

10th Feb. At 3 p.m. on the 10th the march was continued, and at 9 p.m. a halt was called for the night at Liu-chia-tun (D 1). Next day would be the anniversary of the national holiday commemorating the accession of the first of the long line of Emperors that had ruled Japan, and the promulgation of the Constitution of 1889, and it was felt to be an auspicious occasion on which to carry out the dangerous mission of the party: to celebrate a work of construction by one of destruction.

11th Feb. On the 11th, as the distance to be covered was short Liu chia-tun was not left until a little after midday, and by 5 p.m. the force was assembled at Yang-chia-tun,* a village about 5 miles west of the railway line. Three hours later, by the light of the moon, a move was again made, not a sound being audible beyond the ring of horses' hoofs on the hard-frozen ground, and Yen-chia-wo-peng,* two miles nearer the object of attack, gained. There still remained to be covered 5,000 yards of open ground, and, as it was known that the bridge† was guarded and the moon would not set till midnight, some hours must be passed before the time for action would arrive. The men were therefore ordered to dismount and tie their horses up securely, and the following orders were given by Lieut.-Colonel Naganuma:—

"1. 2nd Lieut. Numata will be in charge of the horses, and will have with him 1 N.C.O. and 4 men, and 8 N.C.O.'s and men from sections (*i.e.*, in all 13 N.C.O.'s and men). The medical officer will make the necessary preparations in the village.

"2. Captain Miyauchi is appointed to command the demolition parties, which will be led by 2nd Lieuts. Kotsutsumi and Kurita.

"3. Captain Asano's squadron will form the covering force on the right, and that of Captain Nakaya will perform similar service on the left.

"4. On the march the officer commanding the force will be on foot (as was everyone) in front of the covering force, but during the operation he will remain in the centre between the two squadrons.

"5. The signal to retire will be the sound of the loudest explosion.

"6. The line of retreat will be along the river bed to the village.

"7. The countersign will be ——."


* This place is not marked on Map 54.

† The bridge in question is understood to have consisted of two iron girders, each girder 30 feet long, resting on a central granite pier.—A. H.

To face page 75.

DESTRUCTION OF HSIN-KAI HO BRIDGE

ON NIGHT OF 11TH–12TH FEBY 1905.



At 2.30 a.m., in pitch darkness and in dead silence, the force moved off towards the railway line.* The squadrons advanced at first in close order with scouts thrown forward a short distance, but when from 500 to 600 yards from the bridge they extended. This change of formation had just been completed and the march resumed, when three Cossacks rode along the front, on which the Japanese, seeing that their presence was discovered, opened fire. This was returned from the guard-house† north of the river and from the bridge itself. Lieut.-Colonel Naganuma now ordered Captain Nakaya to lead his squadron against the former place, from which a heavy fire, directed through loopholes, was maintained, while the demolition parties, impeded by their explosives, advanced with difficulty along the surface of the ice-bound river, preceded by four men armed with carbines and carrying wire-cutters. The enemy, now realizing that his post was seriously threatened, concentrated his fire on and around the bridge, hoping to annihilate those who, regardless of his efforts, at length reached the central pier. A charge was soon laid and fired, but though a portion of the stonework was demolished, no very serious damage was effected, while the enemy, now certain as to where the greatest danger lay, increased his fire in that direction. A second and a third charge was laid amid a rain of bullets, which rang against the metal girders and caused sparks to fly from the granite of the pier. This time both charges proved effectual, and with a deafening sound the pier collapsed, bringing to the ground both girders. With loud shouts of "*Banzai!*" the men fell back along the river bed and soon reached the village. Here it was found that the operation had not been carried out without loss, for in the attack upon the guard-house 2nd Lieut. Tamura fell, and at the bridge 2nd Lieut Kotsutsumi was wounded, while of the men, in all 2 were killed and 8 wounded. At 6.20 a.m. the force left the village, taking with it, on Chinese carts, the dead and wounded, and at 10 a.m. reached Erh-tai-hua (E 1),‡ where, after resting till 5.30 p.m., a move was made to Erh-chieh-shan (E 1), and the night passed there. **12th Feb.**

On reaching Chiao-pao-hou (D 1) on the 13th, information was received from Chinese spies that a hundred of the enemy's cavalry were about 17 miles south-east of that place at Yang-chia-tien—a village not marked on the maps carried by the party—and further that 400 to 500 Japanese troops had arrived on the previous day at Hsin-chieh-chiao (C D 1). As nothing regarding the latter force was known, though it was supposed to form another raiding party, an officer's patrol was despatched to verify its presence in Hsin-chieh-chiao. **13th Feb.**

On the 14th the force left Chiao-pao-hou at dawn and went towards Hsin-chieh-chiao, reaching Yao-ta-tzu (D 1) at 4 p.m., **14th Feb.**

* *See* Plate opposite.

† These guard-houses are usually strongly built of stone or brick, and round them is an earthen parapet and sometimes stockade work.—A. H.


‡ *See* Map 54.

where the patrol despatched soon arrived and reported that there was no doubt that a party of Japanese cavalry had been in Hsin-chieh-chiao, but had left, and in what direction they had gone could not be ascertained. Scarcely was this report delivered than artillery fire was opened on the force from the south-west at a range of about 6,000 yards on which cover was sought behind a hill lying north of the village.* Here preparations were made to engage the enemy, whose extended line of cavalry was advancing, followed by a closed body of the same arm. The situation for the Japanese was a critical one. Coming towards them was a force more than double their strength,† supported by artillery, to retire before which, without fighting would probably lead to disaster, for the enemy was in all likelihood better mounted, and unimpeded with wounded. But Lieut.-Colonel Naganuma, conscious that the exact strength he wielded must be unknown, and anxious to exalt the *moral* of his men, which, in his opinion, had not been improved by so many days of hide and seek, resolved to meet the attack, thereafter settling the best way of retreat. The wounded in charge of the medical officer, and a few spare horses were sent to Liu-chia-tun,‡ while the remainder of the force rode forward, and, when a position 2,000 yards north of Chang-chia-pu had been reached, which threatened the enemy's rear, dismounted. A heavy fire was opened on the advancing Russians, who, by sunset, fell back, leaving 8 men and 18 horses dead upon the ground. Not satisfied with this success, the Japanese commander followed up, and on arriving at the northern corner of Chang-chia-pu came under a heavy fire directed from the walls of that village.

About 8 p.m. Captain Asano's squadron made a rush upon the village and broke into it, but found itself engaged with some 200 men, while that of Captain Nakaya menaced the flank and rear. Heavy fighting ensued and the enemy soon began to fall back before the furious onset, leaving behind a rear guard consisting of the guns and 60 men. The moon being now up, Captain Nakaya—whose squadron was on horseback—charged, and, driving off the escort, captured a gun and wagon.§ The enemy fell back in haste, and the Japanese, retiring within the village, counted their losses. These were severe. Captain Asano's squadron had suffered heavily, four-fifths of its numbers being incapacitated. He himself and 2nd Lieut. Kotsutsumi were killed (the latter‖ continuing to fight after receiving a wound) as well as 16 rank and file, while the wounded numbered 44, including 2nd Lieuts. Oikawa and Numata. The action had thus cost Lieut.-Colonel Naganuma

* *See* Plate opposite.
† 320 cavalry and two guns.
‡ 20 miles south-east of Yao-ta-tzu (D 1).
§ They were damaged by the captors and left behind.—A. H.
‖ He had already been wounded at the bridge.—A. H.

face page 76.



ATTACK on
HANG-CHIA-PU

almost half his force, but sufficient officers and men remained to carry out the further duties entrusted to him.

On the 15th the slightly wounded were placed on Chinese carts, while those more gravely stricken were carried on improvised stretchers, and the force moved in the direction of Hsin-chieh-chiao (C/D 1),* reaching Chang-lin-tzu (C 1) on the 16th. **15th Feb.**

Third Period.

17th February to 4th March.

(The force moves beyond touch of the enemy.)

On the 17th, owing to the heavy losses incurred, a fresh organization of the squadrons had to be made, and on account of this and other arrangements a halt was ordered. **17th Feb.**

On the 18th Ying-tu-liu-tun (B 1) was reached and a despatch regarding the operation that had just been carried out sent to Major-General Akiyama by two orderlies, who proceeded to the communicating post at Pa-la-tao-kai (A 4). **18th Feb.**

On the 19th the force came to North Tung-ho-to-ka (B 1), where it remained till the 22nd. On the evening of the latter date information was received that on the previous night five hundred of the enemy's cavalry had arrived at Hsin-chieh-chiao (C/D 1). Thereupon, Lieut.-Colonel Naganuma moved to Tung-wu-chia-tzu (A/B 3), which place was reached on the 28th. While there he heard that small hostile bodies were now west of the railway, some of which were in his own vicinity while others were further off. These were as follows:— **19th–22nd Feb.**

At Po-ten-to, 6 miles south-east of Tung-wu-chia-tzu (A/B 3), about 60 cavalry.

At Liao-yang-wo-peng (B 2) north-east of Tung-wu-chia-tzu (A/B 3), about 200 of the enemy, who were engaged in purchasing supplies.

A large force was also reported to be coming up from the Mukden direction, and had arrived at the following places:—

At Hsin-chou-chang (not on map)	800	cavalry and	2 guns.
„ Chang-tu Fu (C 3) - -	1,200	„	
„ Pa-men-hsing (C 2) -	1,500	„	
„ Fun-ka (D 2) - - -	2,500	„	
„ Kuei-ta (D 1) - -	800	„ „	2 „
	6,800	cavalry and	4 guns.

This news, coming at a time when it was known that a great battle would soon take place, must have caused satisfaction to the raiding party, as showing the effect which their presence had produced.

* *See* Map 54.

1st Mar. On the 1st March a move was made, and on the 3rd Hsiang-kang-kan-lu (A 4) was reached, where news regarding the battle of Hei-kou-tai was for the first time heard. Apparently a non-commissioned officer and a few men had been left at this village* when the force was moving north, for the former reported that he had burnt 240 tons of the enemy's stores at a village east of Tung-wu-chia-tzu (A/B 3).

4th Mar. On the 4th the force assembled at Ta-tang-ying-tzu (A 4), where the non-commissioned officer of that post stated that the battle of Mukden was in progress. A message was now sent to Major-General Akiyama reporting the arrival of the raiding party at Ta-tang-ying-tzu, and stating that from that place an attack on the enemy's communications would be made and his rear threatened.

Fourth Period.

5th to 16th March.

(Minor movements against the enemy's line of communication during the battle of Mukden.)

5th Mar. The sick and wounded were now left in charge of an officer, and preparations made for carrying out several minor attacks upon the Russian line of communication. Should these prove to be successful, it was hoped that the Japanese army, then engaged before Mukden, would be substantially benefited. For this purpose the force was divided as follows:—

One party, under Captain Nakaya, consisting, besides himself, of 2 officers and 37 rank and file, was directed to destroy the railway line and telegraph wires between Kai-yuan (C 4) and Miao-tzu-kao (C/D 3).

A second party, under Captain Miyauchi, consisting of 1 warrant officer and 32 rank and file, was to perform a similar service north of the latter place; and a third, under 2nd Lieut. Numata, numbering 13 rank and file, was to endeavour to interfere with railway communication in the neighbourhood of Kai-yuan (C 4).

The Operations of the Party under Captain Nakaya.†

Captain Nakaya's party and that of 2nd Lieut. Numata left Ta-tang-ying-tzu (A 4) on the morning of the 6th March, and on the 8th reached and halted in San-ku-pu (C 3), where information was received that four Russians were in front in

* As stated, a post was left at Pa-la-tao-kai, but there appear to have been at least two other posts further north. Possibly sick men may have been left behind for the purpose.—A. H.

† *See* Map 54.

Liu-chia-tzu (C 3). Next day the frozen Liao was crossed 15 carts loaded with supplies being captured on its banks and burnt, and by 11 am., the force assembled at San-yen-chin (C 3). After some hours' rest, the march was resumed and a halt made from 6 to 9 p m. at Sha-an-pu (C 3), where instructions regarding the destruction of the railway line were issued. By 5.30 a.m. on the 10th the track in the vicinity of Sha-ho-tzu was reached nothing having occurred on the way thither beyond the discharge of some rifle shots shortly before midnight from the village of Ta-tai-miao. At 5.40 a.m. the troops guarding the railway, some 20 in number, opened fire, and Captain Nakaya swung round towards the south, and at 6 a.m., under a cross fire from the station of Sha-ho-tzu and a guard-house north-east of it, destroyed the line in fourteen places and threw down four telegraph posts, severing the wires. This effected, the force fell back to Ssu-yang-sung (C 3), and after halting for 4 hours, marched at 6.30 p.m, to Tei-chia-wo-peng. On arriving there at 4 a.m. on the 11th, 2nd Lieut. Numata with 7 men was, on information furnished by spies, despatched to Liu-chia-tzu (C 3), where 60 tons of supplies collected by the Russians were burnt, and 25 cows and 15 carts captured. This duty performed, 2nd Lieut. Numata rejoined the squadron at Mi-li-ku (B 3). On the same day the force halted at that place; on the 12th Hsin-shu-lu (A 4) was reached, and on the 13th, Ta-tang-ying-tzu (A 4).

*The Operations of Captain Miyauchi's Party.**

Leaving Ta-tang-ying-tzu (A 4) on the 6th, Captain Miyauchi reached and halted in Wei-wo-peng (C 3), east of the Liao Ho, on the 9th March. Next day, during a halt of two hours in Chin-yang-kao (C 3), the sound of a loud explosion from the direction of Mukden was heard, which was known later to have been the demolition of the Hun Ho railway bridge. At 2.50 a.m. on the 11th, a point of 2,000 yards north of Miao-tzu-kao station (C/D 3) was reached, and the line and one telegraph post destroyed. Immediately after effecting this, the party fell back to Li-chia-kang-tzu (C/D 2), where it remained till the 12th. On the 13th a move to the railway was again made, and at 2.30 a.m. on the 14th it was damaged in five places and three telegraph posts thrown down The party next went to Chieh-cheng (C 2), where it halted for the night, and heard that 400 of the enemy's cavalry with a few guns had been quartered on the previous night in Yu-shou-tai (D 2), in dangerous proximity to the line of march to and from the railway. On the 15th the retirement was continued, and on the night of the 17th March Ta-tang-ying-tzu (A 4) reached.

* *See* Map 54.

20th Mar. The duty entrusted to Lieut.-Colonel Naganuma being now completed, he moved on the 20th March with the whole force to Ta-shih-chiao (C 5),* west of Mukden, and halted there till the 29th, after which officers and men proceeded to rejoin the corps to which they belonged.†

In forwarding a report to Major-General Akiyama upon the operations which he had conducted, Lieut.-Colonel Naganuma summed up his conclusions in the following remarks:—

"1. It is desirable that cavalry sent on raids should be accompanied by machine guns or horse artillery.

"2. As many parts of Mongolia are more or less swampy, the winter season is the best for moving troops over that country.

"3. The people of the country are inclined to take offence at lack of respect paid to their religion by strangers, and as in many houses there is a Buddhist shrine, it is advisable that soldiers should not omit to pay reverence in the customary manner.

"4. During the first week of the raid the horses, being unaccustomed to the change of food, which circumstances rendered unavoidable, lost condition, but thereafter they soon became fit and hard.

"5. That Japanese horses can stand cold fairly well is proved by the fact that at times during the raid the thermometer fell to from 4 to 22 degrees Fahrenheit below zero. They were kept in the open, covered with one blanket, and, if available, Chinese mats, and in the morning were generally white with frost or snow.

"6. The average distance covered in a day was 28 to 40 miles. On one occasion 75 miles were completed in 30 hours, during which time the movement, except for two halts to feed, was continuous; and, in the next 42 hours, 78 miles were covered. Thus the total distance marched in three days and nights was 153 miles.

"7. Leaving out of account wounded horses, only two of the remainder fell sick, and none died. A few only lost their shoes."

Although the raiding party had found it impossible to carry out every item of the original programme, what it had been able to perform was of such great service to the Japanese army in the Mukden operations, that every officer who survived was presented with a *kanjo*‡ by the Emperor. Its sudden and repeated acts were responsible for the absence, or at least diminished strength, of Major-General Mishchenko's cavalry on

* *See* Map 54.

† Almost all the ammunition, 445 rounds per man, was expended during the raid.—A. H.

‡ A certificate greatly valued by the recipient.—A. H.

the Russian right, whereby the Third Japanese Army at Hsiao-pei-ho (B 6) remained undetected, and its northward march for a time unperceived. Unlike Major-General Mishchenko's raid, that of Lieut.-Colonel Naganuma carried with it from the first the impress of success. Its smaller numerical strength lent itself to rapid movement no less than to secrecy, while mobility was further gained by good organization and by dependence on the country for supplies. By making a wide sweep through the so-called neutral territory of Mongolia, where the inhabitants in many places had no conception as to the precise nationality of their unexpected visitors, by following unfrequented paths and halting only in the smaller villages, the chances of discovery were much reduced. In the zone through which the force passed it was, as it were, hidden behind a veil from behind which it never emerged but with resolution and rapidity to carry out its work. This done, concealment was again resorted to, and by means of trusty spies, aided by others hired locally, information gained of possible pursuit.

APPENDIX.

Articles carried on the Horse.

Right wallet.—2 tins of explosives, *i.e.*, 2 charges complete.
30 rounds of ammunition.
1 bandage (field dressing).
Small carbine tools.
1 pair of gloves.
1 pair of stockings, writing paper.

Left wallet.—75 rounds of ammunition.
Wrench for unbolting nuts on railway line.
1 towel, 1 toothbrush, needle, thread, enteric pills, sticking plaster, and small personal items.

Right saddle bag.—Nose bag.
130 rounds of ammunition.
Canvas bucket.

Left saddle bag.—Mess tin.
120 rounds of ammunition.
1 tin extract of *soy*. (Eaten with food like sauce.)
1 Balaclava cap.

Right shoe case.—Pair of fore shoes.

Left shoe case.—2 sets of ice screws for insertion in shoes.
Hind shoes.

Behind saddle.—Fur waistcoat.
Shelter tent, without sticks.

Remarks.

Each non-commissioned officer carried two priming charges. Officers, non-commissioned officers, and trumpeters carried 42 rounds of pistol ammunition inside the left wallet, and on the outside of each non-commissioned officer's wallet were carried a hand-axe, wire-cutters, and folding saw. Officers, non-commissioned officers, and trumpeters carried some paper, pencils, pocket knife, half a dozen candles, and a little tea and sugar. Non-commissioned officers did not carry their map cases (*i.e.*, the case slung from the belts, like that carried in France and Germany).

The party carried two days' rations for themselves on their horses, and one day's grain for their chargers. Each horse had two blankets under the saddle. Each private soldier carried 90 rounds of ammunition on his person, *i.e.*, the usual amount carried by the Japanese cavalry. The shelter tent was not used as such, the troops being invariably lodged in villages. The actual weight carried on the horse was normal, certain articles usually taken being dispensed with, so as to allow of more ammunition being carried.

The amount of money taken is not known, but it could be calculated from what the expedition was estimated to cost, viz., 70 *sen** per diem for each man and horse. Enough was taken for 60 days.

The following amounts were expended :—

——	Staff.	5th Regiment	8th Regiment.	13th Regiment.	14th Regiment.
Food and lodging -	—	1,030	4,242	1,030	1,030
Paid to spies - -	500	—	—	—	—
Miscellaneous -	1,000	100	500	100	100
Total in *yen* -	1,500	1,130	4,742	1,130	1,130
Grand total -	9,632 *yen*, or about 980*l.*				

* 100 *sen* = 1 *yen* = 2*s.* 0½*d.*

(6) The Battle of Mukden.—Operations of the Second Japanese Army.

REPORT by Lieut.-Colonel A. L. HALDANE, D.S.O., General Staff, Second Army Head-Quarters, 6th July 1905.

*Plates.**

Daily positions of the Second Army	Map 55.
Attack on Yu-hung-tun	„ 56.
„ Hsiao Kuei-hsing-pu	„ 56.
Yu-hung-tun and vicinity	Panorama 8.

Appendices.

Japanese Order of Battle	Appendix 1.
Attacks on Hsiao Kuei-hsing-pu and Yu-hung-tun	„ 2.
Russian strength and losses	„ 3.
Losses in the Second Japanese Army	„ 4.

Covering Letter.

In forwarding the attached report upon the operations of the Second Army from the 30th January to the 11th March 1905, I have the honour to draw attention to a few points connected with the subject which is dealt with therein.

1. Throughout the campaign in Manchuria the Japanese have suffered severely in attacking those points of the Russian front which have been armed with machine guns, and an episode related by Captain Hart-Synnot, in the account already submitted by him regarding the operations of the 5th Division in the battle of Mukden,† seems to be of interest as showing to what length the Japanese will go in order to silence such weapons. I refer to the daring and successful manner in which a mountain gun was brought up by them to decisive rifle range of the enemy in order to destroy a machine gun whose presence was materially affecting the prospects of the attack.

2. At the battle of Mukden the Russians made greater use of head-cover than in any of the earlier battles, in which indeed

* As a general map, *see* Map 61. † Page 153.

it was generally conspicuous by its absence, and, on the whole, I believe their shooting was steadier in this battle, more especially so when it is remembered that, as at Shou-shan-pu, the defensive positions were not as a rule covered by a labyrinth of obstacles. From this it may be concluded that head-cover, although not always bullet-proof, proved of value and gave confidence to their infantry. The general form of head-cover used by them was made of sandbags or ammunition boxes filled with earth. An embrasure or loophole was provided for the rifle. On the other hand, the form which Japanese head-cover takes in earthworks is very simple, and consists merely of depressions cut into the superior slope of the parapet one yard apart, or in the case of a defended wall, a loophole.

3. The desperate efforts made by the 5th and 8th Divisions from the 5th to the 10th March, in the attack upon the Russian second line, are the outcome of the necessity of approaching close to an enemy's defensive position, if he is to be held there and prevented from transferring troops to other portions of the field. The Japanese containing attack is a very serious affair, and when, as at Mukden, the ground is frozen too hard to allow of the construction of entrenchments by night, as was frequently done in the earlier battles, the only way the enemy can, as it were, be gripped and his power of movement limited, is to push forward at all hazards to within six hundred yards of his works. The exceptionally high percentage of losses in the Second Army was, no doubt, in great measure, due to the physical difficulties to be surmounted when engaging in a battle, before the ground over which it was fought had ceased to be affected by the frost. But it would seem that such attacks though generally costly are unavoidable; whether the Japanese deliberately try to push them to an issue lest by failure the *moral* of their troops should suffer, cannot be said, but it is clear that the maintenance of this important quality is never lost sight of by them, and nothing is omitted that can possibly tend to raise it. Where they attack they mean to win, and it is inconceivable that an attack once entered upon by them could, unless under most exceptional circumstances, be broken off, and the *moral* of every man engaged—not to speak of those of the army elsewhere—shaken if not temporarily destroyed.

4. Hand-grenades were freely used in the battle of Mukden, and they and mortars firing bombs—but the former more especially—seem to have been of considerable value in the attack or defence of localities.

5. The reconnaissance of an enemy's position is a duty carried out by the Japanese with the greatest care and deliberation, and it must be rare for them to encounter obstacles for which they are not fully prepared in advance. The Russian outpost service is, I believe, not remarkable for vigilance, a

circumstance which has no doubt greatly favoured the scouts of the other side. In the Japanese infantry the most intelligent and reliable men, led by officers, are employed upon this duty, whose importance can hardly be exaggerated, and are carefully trained in peace time.

6. In a prolonged engagement, such as that which lasted from the 1st to the 10th March, the infantry, more especially that of the attacking force, is exposed to considerable privations. To lie in the open under a deadly fire for perhaps twelve hours or more, and in consequence to be cut off from any means of procuring water in addition to what is carried on the person, imposes a severe strain upon troops, and one which careful training in time of peace can alone prepare them to undergo successfully. Men who are accustomed to smoke on the line of march—and not alone at halts—a proceeding which gives rise to thirst, who are allowed to empty their water-bottles at will, who on service will frequently consume without orders the emergency ration, who are not accustomed to carry untouched several days' rations, and, in peace time, are accompanied to the manœuvre ground by sutlers selling refreshments, and in war time by water-carts, cannot be said to be well equipped to undergo the trials of a prolonged engagement. From the Japanese army an excellent lesson might be learned in these respects.

Besides self-control, another factor which has brought success to the Japanese, is their strong sense of subordination to authority. The whole nation—unlike Great Britain—is well disciplined, and it is recognized that it is the bounden duty of every self-respecting citizen, not to pay someone else to serve for him, but to be prepared to take up arms when required to do so. The temptation of a bribe of pay five times greater than that of the regular army is not necessary in Japan. Her citizens, like General Nogi, who refuses to partake of luxuries in war time not granted to the soldier, would feel themselves insulted if asked to serve at rates of pay other than those deemed sufficient for the army.

It is this spirit of self-effacement for the public weal, mingled with fervent patriotism, which has won Japan her long series of victories on land and sea.

Introductory.

After the ineffectual attempt of the Russians to overwhelm the Japanese left at Hei-kou-tai, and the withdrawal of their beaten troops across the Hun, affairs west of the railway gradually subsided into a condition similar to that which had prevailed during the three preceding months. Each side jealously watched the other, and along the line from Chang-tan

(C 3 west),* through Pei-tai-tzu (C 3), Hei-lin-tai (D 3), and Ta-lien-tun (E 3) to Sha-ho-pu (F 3 west); and more especially towards its western limit, the Russians displayed almost feverish activity in the construction of new, and the improvement of existing works, upon the speedy completion of which the safety of their right was doubtless thought to lie. Before them still lay the divisions of the Second Army, and those—the 5th and 8th—which had been hurried westward to the recent fight, calmly submitting to the daily inconvenience of bombardment, rarely replying, and giving no indication of the storm which was then actively brewing and before long would burst. Surprise, most potent of all weapons in the armoury of those who aim at winning great results in war, though not to any high degree a factor in the earlier operations, was, at length, to be the basis of the masterly conception whereby the Russians would first be mystified, next misled, and, lastly, overcome. Towards this end, circumstances were distinctly favourable, for, behind the solid screen that stretched east and west of the Mukden highway several scores of miles, unknown to the enemy, hidden to the last, the necessary preparations could be carried out, and, when all was ready, the actors summoned to the scene. The plan, in brief, by which the hindrances to advance erected by the Russians were to be evaded was to bring pressure against their left, thereby inducing the belief that on that flank the greatest effort would be made. This course would probably lead to the despatch of reinforcements to the threatened point and the consequent displacement of reserves—a serious consideration where an army occupies a widely extended front. Attention thus diverted from the right, the main turning movement on that side could be more easily effected, and, coming as it would where least expected, its value would be multiplied. The mere outline of this scheme sounds commonplace and little calculated to deceive, yet, from the skill with which it was presented, the desired impressions were produced and inferences widely incorrect were drawn. To elucidate what has just been said it will be necessary to consider shortly the broader features of Marshal Oyama's plan.

While the grim struggle was raging on his left at Hei-kou-tai, the Third Army was proceeding northwards from Port Arthur, and by the middle of February had assembled west of Liao-yang at Hsiao-pei-ho. Its movement had been detected by Major-General Mishchenko's cavalry in the Ying-kou raid, but of its final destination nought was learnt by them. At Hei-kou-tai no fraction of that Army had taken part, and its absence therefrom and the presence of the 11th Division shortly after on the Japanese right were points probably not lost sight of by the Russians. Thus far the plot, still in its early stages, boded well, and, to lend colour to the idea that General Nogi's troops had all been sent north-east of Liao-yang and not

* *See* Map 55.

towards the west, a new Army had been created in Japan. There troops were quietly mobilized in January, shipped to Korea, and, joining those at Seoul and Wiju, formed together with the 11th Division the Fifth, or Ya-lu Army. Marching northwards, this force—whose real nature was mistaken by the Russians—came on the 19th February into the area of active operations.

On the Japanese left the time for action had not yet arrived, though the battle in which the troops there had been engaged had caused the coming of the troops from Port Arthur to be hastened and had curtailed the period of preparation for the next event. The cavalry force of Major-General Akiyama had been withdrawn from its position on a level with the front line of the Second Army between the 3rd and 10th February and now held the villages (A 4) of Chih-tai-tzu and Ma-ma-chieh, with the main body in San-chia-tzu (B 4), some 6 miles south-south-west of Hei-kou-tai. Here, connected with the 8th Division on its right it served to conceal from the enemy's mounted troops the assembling of the Third Army at Hsiao-pei-ho, while its position so far behind the general line of front may possibly have silenced fears of hostile movement from that side. That an army of three divisions* should eventually appear upon its outer flank was a manœuvre so unprecedented, a contingency so improbable, that it does not seem to have found room in the imagination of the Russian commander.

On the 17th February, Marshal Oyama issued orders directing certain changes in the constitution of the Fourth and Second Armies, which were to come into effect upon the 20th. The 6th Division, which, on the withdrawal from the front line in January of the 3rd Division, had extended its right for some distance to the eastward while its left kept up communication with the 4th Division, was therein allotted to the Fourth Army, while General Oku, left with the 3rd and 4th Divisions, was instructed to embody the 5th and 8th in his command. These last two divisions held the ground from the west of Shen-tan-pu (C 4 north) through Ma-lan-ku to Yen-tai-tzu, a position taken up by them after Hei-kou-tai, immediately north of which place a pile bridge for wheeled traffic had been thrown across the frozen Hun. The 3rd Division was not, however, to remain with the Second Army, but was detached to form part of Marshal Oyama's general reserve.† This division, which had materially helped to repel the serious attacks made on Shen-tan-pu and the smaller villages lying further east, had relieved the cavalry brigade there when its move southward

17th Feb.

* The Third Army consisted of the 1st, 7th, 9th, and 11th Divisions. The last division marched to join the Ya-lu or Fifth Army after it arrived at Liao-yang.—A. H.

† Marshal Oyama's reserve is called in this report the "general reserve," and General Oku's reserve "the reserve" or "Army reserve."—A. H.

to San-chia-tzu took place, and, from its close proximity to the opposing lines, and the difficulty of withdrawing and replacing it without discovery, was to remain with General Oku till the 25th. That general had moved his quarters to Ta-tung-shang-pu (D 4 south), in the neighbourhood of which village and in Lang-tung-kou (C 4 south) was assembled the reserve of the army, mostly composed of heavy guns. At this time nothing of importance had occurred in front except that the enemy seemed to be extending to the west of Chang-tan (C 3 s.w) where some activity was noticeable, and had transferred a division with artillery from before the First Army to Meng-ta-pu (D 3), a village some 3 miles north of Li-ta-jen-tun.

20th-26th Feb.

The seven days from the 20th to the 26th February embrace the period of active preparation of the Second Army for the coming battle, and the initiatory measures to be carried out therein were briefly summed up in an order of the former date from Manchurian Army Head-Quarters, the main points of which were as follows :—

1. The right of the Second Army will maintain connection with the Fourth Army, while the left will form a pivot for the turning movement of the Third Army. When the progress of the latter Army becomes marked, the enemy will be attacked in force on the line from Shen-tan-pu (C 4 north) to Lan-shen-pu (D 3 east).

2. The commander of the Second Army is authorized to apply at any time to Manchurian Army Head-Quarters for reinforcements not exceeding one regiment of infantry.

On receiving these orders General Oku decided to make Chang-tan in the first instance his main point of attack, thus shifting the centre of gravity of his army to the left, a measure which would involve an increase of strength in that direction and a consequent diminution on the right. To meet the exigencies of the case, he next day issued the following orders for the rearrangement and redistribution of his troops :—

1. The Reserve Brigade of the 8th Division under its commander, Colonel Tomioka, will receive the following units from the 4th Division :—
   - 1 section of cavalry.
   - 1 battalion of field artillery.*
   - 1 captured battery of Russian field guns (six in number).
   - 1 battery of foot artillery (9-cm. mortars, four in number).
   - 1 company of engineers.
   - 3 battalions of infantry.

* As the word "brigade" is required to describe the Japanese unit consisting of three regiments of field artillery, "battalion" (the literal translation of the Japanese term) has been used to describe the unit consisting of three batteries.

This detachment, which will be under the direct orders of the Army Commander, will occupy the line from Lin-sheng-pu (E 3) through Wan-chia-yuen-tzu to Hsiao-tai (D 3/4) and maintain connection with the Fourth Army.

2. The 4th Division, with one squadron of cavalry, and less the troops belonging to it named in paragraph 1, will receive an independent battalion of field artillery,* and will relieve that part of the 3rd Division now holding the line from Ya-pa-tai (C 4) to Shen-tan-pu. The necessary preparations for this relief will be made at once, but the date on which it will take place will be intimated later.
3. That portion of the 3rd Division (Kawakami's Detachment consisting of the 34th Infantry Regiment less two companies) in occupation of the line from Tai-ping-chuang (D 4) through Li-ta-jen-tun to Han-shan-tai, will continue there, and the remainder will assemble in the neighbourhood of Ta-tung-shan-pu (D 4 south), where it will form part of the general reserve under Marshal Oyama. The date on which it will assemble will be notified later.
4. The 5th Division, retaining one squadron of cavalry, will continue to hold its present position (from the west of Shen-tan-pu through Liu-tiao-kao and Ya-tzu-pao to Ma-lan-ku) and prepare to attack. To this division is allotted one independent battalion of field artillery. One of its regiments of infantry will remain at Ta-tai (C 4) as part of the reserve of the Army.
5. The 8th Division will keep its present line (south of Ma-lan-ku through Fei-tsui-ho-tzu to Tu-tai-tzu, B 4 north) and prepare to attack. The cavalry regiment, less one squadron, will be sent to join the cavalry brigade under Major-General Akiyama. To this division is attached one independent battalion of field artillery. One of its regiments of infantry will remain at Ku-cheng-tzu (C 4) as part of the reserve of the Army.
6. Major-General Akiyama's force† will carry out the duties already ascribed to it, and, from the 26th, will be ready to advance at short notice. To it will be attached the 8th Cavalry Regiment (less one squadron), and the 10th Cavalry Regiment will rejoin its own division. Should Major-General Akiyama be ordered to advance,

* Newly arrived from Japan.

† After the order had been carried out Major-General Akiyama's force would be as follows:—1st Cavalry Brigade; 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 8th regiments of cavalry (each less one squadron); the 2nd Reserve Regiment, which was in the neighbourhood of San-chia-tzu, protecting the left flank and rear, one battery of horse artillery, and one battery of captured field guns —12 in all.—A. H.

the 1/35th R* (now attached to his command) will remain at San-chia-tzu.

7. The heavy artillery brigade† will keep its present position and will be ready to advance at any time after the 25th.

After the above orders had been carried into effect the reserve of the Second Army would comprise the following troops :—

1 section of cavalry from the 4th and one from the 5th Division.
13th Artillery Regiment (of the 1st Artillery Brigade).
6 batteries of 12-cm. howitzers‡ (four guns per battery).
3 batteries of 15-cm. guns (four guns per battery).
1 battery of 9-cm. guns (six guns).
1 battery of howitzers (four guns taken at Nan Shan).
1 company of engineers of the Reserve Brigade 9th Division.
42nd Infantry Regiment of the 5th Division (2½ battalions).
31st Infantry Regiment of the 8th Division.

This force was quartered in the villages of (C 4) Ta-tai, Ku-cheng-tzu, Kou-tzu-yen, and Lang-tung-kou.

The withdrawal of troops from the front line, and their replacement by others, was an operation which had already been effected with success by the Second Army, but on the present occasion the undertaking was on a somewhat larger scale, a fact which, coupled with the imminence of a greater movement and the necessity for concealment, demanded that a maximum of care and foresight should be exercised. When, towards the end of January, Lieut.-General Oshima's division left the neighbourhood of Wu-chia-wa-tzu (E/F 3) for that of Yang-chia-wan (D/E 4), the troops marched at night, and in the darkness some little confusion had resulted, and on this account it was deemed wiser this time to wait until the hour of twilight, when a faint mist generally arose, obscuring all objects except those close at hand.

24th Feb. By the 24th, Colonel Tomioka's Detachment had received the troops and guns transferred to it from the 4th Division, and at 6 p.m., being then in the position arranged, came under the direct orders of General Oku. On that date, probably for convenience of command, the 13th Artillery Regiment was temporarily given to the commander of the Heavy Artillery Brigade.

25th Feb. On the 25th, the 3rd Division left the line, and, with the exception of the 34th Regiment, which, with a battery of

---

* 1/35th R. means 1st battalion 35th Reserve Infantry Regiment.

† A considerable amount of heavy ordnance had come up from Port Arthur, part of which, including six 28-cm. howitzers, was in position near Sha-ho station, and part distributed to the Armies.—A. H.

‡ The Japanese translator calls all ordnance either guns or mortars. Where howitzers appear in the report the weapons were personally seen. —A. H.

captured mortars took post from Tai-ping-chuang (D 4 north) to Han-shan-tai, and came under the orders of the 4th Division, assembled in the neighbourhood of Ta-tung-shan-pu (D 4 south). From that village, on the following day, amid a storm of wind and snow, General Oku moved his head-quarters 5 miles west, to Kou-tzu-yen. Everything was now ready, and nothing that could contribute to success in the great struggle about to begin had been overlooked.

During the week of preparation the enemy's patrols were more than usually active, and at night collisions with them were frequent. The pine grove, contiguous to the railway line north of the Sha Ho bridge (E 3) whose possession by the Japanese had always been most obstinately contested, became now, more than ever, a scene of deadly strife during the hours of darkness, while Pao-tzu-yen (D/E 3) quickly became another centre of attraction for Russian enterprise. By day the balloon would rise, apparently to view the ground near Wan-chia-yuan-tzu (D 3 south-east) and by day and night the Russian guns, light and heavy, fired with little intermission, devoting most of their attention to the area lying between Li-ta-jen-tun and Shen-tan-pu, opposite which places work on defences was unceasing. A series of minor movements, awakening greater interest than the ordinary incidents of cannonading and fighting of patrols, now began, and these were duly brought to notice by the Japanese look-out men. Sometimes a battalion, at other times a company, would be seen marching towards the south-west, as if to reinforce the right beyond Chang-tan, but as the presence of the Third Army was still believed to be unsuspected, and the Fifth Army was making itself felt far to the east, it seems probable that under pretence of moving towards the west, reinforcements were gradually being transferred in a diametrically opposite direction.

South of Hei-kou-tai, in front of the cavalry brigade, all was quiet, a circumstance of happy augury for the great turning movement then on the eve of execution. Major-General Mishchenko and his Cossacks, generally so active, no longer held the field west of the railway line between the Liao and the Hun, and their absence at so critical a time was a gain unlooked for by the Japanese. It happened in this way. Before Major-General Mishchenko began his march against the communications south of Liao-yang, what later proved to be a counter-raid was being planned in the 1st Cavalry Brigade,* and to carry it out, about the 10th January, two parties, of strength far less than those which appeared before Ying-kou, sallied forth, and hurrying northward cut the railway and blew up a bridge near Kung-chu-ling. The unrest created by this adventurous dash,† nearly 150 miles north of Mukden, caused the

* Described in the preceding report.

† A gun was taken but destroyed, owing to difficulty of removal.—A. H.

bulk of the Cossack cavalry on their return from their unfruitful raid to be retained in the district west of the Liao Ho, near Fu-ku-men.* Thus it came about that when the Third Army left Hsiao-pei-ho, on the 27th February, with orders to advance its first line as far as Ma-ma-chieh (A 4) and Ka-li-ma,† its
27th Feb. presence was not noticed. On that day‡ the Ya-lu Army, whose advanced guard had occupied Wu-lung-kou and San-lung-yu on the 26th, was directed to continue moving against Ma chun-tan, a place some 25 miles to the south-east of Fu-shun. The right wing of the First Army had taken Kau-tai Ling and Wang-fu Ling on the 26th, and the Fourth Army remained passive along the line which it had held throughout the winter.

To add the final touch to the instructions already issued, and to lead up to the operation that would follow, General Oku gave the following orders at 6 p.m. on the 26th:—

1. To-morrow, in order to conceal from the enemy internal movements in the army, the artillery will open fire. The same procedure is being followed in the Fourth and First Armies.

   All divisions will therefore engage the enemy in the manner indicated for two hours, viz., from 8 a.m. to 9 a.m. and from noon to 1 p.m. As the bombardment is not intended to be serious, only a portion of the artillery, and no heavy ordnance, will be used.§
2. The Heavy Artillery Brigade will take positions at Liu-tiao-kao (C 4 north) at an early hour to-morrow, in such manner that fire can be brought to bear on Chang-tan, Ku-chia-tzu, and Chou-kuan-pu. These positions will be fixed as soon as possible, but fire will not be opened until ordered.
3. Major-General Akiyama's force, keeping touch with the Third Army, will cross to the right bank of the Hun, with the object of assisting the movement of that Army.
4. The 5th Division will send to Ku-cheng-tzu (C 4), at 8 a.m., a regiment of infantry under its brigadier-general, and the 8th Division will send a similar force at the same hour to Wu-chia-tzu (B 4). These regiments‖ will be under the direct orders of the Army Commander.

The 27th February, though little would be done thereon, was to be the first day, so far as the Second Army was concerned, of the operations which were to culminate in the victorious field of Mukden, and the rout of the Russian Army.

* About 50 miles north-west of Mukden.

† About 14 miles north-west of Ma-ma-chieh.

‡ For movements of other Armies, *see* Map 61.

§ The Japanese wished to conceal their artillery positions up to the last, as any disclosure of the whereabouts or existence of the heavy artillery might indicate whence the attack would come.—A. H.

‖ This order is practically a repetition of Nos. 4 and 5 of the 21st February.—A. H.

That day and the next were days on which preliminary action took place, and may be called the first phase; the second extended from the 1st to the 4th March, and includes the assault and capture of the first line, and the pursuit therefrom; while the third phase, from the 5th March onwards, deals with the attack upon the Russian second line.

The area in which the Second Army would manœuvre thus included ground on both banks of the Hun, and that which lies a few miles to the south-west side of Mukden. Fears had been entertained lest the sun, whose rays were daily waxing stronger, should so weaken the ice upon that river as to render bridging operations unavoidable. Should this have proved to be the case, movements would have been seriously impeded,* but fortunately, at the date on which the battle opened, the cold still continued, though not with such intensity as to make night operations a source of very great discomfort.† As in the case of many of the earlier struggles of the war, the battle of Mukden was to be also one of localities. The numerous villages and occasional low sandhills which dot the plain were strongly held by the Russians, while the walls of the houses, and those which generally surrounded the villages, being still hard frozen, were bullet-proof.‡ The general character of the country is similar to that round Hei-kou-tai,§ and the ravines, in which ran frozen rivulets, though difficult of passage, served here and there to cover troops, guns, and transport from the enemy's shells and view. Those villages, immediately behind which the Russians had passed the winter in their huts of mud, were nearly level with the ground, for in order to obtain firewood and materials for defence, the houses had been dismantled with an unsparing hand. Thus, when the Japanese infantry drove the enemy from some village obstinately held, they found themselves exposed to the fire of guns with very meagre shelter. To reach the points held by the enemy, ground devoid of any cover had to be crossed, and as the soil was still frozen as at Hei-kou-tai, the experience of that battle had caused expedients to be adopted to mitigate the evil. Sandbags were distributed to the infantry, and, before the attack was launched, some earth was placed in them and carried forward, so that a few inches of cover might be had. Owing, however, to their weight, which impeded rapid movement, they could not be taken far forward in a day attack, but when closing on the enemy's position at night they were of use. The artillery profited more by the use of sandbags than the infantry, for, being light when empty, a considerable

* The Commanding Engineer of the Second Army had arranged to bridge the Hun in five hours.—A. H.

† No cases of frost-bite in the Second Army occurred in the battle of Mukden. [Lieut.-Colonel Macpherson has since informed me that there were 70. My authority is evidently wrong.]—A. H.

‡ At ordinary times the walls are penetrable at 600 yards.—A. H.

§ *See* p. 30, Operations, Second Army, 20th October 1904 to 29th January 1905.—A. H.

number could be carried on the wagons, and these, with the loose earth that lay upon the surface of the ground and what was dug, could be quickly formed into a parapet. When sand-bags were deficient, cover for guns was made with chests and boxes carried from the nearest village and then filled with frozen clods. It may seem that the advantages of fighting in such a country and at such a season were entirely on the side of the defenders, but where the ground is frozen hard, freedom and rapidity of movement for foot, horse, and wheels, and facility of communication, are on the side of the assailant to a great degree; and when the defender of localities, with shaken *moral*, is once driven forth, his only way to safety lies over ground swept by the guns and rifles of his evictor, at whose mercy he remains until some haven be attained.

First Phase.

27th Feb. About 3 a.m. a company of the enemy's infantry appeared before the front of Colonel Tomioka's troops in the neighbourhood of Wan-chia-yuan-tzu (D 3 S.E.), while two companies advanced towards Pao-tzu-yen. These hostile movements were in both cases driven back.

In accordance with the orders of the previous day, portions of the Japanese artillery opened deliberate fire at 8 a.m. and again at 12 noon. The effect produced was scarcely noticeable, but without losing a moment all the Russian guns, heavy and light, opposite the Second Army replied, disclosing their positions and their nature. The intervals between the hours laid down by General Oku for the bombardment were passed in quietness, for the two opposing armies ceased simultaneously to fire, but at night the Russians broke the peace by re-opening with their guns and making many minor attacks along the line, all of which were speedily repulsed.

Nothing of an unusual nature occurred in the direction of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, and on its left the Third Army reached at noon a line stretching from Ka-li-ma* to Pei-ta-tzu through Lao-huang-ta. For the 28th that Army was ordered to push forward and occupy a front extending from Chen-tzu-kang through Niu-shin-tai and Chang-chia-wo-peng to San-tan-kao.

On the extreme right of the Japanese field force the Ya-lu Army was progressing towards Ma-chun-tan.

At 10 p.m., General Oku issued the following orders:—

1. The Army will hold itself in readiness to attack to-morrow, every division being prepared to do so at a moment's notice. In order to cover the advance of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, the 8th Division will fire upon the enemy at Hou-ma-hui-lin-tzu (B 4 N.W.) with part of its artillery.
2. The Heavy Artillery Brigade will be ready to fire from its positions, if required, at dawn.

* 20 miles west of Chang-tan.

3. To assist the movement of the Third Army, the 1st Cavalry Brigade will push to the front as far as possible and drive the enemy out of Hou-ma-hui-lin-tzu.
4. The 42nd and 31st Regiments of the Army reserve will hold themselves in readiness to move at dawn.

The possibility that the Third Army might be opposed upon the 28th made it incumbent upon General Oku to adopt precautionary measures whereby, if need arose, pressure in its direction might be lightened, and for this reason it would seem that the orders, directing everyone to be ready to attack, were issued.

28th Feb. At an early hour along the whole front of the Second Army a deliberate* fire of guns was opened to which the enemy replied. By the afternoon his guns—fifty-six field and twelve heavy—were counted. Nothing occurred throughout the day, but the cavalry brigade, leaving San-chia-tzu, as ordered, and driving before it a small force of infantry and cavalry, occupied the line from Hou-ma-hui-lin-tzu to Hsiao-pien-wai with the main body at Huang-la-she-tzu. Its advance had been assisted by the independent batteries of field artillery attached to the 8th Division† which fired on Hou-ma-hui-lin-tzu from a position near Tu-tai-tzu (B 4 N.E.).

In the direction of the First Army the forward movement was continued, its right wing occupying Hsi-ku-ling and Wang-fu Ling, while its left and the Fourth Army cannonaded the position before them. The 28-cm. howitzers, used for the first time in the field upon this day, from positions near the railway line, gave satisfactory results, their shells wrecking everything with which they came in contact.

Again the Third Army advanced unheeded and occupied the line arranged.

At 8 p.m. an order came from Marshal Oyama directing the main attack to begin on the 1st March, and pointing out that the duty of the Second Army was to occupy the enemy's first line from Chang-tan to Erh-tai-tzu (D 3 S.W.).

Thereupon General Oku gave the following orders for that date :—

1. The Army is about to advance to the line extending from Lan-shen-pu (D 3 east) to Su-hu-pu (D 2 S.E.), but will first secure that stretching from Chin-shan-tai (D 3/4) to Chang-tan.
2. The 5th Division from dawn will advance from the front Shen-tan-pu to Ya-tzu-pao (C 4 N.W.) and attack the enemy holding the line from Li-chia-wo-peng to Wang-chia-wo-peng, and if possible occupy the vicinity of Chou-kuan-pu.

---

* To save ammunition for a prolonged battle divisional commanders were ordered to expend it with parsimony.—A. H.

† The 5th and 8th Divisions were organized with mountain batteries.—A. H.

The artillery of the 5th Division, including the independent batteries attached to it, will be under the orders of the brigadier-general commanding the heavy artillery which is now at Liu-tiao-kao. If this commander should require a company of engineers it will be furnished from the division, on demand.

3. The 4th Division will commence operations so as to keep touch with the 5th Division, and will advance from Shen-tan-pu and the ground to the east of it and attack the enemy on the line Pei-tai-tzu, Huang-ti (C 4 N.E.), Chin-shan-tai. If possible he will be forced from it and the line Ku-chia-tzu to Erh-tai-tzu occupied.
4. The 8th Division will occupy before dawn the line extending from Ya-tzu-pao (C 4 N.W.) to the sandhill about 1 mile north of Tu-tai-tzu (B 4 N.E.), and keep touch with the 5th Division. When the 5th Division begins its attack the 8th will also do so, and will try to occupy a line stretching from Ya-tzu-pao to the east, thence attacking the enemy at Chang-tan and in its vicinity.
5. The heavy artillery will be ready in its positions in the neighbourhood of Liu-tiao-kao (C 4) before dawn, and when day breaks will bombard the enemy at Li-chia-wo-peng and Wang-chia-wo-peng so as to assist the 5th Division in its attack. After silencing the enemy's guns it will direct its fire against the artillery in the neighbourhood of Chang-tan, so as to help the 8th Division, and some of its guns will be employed to support the 4th Division.
6. The artillery of the 5th Division will be under the orders of the brigadier-general commanding the heavy artillery, and, if that officer requires a company of engineers, he will obtain it on demand from the 5th Division.
7. Colonel Tomioka's detachment will, as soon as the Army begins its attack, bombard the enemy at Ta-lien-tun* and Ta-wu-ching-ying,† so as to assist the main attack.
8. Major-General Akiyama's force will remain between the Second and Third Armies, and will maintain close connection with the left of the former Army and protect its left flank in strength. If possible it will also attack the enemy to its front in order to assist the main attack.
9. The reserve of the Army will assemble, at 6 a.m., at its quarters in (C 4) Ta-tai and Ku-cheng-tzu.

General Oku's original intention on receiving instructions from Marshal Oyama on the 20th was to make Chang-tan and its vicinity the main point of attack, and, with this view, the

* North-west of Lin-sheng-pu (E 3).
† Three miles west of Lin-sheng-pu (E 3).—A. H.

orders issued by him on the night of the 28th were drawn up. A great force of artillery—136* guns in all—was therefore massed in the neighbourhood of Liu-tiao-kao before which and the impetuous infantry attack it was hoped that the solid field works of the Russians and their obstinate defenders would give way. The brunt of the battle on the 1st March would fall upon the 5th Division, while the inner wings of the 4th and 8th Divisions would be also seriously engaged. East of Ya-pa-tai (C 4 east), where the line had purposely been thinned to help the operations on the left, no attack would be made, the troops within that area merely holding the enemy's attention and menacing him with their guns.

Second Phase.

When day broke a mist hid from view all objects at a distance, and until 7.30 a.m. the heavy artillery could not open fire, but, after that hour, battery after battery began to direct its efforts against the various points named to be attacked, while the Russian guns, light and heavy, near Chang-tan, Ku-chia-tzu (C 3), Pao-hsiang-tun (D 3), and Hei-lin-tai fiercely replied. As on the movements of the 5th Division those of the troops on either flank depended, all eyes were turned in its direction, and about 8.30 a.m. its advance began. Its distribution for the attack was in three columns, which were as follows :— **1st Mar.**

Right column.—I./21st Regiment and one section of engineers.

Centre column.—II. and III./21st Regiment and one company of engineers.

Left column.—11th Regiment and one company of engineers : while in reserve was the 41st Regiment.†

Immediately to the right of this division was the main body or left of the 4th Division, comprising the 19th Brigade, less one battalion, and two sections of engineers, while a battalion with a section of engineers held Hsiao-tai-tzu (C 4) and there faced the enemy in Huang-ti. Behind the main body was the reserve. The troops from a little east of Shen-tan-pu attacked the enemy at Pei-tai-tzu, and the redoubt contiguous to it on the west, and their advance was almost simultaneous with that of the 5th, while their artillery for the most part fired on those objectives, a portion shelling Huang-ti and Chin-shan-tai from Ya-pa-tai.

The 8th Division, according to its orders, had moved before daylight, and while the right column, composed of one battalion, remained upon the left bank of the Hun to link it with the 5th Division, a larger force of infantry crossed the river, the artillery taking post at Tu-tai-tzu (B 4 north) whence it could fire on Yueh-pu-tzu (B 3 S.E.) and Chang-tan. Those who

* The 134 guns were composed of 36 mountain guns of the 5th Division, 18 field guns of that division, 36 guns of the 13th Regiment 1st Artillery Brigade, and 46 heavy guns or howitzers.—A. H.

† A few mounted orderlies were attached to each column.—A. H.

passed to the right bank formed the centre, consisting of a brigade, less one battalion, and a company of engineers, the left consisting of one brigade of artillery and one battalion of infantry.

By 9 a.m., Major-General Akiyama's force had reached Tu-tai-tzu, its artillery firing on Chien Nien-yu-pao to help the 8th Division, while part of its mounted troops occupied the low hills west of Hou-ma-hui-lin-tzu (B 4 N.W.).

The advance of the left column of the 5th Division gave promise of success, and though the fire of guns and rifles poured upon it was extremely heavy, a point from 200 to 300 yards from the little sandhill near Wang-chia-wo-peng was reached. The right, whose object of attack was Li-chia-wo-peng, found the force there very strongly entrenched, and, as at Wang-chia-wo-peng, supported by machine guns. The enemy, too, was sending up reinforcements, and, though life was sacrificed without a thought, the utmost it could do was to advance to a line some four hundred yards distant from the works.

Similarly the 4th Division had arrived close to Pei-tai-tzu (C 3 south) but annihilation would have attended any efforts made then to go further to the front. The Russians, realizing that a very serious attempt was being made to oust them from the ground which had been theirs for months, brought up a large force of artillery, and, by the afternoon, played incessantly with some 250 guns upon the troops lying in the open and on the line of defence behind.

When darkness came the 5th Division had its left upon the sandhill south-west of Wang-chia-wo-peng and its right near a similar feature 400 yards south-east of Li-chia-wo-peng. The enemy, who held strong works in front of these villages, still resisted obstinately, and showed no signs of giving way, and, bulldog-like, the Japanese too held to their ground. They had now arrived so close to their object that under ordinary circumstances an attempt would have been made to take it by a rush, but the fire that met them was so deadly that to do so was impossible.

Beyond the Hun, part of Major-General Akiyama's force advanced and occupied Chang-chia-wo-peng (B 3) at 12.50 p.m., but, coming under a heavy artillery fire from Ssu-fang-tai, its movement stopped. At 1 p.m. the centre column of the 8th Division, part of which had for a time been able to advance in safety up the river bed, disregarding shells and bullets, made for Yueh-pu-tzu in one long rush of some 600 yards and drove the Russians from the place. Beyond that point it could not go, for Chang-tan was held in great force, and from infantry in Chien Nien-yu-pao came a hot flanking fire. With the latter village and Ssu-fang-tai still in the enemy's hands, neither Major-General Akiyama's force nor the 8th Division was capable of progress. At 8 a.m. news had reached Army Head-Quarters that about one regiment of Russian infantry and a battalion

of artillery were moving south-west from Pa-yin-tai (B 3) on Ssu-fang-tai, and that in addition some 5,000 infantry, were marching thence from Hsi Nien-yu-pao. Consequently at 2.30 p.m., two battalions from the 31st Regiment of the Army reserve at Ku-cheng-tzu were sent across the Hun by Hei-kou-tai.

At 4 p.m. important information was sent in by the 1st Cavalry Brigade, from which it appeared that about that hour part of the Third Army had come up and had begun to attack Ssu-fang-tai (B 3).* It was hoped that the pressure about to be exercised in that quarter would soon relieve the dangerous situation of the 5th Division, whose centre and right, aided by a heavy artillery fire, had however succeeded in taking the sandhill south-east of Li-chia-wo-peng at 8 p.m. Before that hour, at 5.50 p.m., General Oku had despatched a battalion of the 42nd Regiment with the regimental commander to help to restore the fight.† The left wing too, had endeavoured to advance when it grew dark, but an attempt made by it to reach the enemy's lines at half-past eight failed. So near now were the opposing forces that the nearest men of both were but a stone's throw from each other. During the night reinforcements reached the enemy, and counter-attacks, for which the Japanese were on their guard, were made and were repulsed.

The troops of the 4th Division were in a situation not unlike that of their comrades of the 5th, for their left wing faced the redoubt and village of Pei-tai-tzu (C 3 south), and soon would try to take them by a rush. More to the east nothing unusual had occurred this day. There the force consisted of the right wing of the 4th Division at Ya-pa-tai, the 34th Regiment with a battery of captured mortars from Han-shan-tai to Tai-ping-chuang, and beyond them Colonel Tomioka's troops.

Head-Quarters of the Army still remained at Kou-tzu-yen (C 4), and its reserve was now reduced to two and a half battalions of infantry in Ta-tai (C 4).

Outside the region of the Second Army, of the other Japanese armies the Fourth Army was busily engaged against Wan-pao Shan, or as the Russians call it, Putilov Hill, and the First had this day taken Tung-kou Shan.

At 9 p.m. General Oku issued orders in which he merely stated that the action of the day would be continued on the morrow. A little after 11 p.m. an order came from Manchurian Army Head-Quarters directing him to send Major-General Akiyama's cavalry brigade on the 2nd to the Third Army.

* No information came direct from the Third Army this day, although it is stated that its telegraph corps worked extremely well. The rapid advance of that army and the fact that Chinese transport carts cut the cables of the telephone in several places by driving over them were the the causes; and breaks in cables or damage thereto take longer to find than breaks in overhead wires.—A. H.

† Nearly all the regimental and battalion commanders had been killed or wounded.—A. H.

The cavalry regiments of the 5th and 8th Divisions at present with that brigade were to be withdrawn in order to rejoin the Second Army. Accordingly these regiments were placed under the orders of the commander of the 8th Division,* whose troops were situated on the outer flank of the Second Army's line.

The fighting of all three divisions of the army on the 1st March had been exceptionally severe, and the losses proportionately heavy, but this is hardly to be wondered at when it is remembered that the attack of the Japanese was a purely frontal one, and that the defensive line against which they advanced, though covered only in a moderate degree by obstacles, was very strong and little liable to damage from artillery. Apart from the marked characteristic of the assailants, which led them always to assault the strongest points, it may be concluded that the intention of General Oku in hurling his men against so well-prepared a place was, if possible, to take it, or, at the least, hold the enemy firmly there, and thus draw off attention from the Third Army and prevent troops from being sent against it.

2nd Mar. At 2.50 a.m. information came from the 1st Cavalry Brigade to the following effect:—The enemy who had been holding Ssu-fang-tai had, in the evening, gradually began to retire, and by 10.30 p.m. part of the 9th Division of the Third Army had occupied that village. General Nogi's left was now reported to be on the line from Yang-tzu-kang-tzu (B 2) to Shan-hai,† and, to the north-west, part of his cavalry had taken Ta-min-tun (A 2). Prior to the arrival of this welcome news General Oku was in doubt whether to accede or not to a request which had been made by the commanders of the 4th and 5th Divisions that, in view of the high spirits of their officers and men permission might be given to make a general attack before dawn, After anxiously considering the situation he had approved, and the order intimating his decision had gone forth. Thus the 4th Division was in readiness, at 2 a.m., to charge the redoubt and village that, during the day before, had mocked its utmost efforts, while the 5th and 8th Divisions—both of which had remarked some tokens of unrestfulness before them—awaited, too, a propitious moment to assault. Snow was falling heavily, obscuring distant view—a circumstance that from the nearness of the combatants mattered little—when about 5.50 a.m. the left wing of the 5th Division forced its way into the village of Wang-chia-wo-peng, the right occupying Li-chia-wo-peng at half-past seven. From the latter village the enemy was pursued to Chang-chuang-tzu (C 3) and it was also taken. Thence a heavy fire was poured upon the Russians, who precipitately

* These regiments had one squadron with their divisions. It is believed that the 2nd Reserve Regiment joined the 8th Division from the cavalry brigade, and its presence with that division will be remarked upon later.—A. H.

† 2½ miles due north of Yang-tzu-kang-tzu.

fled towards Su-hu-pu (D 2 south) and up the right bank of the Hun.

At 2 a.m. the 4th Division had charged the redoubt at Pei-tai-tzu (C 3 south) and, in spite of heavy losses, took that work. Unfortunately at the very moment when their object was attained the enemy's reinforcements reached the ground—or perhaps a counter-attack was made—and the brave attackers were driven back, losing several prisoners whom they had taken. Nothing daunted by so tantalizing a repulse, a brief pause was made, and at 4.30 a.m. the redoubt and village were once again assaulted; both fell, the enemy hurrying off towards Ku-chia-tzu and Erh-tai-tzu, leaving 350 dead and several prisoners behind.

West of the Hun, where the presence of the Third Army was more directly felt, the commander of the centre column of the 8th Division, on hearing about dawn from a party sent to reconnoitre that the defenders of Chang-tan (C 3 s.w.) were less in number than on the day before, at once sent forward a portion of his men, and the remainder coming up behind, the place was taken and the enemy driven north of it. The right wing of the division now arrived and joined the centre, while the left, which had suspended operations until daylight, cannonaded Chien Nien-yu-pao (B 3), and at 8 a.m., observing that its defenders were conforming to the general rearward movement from Chang-tan, took the former place.

Thus the first line of defence fell into the Second Army's hands, a result, more especially in the case of the 8th Division, attributable in no small degree to the arrival of the Third Army on its left. In anticipation of this success Marshal Oyama had instructed General Oku beforehand how he should act, for on this occasion it was not intended that the retreat should take place unmolested. At all costs the enemy must be made to fight decisively, and, to prevent his slipping from the toils of the net designed to fall around him, the pursuit of the Second Army must come upon him from a north-westerly direction. Shortly before issuing orders for such a movement a captured map was brought to Army Head-Quarters, which showed that the villages behind the captured line were in a condition of defence, and this led to the belief that heavy opposition might still be met. Bearing this and his instructions in mind, General Oku gave the following orders at 9.30 a.m. :—

1. The Army will this day advance up the left bank of the Hun, and try to force the enemy to the north-east.*
2. The 5th Division, as soon as it has made the necessary preparations, will attack the enemy at Chou-kuan-pu

* Marshal Oyama's order said *from the north-west*, leading to the supposition that the Second Army was to swing round its left in order to pursue from that point of the compass. General Oku evidently understood that he was to follow up from the south-west towards the north-east. Possibly the translator may be at fault, but it was found impossible to clear up the point.—A. H.

(C 3), occupy it and reconnoitre his situation at Ta Han-tai, Hsiao Han-tai, and Fu-chia-chuang.

3. The 8th Division, as soon as it has made the necessary preparations, will advance and occupy Wang-pu-tzu (C 3 centre) and reconnoitre the enemy's situation at Tou-tai-tzu and Ma-tou-lan. This division will maintain connection with the Third Army.
4. The 4th Division will advance as soon as it has made the necessary preparations and occupy the line from Pao-hsiang-tun (D 3 S.W.) to Ku-chia-tzu (C 3 S.E.), and reconnoitre the enemy's situation at Yang-shu-lin-tzu and Meng-ta-pu.
5. The Heavy Artillery Brigade will endeavour with the least possible delay to move from its present position to one south of Shen-tan-pu (C 4 north).
6. The Army reserve will assemble as soon as possible immediately to the south of Shen-tan-pu.

According to these orders each division—in spite of the fatigue and privation which had been incident to the serious fighting of the past thirty-six hours—began to advance.

4th Division.—When the 4th Division by its successful night attack had occupied Pei-tai-tzu (C 3 south), the enemy still held Huang-ti—a village lying 2,000 yards to the south-east. Opposite it at Ya-pa-tai was a battalion of that division, the commander of which unit had, shortly before 8 a.m., sent forward a reconnaissance. The garrison of the place and its works were reported to be strong, but signs of disturbance were observed. Thereupon he decided to try and occupy it by a sudden rush, and, bringing up his men, succeeded in the venture at 9 a.m.

The left of the division, some time later, began to move on Ku-chia-tzu, in which operation it was greatly helped by the 13th Artillery Regiment, sent to join it from the heavy brigade. The batteries took position north-east of Hsiao-shu-tzu, whence they exchanged fire with the enemy's artillery at Hsiao-han-tai. Noting the direction in which the infantry was pressing on, the guns moved forward to Pei-tai-tzu, and on arriving there a portion resumed the duel with Hsiao-han-tai, while the greater number of the batteries fired on Ku-chia-tzu. Under cover of their shells, the left of the division reached the latter village, having suffered comparatively little loss, and driving the enemy back, took with a portion of its force, an hour later, the village of Erh-tai-tzu. Seeing these movements on his left, Colonel Kawakami with the 34th Regiment concluded that the time had come when he too must join issue with the Russians, and, leaving the entrenchments of the main defensive line between Han-shan-tai (D 4), and Tai-ping-chuang, took Fu-chia-chuang (C 3 east) at midnight.

The casualties of the 4th Division on the 1st and 2nd March totalled about 1,200 men, while of the enemy before it 350 killed were buried and 30 prisoners taken.

5th Division.—The 5th Division assembled its troops in the two villages captured early in the morning, and changing its distribution into one column, prepared to follow up the enemy. The advanced guard, under Major-General Surizawa, consisted of a section of cavalry, the greater part of the 5th Regiment of mountain artillery, a company of engineers, and the 41st Infantry Regiment; and the main body under Lieut.-General Kigoshi followed. Hearing that Chou-kuan-pu (C 3) was still strongly held, the latter general sent up half of the 42nd Regiment to join the advanced guard, and, by its help, that village was secured at 5 p.m., the enemy flying in disorder towards the north and east. Shortly afterwards the main body came up, and a halt for the night was made.

The losses suffered by this division on the 1st and 2nd March greatly exceeded those of the 4th and 8th Divisions, amounting to some 2,600 all ranks in killed and wounded, while of the enemy before it 470 bodies were buried, showing that his casualties too had not been light.

8th Division.—After occupying Chang-tan, the 8th Division had pressed on and taken Ho-chia-chuang. There arrangements for the pursuit were made, two columns being formed instead of three.

The right column was composed of the original right and centre columns, and in the left column no change was made, while the two battalions of the 31st sent up by General Oku from his reserve, were kept under Lieut.-General Tatsumi's hand. Thus the troops moved on, keeping touch with the 5th Division, and halted for the night in Wang-hsi-tai (C 3 centre) and Hsiao Li-pu-tzu, the main body quartering behind in Ho-chia-chuang.

The casualties of the division on the 1st and 2nd March numbered about 1,600, and of the enemy only 150 dead were found.

Opposite Colonel Tomioka's Detachment the enemy was noticed firing the villages and making preparations to retire. Guns were directed against him, and, where distance permitted, rifle fire, but when night came he still held his defences.

Part of the Third Army this day occupied San-tai-tzu (C 3 north) and Piao-to-tzu, and the Fourth Army was again busily engaged with the enemy before it. The state of the other armies forced General Oku to the conclusion that the pursuit must be conducted with more vigour, and at 9.30 p.m. he issued the following orders:—

1. The Army will continue the pursuit to-morrow, and press the enemy towards the north-east.
2. The 5th Division will leave Chou-kuan-pu (C 3) at 6.30 a.m., and march if possible to the line (D 3) Ta-chuang-ho—Hsin-kai-ho. Its right will not move south-east of the line of villages, Ta Han-tai, Hsin-tai-tzu, and Shui-lo-chang-tai, while its left will keep along the line

Hsiao-chao-wo-peng to Hsin-kai-ho. A battalion and a half of infantry will be left under the regimental commander at Chou-kuan-pu as part of the Army reserve.

3. The 4th Division will march at 6.30 a.m. from the line (C 3 S.E.) Hsiao-han-tai*—Ku-chia-tzu and try and reach that of Ta-chuang-ho—Ku-chia-tai (D 3). It will move over the ground immediately south-east of that along which the right of the 5th Division marches.
4. The 8th Division will march at 6.30 a.m. from the neighbourhood of Wang-pu-tzu (C 3 centre), the main body keeping on the right bank of the Hun, and will occupy the line Hsin-kai-ho to Wai-chia-pu (D 2 south). The duty of the 8th Division being to assist in surrounding the enemy's right, a strong connection will be maintained with the Third Army.
5. Colonel Tomioka's Detachment will remain on its present line, and fire upon the enemy in front of it, to assist the advance of the 4th Division.
6. The infantry and artillery at Shen-tan-pu will assemble ready to march at 6 a.m.†

3rd Mar. As no doubts were longer entertained that the enemy was in full retreat, the spirit of the troops rose high, and each division prepared to advance in two columns. The weather, however, was somewhat unfavourable, for in the morning a strong north-west wind rose, which increased during the afternoon, raising dust and making observation difficult.

5th Division.—The 5th Division left the neighbourhood of Chou-kuan-pu at 6 a.m.,‡ moving in two columns. The left column, under Major-General Surizawa, consisted of one and a half sections of cavalry, the 5th Regiment of mountain artillery, one company of engineers, and the 41st Infantry Regiment. The right column comprised one section of cavalry, the independent battalion of field artillery, one company of engineers, I./21st and 1½ battalions 42nd Regiment. The remainder of the troops formed the main body of the division. The left column reached Hsiao-chia-wo-peng (C 3) at 7 a.m., and opened fire on the enemy, who was holding the walls of Tou-tai-tzu with one regiment. By 9 a.m. he was driven out, and soon after Ma-tou-lan was taken. The right column, encountering small bodies of the enemy on its march, forced them back and arrived at 9.50 a.m. at Hsin-tai-tzu. Beyond this point it was seen that a regiment of infantry held the village of Ta-wang-chiang-pu, and to help the left column a movement was made against that place from

* Partly occupied at night.—A. H.

† Army reserve less one and a half battalions of infantry at Chou-kuan-pu.—A. H.

‡ This was half-an-hour before the time ordered, but a good deal of licence seems to be allowed to divisions in such matters.—A. H.

which the enemy was eventually pushed off towards the north-east.

8th Division.—The left column of the 8th Division, behind which came the main body, marched from Hsiao Li-pu-tzu (C 3 west), at 6 a.m., and passed through Piao-to-tzu, driving before it small parties of the enemy, and arriving at Hou-chia-wo-peng (D 3 north) at 11 a.m. The right column left Wang-hsi-tai at 6.30 a.m., and crossing to the left bank of the Hun, and keeping touch with the 5th Division, arrived at 2 p.m. at La-ta-pu (D 3 on branch railway). Here it found part of that division, which made its own presence there superfluous. It therefore tried to re-cross the river, but the banks were steep and the passage had to be effected opposite Li-ta-pu (C 3 N.E.),* soon after reaching which place the left column of the division was joined.

4th Division.—As the enemy was close in front of this division it moved deployed for the attack and not in column of route as did the other divisions.† The march of the right wing led over ground belonging properly to Colonel Kawakami's Detachment, which had occupied Pao-hsiang-tun (D 3 S.W.) at 5.30 a.m., and, at 8 a.m., in conjunction with the left of Colonel Tomioka's troops, had entered Hei-lin-tai. The left column moved at 6 a.m., and, completely occupying Hsiao-han-tai (C 3), continued the pursuit, a movement in which it was assisted by the divisional artillery at Ya-pa-tai.

The share of Colonel Tomioka's Detachment in driving back the occupants of Hei-lin-tai was due to the initiative of that commander, who, despite strict injunctions to maintain the line of defence between the 4th and 6th Divisions, decided that the time had come when he must help by moving forward somewhat with his left. His men—except three battalions of the 4th Division—were reservists, some of them veterans of the China-Japan war, and, though numerically they were rather weak, this disadvantage was compensated for in great measure by their quality. Army Head-Quarters‡ had left Kou-tzu-yen at 9 a.m. and proceeded first to Shen-tan-pu, and the reserve§ was at the latter village and at Ku-chia-tzu.

At this time (9 a.m.) the Third Army was before the enemy at Chang-tien‖ (C 3 north).

---

* The clashing of these columns is one of the rare instances of bad staff arrangements that has been noticed. The right column, too, had the field guns, which no doubt made the re-crossing more difficult.—A. H.

† As the ground is quite open the troops might all have moved deployed.—A. H.

‡ So many of the villages near the line of defence were in ruins that Army Head-Quarters had to wait till the troops had got well forward in order to obtain quarters.—A. H.

§ The reserve had to-day two very weak battalions of the 21st Regiment with it.—A. H.

‖ This place must not be confused with Chang-tan to the north by west of which it lies, about 7 miles.—A. H.

General Oku now thought it time to issue further orders regarding the conduct of the pursuit, for the basis of his orders of 9.30 a.m. of the 2nd had been that the enemy would offer a strong resistance, an assumption now found to be incorrect.

At 11.30 a.m., therefore, the following orders were given out:—

1. The Army will pursue the enemy on the line from Shao-kuo (D 3 east) to Tung-nan-tao (D 2).
2. The 8th Division, connecting with the 9th Division of the Third Army now engaged with the enemy at Chang-tien, will go as far forward as the line Tung-nan-tao—Shah-ti (D 2).
3. The 5th Division will follow the enemy to the line Ssu-liang-tang-pu (D 3 north)—Tung-erh-pu, its right taking the direction Ta-chuang-ho, Yin-erh-pu, and Tung-erh-pu.
4. The 4th Division will advance to the line Shao-kuo—Tung-erh-pu.
5. When the right of the 4th Division passes the village of Hsing-chia-tai-tzu (D 3 east), Colonel Tomioka, with the troops from Wan-chia-yuan-tzu, will attack Ta-wu-ching-ying. The remainder of his force will hold their present line.

At this time General Oku was anxious regarding that part of the line held by Colonel Tomioka's Detachment, and did not yet wish to move it bodily to the front, for the Fourth Army was still heavily engaged and in difficulties with the enemy at Wan-pao Shan and Han-chang-pu.

According to these orders the divisions continued their movement, and, only meeting slight opposition, arrived generally upon the line named, the extreme left, however, being somewhat to the south-west of it.

The 4th Division stretched from San-chia-tzu (D 3) through Shao-kuo to Huang-ti; the 5th from the west of Yin-erh-pu to Ssu-liang-tang-pu, and the 8th was on the right bank of the Hun in the vicinity of Wai-chia-pu (D 2/3). The night was passed by the divisions covered with a strong outpost line, for the enemy was close at hand. Late at night Ta-tai (D 3 N.E.) was taken by the 5th Division, and Su-hu-pu (D 2 S.E.) was occupied by a small party of that division and of the 8th. The enemy still held his works near Colonel Tomioka's force, and, being especially strong about Wan-chia-yuan-tzu (D 3 S.E.), precautions opposite that place were taken by the Japanese.

Army Head-Quarters moved on from Shen-tan-pu and passed the night at Hsin-tai-tzu (C 3 east), the reserve being at Ta-han-tai and Hsiao-han-tai.

The enemy, who had fallen back during the day, was reported at night to be in occupation of the line from Hsiao-lin-tzu (D/E 3) through Lan-shen-pu, Pu-chia-tzu and Ta-tai to Su-hu-pu.

The Third Army, after repulsing what was estimated to be one army corps on the 2nd and 3rd, held the villages of Ssu-fang-pu (D 2) and Hou-sai-chia-pu, and coming up in its direction from the general reserve was the 3rd Division, which had crossed the Hun at Chang-tan about mid-day on the 3rd.

At 11 p.m. General Oku issued the following orders:—

1. The Army will continue to pursue the enemy to-morrow, and, attacking the enemy on the line Ta-lien-tun (E 3) to Su-hu-pu* (D 2 S.E.), will endeavour to cross to the right bank of the Hun.
2. The 4th Division will march at dawn and occupy the line from Kuan-lin-pu (E 3 west) through Hsiao Su-chia-pu to Wan-sui-yuan-tzu. Colonel Tomioka's Detachment, conforming to the movement of the 4th Division, will attack the enemy first at Ta-wu-ching-ying, next at Shuang-tai-tzu, and, lastly, at Ta-lien-tun. The operations of this detachment will begin from the left, and a strong connection with the right of the 4th Division will be maintained.
3. The 5th Division will move at dawn and attack the enemy at Su-hu-pu.
4. The 8th Division will keep on the right bank of the Hun, assist the attack of the 5th Division, and endeavour to occupy the line Hou-sai-chia-pu (D 2 east) to Hsiao-yu-shu-pu.
5. The heavy artillery will leave Ta Han-tai (C 3 east) at 6 a.m. and move to Ta-chuang-ho. The remainder of the army reserve will leave Hsin-tai-tzu at 6 a.m. and march to the same place.
6. Army Head-Quarters will proceed to Ta-chuang-ho, leaving Hsin-tai-tzu at 9 a.m.

The operations of the Second Army on the 2nd and 3rd March seem open to criticism in more than one respect. Before the advance began it occupied a front—from Lin-sheng-pu (E 3) to Hsi-huang-la-she-tzu (B 4)—of, roughly, twenty miles, with a fighting strength of some 68,000 men. At that time Colonel Tomioka's force had been deputed to guard the line passively as far as Hsiao-tai, five miles, so that it may be left out of consideration.

On the 1st and 2nd the balance of the Army towards and beyond the Hun pressed forward, and, by the evening of the latter date, owing to the defeat inflicted and the presence of the Third Army to the north, the front occupied became diminished by a third. The force was then more concentrated, and, despite losses—some 5,400 men—was everywhere in greater strength than on the 1st, and had before it, to say the least, half beaten troops. Yet the orders to advance—in which no mention of pursuit is made—were issued late, and that advance

* The occupation of this place by the 5th and 8th Divisions was not then known at Head-Quarters.—A. H.

cautious in the extreme, facts only to be accounted for by the belief that the second line would make a strong resistance, or by the desirability of allowing time for the Third Army to push on north-east. But passing from the 1st and 2nd March and coming to the 3rd, the movements on that day are not so easily accounted for. The opposition throughout it was insignificant, and opposite the 8th Division *nil*, yet the front allotted for that division's march was so restricted that its right clashed with the next division to the east, creating both confusion and delay. A Russian army corps north of the Sha Ho had been withdrawn, causing a considerable diminution in strength upon that line, and, further, with so good an obstacle for the left flank of the 5th Division as was the Hun, it scarcely seems that risk would have been run had the 8th Division been eliminated from the line of battle of the Second Army and transferred towards the north, whither it eventually was sent. The first plunge forward of the Second Army made, its future course of action must naturally be to follow up the enemy without delay, and should he halt to fight, contain him. Every man, therefore, employed upon this duty meant a rifle less at the decisive point. Conclusive victory could alone be won by cutting off the Russians from the railway and the roads leading from Mukden towards the north, and no advantage won in other quarters of the field could compensate for failure there. Yet the tendency of the Second Army was at first rather to lean toward the south than towards the north, and the same nervous fear of communications—amply guarded by strong works and trusty men, with many heavy guns—caused the general reserve of the whole field force in Manchuria to be placed behind the Second Army's right.

4th Mar. As ordered on the previous night, the Army was to continue its pursuit this day. In front of the right column of the 5th Division, in the village of Yin-erh-pu (D 3), was a regiment of infantry, a squadron and a battery, and to dislodge them without suffering somewhat heavy loss seemed difficult. Mortars were therefore brought up by the engineers from which bombs of dynamite were fired, and by their help—which caused alarm among the enemy—the village and vicinity were taken. While this affair was going on the remainder of the division massed in Chang-tang-pu.

The 4th Division from an early hour was busily engaged in preparing its attack upon the line held by the enemy from Hsiao-lin-tzu (D/E 3) to Lan-shen-pu; and the 8th Division, helped by the artillery of the 5th, repulsed the force in Shah-ti, and, pushing forward, occupied at 11 a.m. a line (D 2 east) from Hsiao Yu-shu-pu to Ta Yu-shu-pu with its advanced guard consisting of five battalions of infantry, a regiment of artillery, and a few mounted troops and engineers. The cavalry attached to the division (six squadrons, 5th and 8th Cavalry), together with an infantry battalion, was ordered up to fill the gap

between it and the 9th Division on its left, and to maintain connection with the Third Army.

General Oku was now confronted by two problems. On the one hand, in order to assist General Nogi's turning movement towards the north, the transfer of the bulk of the Second Army to the right bank of the Hun was most desirable, while on the other the Fourth Army was stated to be in need of help, for its attack on Wan-pao Shan* and neighbourhood was not progressing. That the Fourth Army should succeed would seem to have been immaterial, provided that the Third came to the north in strength, but that the commander of the Second Army did not take this view is evident from the fact that he sent a message to the Commander-in-Chief offering the 4th Division to help the former Army. Before an answer had come back he put his plan in action, and gave the following orders. These were issued at 10 a.m.

1. The Army will cross to the right bank of the Hun, and direct its march so as to occupy a front from the old railway bridge (south of North Mo-chia-pu)† (E 2 west) to Liu-kuan-tun‡ (E 2).
2. The 4th Division without losing a moment must repulse the enemy before it, and then assist the 6th Division at its right, at the same time covering the right flank and rear of the Army. Colonel Tomioka's Detachment will be under the orders of the General Officer commanding the 4th Division.
3. The 8th Division will leave the neighbourhood of Hsiao Yu-shu-pu (D 2 east) at 11 a.m., and, marching through Yu-ling-pu and Ning-kuan-tun, will proceed as far as the nameless village south-west of Ta-pu§ and Liu-kuan-tun. Great care must be taken to maintain a strong connection with the Third Army.
4. The 5th Division, leaving Su-hu-pu (D 2 S.E.) at 11 a.m. will advance to a line from the old railway bridge to Sha-to-tzu (E 2 west). Special care will be exercised to guard the gap which the northerly movement will cause between it and the 4th Division.
5. Colonel Tomioka's Detachment will be under the orders of the General Officer commanding the 4th Division.
6. The reserve of the Army is placed under the command of the chief of the Heavy Artillery Brigade, and will leave Ta-chuang-ho (D 3 centre) at 11 a.m. and move to Ssu-liang-tang-pu (D 3 north).
7. Army Head-Quarters will proceed temporarily to Ta-chuang-ho.

---

* An almost impregnable position.—A. H.

† In other accounts, North Mo-chia-pu is called Mi-chia-pu.

‡ The front given to the 5th and 8th Divisions was thus 4½ miles.—A. H.

§ (E 2 centre). For the sake of brevity the nameless village is marked "Z" on Map 55, and so styled in this report.—A. H.

As soon as this order was despatched, Army Head-Quarters left Hsin-tai-tzu for Ta-chuang-ho.

At 12.30 p.m. an order came from Marshal Oyama in reply to General Oku's offer of the 4th Division, directing it to be given to the Fourth Army.

At that hour the situation of the other armies was known in the Second Army to be as follows :—

The First Army was closely confronting the enemy and waiting for a favourable opportunity to press its attack.

Nothing was known of the Ya-lu Army, then far to the east and beyond communication with the Armies on the other flank.

The Third Army was pursuing the enemy, who had begun to retire north of Mukden, and purposed to occupy the high ground north-west of that city.

The Fourth Army was making good progress everywhere except as regards the attack on Wan-pao Shan, the impregnable nature of which foiled all efforts to capture.

The sanction received from Marshal Oyama to hand over the 4th Division to General Nodzu's command demanded that help should be given to the 5th Division to maintain communication with the forces on its right, and with this object the six batteries of 12-cm. howitzers were sent to it from the Heavy Artillery Brigade at 1 p.m. An hour later orders were sent to the General Officer Commanding, directing him not only to maintain communication, but also guard the right flank of the Second Army, for which purpose he was given 1½ battalions 41st Regiment, then at Chang-tang-pu.

At 2.20 p.m. an order came from Marshal Oyama placing the 3rd Division* of the general army reserve under General Oku's orders.

3rd Division.—The 3rd Division, which, as mentioned, had marched along the rear of the Second Army on the 3rd March, was now at Fang-chia-tai (C 2), west of the Hun, and was given orders to proceed as quickly as possible to Tung-nan-tao (D 2 centre), so as to arrive there by sunset and take up quarters in the adjacent villages of Hsi-nan-tao, Ta Chin-tsui-tzu, and Hsiao Chin-tsui-tzu.

8th Division.—Previous to this (2.20 p.m.) the 8th Division had left Ta Yu-shu-pu, and about 4 p.m. reached the line from Yu-ling-pu to Ning-kuan-tun. Arrived there it found the enemy holding the ground from Sha-to-tzu (E 2 west) through Kan-kua-tun to Yang-shih-tun, while against its flank from South Mo-chia-pu came a heavy artillery fire. Deploying for the attack, it advanced and fired, but the enemy was at hand, and a halt for the night was called, a strong line of outposts being thrown out to the front.

* The 3rd Division was three battalions of the 34th Regiment short. They were with Colonel Kawakami's Detachment.—A. H.

5th Division.—According to the 10 a.m. orders, the 5th Division left one company in each of the villages of Ta-tai and Su-hu-pu, after which the left column was disposed as advanced guard and crossed the Hun near the latter place, followed by the rest of the division. When the head of the column reached the neighbourhood of Ta Yu-shu-pu it became known that the 8th Division had already taken up the line from Yu-ling-pu to Ning-kuan-tun, upon which the advanced guard deployed and attacked the enemy on the front from the old railway bridge to Sha-to-tzu. To support this operation a regiment of infantry was sent forward from the main body, and the mountain guns took position south-east of Ta Yu-shu-pu, but, owing to the heavy artillery fire received from South Mo-chia-pu and Ku-chia-pu the attack did not progress. Nevertheless, it was continued until sunset gave an opportunity to break it off, and a strong line was taken up by the division for the night.

4th Division.—In front of the 4th Division, whose troops now formed part of the Fourth Army, but whose operations were intimately associated with those of the Second, the enemy was in considerable strength, having one division of infantry and fifty guns and machine guns, and resisted with great obstinacy. Under cover of its artillery, and disregarding loss, the left wing from Shao-kuo (D 3 east) gallantly stormed the village of Lan-shen-pu and captured it at 1 p.m. Its transfer to the Japanese was evidently a cause of grave disquietude to the Russians, for no less than three counter-attacks were made in order to recover it, and in the last attempt a whole division took part. The Osaka troops, however, held their fire, and, waiting till the enemy's ponderous advance came near, shattered his ranks and drove him back with very heavy loss.

The right wing of the division engaged against Hsiao-lin-tzu received a heavy flanking fire from guns near Hsiao Su-chia-pu (E 3) and failed in its efforts to take the place. Some troops were therefore sent towards the north to threaten the enemy's retreat, on seeing which the defenders of the village appeared alarmed. The main part of the wing now made a charge and drove them out, and fired heavily as the retreating troops fled precipitately to the rear. Opposite the front of this wing 150 dead were buried.* At night the division, which during these attacks had lost 900 of all ranks, held a line from Kuan-lin-pu (E 3 west) through Hsiao Su-chia-pu to Wan-sui-yuan-tzu.

The left of Colonel Tomioka's force this day occupied with little difficulty Ta-wu-ching-ying (D/E 3), and, keeping touch with the 4th Division, remained there for the night.

Prior to the opening of the battle of Mukden it was known that the enemy had a strong position near that place, but the army was in ignorance of its exact locality. As it was important to keep close touch of him now that he had reached this line—

* The Russians are stated to have spent all night in removing the killed and wounded.—A. H.

his last line of defence—and ascertain its nature in detail, General Oku issued the following orders at 10 p.m.:—

1. To-morrow, 5th March, the Army will continue its attack, repulse the enemy towards the east, and advance to the line (E 2) "Z" to Liu-kuan-tun.
2. Part of the 5th Division will at dawn repulse the enemy before it and try to occupy Ta-pu and the village "Z." The main body will assemble in the neighbourhood of the old railway bridge, and special care will be taken to keep connection with the 4th Division south of the Hun.
3. Part of the 8th Division will at dawn repulse the enemy before it and try to occupy Liu-kuan-tun. The main body will assemble at Yu-ling-pu.
4. The 3rd Division will assemble by 7 a.m. at Tung-nan-tao (D 2 centre).
5. The 5th and 8th Division commanders will lose no time in reconnoitring the enemy's position west of Mukden, and will inform the Army Commander regarding it with the least possible delay.
6. The reserve of the Army will assemble by 7 a.m. at the western corner of Wai-chia-pu (D 2/3).

The Second Army had now arrived in front of the last line of Russian works before Mukden, and the knowledge which General Kuropatkin must have by this time possessed, that the real danger to which his forces were exposed would come from that direction, led him no doubt to garrison strongly this portion of the field by troops become available by the retreat from other parts. The ground west of the city is admirably suited for defence. Looking in that direction from the railway station, a ridge some twenty feet in height is seen, which runs a little from the north of Yu-hung-tun* generally along the line of villages that from it extend to the road to Hsin-min-tun. This ridge is really the eastern termination of a kind of terrace of higher ground that extends towards the west for several miles. The country in its direction and towards Yang-shih-tun (E 2 west) rises from the station almost imperceptibly, and where the rise ends there was the position taken up by the Russians. Towards the south-west the general trend is on the downward grade until the little sand-dunes on the right bank of the Hun are reached. From Yu-hung-tun southward, and west of the defended villages of Yang-shih-tun, Kan-kua-tun, Sha-to-tzu, and Mo-chia-pu, there are some distance off here and there, sandhills of varying height, but none rise more than fifty feet above the plain. From

* (E 1 2.) The Japanese called Yu-hung-tun by the name of Li-kuan-pu at this time, but as the correct name is Yu-hung-tun, and as it is so marked on the latest maps, that name has been substituted in this report for the incorrect one wherever it appears. Li-kuan-pu is one mile west of Yu-hung-tun.—A. H.

three to four hundred yards west of these villages, and sometimes less, are a few inconsiderable mounds of earth or sand and hollows in the ground, capable of sheltering from rifle fire, here a section, there a dozen men. With these exceptions, cover there is none, so much so is this the case that if the eye be placed upon the level of the fields and a glance cast across the furrows towards the line held by the Japanese, nothing beyond the meagre stubble of last year's harvest impedes the view. The mud walls of the villages of the Russian line had head-cover on them made of sandbags, bricks, or metal ammunition boxes filled with earth. In places along the front there was a somewhat hollow road, and according to the varying depth at which it lay, ideal cover for men standing, kneeling, or lying down. Between the villages, and in some places in front of them, were strong but small redoubts, in front of which and for a few yards towards their flanks were obstacles. The nature of the defences bears no comparison with the elaborate labyrinth of works at Liao-yang or on the Sha Ho, but in one respect —invisibility—they were infinitely stronger. The condition of some of them indicated that they had been made before the winter, while others among them had not reached completion, which strengthens the belief that the battle was begun some time before it was expected.

Third Phase.

The Attack of the Second Line.

5th Division.—In order to carry out the attack on Sha-to-tzu (E 2 west), the independent battalion of field artillery and the batteries of 12-cm. guns took position at the small hill about 1,200 yards north-east of Hou-sai-chia-pu (D 2 east) while the mountain guns, with shorter range, came into action about 1,300 yards south-east of Ta Yu-shu-pu. This force of artillery, counting seventy-eight guns, fired on the enemy's infantry and artillery, helping Major-General Surizawa in his attack. This was made with the 9th Brigade—11th Regiment on the left—divided into two wings, and was directed against the position on the right bank of the Hun, the western side of North Mo-chia-pu and the south-west border of Sha-to-tzu. By 7 a.m. a portion of the division took the embankment of the old railway line west of South Mo-chia-pu, but in spite of this success, the attack was doomed to failure, for the enemy, who had a force of a brigade of infantry and sixty guns, swept with a leaden hail the intervening ground and made approach impossible. Throughout the day many and gallant were the attempts made to push on, but none succeeded, and when sunset came and the roll was called no less than 1,500 of all ranks had fallen. **5th Mar.**

8th Division.—The division was this day divided into two wings which were composed as follows :—

Right wing.—Under Major-General Yoda :—

One battalion 5th Infantry Regiment.
One battalion 31st Infantry Regiment.
8th (Mountain) Artillery Regiment, less one battery.
One company of engineers.

Left wing.—Under Major-General Kamada :—

Two battalions 5th Infantry Regiment.
16th Brigade, less one battalion.
8th Cavalry Regiment, less one squadron.
The independent battalion of field artillery.
One battery 8th (Mountain) Artillery Regiment.
One battery of captured 9-cm. mortars.
Two companies of engineers.

Containing the enemy with the right wing, the left wing advanced on Yang-shih-tun supported by the artillery in position north-east of Ta Yu-shu-pu, but the Russians, here also, resisted stoutly, and when evening came no progress had been made.

At 8.20 a.m. the following report had reached Head-Quarters from the Third Army :—*

1. On the night of the 4th the Third Army received the following orders from Marshal Oyama :—

   "The Third Army, from Ta-shih-chiao (E 1), Kang-chia-pu-tzu, and, if possible, from Tan-i-tun, will press the enemy back on Mukden.

   "The Second Army will hold the ground from the old railway bridge to Fun-tai (E 1). As this front is allotted to the Second Army, the Third will endeavour to move as far as possible in the direction named, and will transfer to the Second Army the front now held by it from Chang-shih-tun (D 2) to Hou-ming-tun (D 1)."

2. According to this order the Third Army will cease attacking the enemy at its front, and will move towards the north-west. As, however, in the neighbourhood of Liu-kuan-tun troops are in close touch with the enemy, he will first be driven off before that part of the line is transferred to the Second Army. Elsewhere a weak force will be left opposite him to cover the withdrawal of the bulk of the troops, which will proceed towards the north-west.

---

* The order contained in this report had already passed through General Oku's hands on its way to General Nogi. *See* Plate 50 I.—A. H.

Based on the above report, General Oku, whose headquarters of the 5th were in Wai-chia-pu (D 3/2), issued the following orders to the 3rd Division at 10 a.m. :—

1. The enemy's front is from the old railway bridge through Sha-to-tzu to Yang-shih-tun. The 5th Division is attacking him from Hou-sai-chia-pu (D 2), and the 8th from Yu-ling-pu and Ning-kuan-tun. The 9th Division —Third Army—is now deployed from Ning-kuan-tun and north of it, but the division is about to be transferred to the north-west.
2. The General Officer commanding 3rd Division will carefully consult with the General Officer commanding 9th Division, and, when the latter division is removed from Chang-shih-tun, the 3rd Division will take its place with as little delay as possible, and will deploy on a line facing Chang-shih-chang (E 2).
3. The 3rd Division will move at once to carry out the above orders, proceeding through Ssu-fang-pu and Ssu-chia-tun.

In compliance with these orders the 3rd Division moved northward.

At 4 p.m. the 15-cm. mortars (twelve in number) were given to the 8th Division, and a position was taken up by them in the neighbourhood of Ta Yu-shu-pu. Before this hour, however, its attack was at a standstill, the losses reaching a total of about 1,000 all ranks.

When orders were given to the 3rd Division to go northwards, and replace the 9th, the hopelessness of the attempts of the 5th and 8th Divisions, under present conditions, to take the positions before them—more especially the village of Yang-shih-tun—had already become apparent to General Oku, and, as no improvement occurred during the hours that supervened, another order was issued at 2.50 p.m. to Lieut.-General Oshima, now on his way northward with the 3rd Division. It was as follows :—

The 3rd Division will deploy on a line from Chang-shih-tun to Hsing-ming-tun (D 2 north), and attack the enemy who now occupies the ground from Chang-shih-chang to Yu-hung-tun.

Part of the 9th Division, now before the enemy in the region about to be occupied by the 3rd Division, will temporarily come under the command of the general officer commanding the latter division.* The main body of the 9th Division is leaving the village of Chang-shih-tun to-day.

When this order was despatched Lieut.-General Oshima and his staff were on the sandhill west of Ning-kuan-tun, where

* This had been arranged by the staff of the Second Army and the General Officer commanding 9th Division.—A. H.

they had arrived at half-past two, and behind the hill at half-past three part of his nine battalions* came, while the remainder of the force with the artillery further to the west, well-hidden from the enemy, wended its way northwards. By 3.45 p.m. orders had been given to the brigade generals, and the whole force moved towards its destination; but the operations of transfer were not completed that day.

4th Division.—The 4th Division occupied the line from Wen-shin-ku (E 3 centre) through Ta-tzu-ying to Ta Su-chia-pu, where it faced the enemy who held the embankment of the main railway line and from Yao-chia-ko through Wang-chia-ku-chia-tzu to Han-cheng-pu.

Further eastward part of the First Army had occupied Hou-sung-mu-pu-tzu and Shih-hui-yu.

At 9 p.m. General Oku issued the following orders:—

1. The Army will contain the enemy before it with the view of furthering the general object of securing the ground north-west of Mukden, and each division will attack and endeavour to reach the line already ordered to be occupied.†
2. The reserve of the Army will leave Wai-chia-pu at 6 a.m. and march to Ssu-chia-tun (D 2).

6th Mar.

5th Division.—The right wing—9th Brigade under Major-General Surizawa—and the left, 42nd Regiment, less one battalion, and one company of engineers under Major-General Murayama, were drawn up opposite South Mo-chia-pu and Sha-to-tzu, and maintained connection with the right of the 8th Division. The heavy batteries took position at the hill north-east of Hou-sai-chia-pu and opened against South Mo-chia-pu; the independent battalion of field artillery came into action east of Ta Yu-shu-pu, and the mountain guns west of the old railway bridge, and both fired on North Mo-chia-pu and Sha-to-tzu. Gun and rifle fire, deliberate at first, began at 7.20 a.m., but the Russians did not reply till 8.50, when the action on both sides grew hot. At 2 p.m. the first line was pushing towards the enemy, and seeing the movement the 5th Division conformed to it. In spite of the fire on flank and rear from South Mo-chia-pu, and, after many men had fallen, the river bed west of those villages was reached. Further than this no advance could be made, and a fitful fire went on till night. At 4 p.m. a small force of the enemy began to retire, followed later by another body and some guns, on which the Japanese fired heavily in hopes that the moment to break through had come, but the main body of the Russians at this point had not moved‡ and

* The 34th Regiment had not yet returned from the 4th Division.—A. H.

† "Z" to Liu-kuan-tun and Chang-shih-chang to Yu-hung-tun. Marshal Oyama mentioned Fun-tai (E 1) as the northern extremity of the line.—A. H.

‡ The Japanese learnt this afterwards.—A. H.

an attempt to press forward failed. Keeping, therefore, the position it had reached, the division passed the night there.

The 5th Division during the day had had a division and a half of infantry and one hundred and fifty guns, field and heavy, against it, and its casualties amounted altogether to about 800 killed and wounded. During the night two companies of the 21st Regiment, left in Su-hu-pu and Ta-tai to keep connection with the 4th Division, attacked Erh-tai-tzu, and though they were repulsed their movement seemed to draw the enemy's attention to the first of these villages.*

8th Division.—The heavy artillery was in position on the east side of Hsiao Yu-shu-pu, the field guns north-east of the heavy guns, and the mountain batteries in the gap between the two portions of Ning-kuan-tun, in line with the western border. Fire was opened at 9 a.m. on Yang-shih-tun and Kan-kuan-tun, and steadily maintained till 2 p.m., when a determined attack was made by the right wing on the latter place. At that hour the 13th Artillery Regiment, which had returned from the 4th Division, was sent to the 8th, and though its thirty-six guns raised the total of the pieces firing to thrice that number, the position still held out. Gallantly crossing the fire-swept plain, some of the boldest spirits actually reached the village walls, but only to perish under the flank fire of rifles from Sha-to-tzu or of guns from Mo-chia-pu, for the ditch and wall before them were together twelve feet high. Lieut.-General Tatsumi, seeing his men so near their object, sent up nearly all the reserve, and the left tried to take Yang-shih-tun, but the enemy, who had one and a half divisions of infantry and one hundred guns, was not to be dislodged, and the attack failed, the losses of both wings amounting to 1,500 killed and wounded.

The failure of the Japanese guns to touch the well-hidden Russian batteries, the severe flank fire from South Mo-chia-pu and the well-protected infantry, were the main causes of the check this day. As darkness would in some respects favour the Japanese, Lieut.-General Tatsumi determined to make a night attack.

All day, posted on the sandhill west of Ning-kuan-tun, General Oku watched the sanguinary scene, now aware that the position opposite the Second Army from Yang-shih-tun to Sha-to-tzu was of undoubted strength. In the morning word had come from the Third Army that, though exchanging fire with the enemy, it was continually extending northward, and the news confirmed General Oku in his decision to hold the enemy with determination and prevent him from moving north.

* One portion of the General Staff of the Army wished first to take South Mo-chia-pu, but another was not in favour of doing so, as, being at the south-west corner of the line of defence, it was certain to be strongly held.—A. H.

3rd Division.—At 11 a.m. the following information had been received from Lieut.-General Oshima :—

1. The 3rd Division, with two battalions, 18th Regiment, has occupied a line from a point 900 yards north of Chang-shih-tun. The 5th Brigade—less two battalions—holds the nameless village (" Y "), 3,000 yards east of Hsing-ming-tun (D 2 north), part of the brigade being on a line 1,000 yards further east.

   The artillery is now in position on the ground north-east of Chang-shih-tun.

   The enemy's position is at present under examination. By the reconnaissance of to-day it was ascertained that there is about a regiment of infantry at Yu-hung-tun and twenty-four guns in the vicinity of that village. At Chang-shih-chang there are no houses, but some of the enemy are visible there.*

2. The transfer of positions with the 9th Division was completed last night, and its troops are now on the march to Ma-san-chia-tzu (D 1 north).

The 3rd Division was already furnished with orders to attack the line from Yu-hung-tun to Chang-shih-chang, but, until the reconnaissance of that position was finished, the operation was held in abeyance. North of it the 7th Division of the Third Army now held the ground from Fun-tai as far as the nameless village " X " (E 1).

At 1.20 p.m., further information came from General Oshima, which was as follows :—

" From the nature of the position occupied by the enemy before us, and the number of his guns, his force is estimated at about one division of infantry."

About this time and shortly after, the situation of the 5th and 8th Divisions became grave, and, for this reason, the following order was sent to the 3rd Division at 4.15 p.m. :—

" Your division will connect with the left of the 8th Division, which is seriously engaged, and attack the enemy in front."

As soon as this order was received the artillery opened fire on Yu-hung-tun and the ground south of it, and part of the right of the division moved against the enemy, but night was fast approaching and soon the action ceased.†

At 5 p.m. an order was issued to the 8th Division that the 5th Cavalry Regiment—which had been attached to it when withdrawn from the 1st Cavalry Brigade on the 1st March—would rejoin its own division.

---

* This place must have been razed to the ground by the Russians, and a redoubt constructed on its site, of which the Japanese were still ignorant.—A. H.

† 28,000 rounds of small arm ammunition are stated to have been expended in this operation.—A. H.

Second Army Head-Quarters were this night in Ssu-fang-pu (D 2 centre), and the reserve of the Army, increased by a battalion of the 34th Regiment, which had arrived from the 4th Division, was in Su-chia-tun and Ssu-fang-pu.

At 9.30 p.m., Manchurian Army Head-Quarters informed General Oku that a regiment of the 13th Reserve* Brigade would come under his command, whereupon a message was sent to Ya-chieh-kang (D 2) to call it up.

8th Division.—The 8th Division, in accordance with Lieut-General Tatsumi's orders prepared for a night attack. The two wings, which were composed as on the 6th, moved as follows. At 2.30 a.m. the right wing advanced from the south-east side of Yu-ling-pu (D 2 west) against Kan-kuan-tun, and two and a half hours later the left wing started towards Yang-shih-tun.† The Russians, fully prepared for such an enterprise, held staunchly to their ground, and, although the advance was made with the utmost intrepidity, it failed. On the left especially the attack was pushed with great determination, and the many hundred dead, whose corpses in places literally carpeted the ground up to the very edge of the parapets—some even lying between the entrenchments and the village behind—attested to the unflinching valour of those sent on the deadly mission. Accompanied by engineers carrying bamboo mortars, and taking with them sacks or shelter tents filled with earth, the majority of the troops had got within 300 yards of the Russian line, where death had stricken them. The engineers, too, who carried shields, had all been shot, and thus the mortars firing bombs had been of no avail. **7th Mar.**

The attack of the right wing fared no better, and the scattered remnants of those who after midnight went forth full of hope fell back to their original line, from the vicinity of which the bombardment went on all day.

5th Division.—The troops of the 5th Division, who from the 1st March had been more heavily engaged than the remainder of the army, had ranks so attenuated by this time that throughout the day they merely played a passive part. From 2 p.m. the enemy, in the neighbourhood of Erh-tai-tzu and Ku-chia-pu, turned his guns upon the flank of the division, to which many guns replied. Seeing the enfeebled condition of the right and centre, General Oku sent a battalion of the 31st Regiment to the 8th Division at 6 a.m., and, two and a half hours later, a battalion of the 21st, to the 5th Division.

3rd Division.—It has been said that the country north of Yu-hung-tun is somewhat higher than that on which the village stands. In that direction, distant about one thousand yards,

* From the general reserve. It is believed at the beginning of the battle to have consisted of the 3rd Division, 1st, 13th, and 14th Reserve Brigades.—A. H.

† It is not known why the two wings attacked separately.—A. H.

was a redoubt, connected with the village by a mud wall, and on its flank a battery. Yu-hung-tun is a large collection of houses, some solidly built of bricks with walls one hundred yards beyond them, its longest sides facing the east and west. Before it were no obstacles, but the outer line of walls was held. Some five hundred yards south, and slightly eastward, was a hamlet* of five houses, four in one row from east to west, and one cottage on their south side. Round this little block of dwellings, called by the Japanese "*San gen*,"† is a low and fragile wall, fifty yards by one hundred, the long sides running parallel to the row of houses. Between the hamlet and the village the ground was undefended except for a strip of wall north of which were some unfinished *chevaux-de-frise* of wood and wire. Still further to the south of the hamlet, about 1,000 yards, and quite apart, is a redoubt constructed on the site of the razed village of Chang-shih-chang. Besides the guns upon the hill, two batteries, within epaulments, stood on the low ground behind Hsun-chia-kan-tzu, completely hidden from the Japanese at Li-kuan-pu. Of this position the portion chosen for attack was Yu-hung-tun and the three houses to the south. The ground, as elsewhere east and west of it, is absolutely open, and on the latter side, over which the attacker must advance, the two redoubts could bring to bear cross fire. To send his men‡ into this murderous spot was the duty of the commander of the 3rd Division, and, on the morning of the 7th, as they went forth to fight, they might indeed have greeted him with classic words.

At the time the operation was about to begin the enemy was reported to be falling back from all sides of the field in such numbers that, should he be permitted, unassailed, to fall upon the Third Army, now almost barring his retreat, its situation would be seriously imperilled. Moreover, the capture of a portion of the line so near to Mukden would probably cause him to delay and perhaps retaliate by a counter-attack. At all events the 3rd Division must so act as to try and draw superior forces against itself, and Major-General Nambo, to whose brigade the duty was entrusted, had orders to conceal his strength, thereby, presumably, the better to lure the Russians towards the south-west.

The ground had been reconnoitred on the 6th by that brigade, and General Nambo looked upon the capture of "*San gen*" as of first importance, as from its position, once occupied, the south-west side of Yu-hung-tun would be surrounded. To effect this purpose, the I. and II./33rd were assigned for the movement on the hamlet. These two battalions formed the

* It has been nearly pulled down since the battle to get the wood from the houses.—A. H.

† "*San gen*" is the Japanese for "3 houses."—A. H.

‡ *See* Panorama 8. Major-General Nambo himself gave the attachés an account of what took place. (*See* Appendix 2.) He was unable to state his precise instructions, but what is given in this report was gained from other sources.—A. H.

right, while the left, consisting of the II. and III./6th was directed to lead on Yu-hung-tun, keeping towards its southern end. A small party was deputed to move beyond the outer flank of the left and demonstrate by fire, thereby drawing off attention from the attack of the remainder, while from the vicinity of Chang-shih-tun the 18th Regiment in like manner would assist.

By 4 a.m., in dead silence, the force deployed,* and, despite a counter-attack from the redoubt at Chang-shih-chang and heavy losses—for the men held back from battle for several months shouted their war cry as they approached and so drew fire—"*San gen*" was taken and the two Russian companies were driven out by 6 a.m. The gallant leader† of the 33rd slew the commander of the enemy in single combat, and many men, too, fell by his sword. By 7 a.m the southern corner of Yu-hung-tun was taken by the 6th Regiment, but, in spite of almost superhuman efforts to force the Russians out, they clung to the northern portion of the village. The right of the 33rd being greatly exposed, the reserve battalion was sent forward at 6 a.m., and, under a terrific fire, approached. Aware that the holders of "*San gen*" were suffering greatly from the flank fire from the south redoubt, the commander—one of the few surviving officers—led his men against that place, but failing to take it drew off to his left joining the main body of the regiment. As soon as it was light the Russian guns did everything to drive back the intruders of "*San gen*," but officers and men had gone there to win or die, and clinging to the meagre cover of its walls, resolved to sell their lives as dearly as they could. Some hours passed, and at 11 a.m. a long line of Russian columns led by mounted officers was seen moving swiftly forward and extending from Tsi-kuan-tun well towards the south. A heavy fire was opened as they came near and they were driven back with loss. Next, the artillery on the enemy's side increased, and by 1 p.m. 50 guns played on the hamlet and on Yu-hung-tun. The situation of the brave occupants of the former place, crowded into an area one hundred yards by fifty, grew worse and worse. No spot was safe from bullet or from shell, and the dust created by the latter served to hide the enemy who had rallied and with many more battalions was coming on again. About 2 p.m. the bombardment ceased, and line after line of Russians, looking like giants in the mirage of the plain, were seen. On they came, forming an easy target for the few men left to fire, and littering the ground with dead and wounded. The first line driven back was brought on by the second and at length the little island

* *See* Map 56.

† Lieut.-Colonel Yoshioka. He had been senior adjutant of the 3rd Division, and begged to be allowed to command a regiment, and on this the first occasion that he did so in battle he lost his life, but so signally distinguished himself that the whole army rang with his name for days.—A. H.

with its brave defenders was reached. A deadly bayonet fight of short duration then took place—for most of the officers, the regimental commander and two battalion commanders were dead—and the remnant of the gallant 33rd took refuge in the adjacent village. There the 6th, joined by its first battalion before half-past nine, was engaged in a bitter struggle with the Russians, who had so increased in the northern portion of the village that only the lower section could be held. Here for hours—both sides—the Japanese constantly running short of ammunition, the Russians well supplied from the redoubt—hurled hand-grenades over the walls that bounded the central street, and until night a fight of singularly desperate character went on. Towards evening it had become apparent that the enemy would not rest satisfied until he had regained the place, and as the force available to hold it was not enough, and the general condition of the battle elsewhere did not demand more sacrifice at this single point, two battalions were sent forward from Li-kuan-pu, and profiting by the dark, withdrew through the ring of Russians, now almost encircling the place, the wounded and survivors. Of the 5th Brigade, of all ranks there were left unwounded 1,300 souls, the remnant of 5,500* men.

Great as the losses were, the Japanese hold that they are amply justified by results, but be that as it may, the fine courage—almost Spartan-like—shown by the 5th Brigade on the 7th March will stand for future generations of their army as fields like Albuera, Maya, and many more, stood and still stand for our own.

After the withdrawal from the village had been effected there were expectations that the 3rd Division at Li-kuan-pu might receive a counter-attack, and preparations to meet it were made, but the enemy, who throughout the day had fought with his customary courage, had lost from six to ten thousand men, and was not in the mood to follow up his dearly won success, and push on westward.

During this day (7th March) the 51st Regiment of the 13th Reserve Brigade came up, and at 2.30 p.m. one of its battalions was sent to the 3rd Division Before that hour the following reinforcements had also been despatched thither:—

At 6 a.m., a battalion of the 34th Regiment.

At 10.30 a.m., the 13th Artillery Regiment, withdrawn from the 8th Division.

At 1.30 p.m., two batteries of heavy artillery from the 5th and two from the 8th Division.

The Second Army had attacked with such energy at all parts of the line opposite it that it was now almost without reserve, but just before sunset the remaining battalions of the 34th Regiment rejoined and were quartered in Ta-chin-tsui-tzu (D 2).

* The 11 6th had 30 survivors according to the statement of one of the officers who was present and unwounded.—A. H.

The Third Army during the day had succeeded in occupying a line from Chang-chia-tzu (F 1) through Kao-li-tun to Fun-tai (E 1).

At 10 p.m. General Oku issued the following orders :—

1. The right wing of the Army will occupy the enemy's attention, so that more troops may be sent to the left to keep touch with the Third Army.
2. The 5th Division will hold the ground from the neighbourhood of Hou-sai-chia-pu (D 2) to the south-east of Yu-ling-pu, including the old railway embankment.
3. The 8th Division, keeping touch with the 5th, will extend the line as far as Chang-shih-tun.
4. The 3rd Division will maintain its present position and protect the right flank and rear of the Third Army. A part of the division will be sent to occupy Hou-ming-tun (D 1) in strength.
5. Each division will endeavour to make defensive works along its position, and will keep as large a reserve as possible.
6. The reserve of the Army will assemble at 5 a.m. south of the sandhill near Lin-ming-sha-tzu (D 2 east).*

At 3.15 a.m., information was received from the Third Army to the effect that on the previous evening it had occupied a line extending from the neighbourhood of Chang-chia-tzu to Chang-wang-chiao through Ssu-fang-tai (E 1 N.E.) and Pa-hsiao-tsui. **8th Mar.**

General Oku thereupon decided that he must endeavour to hold the enemy before him so as to minimize the pressure that might be brought against General Nogi's troops, and allow of their interrupting more completely the Russian line of retreat. The guns of the 3rd and 8th Divisions were therefore ordered to open heavily on the position in front of them, and the left of the former division was extended towards Fun-tai by the arrival, early in the morning, at Fei-chia-tun (D E 1) of a battalion of the 51st Reserve Regiment, which had been sent there on the 7th.

The state of affairs before the First and Fourth Armies up to 11 a.m. was known to be as follows :—

The whole of the enemy in front of the First Army was retiring, and that Army from the evening of the 7th and the Fourth Army from the morning of the 8th had taken up the pursuit. The First Army was expected to reach Hsin-liu-tien with its main body, while the Fourth—less the 4th Division and Colonel Tomioka's Detachment—had orders to pursue to the line Ta-chang-erh-tun, Man-chia-ling-tzu, Chan-lin-tzu. After reaching their destinations both armies would at once pursue the enemy to Tieh-ling.

---

* Army Head-Quarters are not mentioned daily in orders as they occupied the same village, and came to the same sandhill daily at this time.—A. H.

At the time this information reached the Second Army an order came from Marshal Oyama returning to it the 4th Division and its troops which were with Colonel Tomioka's Detachment. With the intention of bringing that division to Hou-ming-tun (D 1), in order to fill up the ever widening gap between his Army and the Third, General Oku issued at noon the following order:—

"The 4th Division, leaving Colonel Tomioka's Brigade (8th Reserve Brigade) in occupation of the line Su-chia-tun (E 3) to Erh-tai-tzu (E 2 s.w.), will prepare as quickly as possible to move."

When this order reached Lieut.-General Tsukamoto, his troops were hotly pursuing the enemy, who was not in strength and in considerable disorder, on the line from Ta-yang-erh-tun (E 3 west), Su-chia-tun, Ta Kuei-hsing-pu to Pei-ta-tzu-ying, and his main body was at Lan-shen-pu (D 3 east). As Colonel Tomioka's Detachment had been assisting the 6th Division in its attack since the preceding day, the most that could be done on the 8th was to assemble it at Ssu-fang-tai (E 3) and withdraw from it the units of the 4th Division. This effected, the front held by that division could be transferred to what would then become solely the 8th Reserve Brigade. Lieut.-General Tsukamoto therefore asked that he might be allowed one day more to carry out the order, a request which was reluctantly accorded. As the III./37th Regiment of his command was at this time free to march in the required direction, it was sent forthwith to Ssu-fang-pu (D 2), where it joined the Army reserve.

5th Division.—On the line held by the 5th Division a slight change had taken place, for the troops had been drawn back somewhat, and now held a position from Yu-ling-pu to Ta Yu-shu-pu, where from 4.30 a.m. works of defence were made. Soon after daylight the artillery of the division opened fire on Sha-to-tzu, which was returned by the enemy's artillery there, but the usual reply did not come from North and South Mo-chia-pu, for the guns there had been removed. A small reconnaissance party followed by a larger was therefore sent in the direction of the two last-named villages, and their report disclosed the fact that the enemy was few in number.

At 10 a.m. the 5th Cavalry Regiment under Lieut.-Colonel Tanada—which was on the left bank of the Hun—occupied Erh-tai-tzu, and part of the right wing of the division, at 11 a.m., acting on the information gained by the reconnaissance, took South Mo-chia-pu, while four hours later another part of the same wing seized North Mo-chia-pu.

At 3.30 p.m. General Oku, hearing that the movement of the First and Fourth Armies was progressing, issued the following orders:—

1. The enemy before us seems to be inclined to retreat, while before the Third Army his numbers are gradually

increasing and threatening to break through to the north.

2. The Army will at once pursue.
3. The 5th Division will repulse the enemy before it, and should reach Ta-pu (E 2).
4. The 8th Division will connect with the 5th, repulse the enemy before it, and reach Liu-kuan-tun, but one battalion of reserve* troops will be left at Ssu-chia-tun (D 2) as part of the Army reserve.
5. The 3rd Division, after repulsing the enemy in Chang-shih-chang and Yu-hung-tun, will occupy that line. One battalion will be given to the division; it is now at Ssu-fang-pu, and will proceed to Hsing-ming-tun (D 2 north).

5th Division (continued).—At 4 p.m. the wings of the 5th Division prepared to advance, the right wing from North Mo-chia-pu on Sha-to-tzu and the left from Ta Yu-shu-pu against the western face of the same objective, and to support these movements the mountain guns took position in the neighbourhood of the old railway bridge. After a brief bombardment the attack began at 5.30 p.m., but the enemy maintained his ground, and when the sun set, the first line had only reached a front some four hundred yards from his entrenchments, yet sufficiently close to make his retreat therefrom a matter of difficulty.

At night Army Head-Quarters remained at Ssu-fang-pu, the reserve being partly there and partly in Ssu-chia-tun (D 2).

At 10.50 p.m. orders were issued to the 3rd Division.

1. The mass of the enemy's retreating troops is trying to break through the front of the Third Army, and, to check that movement, that army is occupying a line from Chang-chia-tzu (F 1) to Fun-tai (E 1).
2. The 3rd Division will detach two battalions and a battalion of artillery to proceed to Fun-tai, and take over that place from the Third Army. The duties to be performed by this detachment are (*a*) to protect the right flank of the Third Army, and free the units of that army which it will replace, (*b*) to endeavour to assist the attack of the Third Army. A battalion of the 51st Reserve Regiment will arrive at Hou-ming-tun (D 1) at 5 a.m., 9th instant.

So far, with the exception of the 3rd March, the weather during the battle had been fine and clear, but on this date a strong south-west wind blew, raising clouds of dust and sand, and not only making observation difficult, but greatly impeding **9th Mar.**

* This seems to have been a battalion of the 2nd Reserve Regiment, which had been with the 1st Cavalry Brigade at San-chia-tzu (B 4), but probably joined the 8th Division when that brigade went to the left of the Third Army.—A. H.

inter-communication. It was now obvious that the enemy between sunset and dawn had begun to withdraw the greater portion of his troops, and, in consequence, two distinct duties devolved upon the Second Army, firstly, that of assisting the Third Army, and, secondly, that of preventing the enemy before itself from retiring, except with heavy loss. To carry out these duties a transfer of troops, for which the 4th Division was designed, was imperative, but the arrival of that division had, at its commander's request, been postponed for twenty-four hours, and, as the operation was one admitting of no delay, troops to carry it out must be obtained elsewhere. To withdraw them for this purpose from the first line of the army, then in the open within a few hundred yards from the Russian line, would be a task both hazardous and difficult,* but as no other more satisfactory solution offered, it was decided to send the 8th Division to the north, and direct the 4th Division to cross the Hun near Mo-chia-pu, and, connecting with the 5th Division, move north-westward. At 2 a.m., therefore, the following orders were issued :—

1. The Army will pursue the enemy with its main body, a part moving to the assistance of the Third Army.
2. The 8th Division, leaving one regiment of infantry (less one battalion) at Ning-kuan-tun (D 2 east) and one battalion at Yu-ling-pu under the command of the General Officer commanding 5th Division, will move by the southern side of the old railway embankment by Lan-shan-tai (D 2 north) and Hou-ming-tun to Fun-tai On arriving there it will cover the right of the Third Army, and, if necessary, repulse the enemy before it, so as to help the Third Army's movements. One battalion of reserve infantry at Ssu-chia-tun will be attached to the division.
3. The 5th Division will, if possible, repulse the enemy before it, and, advancing to the ground north of the line (E 2) Sha-to-tzu to Hsiao-lin-tun, try to occupy a front from Liu-kuan-tun to Chang-shih-chang. One regiment (less one battalion at Ning-kuan-tun (D 2 east) and one battalion at Yu-ling-pu) will enter into the command of the General Officer Commanding.
4. The 3rd Division, maintaining connection with the attacking force of the 5th, will endeavour to occupy Yu-hung-tun and assist the turning movement of the 8th Division.
5. Of the 4th Division the 7th Brigade (less one battalion), under the command of its brigadier-general, with the

* It is understood that a prolonged discussion took place among the General Staff of the Second Army as to the transfer. Part were in favour of applying to Marshal Oyama for more troops for the purpose, and part wished to carry out the duty without assistance from outside, lest the general reserve might be wanted elsewhere. The latter faction won their point, and General Oku concurred with them.—A. H.

> 4th Artillery Regiment and 4th Engineer Battalion, will cross the Hun in the neighbourhood of South Mo-chia-pu at 8.30 a.m., and from North Mo-chia-pu try to reach Ta-pu.

According to these orders that portion of the 4th Division mentioned in General Oku's last order left Wen-shin-ku (E 3) at 6.30 a.m., and marching through Pei-ta-tzu-ying crossed the Hun at South Mo-chia-pu and advanced on Ta-pu, the artillery passing the river near Su-hu-pu.

The 5th Division attacked Sha-to-tzu before dawn, but the fire of the enemy's machine guns and artillery on the flank at Kan-kuan-tun caused heavy loss, and once more the attempt to take the village failed. The left wing, however, was now only one hundred and fifty yards and the right three hundred yards from the entrenchments, and against the defenders several unavailing charges were made. Part of the right wing from North Mo-chia-pu brought to bear a flank fire on Sha-to-tzu, and caused some of the troops on its southern border to withdraw, but their place was quickly taken by reinforcements, and artillery appearing at Ta-pu helped by its fire to restore the situation. From 9 a.m. till noon the enemy's fire was at its height, and the losses, 1,000, including many officers, grew so heavy that General Kigoshi ordered Major-General Murayama, then in command of the first line, to cease making charges and hold the position so far gained, whence the enemy could not retire by day. To assist in this duty a battalion was sent forward from the divisional reserve.

At 9.30 a.m. part of the 4th Division came up, and taking post on the right of the 5th, helped to contain the enemy. The main body of the 7th Brigade had by that hour reach South Mo-chia-pu, whence a battalion of infantry was sent eastwards to Ho-wan-tun (E 2) to protect the advance of the 8th Reserve Brigade, and by the afternoon had crossed the river, the artillery, which had already arrived on the right bank, coming up to Ta Yu-shu-pu, whence it opened fire. The transfer of the front held by the 4th Division to the 8th Reserve Brigade was effected by noon, and at night the division was quartered in the neighbourhood of South Mo-chia-pu and Erh-tai-tzu. To keep communication with the Fourth Army, the 5th Cavalry Regiment with two companies of infantry under Lieut.-Colonel Tanada, was detached to Hsiao-yang-erh-tun (F 3).

8th Division.—The losses which the 8th Division had undergone had so depleted its ranks that Lieut.-General Tatsumi, to secure the position from Ning-kuan-tun to Yu-ling-pu, found himself under the necessity of leaving not three battalions, as ordered, but five. The remainder of the division was successfully withdrawn, and assembled before daybreak in the neighbourhood of Ssu-chia-tun, whence at 6 a.m. it marched through Lan-shan-tai to Chia-tien (D 1 centre). The Russian force, opposite the ground which it was about to occupy, numbered about one

division, the infantry thereof holding a line from the north of Yu-hung-tun to a point 1,500 yards north-east of Fun-tai, with artillery in position (E 1) at Tsi-kuan-tun, Ma-kuan-tzu, and Ta Fang-shih-tun. A little after mid-day four battalions of the 8th Division, sent on in advance, came up and occupied a line from Fun-tai to Chang-wang-chiao, relieving a portion of the 9th Division of the Third Army, which immediately went north-east. The main body of the 8th went into quarters for the night in Chia-tien and the adjacent villages, where it was within supporting distance of the line taken up.

3rd Division.—To fulfil the 10.50 p.m. order of the 8th March, the 3rd Division sent two battalions of infantry and eighteen guns to the neighbourhood of Fun-tai, a force which, with the units of the 8th Division that came up later, made the total strength of infantry guarding that place and its vicinity one brigade. The 3rd Division itself could do little this day towards occupying Yu-hung-tun. The stormy weather made it difficult to ascertain whether or not the enemy still held that place in force, and for this reason Lieut.-General Oshima withheld the order to attack. The day was therefore passed in reconnoitring with small parties and in firing with artillery.

At 9 p.m. General Oku sent an order to the 8th Division defining more precisely the object with which it had been transferred further north. Its terms were these :—

1. The main body of the 8th Division has been sent in the direction of Fun-tai in order to protect the right of the Third Army so that it can continue its movement without fear of the enemy breaking through between it and the Second Army.
2. Keeping the above object in view, the 8th Division will try to occupy a line extending from Fun-tai to a point 2½ miles east of Ta-shih-chiao (E 1 west), but no further. This prolongation of the left wing of the division is intended to help the movement of the Third Army. Before occupying the above-mentioned line the General Officer commanding 8th Division will consult with the General Officer commanding Third Army so as to fall in with his views.*

10th Mar. During the night indications were not wanting that the enemy was on the point of retiring, and it was known, too, that he had already sent back a considerable portion of his force. In consequence, at 6.30 a.m. the 5th Division attacked and took Sha-to-tzu, and at the same time the 7th Brigade of the 4th Division occupied Kun-chan-tun (E 2 centre), and an hour later the noise of an explosion announced that the railway bridge over the Hun had been blown up. The 7th Brigade pushed on and at 10.30 a.m. engaged the enemy on the line from Lang-ah† through Kang-chia-tun to Ta-pu, whence he was driven to the north-

* Lieut.-General Tatsumi had anticipated this order and carried it out.—A. H.

† On south bank of Hun Ho (E 2).

east. The 3rd Division, through the fog, which hung over the ground in front of it, detected that a movement to the rear was in progress, and, supported by its artillery, reoccupied the line taken at such cost on the 7th. On its left the 8th Division called up all its guns to the vicinity of Liu-chia-wo-peng (E 1) and cannonaded the troops at Ta Fang-shih-tun. At 11 a.m. perceiving the enemy to be retiring in disorder, its whole line pursued, and at 2.30 p.m. arrived on a front from Ta-ping-chang through Cha-shao-tun to Hsiao Fang-shih-tun. At the same hour information arrived at the head-quarters of the Second Army that the Fourth Army was pushing forward on the east of Mukden.

At 11.30 a.m. General Oku had issued the following orders :—

1. The enemy in front is retiring from all points towards the north and north-east. The Army will at once pursue.
2. The 4th Division, from the neighbourhood of Ta-pu (E 2) and Liu-kuan-tun will pursue to Su-li-ma-tung (E 2 east). One brigade—less two battalions—must be kept ready to come under the direct orders of the Army Commander.
2. The 5th Division, connecting with the 4th, will pursue from Liu-kuan-tun and Chang-shih-chang in the direction of Ssu-ton (E 2 N.E.)
4. The 3rd Division, connecting with the 5th, will advance to Ta-ping-chang (E 1).
5. The 8th Division, connecting with the Third Army, will repulse the enemy before it and advance to Hou-ton (E 1).

In accordance with these orders the 4th and 5th Divisions following up the enemy arrived west of Mukden at 7 p.m., part of their troops taking possession of the city, where a portion of the 8th Division had already arrived at 4.30 p.m. The main body of the 4th Division assembled at Wu-chia-tzu (F 1) and Su-li-ma-tung (E 2 east), while one of its brigades—less two battalions—was placed under the direct orders of the Army Commander at Cheng-chia-wa-tzu (E 2).

At 7 p.m., the 3rd Division reached the neighbourhood of Liu-chia-wa (F 1), and two hours later the main body went into quarters at Chin-chia-wo-tzu (E 1 east). Part of the 8th Division, as stated, had entered Mukden at 4.30 p.m., whence it advanced to Hou-ton, the main body being quartered north-west of the city. The 8th Reserve Brigade, which had followed close on the heels of the retiring enemy, halted south of the Hun railway bridge at Yang-hsui-tun-tzu.

At 5 p.m. Army Head-Quarters reached Chang-shih-tun (D 2), and thence orders were sent directing each division to hold the ground then occupied.

At 11 p.m. the position of the Third and Fourth Armies was known to be as follows:—

The Third Army was in occupation of a line from San-tai-tzu through Chan-chia-tzu to Tan-i-tun (E 1 N.E.), and opposite its left was a strong force of the enemy.

The Fourth Army was on a line from Ta-wa* through Yu-lin-pu to Erh-tai-tzu (F 1) and was driving before it the flying enemy.

Under these conditions General Oku ordered the commander of the 8th Division to pursue as far as Ta-wa and Tan-i-tun.

11th Mar. The General Officer commanding 8th Division in accordance with his orders detached a force to pursue, which was composed as follows:—

Right column.—One battalion 41st Reserve Regiment.

Left column.—About half of the 8th Cavalry Regiment.
32nd Infantry Regiment.
One battalion 2nd Reserve Regiment.
One independent battalion of field artillery.

The right column left the neighbourhood of Liu-chia-ah (F 1) at 8 a.m. and advanced to Wu-ni-chiu, and the left column, at the same hour, keeping west of Liu-chia-ah, marched to Yun-kuan-tsui. Behind these forces, which reached the indicated limits at 10 a.m., the main body of the division followed in two parts. During the pursuit many prisoners were taken or surrendered.

At 8 a.m. Army Head-Quarters marched from Chang-shih-tun, and reaching Mukden in the afternoon went into quarters west of the city, in the vicinity of which place its divisions—too reduced in numbers to follow up the enemy to the north—were ordered to remain in second line.

The great struggle was for a time over for the Second Army, and its high percentage of loss—33 *per cent.*—is sufficient evidence alone to prove how thoroughly General Oku carried out the task assigned to him. As commander of the force on the immediate right of the Third Army, his duty was to further to the utmost its efforts to push well to the north-west by drawing upon himself superior numbers and thereby lessening the resistance that might be brought against it. The greater the pressure he could put upon that part of the position which lay opposite his army, the better the chance would General Nogi have of severing the railway line and barring the roads leading north from Mukden. But, in addition to engaging the enemy's attention to such a degree as to make him realize that if a man were transferred to another portion of the field the position might be broken through, it was necessary to employ every man that could be spared towards extending his

---

* 8 miles north-east of Mukden. For position of Third and Fourth Armies, *see* Map 61.

own left. The further north that he could stretch, the stronger would the Third Army be at the decisive point, and the less the probability that the enemy in his hurried exodus could force a passage through its ranks. But, apart from the question of winning a conclusive victory by surrounding the Russian Army —an operation of great difficulty for which the Japanese had forces scarcely adequate—the point as to how far the Second Army was employed in the battle of Mukden to the best advantage, and whether, had its troops been applied in a somewhat different manner, greater results might have been gained, is perhaps worth considering.

Where, as in this crowning victory of the Japanese, five armies are combined together to break the enemy's power, the movements of all of which are closely interwoven, it is not easy to decide to what extent the action of one single Army—more especially of one not posted on a flank—has affected the general issue. It has been pointed out before that the tendency of the Second Army was to lean towards its right at first, and, on the 4th March, this inclination was accentuated by the offer of the 4th Division to the Fourth Army, then engaged in a futile attempt to take the almost impregnable position of Wan-pao Shan. Whether anxiety at that time prevailed at Manchurian Army Head-Quarters regarding the line of communication to the south cannot be said,* but, as on that date the Third Army was making good progress in its northward movement, reason if any there had been for alarm had vanished. Moreover, the history of wars abounds in examples showing how, when the adversary's line of retreat is dangerously menaced, his every thought becomes immediately concentrated on the problem of restoring the situation by driving off the aggressor with superior force. But when the way to safety is reduced practically to a single railway line several thousand miles in length, the peril is proportionately greater, and few but the boldest and most confident of generals could face it with indifference.

The time had therefore come for the Japanese to throw every man that could be spared north and not south of Mukden.

Yet, on the 4th March, when the situation was developing in a highly favourable manner, Marshal Oyama acquiesced in the withdrawal of practically one half† of the Second Army, and its transference to another point where success if gained would have availed him little. The decisive point was not on that part of the line, and for this reason it is thought that a better application of the forces of the Second Army might have been made.

---

* The writer came to know later that the Japanese thought it possible that an attempt might be made by the Russians to break their centre.—A. H.

† The 4th Division had nine battalions, Colonel Tomioka nine more, and the 34th Regiment was still with them.—A. H.

If all the battles fought in Manchuria during the present campaign be examined, it will be found that rarely, if ever, have the Japanese brought overwhelming strength to bear at that point where success if won is most complete. At Liao-yang the Second Army, with three and a half divisions, hurled itself for days against an immensely strong position held by an inferior force, when one of its divisions employed elsewhere would probably have given a decisive victory. So, too, at Mukden, had the Second Army, instead of busying itself with the affairs of the force upon its right, turned its attention to the northward, and, while maintaining touch to the south, occupied Fun-tai on the 5th or 6th, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the Third Army might have crossed the railway and brought about a rout even greater than that which actually occurred.

Every army has its own peculiar characteristic, and the preference of the Japanese for what Wellington called "bludgeon-work" is remarkable. Where the enemy is strongest there the attack must be pushed with the utmost vigour, and so the weak spot in his armour is overlooked or insufficiently probed. There is little delicacy in the handling of their troops; all depends on the sledge-hammerlike attacks which succeed, not by force of numbers, as did those of the Germans in 1870, but by indomitable valour. Nevertheless, that the Japanese generals know their men is certain, and that, knowing them, they employ them to the best advantage, is probable. Against a singularly obstinate foe they have invariably succeeded, and though their methods may seem lacking in some of the refinements of the art of war—the brilliant touches of the master-hand—the results they have attained have been astounding.

APPENDIX 1.

Order of Battle of the Second Japanese Army.

General Officer Commanding, General Baron Oku.

4th Division, Lieut.-General Tsukamoto.

7th Brigade, 8th and 37th Regiments.
19th „ 9th and 38th „
Divisional troops :—
1 squadron cavalry, 1 battalion of engineers.
6 batteries field artillery, 3 independent batteries field artillery.

5th Division, Lieut.-General Kigoshi.

9th Brigade, 11th and 41st Regiments.
21st „ 21st and 42nd „

Divisional troops :—
1 squadron cavalry, 1 battalion of engineers.
6 batteries mountain artillery, 3 independent batteries field artillery.

8th Division, Lieut.-General Tatsumi.

4th Brigade, 5th and 31st Regiments.
16th „ 17th and 32nd „
Divisional troops :—
1 squadron cavalry, 1 battalion of engineers.
6 batteries mountain artillery, 3 independent batteries field artillery.

Colonel Tomioka's Detachment.

8th Reserve Brigade :—
*1 section cavalry.
*1 battalion of field artillery (18 guns).
1 battery captured Russian field artillery (6 guns).
1 battery of 9-cm. mortars (4 guns).
*1 company of engineers.
*3 battalions of infantry.

Reserve of the Army :—
Heavy artillery :
6 batteries 12-cm. howitzers (24 pieces).
3 „ 15-cm. „ (?) (12 pieces).
1 battery 9-cm. howitzers (6 pieces).
42nd Regiment of 5th Division (2½ battalions).
31st „ 8th „ (3 „).
1 company engineers from 9th Reserve Brigade (?).
51st Regiment 13th Reserve Brigade joined the reserve from the general army reserve on 6th March.

Notes.

(*a*) In addition to the above troops the 34th Regiment of the 3rd Division (of the general reserve) was with the Second Army, and up to the 6th March was on the left of Colonel Tomioka's Detachment. After that date it came up battalion after battalion to the Second Army reserve.

(*b*) The 4th Division and Colonel Tomioka's Detachment were transferred to the Fourth Army for several days. The 4th Division was returned to the Second Army, but Colonel Tomioka's Detachment, less the units of the 4th Division, remained separate from the Second Army.

NOTE.—Troops marked "*" were taken from the 4th Division, so that that division was really short of these units and had not its full strength. —A. H.

(*c*) The 3rd Division was sent to the Second Army on the 4th March.

(*d*) The 2nd Reserve Regiment (2 battalions) was with the Second Army, and seemed to have joined the 8th Division from the Cavalry Brigade to which it was attached.

(*e*) The cavalry of all the divisions—except one squadron—was with the Cavalry Brigade. The 3rd and 4th Regiments of cavalry remained with the brigade when it went to the left of the Third Army, but the 5th and 8th Cavalry Regiments were sent to the 8th Division. After a few days the 5th Regiment rejoined its own division.

APPENDIX 2.

The Attack of Part of the 19th Brigade 4th Division on Hsiao Kuei-hsing-pu (E 3).*

This is an account of an attack made by part of the 4th Division on the 7th March, to try and relieve the pressure on the Fourth Army, to which it was temporarily attached.

The ground over which the attack was made is a dead level, and free of any kind of cover, and the village attacked is in two parts, forming a horse-shoe with the ends towards the assailants. On the east side is the railway which was held by the Russians, and enfiladed the advance. In front of the village, distant about one hundred yards, were four long trenches, but in front of them again were no obstacles. The Russian artillery was so superior to that of the Japanese that the latter could not support the infantry by fire, and in consequence a frontal attack made, unsupported by artillery, failed. It succeeded at night, however, by the use of bombs fired from mortars, and by the determination of the troops and their commander not to be beaten.

An officer of the 9th Regiment, who directed the attack, gave the following account:—

On the night of the 6th March, the 19th Brigade was in Ta-su-chia-pu, and the enemy was on the line Ta Kuei-hsing-pu–Hsiao Kuei-hsing-pu, and small numbers held the railway embankment.

We first thought that in front of us was a force of not less than one brigade, and it was apparent that in attacking we would be fired on from front, flank, and possibly also from the rear. To attack was, nevertheless, imperative, as the Fourth Army, which was attacking Han-cheng-pu was in difficulties. Consequently the question of losses was beyond consideration.

---

* *See* Map 57.

At 5 a.m. on the 7th we left our village, at that time part of the Fourth Army being at Ta-tzu-ying in connection with us. Our march from the village to Ta-tzu-ying was without incident. There we assembled and prepared to attack. The nameless village which lies a little to the north-west was ordered to be the centre and the deployment was to be in two wings, one wing on either side of it. We deployed unnoticed as it was early, but very shortly after day dawned and we were in full view of the enemy. Though the distance was considerable he fired at us from trenches in front of the village and from loop-holed walls in the place itself. Two machine guns also, one gun in each wing of the village, opened at this time.

Casualties began, and when one thousand five hundred yards distant from the point of attack we halted and made section rushes (*i.e.*, a third of a company rushes). The II./9th, on the west side of the nameless village, suffered most, and the I./9th less so. Therefore the latter was ordered to advance as if to surround Hsiao Kuei-hsing-pu. It made good progress, the enemy's fire slackened somewhat and rushes were made by squads. Thus the east corner of a hamlet of a few houses with a wall round them, about one thousand yards from Hsiao Kuei-hsing-pu, was reached. I now ran to this hamlet and placed myself in the north-east corner of it. On arriving there I saw that the men were being fired on from Ta Kuei-hsing-pu, and by artillery from Chin-pao-tai as well as from the front.

The enemy now increased in numbers opposite the right centre, and it seemed that there were three battalions in front and one battalion in Ta Kuei-hsing-pu. As our men could not move forward, a report was made to the brigadier, and he sent up the I./7th Reserve Regiment to join the I./9th on the right. This battalion received heavy casualties and could not advance. The enemy, too, at Ta Kuei-hsing-pu, increased his infantry, and more guns arrived at Chin-pao-tai.

Thinking that to advance under such circumstances was useless, I ordered the men to remain where they were, scratch up the ground to get such cover as they could, and lie flat in the furrows till a chance to advance offered itself. Previous to this I noticed that the enemy on the embankment had increased, which was a proof that we were effecting our object by drawing men from in front of the Fourth Army.

I therefore resolved to wait until night and then resume the attack.

Inside the wall of the hamlet were two machine guns. One was destroyed by a Russian high-explosive shell and the other was worn out.

At 4 p.m. three companies of the 38th Regiment came up and were utilized to prolong the right wing towards the east. After their arrival the whole line rushed forward 200 yards. As

it was getting dark, between 7 and 8 p.m., the enemy was seen to be moving troops from his right to his left to counterbalance the increased forces on our right.

About 9 p.m. I issued orders to the II./9th to rush against the north-west corner of the west wing of the village, and about the same time the three battalions of the right wing were directed to make for the south-east corner of the other wing as if to surround it. About midnight the II./9th arrived some 50 yards from the enemy. They were received by drum-beating on the part of the Russians. Three separate rushes were made but were repulsed with a loss of two-thirds of the force on the left wing, the greater part of the casualties being caused by flank fire from Ta Kuei-hsing-pu.

The three battalions of the right wing arrived three hundred yards from the south-east corner of the east wing of the village about midnight. They also suffered heavily, that part which was nearest to the railway embankment losing most. The men now crowded up to the walls of the village and tried to force their way in, bayonet fighting going on with the defenders of the entrenchments, who had fallen back.

About 1 a.m. the rifle fire from the embankment greatly slackened, but it continued from Hsiao Kuei-hsing-pu. The brigadier now sent forward three companies of infantry and some engineers with orders to try and rush the village. They were to do so independently of the three battalions engaged. They arrived two hundred yards from the walls, and taking position, the engineers, who carried mortars, fired bombs from them. The fire of these mortars was to be the signal for a general rush on the village. This was carried out, and at 4 a.m. on the 8th the place fell into our hands. The troops then assembled and one company of the 9th Regiment was sent to garrison Su-chia-tun railway station.

My informant added a few remarks, which are as follows :—

Rushes should be of different strength according to the distance of the enemy. Thus up to 1,500 yards they should be section rushes, from 1,500 to 1,000 yards not bigger than squads, and from 800 yards onwards reinforcement should be by single men. The length of the rush depends on the distance of the enemy. The three batteries with the attack were insufficient to meet the superior force in artillery of the enemy and could not therefore support the attack. In the attack the four battalions—which were not up to strength, having lost earlier in the battle—had 1,350 killed and wounded. The companies were all in line by the time the hamlet was reached, and by that time the losses were heavy. The enemy's artillery, which fired exclusively on the infantry, did not cause much loss.

Attack of the 5th Brigade on Yu-hung-tun* (E 2 N.W.).
(*See* Map 56 and Panorama 8.)

The following are accounts given by survivors of the attack, with the addition of information from the commander of the brigade and his staff.

Statement by a Staff Officer.

On the afternoon of the 5th, the brigade was ordered to attack the enemy in the vicinity of Yu-hung-tun, and it marched in the direction of Li-kuan-pu, the neighbourhood of which village it reached before night. The brigade was the left of the Second Army, and on its right was a portion of its own division, the 3rd. Nothing was known beyond the fact that the enemy was at Yu-hung-tun. On the 6th the enemy's position was reconnoitred, and Major-General Nambo went to the eastern corner of Li-kuan-pu to examine it himself.

The following was noted:—

(1) On the southern side of the hill at Hsun-chia-kan-tzu was a redoubt. The village of Yu-hung-tun appeared to be defended, but no obstacles were visible. South of that village the enemy was holding a hamlet of three houses, beyond which, from five hundred to one thousand yards distant, was another redoubt.

(2) Many of the enemy were seen working between Yu-hung-tun and the three houses.

(3) The enemy had two batteries in front of the redoubt near Niu-hsin-tai, and on the east side of the wood near that village, where there is another small hill, one or two batteries.† Also one or two batteries on the north side of Yu-hung-tun, which fired on the village north of Li-kuan-pu, and another battery on the south-east side of Yu-hung-tun. The Japanese artillery was on the south side of Li-kuan-pu.

Preparations were made for the attack.

The general condition of affairs at this time was as follows:—

The Third Army had already attacked and checked the enemy north of Mukden, and he was retiring in disorder east of the railway.

In the neighbourhood, and round the walls of Mukden, the enemy was in masses, which had retired from the left bank of the Hun. At Yu-hung-tun the enemy was placed so as to cover the retreat and withdrawal of stores, and his position there was of great importance. If the enemy were to be beaten by us at Yu-hung-tun he would assuredly make a counter-attack. The left wing must secure a base to work from, and to obtain it

---

* *See* page 120 *et seq.*

† The position of the batteries was difficult to find, but three were noted, and are shown on Map 56.

it must attack early on the 7th. As the redoubt north of Yu-hung-tun commanded the ground over which the attack would be made, it must first be shelled.

By the situation of the three houses it seemed probable that their capture would assist in surrounding the adjacent village.

The advance began from Li-kuan-pu at 4 am., on the 7th, and the deployment took place at 5 a.m. at the line of bushes eight hundred yards from Yu-hung-tun.

As right wing, the 33rd Regiment was to attack the three houses, and the 6th Regiment Yu-hung-tun, more particularly the south-west corner.

Another party of men, from the north of Li-kuan-pu, was to move in the direction of the redoubt north of Yu-hung-tun, and the northern end of that village. This body was intended to draw the enemy's attention from the real attack.

The deployment being finished by 5 a.m., the troops arrived from five hundred to six hundred yards from the enemy, who found them out and fired. On coming to a distance from him of from two hundred to three hundred yards, a very hot fire was poured on them. Both regiments fixed bayonets, and without answering the fire, advanced in the expectation of bayonet fighting. The demonstrating party had meanwhile fired on the village, and had to some extent attracted the enemy's fire in its direction.

Statement of a Battalion Commander.

The Major of the II./32rd Regiment, the only surviving battalion commander, stated:—

On the morning of the 7th, the regimental commander, Lieut.-Colonel Yoshioka, went forward with the 1st and 2nd Battalions. These two battalions were in close formation, and the battalion on the left led towards the north corner of the three houses, the other battalion on the right keeping touch with it.* When the left battalion arrived from four hundred to five hundred yards from its object it received the enemy's fire thence, but continued to advance without changing formation. When it arrived two hundred yards from the houses, the fire became very heavy. The battalion then formed line and fixed bayonets, while the right battalion pushed up from the south as if to surround the place. This took place a little before 6 a.m. Dawn was then making it lighter, and objects began to be visible. At the moment that the right battalion made the movement to surround the houses, the enemy made a counter-attack from the east side of the redoubt south of them, but it was repulsed by the two reserve companies of that battalion. No sooner was it repulsed than another was made

* *See* sketch on page 522.

from the west side of the redoubt, and both counter-attacks were only driven off after severe bayonet fighting.

While this was going on on the right the main body of the 33rd continued to move towards the houses, and the right battalion succeeded in surrounding them after beating off two counter-attacks. Heavy bayonet fighting took place at the hamlet, and both sides threw hand-grenades. After several minutes the enemy was driven out, part retiring to the village of Yu-hung-tun and part towards Mukden.

At the time that the main body of the regiment took the houses, the commander was in advance—he was the first man to get inside the wall surrounding the houses—and went inside the wall from the direction of where his grave now is, one hundred yards south of the houses. The enemy was holding his ground obstinately, and Colonel Yoshioka fought with the Russian commander and killed him and twenty or thirty men with his sword. The battalion pushed on to the eastern wall and opened fire on the Russian second line. At this time I was at Li-kuan-pu with the reserve battalion, there also being a battalion of the 6th Regiment in reserve.

At 6 a.m. my battalion received orders to cover the right rear of the right battalion. Taking my men from the southern side of the village I deployed and advanced. Although the sky was now clear we could not see the enemy, but being aware that the redoubt on the south was held, scouts were sent in its direction; they reported that the enemy there was firing on the right of the troops at the three houses, thereby making their position very dangerous. I therefore decided that I must attack the redoubt, and advanced till we were six hundred yards from it and fired. I sent, at 7.10 a.m., the reserve company of the battalion to the clump of trees one hundred yards south of the three houses. The enemy had now all retired from their vicinity, and his artillery was firing from the direction of Niu-hsin-tai. We failed to take the redoubt, but for a time reduced the fire that was being poured on the rest of the regiment. I next extended my battalion between the redoubt and the three houses.

About 9 a.m. the enemy seemed to be increasing from the direction of Hsi-kuan-tun towards the redoubt, but as it was foggy his movements could not be distinctly seen. The regimental commander now wanted to advance, but when he saw the enemy increasing he decided to remain at the three houses. At 11 a.m. the enemy's infantry began to advance, his line extending from near Niu-hsin-tai through Hsi-kuan-tun to a point east of the redoubt. As soon as it was seen, fire was opened, and part began to retire. From 11.30 a.m. to 1 p.m. his artillery greatly increased, and the three houses were bombarded from guns north of Yu-hung-tun, from near Niu-hsin-tai, and from the village east of the three houses. From 1 p.m. the cannonade grew hotter, and over fifty guns played on the three

houses. Covered by the smoke and dust which was thus raised the enemy could not be seen. A little before 2 p.m. the artillery fire stopped, and the enemy could be seen in the same positions, but advancing in several lines. His thick formation made an easy target for our rifles. On reaching five hundred yards from us his first line had suffered so that it fell back on the second, which came on, and, reaching us, bayonet fighting ensued.

The 33rd Regiment had now been fighting incessantly in a very severe manner for nine hours, and had lost many officers and men. The cover furnished by the three houses and the wall round them was very indifferent, and being overpowered by numbers—for the enemy brought up two divisions—the remnant of the regiment fell back to the southern corner of Yu-hung-tun. The regimental commander fought to the last, and was killed inside the wall. He had before remained behind the row of houses at their western end, but both he and myself—for I was with him—had continually to keep moving about as bullets and shells were coming in nearly every direction. To have got the men to make trenches was not practicable, for the ground was hard and the enemy's fire too hot.

Remarks by the Commander of the Brigade.

Each regiment that attacked had with it two battalions and a section of engineers. The latter was attached to the infantry, as it was thought that the village defences might have to be destroyed or arrangements made regarding hand-grenades. As I was anxious about the redoubt south of the three houses, I sent the reserve battalion of the 33rd against it. I had given Lieut.-Colonel Yoshioka orders that he was not to go beyond the three houses. I saw the Russian counter-attack coming from the east before it was reported, and I then sent the reserve battalion of the 6th Regiment to the village, and asked the divisional commander for two battalions, which were sent from the reserve. These battalions were extended from Li-kuan-pu to the south. The attack of the 5th Brigade was brought about by important orders received by me which I am not at liberty to divulge.

Regarding the formation adopted in the advance, the men were sent forward in close order, as it was pitch dark, and the enemy nearly always fires high at night. I did not send the reserves to the front earlier as I feared that a large body of men in a small space might get into confusion, and I therefore waited a little. One Japanese battery south of Li-kuan-pu prevented the Russians from surrounding the three houses. The Japanese and Russian dead were all mixed, many of them lying or kneeling in the fire position, and all our dead faced the direction of the enemy, not a man having flinched. (This was proved by eye witnesses on the 10th March.)

The Attack of the Left against Yu-hung tun.

Account by a Surviving Officer of the 6th Regiment.

At first two battalions advanced; each battalion had three companies in the first line and one company in reserve, and touch was maintained with the right wing. The right of the regiment led against the southern corner of the village, and the left had orders to move against the centre of that place. As the right was to surround the southern corner it did not expect so much fighting as the left, which was to go directly for the village, and for this reason the greater part of the section of engineers with us was given to the left. The engineers followed behind the first line ready to throw hand-grenades. The heaviest fire received was when we were two hundred yards short of the village. The regimental reserve of two companies was following behind the centre of the first line. The enemy in the village did not fire so heavily as the defenders of the two redoubts, and in any case his fire from Yu-hung-tun was mostly directed against the demonstrating party, which, however, did not suffer much as the bullets went high. It being thought a mistake to loiter, a rush was made by the first line and the reserve about 6 a.m. The walls, one hundred yards from the village, were held by the enemy and were easily taken, but the houses behind were loopholed. Bayonet fighting and hand-grenade throwing now began, and though the resistance in the houses was obstinate some of them were taken, one house after another. Seeing the difficulty of the situation, the regimental commander sent up the two reserve companies to the right battalion to help in surrounding the village, while the left battalion held the enemy on the western side and tried to get in. The fighting that went on was very confusing and difficult to explain, but the right battalion got into the village, and with the left battalion drove the enemy from house to house—setting them on fire in order to do so—and gradually secured the southern part of the place. This was effected about 8.30 a.m. As the enemy to the east was preparing to counter-attack, the regimental commander decided that he could not hold the whole village, and therefore the Russians remained in the northern part, where they were easily supplied with ammunition and hand-grenades from the redoubt behind. Two companies now came up from the brigade reserve and two more at 9.30 a.m., and in their advance lost heavily by the cross fire from the two redoubts. They were insufficient to strengthen the first line to any great extent. The counter-attacks soon began, and though heavy loss was inflicted on the enemy, he constantly increased in the northern portion of the village, and we therefore were ordered to retire to the southern side of the street, which runs through it from east to west. The Russians were thus on one side of the street and we on the other, and from behind the walls we threw hand-grenades at

each other. We stood behind the walls with sandbags ready to fill up the holes made in the former by the explosion, and other men were ready to attack the enemy with their bayonets if he attempted to break through. (The street is about two hundred yards long and twenty-four feet wide.)

In this manner the lower half of the village was held till 3 p.m. We had by this time a great number of wounded, and they were collected in some of the largest houses.

The enemy, finding that he could not drive us out with hand-grenades, next employed mortars, but, in spite of them, the method we adopted of standing by with sandbags, prevented him from getting inside our wall.

Remarks by the Commander of the Brigade.

When I received the report that the ammunition was running short, I twice sent up two companies with as much as they could carry, but as many of them were killed and wounded it only arrived in part. Train soldiers then, from the light baggage, were sent up carrying a supply on their backs, but of them only two-thirds arrived in the village. They were used to collect the ammunition from the dead and wounded in the village. From 11.30 a.m. to 3 p.m. the fire was so severe that it was impossible to send up train men, and about 4 p.m. some of the defenders had no ammunition. They therefore used Russian rifles till night. All the doctors were sent into the village to look after the wounded, as it was impossible for stretcher bearers to carry them out of it to the rear. I was planning to bring them back to Li-kuan-pu, where I was, when it got dark, but it was thought that it would take all night to do so. As soon as sunset came one company was sent into the village with as much ammunition as it could carry, and ordered to bring back the wounded. The more men I had sent up to the front during the day the more wounded there were, but when it was quite dark I despatched two battalions, by whose assistance the survivors and the whole of the wounded were withdrawn in spite of the efforts of the Russians to surround them.

I had hoped to send up a couple of guns in order to blow down the walls and force the Russians out of the northern part of the village, but, on consideration, regarding the general condition of affairs, I decided that to hold the place was not advisable, and I therefore gave orders for the troops to withdraw. This was practically effected without the knowledge of the enemy. It was known afterwards from the shoulder straps of the Russian dead that parts of eight different divisions attacked Yu-hung-tun and the three houses.* Of these the 25th and 55th were in greatest force, and they happened to be the same troops as had faced us on the Sha Ho in the earlier months of winter.

* *See* Notes on page 144.

It was fortunate that the walls were frozen, as no bullet would penetrate them.

At the end of this action there were alive in the brigade 1,300 out of 3,200.*

APPENDIX 3.

Russian Strength and Losses in the Battle of Mukden.

The following notes compiled by the Intelligence Section of the General Staff of the Second Army were received after the operations' report was completed.

Between the 27th February and 2nd March, the Russians opposite the Second Army had 32 batteries of field artillery, in all 256 guns, and also 20 15-cm. howitzers.

On the line from Chien-nien-yu-pao (B 3) to Pei-tai-tzu (C 3), which was attacked on the 1st March, there were the 8th Army Corps, 1st, 2nd, and 5th European Rifle Brigades, and a regiment of the 35th Division. Also the "Liao Ho Detachment," consisting of one regiment 61st Division, seven squadrons of Cossacks, two companies of garrison troops Eastern Chinese Railway, and 14 guns.

On the 2nd and 3rd March, the enemy left 1,160 dead on the ground, and the Japanese estimated his total loss at 9,000. Prisoners taken amounted to 135.

On the 3rd and 4th March, opposite the 8th Division, on the right bank of the Hun, there were one regiment 54th Reserve Division, one regiment 61st Reserve Division, and one regiment of the 8th Army Corps. (There was, however, practically no opposition on these days.)

From 4th to 8th March, opposite the 4th Division:—

5th Siberian Army Corps (less 215th and 241st Regiments which were opposite the 8th Division), 72nd Reserve Division, 3rd and 14th Divisions, 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division, 2nd Siberian Division. All these troops were parts of larger units which were not complete. Each day, too, there were about 50 guns.

From Mo-chia-pu to Yu-hung-tun.—8th Army Corps (complete). Main part of 6th Army Corps (25th Division complete, 41st incomplete, 31st complete), 35th Division (complete), 55th Reserve Division (part), 5th European Rifle Brigade (complete): this unit had just arrived from Mukden.

The forces opposite the Second Army were therefore a little over three army corps and about 240 guns and some heavy guns.

---

* This was a mistranslation, and meant that 1,300 men were unwounded. —A. H.

Total estimated force opposite the Second Army, 150 battalions and 300 guns.

Enemy's Casualties.—(Except those opposite the 4th Division, and Colonel Tomioka's Detachment after they were attached to the Fourth Army):—

Killed, about 8,000; prisoners, 5,000. Total estimated number, 40,000.

Notes.

After Hei-kou-tai the Russians had the 1st Siberian Army Corps at Ssu-fang-tai (west of the Hun), but before the battle of Mukden it disappeared and was traced to the general reserve, whence it went to the Russian left at Ma-chun-tan.

On 7th March there was at Yu-hung-tun the 25th Division of the 6th Army Corps. When the 3rd Division attacked, the Russians sent part of the 35th and 55th Divisions to assist, or about 1½ extra divisions.

It was not possible for the enemy to make a great counter-attack in the battle of Mukden against the Second Army, as the troops arriving from other parts of the field to the vicinity of that place had lost unity of command and were much mixed up. The strongest counter-attack was made on Yu-hung-tun, but elsewhere the counter-attacks were small.

APPENDIX 4.

TABLE of the KILLED and WOUNDED of the SECOND JAPANESE ARMY at the BATTLE OF MUKDEN.

(From February 27th, 1905, to March 10th, 1905.)

		Killed.			Wounded.			Total.		Explanation.
		Officers.	Soldiers.	Horses.	Officers.	Soldiers.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	
3rd Division.	Infantry	44	1,613	10	77	2,492	4	4,226	14	The number includes slightly wounded kept in action— Officers 13, Soldiers 299, Total 312
	Cavalry	—	—	2	2	2	—	4	2	
	Artillery	—	11	17	5	61	45	77	62	
	Engineers	3	44	2	1	92	3	140	5	
	Others	—	1	2	1	16	3	18	5	
	Total	47	1,669	33	86	2,663	55	4,465	88	
4th Division.	Infantry	7	385	16	30	965	16	1,387	32	The number includes slightly wounded kept in action— Officers 6, Soldiers 74, Total 80
	Cavalry	—	—	7	1	1	12	2	19	
	Artillery	—	5	8	—	8	25	13	33	
	Engineers	—	9	3	—	21	1	30	4	
	Others	—	—	—	—	4	—	4	—	
	Total	7	399	34	31	999	54	1,436	88	
5th Division.	Infantry	53	1,346	22	133	4,110	37	5,642	59	The number includes slightly wounded kept in action— Officers 18, Soldiers 146, Total 164
	Cavalry	—	2	9	—	10	24	12	33	
	Artillery	2	12	26	5	106	87	125	113	
	Engineers	1	12	20	—	88	6	101	26	
	Others	1	1	1	—	14	1	16	2	
	Total	57	1,373	78	138	4,328	155	5,896	233	

APPENDIX 4—*continued.*

		Killed.			Wounded.			Total.		Explanation.
		Officers.	Soldiers.	Horses.	Officers.	Soldiers.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	
8th Division.	Infantry	43	1,471	48	106	3,833	56	5,453	104	The number includes slightly wounded kept in action— Officers - 37 Soldiers - 481 Total - 518
	Cavalry	—	1	16	—	8	38	9	54	
	Artillery	4	59	76	17	234	137	314	213	
	Engineers	3	72	5	3	195	7	273	12	
	Others	—	1	1	3	33	2	37	3	
	Total	50	1,604	146	129	4,303	240	6,086	386	
Others.	Infantry	6	82	9	12	371	10	471	19	The number includes slightly wounded kept in action— Officers - 1 Soldiers - – Total - 1
	Cavalry	—	1	2	3	14	5	18	7	
	Artillery	1	23	32	8	197	59	229	91	
	Engineers	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Others	—	—	2	—	3	3	3	5	
	Total	7	106	45	23	585	77	721	122	
	Total sum	168	5,151	336	407	12,878	581	1,8604	917	
		179	*5,729*	*512* *3 missing.*	—	*15,776* *528 missing.*	—	*22,727*	—	

NOTE.—In the number of "soldiers," non-commissioned officers are included. The figures in italics were given me by Lieut.-Colonel Macpherson, R.A.M.C. They are believed to be accurate, and this return omits Colonel Tomioka's Detachment, &c.—A. H.

The Classified Table of the Wounded of the Second Japanese Army at the Battle of Mukden.

——	3rd Division.	4th Division.	5th Division.	8th Division.	Others.	Total.
Bullet wound -	1,451	2,350	1,938	3,041	835	9,615
Shell wound - -	149	319	113	776	92	1,449
Sword wound -	32	6	—	5	5	48
Other wounds -	13	66	69	23	45	216
Total - -	1,645	2,741	2,120	3,845	977	11,328

Note.—This table shows the classification of the wounded carried by the stretcher bearers only, and it does not show the total number of the wounded during the battle of Mukden.

(7) The Battle of Mukden.—Operations of the 5th Division, Second Japanese Army.

REPORT by Captain A. H. S. HART-SYNNOT, D.S.O., the East Surrey Regiment, Mukden, 2nd May 1905.

Plates.

General Map - - - - Map 55.

The month of February was a busy one for the Japanese Armies along the line of the Sha Ho. Day and night trains from the south poured their contents into the great reservoir at Liao-yang, whence they were dispersed by road and rail over the great front of nearly 150 miles.

Troops from Port Arthur, fresh troops from Japan, guns, vast quantities of supplies, enormous quantities of ammunition, &c., poured unceasingly into the advanced base at Liao-yang.

The winter, too, was drawing to a close, and we knew that if any big move were contemplated it must take place before the thaw set in and made the rivers unfordable and the roads impassable. A general feeling of unrest was in the air, and everybody felt that great doings were imminent.

On the 26th February, the foreign attachés of the Second Army, then in quarters at Shih-li-ho, on the Mukden highway, were ordered to move to Kou-tzu-yen, about 16 miles west, to which place the Head-Quarters of the Second Army had removed some weeks before. We rode to this place on a bitter cold day with a blizzard blowing from the north-east, and on our arrival were assigned quarters in some broken-down Chinese houses with no windows. The cold was intense, and we all felt it very much. On the 28th we were asked if we preferred to remain with the Head-Quarters of our Army or to be attached to various divisions for the battle that was impending. Most of us chose to go to divisions, and I, in company with Lieut.-Colonel Macpherson, Royal Army Medical Corps, Colonel Lombard, the senior French attaché, Lieut.-Colonel von Vörster, German Attaché, Lieut. Franz, Austrian attaché, and a French doctor, were told off to the 5th Division.*

We rode off in the early afternoon to join the head-quarters of our division at Ta-tai (C 4). Our guide mistook the road, and instead of taking us to Ta-tai, conducted us to the front line at Shen-tan-pu (C 4 north), which was at that time under a moderate shell fire from the Russain artillery, who considered

* *See* Map 55, Squares C 4, C 3.

our little group of horsemen a sufficient target to waste several shells upon; these, however, did no harm, and we arrived at Ta-tai about 4 p.m.

Here we were received most hospitably by our new general, Lieut.-General Kigoshi. A Chinese house had been cleaned up and made comfortable for us, and we were very glad to get shelter from the bitter wind.

The Japanese Armies were at this time disposed along a front of 480 Chinese *li* or about 150 miles.

On the extreme left was the Third Army (1st, 7th, and 9th Divisions) with its left thrown forward; next to it the Second Army, 8th Division on the left, 5th in the centre, and 4th on the right. Next came the Fourth Army along the line of the old Sha Ho defences astride the railway, and extending to the east to meet the left of the First Army, while far away in the east was the Ya-lu Army under General Kawamura.

I have shown approximately, on the accompanying sketch,* the relative positions of the Japanese and Russian lines west of the railway.

The 5th Division was then holding the line which I have shown on the sketch by a hard blue line, the Russians confronting it I have shown by a hard red line.†

The division was composed of the following troops:—

Divisional Commander, Lieut.-General Kigoshi.
Chief of the Staff, Colonel Nitahara.

Infantry—

9th Brigade { The 11th Regiment, three battalions.
The 41st „ „ „

21st Brigade { The 21st „ „ „
The 42nd „ „ „

‡*Artillery.*—The 5th (Mountain) Artillery Regiment, two battalions of three batteries each, total 36 guns.

Cavalry.—One regiment.

Engineers.—One battalion.

Field Hospitals.—Four of 200 beds each.

Stretcher Bearers.—One battalion, supplemented by the regimental bearers and a large number of Chinese coolies.

Ammunition Columns.—One battalion formed into three artillery and two infantry columns.

Supply Columns.—Four, formed by the train battalion, each carrying one day's supplies for the whole division.

---

* Not reproduced, as the positions are also shown by Lieut.-Colonel Haldane on Map 55.

† The 5th Division was shown holding a line from Li-ta-jen-tun (D 4) to the Hun Ho.

‡ During the battle the artillery with the division was largely supplemented from the Army reserve, as will be seen later on.—A. H.-S.

Late on the evening of the 28th February I went to see the Divisional Staff and heard from them that the Japanese intended to open a bombardment along the whole front soon after daylight the following morning.

st Mar. At 6 a.m. on the morning of the 1st March the ammunition columns in Ta-tai began to move. It was pitch dark and bitterly cold, and at 7 a.m. the thermometer stood at zero. Day dawned about 7 a.m., grey and misty. At 7.30 the first shot was fired, and soon afterwards a brisk cannonade began, but it was too misty to see much.

The Divisional Head-Quarters did not move early from Ta-tai, so, after trying ineffectually to see anything through the mist, I made for the artillery position and reached the village of Liu-tiao-kao (C 4) at about 9 o'clock. This village was in the front line and was being heavily shelled with shrapnel and 12-cm. high-explosive shell; it was also under rifle fire.

The front side (north side) of the village was carefully entrenched and was full of infantry, while the gun teams and horses of officers were collected in the bed of the stream close behind, where they stood on the ice and got shelter from view and fair shelter from fire, although a great many were killed during the day by shrapnel bullets and pieces of high-explosive shell.

The Russian forces were disposed as follows:—

West of Chang-tan (C 3) were three batteries of field artillery, twenty-four guns.

North of Chang-chuang-tzu were four batteries, either three of field and one of heavy artillery or else all four of field, in all thirty-two guns. One battery, either field or heavy artillery, of eight guns was a little north of Li-chia-wo-peng. The exact position of this battery of 12-cm. guns I have not been able to determine, but it was in one of these two places, as the shells from both places came from almost the same direction; but I am inclined to think that it was close to the river, and that the advanced battery was a field-gun battery

The Russian infantry consisted of the 1st Siberian Rifles—four regiments of three battalions each; and from this I think the batteries north of Chang-chuang-tzu were probably the 1st East Siberian Artillery Brigade under General Luchkovski. This infantry held from opposite Chang-tan, the villages of Wan-chia-wo-peng, Li-chia-wo-peng and some works south-east of the latter village. They had two regiments on the right, one on the left, and one in reserve. I think there were also some troops of the 8th Corps in the position, for during the subsequent pursuit I saw some dead soldiers of the 14th and 15th Divisions. The Russians also had two machine guns on each side of Wan-chia-wo-peng, and two more in the works on the sand-hill at

point "K" east of Li-chia-wo-peng. The Russians were strongly entrenched in these villages and at the point "K."

From the village of Liu-tiao-kao the works at "K" looked like a Chinese fort, and I could distinctly see the sandbag head-cover and the loopholes in the parapet.

A good many trees grew about the villages, but between the Russian works and the Japanese front line the ground was perfectly open and quite flat.

Previously to attacking this formidable position the artillery of the 5th Division was very largely reinforced from the reserve of the Second Army, as follows:—

One regiment of field artillery, of two battalions of three batteries each, total thirty-six guns.

One regiment of 12-cm guns, consisting of two battalions of three batteries each (four guns in each each battery), total twenty-four guns.

One battalion of three batteries (four guns per battery) of 15-cm. howitzers, total twelve guns.

This reinforcement together with the 5th Divisional Artillery, namely, the 5th (Mountain) Artillery Regiment of thirty-six guns, gave a total of one hundred and eight guns, which were disposed as follows:—

One battalion of field artillery south-east of Liu-tiao-kao (C 4), and the other battalion a little behind the same village.

The howitzers were in the bed of the stream and were quite hidden from view.

The 12-cm. guns were a little in front of the Divisional Head-Quarters, while the mountain guns were echeloned forward on their left.

All these guns were in emplacements made of earth or sandbags, and, wherever the guns were in the open, deep holes had been cut close at hand for the gunners to take cover in.

About 9 a.m. I found a shrine in the front line of the village of Liu-tiao-kao, it stood in a small mud walled enclosure about twelve feet square; from here I got a splendid view of the operations.

A very heavy artillery engagement was going on, the field batteries, and the village itself were under a tremendous fire. The Russian ranging was perfect, and at times the batteries were quite hidden by the dust raised by the rain of shrapnel bullets and pieces of shell; the Russians fired chiefly salvoes of eight guns rapidly one after the other. When the enemy's fire got very hot the Japanese gunners ceased firing and went to ground for cover. The officer commanding this battalion had a look-out place on the roof of a Chinese house close to the place where I had taken shelter in the shrine, and from here, behind a little bullet-proof crow's-nest arrangement they had made for him, he watched the enemy's artillery through an indirect vision glass, and worked his batteries with two small flags, one

white and one red. The red flag was for one battery, the white one for another, and both together for the third. The batteries were close by, and the commanders could easily see his signals, and knew when to get their men out of cover and go on firing and when to go to ground. This was all done very quietly, and there was no shouting; it struck me as being neat.

The Japanese guns pounded the Russian batteries and then turned on the entrenchments. I could not see the effect of the fire on the Russian guns, but I do not think it had much, for it made no difference in the intensity of their fire, though they, like our own, slackened down from time to time, but burst out again soon afterwards as vigorously as ever.

At 10 o'clock the Japanese launched their infantry attack. On the right two battalions of the 21st Regiment moved against Li-chia-wo-peng and the works at "K," which were entrenchments on some little sand-hills.* One battalion of the 21st Regiment remained in support in the trenches at Liu-tiao-kao.

On the left the 11th Regiment (three battalions) moved against Wang-chia-wo-peng. The 41st Regiment was in second line, two battalions supporting the right and one the left attack. The 42nd Regiment was held in reserve.

The infantry attack was made in a manner almost exactly similar to our own system, that is to say, line upon line of men extended to five or six paces. This method of fighting has only been recently adopted, and is copied from us. The Japanese, and indeed the European attachés too, speak of it as "Boer Tactics." I will refer to this subject more fully at the end of this report.

The infantry advanced over flat and bare fields with no cover of any sort, under a perfect storm of bullets; fortunately for the Japanese, the shooting of the Russian infantry was wild to an extraordinary degree, bullets flew all over the place, most of them high up in the air, they pattered about in the village, flew over the guns, and fell like rain on the plain about a mile away behind us. Another fortunate thing for the Japanese infantry was that the Russian artillery practically ignored them, and save for a few wild salvoes, confined their attentions to the village and the guns. If the Russian shooting had been even moderately good, I think that this attempt to move over the open against such strong defences would have resulted in a disaster, or in any case a horrible slaughter of men.

The Japanese artillery turned on the works at "K," but in spite of their magnificent shooting, the unfortunate infantry in the open were being shot down by hundreds.

The infantry of the right attack got to within three hundred or four hundred yards of the work at "K," but could get no nearer, though they held on grimly to the ground they had

* "K" is the small sand-hill a little to the south-east of Li-chia-wo-peng.

gained, and at 11.15 a.m. it appeared to me that they made no further effort to advance.

The whole surface of the ground between Liu-tiao-kao and the line from which the Japanese had started, was literally strewn with the bodies of the killed and wounded, amongst whom the stretcher bearers walked about in the coolest possible manner in spite of the flying bullets.

Wounded men walked back from the firing line by scores, and the strangest thing of all was that nobody seemed to be in a hurry, or in the least bit flurried, though bullets were flying wildly in every direction. The Russian artillery had dealt very gently with this infantry attack, and I do not think that more than a score of men altogether were hit by shell fire; one man I did see hit, and he was a wounded soldier who was being carried in on a stretcher. The shell burst just over him, and I heard him shriek; the bearers put him down to see what was the matter, but when they found out what it was they picked him up again and quietly went on with him to the dressing station.

I only saw one man run, and curiously enough he was a wounded man who had been shot in the foot. He was limping back slowly from the firing line when a salvo of Russian shells burst in the air behind him. He was very much startled, and forgetting all about his wounded foot, he took to his heels and sought shelter behind a tree, the empty case of a shrapnel following him came rolling along in the dust and stopped a few feet from where he had taken shelter. He laughed good humouredly when he saw I had been watching him.

The casualties on this part of the ground were very great. I was surprised that they were not even greater, for apart from the openness of the ground and the short ranges at which the enemy was firing, the whole battle-field was dotted with men walking about—officers, wounded soldiers, stretcher bearers, and others. I think many of them exposed themselves quite unnecessarily, and a great many must have been shot quite needlessly.

On the left the 11th Regiment, supported by the fire of the mountain artillery and twenty-four 12-cm. guns, was attacking the village of Wang-chia-wo-peng. There were a lot of trees all about this village, and the Russians were very strongly entrenched there, and had besides four machine guns, two on each side of the village.

These machine guns played havoc in the ranks of the 11th Regiment, and it was decided that at all costs they must be silenced.

A very bold stroke was determined upon—so bold that volunteers were called for to carry it out. It was proposed to send forward two mountain guns to within five hundred yards of the Russian machine guns to try to break them up.

Fortunately there was a kind of sunken road between the little hamlets of Ma-lan-ku (C 4 N.W.) and Chang-i-tou, and along this approach went the two guns, pack ponies and all; they arrived in the latter place with all their horses, having only one or two men wounded on the way. Having arrived in the village, they bored two holes in the outer wall for the muzzles of the guns, and opened fire; in a few moments two of the machine guns were smashed to pieces, but the other two were so well hidden that the Russians managed to withdraw them.

The successful issue of this bold attempt tempted the Japanese to go on with it, and accordingly four more guns followed the first two in a similar manner, so we had a whole battery within five hundred yards of the Russian infantry. The 11th Regiment made another effort, and this time got as far as the bed of the stream between Chang-i-tou and Wang-chia-wo-peng, where they got good cover, and here they remained all the rest of the day and the following night.

During the night several attempts were made to storm the village, but the Russians fought hard, and one attempt after another failed, until, at 4 a.m. on the morning of the 2nd, a desperate effort was made, and this time succeeded; the Japanese captured the village, took 20 prisoners, and the Russians fell back to the north and north-east, leaving many dead and wounded behind them.

Now to return to the right attack. At 4 p.m. the 21st Regiment had got to within 15 yards of the sand-hill at point "K," and had lost very heavily; amongst the killed was Colonel Inaba, its commander. At 6.30 p.m. the Russian resistance was overcome, and the hill with its works was captured; the enemy, however, managed to remove the two machine guns which had been there all day.

The troops of the right attack passed the night in the region of the sand-hill and in the early morning, without much difficulty, occupied Li-chia-wo-peng. The Russians retired to the north-east, leaving many killed and a good many wounded behind them.

Thus ended the first day of the battle. The 5th Division had fought a hard fight, but had driven back the enemy and captured his first strong line. We had lost in killed and wounded 2,500 men.

Fire Effect.—Amongst the killed and wounded on the Japanese side the number hit by artillery fire was extraordinarily small; this is a most remarkable fact, for the Russian shooting was as nearly perfect as it is possible to be; they knew their ranges almost to a yard, and their shells burst well; however, the actual effect of their fire was practically nil. For example, the three Japanese field batteries, east of Liu-tiao-kao, were bombarded continually—at times one could not see the guns on account of the dust raised by the falling showers of shrapnel;

this went on all through the day, and the total loss in the three batteries was only 13 men wounded; the other field batteries, the 12-cm. batteries and 15-cm. howitzer batteries, had no casualties at all, while the mountain artillery had only 22 casualties, of which, however, every single one was caused by rifle bullets.

The Russian 12-cm. guns were using high-explosive shell; these they dropped into the village of Liu-tiao-kao, among the batteries, and along the banks of the river, where all the horses had been stowed away, and where nearly everyone who was not actually fighting had gone for cover. These shells burst with terrific force, making a fearful noise and raising great clouds of black dust, but beyond killing a few horses and setting fire to a house or two I do not think they did much harm.

I walked all over the ground between Liu-tiao-kao and Li-chia-wo-peng early on the morning of the 2nd; most of the Japanese wounded, and some of the Russian, had been collected, but all the dead of both sides lay where they had fallen.

It appeared to me that a very large proportion of the killed on both sides had been shot through the head. I also noticed from the way the bodies were lying that most of them had apparently been killed while lying down; one could distinctly trace where a line had halted, by the rows of dead bodies; many of the men were still grasping their rifles in their dead fingers.

I mentioned this fact to a Japanese staff officer, and he told me that he had noticed the same thing at the battle of Hei-kou-tai, and he was kind enough to get the figures for me.*

The Japanese artillery fire had apparently been a little more effective than the Russian, for some of the dead Russians in the sand-hill defences at "K" were horribly mutilated by the shells.

There were about 150 dead Russians lying about in the works at "K," and I saw also about half-a-dozen wounded who had not been picked up. Most of the latter were very bad cases, I fancy, and the little vitality that was left in them by their wounds was almost gone owing to the fearful cold.

The Russian works on the sand-hill at "K" (I call it a sand-hill for want of a better word, for it was nothing but a little mound, the highest part of which was not more than twenty feet above the plain) were well constructed breastworks, with short traverses; here and there underground dwellings had been hollowed out behind them, and for the most part the works faced west or south-west. Between the sand-hill and the village was a parapet and trench which might have held about 50 men if they had been packed fairly tightly. The village itself was strongly protected, double rows of abattis and

* Full information upon this point will be found in Lieut.-Colonel Haldane's report on the battle of Hei-kou-tai, Appendix III., page 53, and in Report 31, page 507.

wire entanglement placed in front of the trenches, while all the walls of the village were pierced with loopholes.

Medical Arrangements.—I saw two dressing stations at work during this fight, one was in the front line of trenches at Liu-tiao-kao, and the other, a larger one, was in the bed of the stream near the bridge in rear of Liu-tiao-kao. Both of them were very much exposed to artillery fire; a doctor in the first mentioned one was hit by a shrapnel bullet.

The dressing station near the bridge was a curious sight, the nullah was full of horses, and all the rag-tag and bob-tail of nondescript people who are present at battles without actually taking an active part in them. Fortunately the river was frozen, and the ice made a flat roadway down the nullah. The medical people had a group of officers and men here hard at work. The wounded streamed in, some on stretchers and some on foot; as they came in, each man had a label tied on to his coat to show the nature of his wound—a white label for a serious wound, and a red one for a slight one.

The wounded men were dumped down on the ice among the horses' heels, and the doctors, working at high pressure, simply applied antiseptic dressings and bandages; this having been done, the wounded man was sent off to the field hospitals, which in this instance were at Ku-cheng-tzu, some three miles away to the rear. A very large number of men walked this distance, so as to spare the stretcher-bearers for more serious cases. It would be difficult to imagine anything more unlike one's idea of what a dressing station should be. The wounded men lay on the ice bearing their pain without a murmur, while the vicious little Japanese horses fought and kicked each other within a few feet of them; great shells screamed overhead or burst close by with a fearful noise. One 12-cm. shell pitched just beside the bridge and on the brink of the nullah while I was there, and the explosion was deafening, while everyone was covered with dust and pieces of stone. The doctors took no notice of all these disturbing elements, but worked away untiringly, though every man of them who was not actually at work sat with his back up against the river bank.

A field hospital had established itself in the village of Ku-cheng-tzu, and thither a stream of wounded on stretchers or afoot poured all through the day. The Japanese field hospitals, have, nominally, a containing capacity of 200 patients, this one, however, on the 1st March took in no less than 1,400 wounded men: in order to be able to do this, it annexed nearly all the houses in the village.

The fact of the hospitals opening at Ku-cheng-tzu instead of at Ta-tai, showed, I think, great forethought on the part of the principal medical officer, for it was quite close to the Head-Quarters village and at the same time off the main line of traffic between Ta-tai and the fighting line, so all the wounded,

once they were clear of the front line, had a quiet road all to themselves.

Lieut.-General Kigoshi during this fight had his head-quarters about 1 mile south-west of Liu-tiao-kao.

*Narrative continued.**—On the early morning of the 2nd March the following was the situation :— **2nd Mar.**

On the left the 8th Division had occupied Chang-tan and Hsi Nien-yu-pao (B 3). On the right the 4th Division had got as far as Pei-tai-tzu (C 3 S.E.), while the 5th Division, having occupied Wang-chia-wo-peng and Li-chia-wo-peng, was advancing, and at noon occupied the village of Chang-chuang-tzu, where the enemy made no stand worth mentioning.

The 41st Regiment and the 5th (Mountain) Artillery Regiment were told off to pursue the retiring Russians.

I was told that the Third Army was making good progress on our extreme left, but I could get no information as to its whereabouts.

Lieut.-General Kigoshi had not shifted his head-quarters from yesterday's position. I joined him there about 8.15 a.m., having spent the night at Ta-tai.

The day was raw and cloudy, temperature 19 degrees Fahr., at 10 a.m. snow began to fall, and kept on till the middle of the afternoon. I saw the Russian soldiers who had been captured at Wang-chia-wo-peng, who looked cold and miserable ; they nearly all belonged to the 1st Siberian Rifles, though one or two were of the 14th Division of the 8th Corps.

I left head-quarters about 9.30 and rode all over the scene of yesterday's engagement ; all the Japanese wounded had been collected, but a few of the Russians were still lying out in the snow ; the bodies of the slain still lay, of course, where they had fallen. In one part of the ground some of the millet crop of last year had not been gathered in, and it lay in little heaps. It was a curious thing to notice that behind almost every heap lay a dead soldier ; apparently the soldiers in the attack had taken cover behind these heaps of straw, which, of course, were no protection against bullets, but rather the reverse, for they gave the Russian riflemen something to aim at.

By 11 a.m. there was a general move forward. All the Japanese guns had been withdrawn from the emplacements of yesterday. The heavy howitzers were collected by batteries on the banks of the stream, and the mountain guns were getting ready to move forward. I rode on and got into Chang-chuang-tzu a little after noon ; from the shelter of a ruined house I could see right up the river bed towards Chou-kuan-pu (C 3). There was some heavy artillery firing going on to the right. The Russian guns were somewhere near Ta-han-tai, and they were firing at the troops of the 4th Division in the village of Ku chia-tzu (C 3). I saw a Russian infantry patrol about a thousand yards off

* *See* Map 55, Squares C 3 and D 3.

moving about among some trees; one of the men stopped and deliberately had a shot at my orderly, who was holding his horse and mine at the corner of Chang-chuang-tzu village.

The Russians were holding Chou-kuan-pu, and also had some works on the top of a kind of small cliff on the river bank and some trenches between the village and the cliff, but no artillery near the village, though there were three batteries of field and one of heavy artillery to the east in the neighbourhood of Ta-han-tai. Shortly after 1 o'clock the 5th Division began to concentrate in Chang-chuang-tzu.

The 5th (Mountain) Artillery Regiment came up and were soon at work making emplacements for their guns all along the eastern side of the village; these emplacements were all completed before the guns were brought up.

About 2.45 p.m the guns opened fire on Chou-kuan-pu and on the works on the cliff. The Russian guns were apparently busy with the 4th Division, for they hardly replied to us at all.

At 2.50 p.m. the infantry advanced to the attack. It was a very fine sight. The 41st Regiment on both sides of the river, and on its right two battalions of the 42nd, went forward against the Russians in long extended lines, one behind the other. One battalion of the 42nd had no less than twelve lines at about one hundred to one hundred and fifty yards apart.

The Russian guns now turned their fire on the infantry and the attack was very heavily shelled; the rifle fire, too, from the village, and particularly from the works on the cliff, was very hot, but somehow or other it seemed to have very little effect, for in the whole attack the Japanese only lost about 100 men killed and wounded.

In the middle of the attack the Russian guns at Ta-han-tai suddenly ceased firing and retired.

At 4 p.m. some artillery of the 8th Division came into action on the north bank of the river opposite Chang-chuang-tzu; the action of these guns must, I think, have helped the infantry very considerably.

At 5.40 p.m. I saw large numbers of the Russian infantry streaming northwards through the village of Ta-han-tai in great disorder; they appeared to be regularly routed, for they moved in no kind of formation whatever; there were a thousand of them at least and there may have been more.

By 6 p.m. all firing had stopped; the Japanese were in Chou-kuan-pu and the Russians were flying to the north.

The attack on Chou-kuan-pu was a very pretty sight; the troops on the south bank of the river moved slowly forward, while a part of the 41st Regiment, moving up the river bed on the ice and on both banks, attacked the entrenchments on the cliff. These entrenchments commanded the river bed, and most of the casualties occurred here, but there was a little cover to be got right under the south bank, and of this the most was made; besides this, the mountain gunners fired on the trenches as

fast as they could load their guns; this made the Russians a little shy about putting up their heads to fire, for the works here had evidently been rapidly made and had no head-cover. By degrees all the men on the north bank worked over on to the south side of the river, and, thanks to the covering fire of the mountain guns, were able to get close up to the trenches on the cliff. Here they collected in a thick mass close under the river bank. Suddenly five men ran forward in a little group and gained a footing on the top of the bank within fifty or sixty yards of the enemy's trenches—not one of them was hit—and lay flat behind a sandy undulation, while one of them took from his pocket a small flag with the "Rising Sun" on it, and, tying it to the cleaning rod of his rifle, waved it triumphantly. Almost immediately up swarmed three or four hundred men from below, and in a few moments the Russian trenches were won.

After this work fell the Russians in the village made no attempt to hold out any longer, indeed, it would have been useless to do so, for the village was completely commanded at close range by the work on the cliff, so they withdrew, leaving a great many dead and wounded behind them.

The trenches of the work on the cliff were literally full of dead men, and there were many bodies lying about on the open ground between the trenches and the village; for when they left their trenches to retire the Russians had to pass over several hundred yards of open ground, where they were shot down like rabbits in a ride. The Japanese artillery had done terrible damage among the men in the trenches on the cliff, as the mutilated bodies testified; several men had been decapitated and others had lost limbs and were otherwise mutilated. I think nearly all the Russian casualties in this particular spot were due to artillery fire.

I saw one dead Russian officer and a good many wounded men, but the Japanese losses were extraordinarily small; in front of the work on the cliff, for instance, there were only 23; more lay out on the frozen surface of the river and along the sandy banks, but hardly anyone on the right flank of the attack had been touched.

The Japanese medical staff had their hands very full after the severe fighting of yesterday, but nevertheless most of the wounded in this day's fight were collected and brought in before dark. Early on the morning of the 3rd, however, I was riding with Lieut.-Colonel Macpherson over the ground near the cliff, and we discovered three wounded Russians who had been overlooked, or rather, their wounds had been dressed and they had been left to shift for themselves. They had crawled close together to try and keep warm during the bitter cold of the night. The most severely wounded among them had been covered up with some old sacks by his two wounded comrades; and so we found them, half dead with cold, misery, and loss of blood.

We gave them some spirits from our flasks, but could do nothing more for them beyond leaving them in charge of a Japanese Red Cross man, who promised to see them picked up and cared for.

On the night of the 2nd March the first line was in Chou-kuan-pu, the 42nd Regiment, and three batteries of field artillery at Ta-han-tai, from which the Russians had retired, and the remainder of the division in and about Chang-chuang-tzu.

3rd Mar. On the morning of the 3rd March the 5th Division moved forward in two columns. The left column was composed of the 41st Infantry Regiment and the 5th Mountain Artillery Regiment. All the rest of the division, together with the battalion of field artillery, moved forward by the road to the right.

The left column found the Russians had Tou-tai-tzu, where there were about three battalions of them, very much mixed up, for some were Siberian Rifles and some were men of the 14th or 15th Divisions. The enemy made no stand here, but retired almost at once, before the artillery could come into action against them; this retirement, however, may have been caused by the movements of the 8th Division on the north bank of the river.

Moving forward again, the 41st Regiment got into the village of Ma-tou-lan, while the enemy again fell back rapidly before it.

About a mile further on was a large double village with a lot of trees about it, this was Ta-wang-chiang-pu (D 3); here the Russians stopped and resisted the pursuit. They brought three batteries into action north-east of the village. The 41st Regiment deployed for attack and the mountain artillery came into action south-east of Ma-tou-lan, while the 21st Regiment and the three batteries of field artillery from the right column also moved forward against the villages.

However, before the attack had time to develop the Russians were off again as fast as ever; they had only stopped long enough to gain time to set fire to the large depôt of supplies which had been collected in this place.

While the movement against Ta-wang-chiang-pu was taking place the right column was diverted on to the left road and moved straight on to the village from Fu-chia-chuang and Ta-han-tai. As soon as the Russians retired the 21st Regiment and three batteries of field artillery moved back on to their original course on the right road, and the troops now pouring into Ta-wang-chiang-pu took off their equipment and set to work with all their might to try and save as much as possible from the great conflagration which had been started.

The 41st Regiment and the mountain artillery, however, pushed on in pursuit of the flying Russians.

The enemy made a feeble effort to hold the village of Chang-tang-pu (D 3 north); they were the same three battalions which

we had been hunting all day, and I think that they had very little heart left in them, for although they had five batteries on the flanks of the village of Ta-tai to help them and it was now almost dark, no sooner did the Japanese batteries open on them, which they did with great intensity of fire, than they were off again as hard as they could go.

Pursuit as carried out by the Japanese is painfully slow, but very sure. It is a pity they have no mounted infantry, for on occasions of this kind it would be invaluable. I believe that the whole of this mixed lot of Russian infantry, and perhaps the guns as well, might have been captured by a bold and rapid move with mounted troops, for the Russians were worn out and dispirited, and I think would have given up if they had found their line of retreat blocked.

The flying Russians were given no time to rest, the 41st Regiment kept them on the run, and during the night the Japanese entered Ssu-liang-tan-pu, while the scouts got as far as Su-hu-pu (D 2 south).

Now to follow the fortunes of the right column. The 21st Regiment and the three batteries of field artillery, after returning to the right route, moved forward again, but were checked at once at Ta-chuang-ho (D 3 centre): this was late in the afternoon. The artillery immediately came into action, and the infantry moved forward to the attack, but the Russians fell back at once into Yin-erh-pu.

The infantry moved on at once against Yin-erh-pu, just as it was getting dark. Suddenly five Russian batteries from the region near Tung-erh-pu opened fire with very good effect, and did a good deal of damage among the infantry. Night now closed in and it was very dark; the Russian guns retreated, but their infantry held on to the village all night and retired in the small hours of the morning.

The 21st Regiment occupied the village at 6 a.m. on the 4th.

The total Japanese casualties on the 3rd were about 120, and of these most fell before Yin-erh-pu.

The Russians had used the village of Ta-wang-chiang-pu as a kind of advanced depôt. A broad-gauge railway (5-foot gauge) had been laid, connecting up with the main line of the Manchurian Railway south of the Hun Ho bridge, and there were a great many sidings. Large quantities of stores, fodder, grain, flour, &c., &c., had been collected here; all were neatly arranged in great stacks and pyramids, but all was blazing when we entered. I believe the Japanese managed to save about one-third of the total. All these stores were collected in the south half of the village. In the north half was a large field bakery, beautifully arranged, and vast quantities of ready baked rye bread. The Russians had set fire to this too, and most of it, including the great stacks of bread, was burning fiercely when we arrived. The loaves were enormous, measuring in inches 10 × 9 × 6, and weighing at least 12 lbs. each.

The bread was frozen and as hard as flint, but we were glad to get it, for we had nothing else that night, and the baggage was miles behind; so we thawed it by the fire and found it very palatable; it was black and coarse, but, with a little salt sprinkled on it, was excellent.

In addition to the broad-gauge railway I have mentioned, this village was the rail-head of a light railway which ran from here through Chou-kuan-pu and away down the river on the ice. I was told that it went as far as Hei-kou-tai,* but I did not see it myself further south than near Chou-kuan-pu, where it was laid on the ice. I expect the Russians found it very useful for bringing up supplies of food and ammunition to the villages in their front line, as well as for transporting their wounded to the rear.

At Ta-wang-chiang-pu the Japanese captured over one hundred little bogie trucks belonging to the light railway; about half of this number were fitted up as Red Cross trucks, by means of uprights fastened to the trucks and hanging matting upon them to keep off the bitter cold wind, the bottom of the truck being covered with *kaoliang* straw for the wounded to lie on.

Each truck was fitted with a swingle-tree on each side, and could be pulled by two ponies, though on the flat they were so light that one man could easily push an empty one along.

4th Mar. On the morning of the 4th we occupied Ta-tai and Su-hu-pu (D 2 south); the Russians before us had fallen back, but were still holding the villages of Erh-tai-tzu (E 2 s.w.) and Pei-ta-tzu-ying (E 3 north), though not in any great force.

Lieut.-General Kigoshi detached one battalion of the 21st Regiment to guard his flank against the Russians in these two villages, and with the remainder of his division crossed the river to the north bank. This crossing began about 4 p.m.

Su-hu-pu is a large village, and had evidently been occupied by a considerable number of the enemy's troops. There was a large yard full of great cauldrons for making soup and boiling water, and a large supply of tinned rations of various kinds in some of the houses.

The Russians had, as usual, set fire to the houses which contained their stores before they left, but they had not had time to burn before we came in, and the Japanese soldiers were allowed to help themselves to the tins of provisions as they marched through.

These tinned rations looked exceedingly nice; some of the tins contained pea soup, some a sort of ragout of meat and vegetables, and some ordinary preserved meat; each tin was marked at one end with the date of tinning—an excellent plan to prevent old stores from being foisted on the supply department by dishonest contractors. 1897 was the oldest date I could find among them, and 1903 the most recent.

* This is a mistake.—A. H.

These tins were a little larger than the ordinary condensed milk tin, and weighed three-quarters of a Russian pound. I took one as a sample, as it seems to me a very convenient size and shape, and if possible I will forward it with my report.

We crossed the Hun Ho, as I have said, at about 4 p.m.; there was a high wind and the dust was blinding; the ice showed no signs of melting or even of getting cut up under the traffic of thousands of feet and the wheels of innumerable vehicles and guns.

The river here is almost exactly similar in appearance to the Jumna or Ganges in India, if one can imagine intense cold prevailing instead of intense heat. There are the same great weary stretches of sand, the same sort of banks, and the same sort of scrubby jungle, but here, instead of mimosa thorn, almost all the growth on the banks is willow. The river bed here is about eight hundred yards wide, of which more than two-thirds is sand. The banks of the Hun, like those of all the rivers of the plains of Manchuria, are either little cliffs, varying from ten to twenty feet high, or else gentle slopes of sand, gradually rising to the level of the surrounding country.

Soon after crossing the Hun we reached the village of Tu-tai-tzu (D 2), which had been taken from the Russians that morning by the 8th Division. This was a big village surrounded by a mud wall about five feet high, with a huge fosse all round it—a Chinese protection against the brigands.

The fosse was full of Russian *débris* and so was the space between the wall and the houses of the village; and a good number of dead Russians were lying about here and there, particularly in the fosse, where I saw at least twenty on the east side of the village. A few wounded men were lying where they had fallen on the outskirts of the village, and a few had crawled away out of sight into the osier beds which fringed the banks of the stream on the north side of the village, while a few bodies lay on the ice in the middle of the river bed. The Japanese infantry pushed on in open formation to the next village, Ta Yu-shu-pu, which had been passed through earlier in the day by some of the troops of the 8th Division.

Darkness was coming on, and it was very difficult to follow what happened: a very heavy artillery fire from the Russians was going on, the Russian guns appeared to be firing from every direction in an arc of a circle of about 100 degrees from north-east to south of south-west, shells were bursting on every side, and it seemed almost hopeless to tell where they came from: the 8th Division, too, on our left, appeared to be under a terrific shell fire.

Just as the daylight failed the 41st Regiment went forward from Ta Yu-shu-pu in a south-easterly direction towards the river bed, while the 11th Regiment took up a position a little east of Ta Yu-shu-pu and facing the railway embankment, and

our mountain guns took up a temporary position on the eastern edge of the village.

Meanwhile the battalion of the 21st Regiment which we had dropped on the south side of the river moved against Erh-tai-tzu (E 2 S.W.), but found it very strongly held by the enemy. So this attack was not pushed home and the battalion was ordered to remain before the village, as it was not considered necessary that this place should be taken at once.

On this day, in spite of the tremendous artillery fire, there were only 58 casualties in the 5th Division, and almost all of these were from rifle bullets and among the ranks of the 21st Regiment before Erh-tai-tzu.

At Ta Yu-shu-pu, looking towards the enemy, right across our front and about two miles off, ran a railway embankment varying from ten feet to twenty feet high; between the embankment and the village the ground was a bit broken, that is to say, lines of sand-hills a few feet higher than the surrounding plain, parallel to each other and to the embankment, crossed the front, and a winding stream with perpendicular banks perhaps twenty feet high. This stream, the water of which was, of course, frozen nearly solid, made a splendid sunken road which was very much used by the Japanese during the days that followed.

The embankment led down to the river, where the gaunt timbers of an unfinished bridge showed up very plainly against the dark background of trees surrounding the village of Mo-chia-pu (E 2 west), while on the north side of the unfinished bridge was another tree-surrounded village called Mi-chia-pu. Both these villages were in the hands of the enemy, and it looked as if he meant to hold them at all costs. Round to our right and close to the river bank was a sand-hill of larger dimensions than usual, useful as a good look-out place, but it was continually swept by shell fire.

5th Mar. On the morning of the 5th we received the following information concerning the other divisions of the Japanese armies:—

The Third Army had made good progress, and was now close to the railway north-east of Mukden; it was further stated that there were no defensive works on the north of that town.

Last night the 6th Division attacked and captured the Russian first line along the Sha Ho in the vicinity of La-mu-tun (E 3 S.E.) and Lin-sheng-pu (E 3 south centre), and amongst its trophies was one 10·5-cm. gun.

The 4th Division on our right is holding the enemy, who is strongly entrenched. The attack here is not being pushed home, the idea evidently being to contain the enemy on the south while the Third Army is working in behind him.

The First Army is fighting in the hills to the east and is doing well, though its progress is slow.

On the early morning of the 5th the Russians facing us on the north bank of the river held the line of the railway embankment, while on the south bank their left extended as far as Erh-tai-tzu (E 2 s.w.). Distributed between Mi-chia-pu, Mo-chia-pu, and along the embankment, the Russians had about four regiments or twelve battalions of infantry, while they had two batteries (16 guns) at Mo-chia-pu, two close to Nan-chang (E 2 centre), and more guns in the centre in the vicinity of Sha-to-tzu.

From this period until the end of the battle it was most difficult to follow the movements of the Russian artillery opposite us, or to keep knowledge of the number of guns the Russians had in action; five batteries we had against us very regularly, but very often a huge reinforcement came up, generally in the region of Sha-to-tzu; on one occasion, which I shall mention later, the Russians brought at least one hundred guns into action in this small area exclusive of those scattered along their front further to the south.

The intensity of fire was at times terrific, but it did very little damage, although the ranging was excellent. Sometimes the Russian gunners fired wildly, on one occasion they bombarded the sand-hill near Ta Yu-shu-pu for several hours in the morning, but as we had withdrawn our guns from there the previous evening every round was wasted; they sent up a balloon in the afternoon, and discovered their mistake and stopped firing at nothing.

On another occasion I saw two shells fired at a single mounted orderly; another time a Japanese official photographer and his assistant had three salvoes (twenty-four shells) fired at them; they stopped their photography very quickly, but were not hurt.

At 6 a.m. the Japanese guns (seventy-eight of them)* opened fire on the Russian position and under cover of their fire the infantry advanced to the attack. The 9th Brigade (Major-General Surizawa) attacked with the 41st Regiment on the right and the 11th Regiment on the left, while the 21st Brigade was held in reserve.

The Japanese infantry went right in against the embankment, but the Russians held on bravely, and it came to hand-to-hand fighting in which bayonets, hand-grenades, and bamboo guns were freely used.

The Russians were finally driven back and retired into Mi-chia-pu and Sha-to-tzu, but on the south-bank of the river at Mo-chia-pu the enemy resisted so strongly that the attack failed altogether. The Russian guns at Mo-chia-pu enfiladed the attack on the north of the river; fortunately the ground was broken up into sand dunes and gave good cover, or the

* Two batteries at Hsiao Yu-shu-pu, one at Ta Yu-shu-pu and two between Ta Yu-shu-pu and the Hun Ho.

Japanese would have lost very heavily. The infantry held on to the embankment, some of them had even got over it, in spite of the enfilade fire. About 2 p.m. the Russians made a counter-attack very fiercely; it was repulsed, however, with very heavy loss to the enemy. The Japanese guns, knowing the range to a yard, dropped shrapnel amongst the disordered ranks of the Russians as they retired, and killed and wounded great numbers of them.

This operation cost the Japanese 500 casualties, of which about 100 were killed outright; the Russians lost, I believe, considerably more, of which by far the greater proportion fell during the counter-attack.

The whole of this day, particularly in the forenoon, the air was full of the noise of battle; from north to south-east the roar of guns and the rattle of rifle fire was almost incessant. Far away to the north, east and south-east the deep booming of cannon told us that the Third and Fourth Armies were hotly engaged, and that perhaps the great battle we had been so long expecting was now at its height.

At 10.40 a.m. I was told that the 3rd Division had been sent up from the Second Army reserve to join the first line and that it was to come in between the left of the 8th Division and the right of the Third Army.

Now the Third Army was very much *en l'air*, and I think that General Nogi must have felt the enormous risk he ran should the Russians make a determined effort against his right; had such a counter-stroke been successfully carried out the Third Army would have been completely cut off and probably almost annihilated, while the pressure on the Russian line of retreat to the north would have been taken off. Whether General Nogi saw his danger and appealed to General Oku for help or whether the 3rd Division was ordered up by Marshal Oyama himself, I do not yet know. However that may be, the 3rd Division arrived just in time, for, as events proved, the Russians did make the attempt and in the bloody fight at Yu-hung-tun (E 1/2) the attempt was foiled by the sacrifice of the 33rd Regiment of the 3rd Japanese Division, which was practically annihilated.

In the desperate struggle at this village a fine regiment over three thousand strong was to all intents and purposes completely wiped out; in one battalion but two officers and thirteen men remain, but it died hard and demanded a terrible toll of its enemy, for no fewer than eight to ten thousand Russians fell in this ghastly encounter.

What the fighting was like may perhaps be guessed at by the following story:—Behind a gap in a broken-down mud wall a foot or two high lay the body of a Japanese soldier; his thigh was broken and had a bloody bandage tied round it; along the wall were the marks showing distinctly how he had dragged himself along to get to the gap; beside him lay a little pile of empty cartridge cases, and before the gap lay the bodies

of seven dead Russians, one of them almost on the top of him. The Japanese lay dead with a horrible bayonet wound in his neck, possibly inflicted by the Russian who lay beside him.

During the night of the 5th the battalion at Su-hu-pu made another attempt to get into Erh-tai-tzu, which again failed; this attack was more of the nature of a reconnaissance and was not much pushed. It found the Russians entrenched and showing no signs of any inclination to move.

During the afternoon of the 4th and nearly all the 5th Lieut.-General Kigoshi had his head-quarters on the roadside close to a single large elm tree, where he was connected up by telephone with Army Head-Quarters, with his brigadier engaged, and with his artillery commander. I do not know why he selected this place, for being close to a sandy road and on the down wind side of it, he was smothered with dust whenever anything passed along the road; there was no view, and he was far closer to the enemy's artillery than is usual for generals of division, and the tree was most conspicuous for miles around.

About 11 a.m. I happened to be at head-quarters and noticed that the engineers were busy rigging up a telephone on the general's tree. Whether the Russian gunners saw the sappers up in the tree or whether they suspected the presence of a general or not I do not know, but they suddenly turned their guns on this little group; fortunately there was a big hole in the river bank close by, into which everyone ran for shelter. The shells were perfectly aimed and the ranging was exact; for about twenty minutes everyone, including a stray Chinaman, huddled up together in the hole while the shells struck the ground or burst in the air all round and within a few feet; so close did they come that a pile of rifles standing on the brink of the hole was struck full pitch by a shell and knocked over and one of the rifles cut in two, while pieces of shell and not a few bullets fell into the hole itself on the exposed side. When we finally emerged from our cover we found the tree was scored all over with bullet marks and the ground ploughed up all round; one shell had struck the ground about six feet from the little charcoal fire over which the general had been sitting.

I mention this fact for two reasons, first to show the small effect of very accurate artillery fire, and secondly to show that when fighting in very flat country, such as this is, the generals find it necessary to be very far forward, even under decisive artillery ranges; it is contrary to what I had heard was the case, but in my own experience during the battle of Mukden, the divisional head-quarters have always been well within reach of the enemy's guns, and more often than not within easy ranges.

During the day of the 6th there was very little change in the situation, the troops hung on to the ground which they had gained and the enemy made no effort to dislodge them. **6th Mar.**

Lieut.-General Kigoshi, however, withdrew his battalion of field artillery from the east of Ta Yu-shu-pu and placed it on the outskirts of the village of Hsiao Yu-shu-pu so as to be better able to shell Sha-to-tzu. During the day the Russians, too, fortunately for the infantry, withdrew their two batteries from Mo-chia-pu; these two batteries fell back along the south bank of the river for about two thousand yards. During the day the Russian garrison at Erh-tai-tzu (E 2 S.W.) was reinforced, making its strength up to about a battalion, while the garrison of Pei-ta-tzu-ying (E 3 north) also received a small reinforcement and began to strengthen its earthworks. During the night the front line along the embankment was reinforced by two battalions of the 42nd Regiment, and another effort was made to dislodge the Russians from Mi-chia-pu and Sha-to-tzu; this proved in vain, for the Russians held on stubbornly, and reinforcements began to come to them.

The Japanese lost heavily in this effort, but although they could not get on, they still held on to what they had gained, viz., the region of the embankment and the ground beyond as far as the banks of the little stream beyond it. The withdrawal of the two Russian batteries from Mo-chia-pu was of enormous importance to the infantry, and I cannot understand why the Russians withdrew them, for they were exceedingly well placed, and greatly harassed not only the 5th Division, but frequently fired with very good effect over our heads into the flank of the 8th Division, by whom they were called the "Mad Batteries."

7th Mar. In the dark of the early morning the 12-cm. guns, twenty-four of them, changed position from the Japanese right flank near the sand-hill to the outskirts of the village of Hsiao Yu-shu-pu; the field artillery and the mountain guns remained in the same positions as yesterday. All through the day desultory firing, both gun and rifle, went on from both sides, but during the daytime no movements of troops took place on the Japanese side.

Russian reinforcements, however, both of infantry and artillery, were swarming into the villages east of the embankment, and in the evening it was calculated that the enemy had at least a division and a half in the region of Mi-chia-pu and Sha-to-tzu, and a great number of guns a little further north.

In addition to all these guns we located Russian artillery in the following places:—

(*a*) Two batteries, or sixteen guns, between Erh-tai-tzu and Mo-chia-pu.

(*b*) Two batteries (sixteen guns) a little beyond (*a*); probably the same two that had fallen back the day before.

(*c*) Two batteries (sixteen guns) at Mi-chia-pu.

(*d*) One battery a little north of (*c*).

This looked like preparations for a counter-attack on a large scale, and as the Japanese infantry, in its present positions, was

very badly placed to meet it, the first line fell back at midnight to the sand-hills about a mile west of the embankment, where it immediately entrenched itself.

From the time the Japanese infantry first advanced over the embankment up to midnight on the 7th it had thirteen hundred casualties.

During the night the heavy 12-cm. guns left Hsiao Yu-shu-pu and returned to their original position by the sand-hill.

In the afternoon we heard very heavy firing far away to the north, which must have been the engagement of the 3rd Division at Yu-hung-tun.

During several hours in the morning the Russian artillery pounded the sand-hills east of Ta Yu-shu-pu, but as at that time all the divisional artillery was on the left flank, there was nothing on the sand-hills, and every round was wasted.

In the evening a small reinforcement of 1,000 infantry fresh from the depôts in Japan was received; of these, 700 were for the 21st Regiment and 300 for the 11th. A further supply is expected to-morrow. I have heard that the Japanese War Office, anticipating this battle, and allowing for 10 per cent. casualties, have got ready in Japan the men to fill the gaps. This was the only occasion on which I personally saw fresh men join the ranks during the battle, but since we have been in Mukden very large numbers of fresh men have joined the army, evidently straight from Japan.

8th Mar. The following information reached us in the early morning:— The First and Fourth Armies, having captured the Russian line along the Sha Ho, are advancing,* but it was not known exactly how far they had got.

The Third Army is pressing in close to the railway, north-west of Mukden, but is in very much the same position as yesterday.

The situation in the vicinity of the 5th Division on the morning of the 8th was, briefly, as follows (*see* E 2):—

About a division and a half of the Russians were in and about Sha-to-tzu, while smaller detachments still occupied the villages of Mi-chia-pu, Mo-chia-pu, Erh-tai-tzu, and Pei-ta-tzu-ying (E 3 north). Several columns of Russian infantry had been seen moving about in the vicinity of Ta-pu (E 2 centre) but they had been lost sight of.

A vast number of guns, a hundred at the very least, were in position in the rectangle formed by the villages Kang-chia-tun, Sha-to-tzu, Kan-kuan-tun, and Niu-tai, but the guns we had located last evening further east were strangely silent, and, indeed, we found out later that they had been withdrawn during the night.

On the south side of the river, one battalion of the 21st still lay at Su-hu-pu (D 2 S.E.), and opposite to Erh-tai-tzu; entrenched

* For general position of the First and Fourth Armies, *see* Map 61.

along the sand-hills, and about a mile from the embankment, were the 41st and the 11th Regiments, while the 42nd and two battalions of the 21st were in reserve in Ta Yu-shu-pu. The divisional artillery was very much in its old positions, that is to say, the twenty-four heavy guns were back at the sand-hill, the eighteen field guns were on the outskirts of Hsiao Yu-shu-pu; but the mountain guns had moved forward a bit, and were in two lines, the first of which was about half a mile behind, and parallel to the infantry, while the second line was half a mile behind the first and hidden away in a nullah.

The whole of the morning of the 8th was unusually quiet; the Russian guns fired occasional salvoes at nothing in particular, and the Japanese gunners now and then dropped a few shells into Sha-to-tzu or Mi-chia-pu.

It was surprising to find that no artillery fire came from our right front from the south bank of the river, so shortly after noon the Su-hu-pu battalion was ordered to push forward; this it did unopposed, and by 1.30 p.m. had occupied Erh-tai-tzu and Pei-ta-tzu-ying without firing a shot, and Mo-chia-pu a few minutes later, only a few stray shots being fired by the very small rear guard which the Russians had left behind.

The enemy, apparently finding himself being squeezed uncomfortably tightly in the corner between the right of the 5th Division and the left of the 4th Division, had withdrawn from these villages in the small hours of the morning, leaving only a very small rear guard to cover his retreat.

At 4.30 p.m. the 42nd Regiment was ordered to occupy Mi-chia-pu, from which the enemy had retired, and into which a few men of the 21st Regiment had already penetrated from Mo-chia-pu, crossing the river on the ice.

At the same hour orders were sent to the battalion at Mo-chia-pu to leave two companies there, and send the other two to join the divisional reserve at Ta Yu-shu-pu.

At the same time the regiment of cavalry was sent to Mo-chia-pu to act as part of the garrison, and, if possible, to get into touch with the left of the 4th Division, and to watch the enemy's movements in the direction of Su-chia-tun (E 3 north) and San-chia-tzu (F 2 south). This was the first time the cavalry had had anything to do during the battle, and then it was sent to act as garrison of a village!

About 5 p.m. it was reported that the enemy was withdrawing his artillery from the region of Sha-to-tzu, it was also suspected that his infantry was falling back too. Accordingly Lieut.-General Kigoshi determined to make another attack on Sha-to-tzu: he ordered the heavy guns to move back to their former position near Hsiao Yu-shu-pu, and the 42nd and 11th Regiments were directed to make the attack, the former from Mi-chia-pu and the latter from the sand-hills.

The infantry advanced just as it was getting dark, over the open fields, and was received with a galling fire; the village was still strongly held.

All through the night the Japanese infantry strove in vain to get into Sha-to-tzu, the Russians had made up their minds to stay, and all the efforts of the Japanese failed to dislodge them; there was no hand-to-hand fighting, but the Japanese managed to get to within a hundred and fifty yards of the outlying works and could get no further. The losses were fairly heavy, but nothing like what they must have been had the attempt been made in broad daylight.

So passed the night of the 8th March, and the morning of the 9th dawned on the men lying in the open, or with what little cover they could scrape up from the frozen ground, within a hundred and fifty yards of the enemy's rifles.

Day broke on the 9th March, wild and stormy. A south- **9th Mar.** westerly gale was blowing, and the air felt quite warm; furthermore, a dust storm, such as India itself might have been proud to own, was raging. It was literally impossible to see a hundred yards. This dust storm, as will be seen, had a very great effect on the results of the battle generally; it continued incessantly all through the day.

In the morning the guns of both armies began firing wildly into the pall of dust, but very soon gave it up. Now and then a crackle of rifle fire came from the direction of Sha-to-tzu, but on the whole very little fighting was done.

All through that day the Japanese infantry lay in front of Sha-to-tzu, but I do not think any great effort was made to get in. The Russian rifle fire was at times heavy, but perhaps owing to the screen of dust, it was not very destructive, and the Japanese were able to hold on, even at such seemingly impossible close quarters.

It was the general opinion that the Russians were going to fall back, but shortly after noon a message came in to say that two more Russian battalions had arrived at Sha-to-tzu.

So firm was the belief that the Russians would soon retire, that the Japanese infantry clung on to the ground it had gained so close to the enemy's works, and the mountain guns, veiled in the dust, came right forward within easy rifle range, on to the embankment, and fired hundreds of shells into Sha-to-tzu. I will explain later how it was that all these shells, though apparently well directed, did little or no harm to the Russians.

On the left very little was doing, a great part of the 8th Division had been moved away to the north, and what little of it remained was in or about Yu-lin-pu (E 2 west), and, as far as I know, took no part in the final attack on the Mukden defences.

The gale lasted all day and far into the night. Some of the villages caught fire, and sparks and burning straw flew about in all directions; the few Chinamen left in the villages made frantic efforts to stop the spread of the flames, and to save what little property the ravages of war had left to them, the Japanese, however, did nothing to help or hinder them.

So ended the 9th March.

10th Mar. True to anticipation, the Russians did at last retire, drawing off their infantry quietly and skilfully during the night and in the small hours of the morning; so in the dark of the early morning the remains of the 11th and 42nd Regiments occupied Sha-to-tzu, and, as far as the 5th Division was concerned, the great battle of Mukden was over.

In this last attack, that is to say, from the evening of the 8th to the early morning of the 10th, 1,200 men fell, which figure, considering the abnormally close quarters at which they had been fighting, seems absurdly small. This fact, I think, may be considered as being almost entirely due to the screen afforded by the dust storm. The casualties among the men of the mountain batteries when they came under rifle fire on the embankment were trifling, probably from the same cause.

I went all over the battlefield on the morning of the 10th; it was exceedingly interesting. The Russian works were most cunningly placed, and so well constructed that they were quite invisible a few hundred yards away.

A work immediately south of Mi-chia-pu was made in sand, and was invisible even from a distance of thirty or forty yards. Near it was a long trench, rapidly made, with no head-cover, but concealed among a number of Chinese graves. Another work in front of Sha-to-tzu was the main redoubt. It had a very good command, but the engineer who designed it had, with great ingenuity, stuck the stalks of *kaoliang* straw into the superior slope, and bent them down into the ditch, so that from quite a short distance the redoubt looked exactly like the surrounding fields.

Furthermore, he had placed his redoubt from one hundred to two hundred yards in front of the village, so the Japanese gunners, not being able to see the redoubt, and knowing their ranges to a yard after nearly a week's practice at the same target, fired all their shells at the village; the consequence was that nearly all the shells passed over the Russian works and exploded either in the village or in the open space between the village and the redoubt. Hundreds and hundreds of shell cases were lying in this open space and in the village itself; some of them were sticking in the frozen mud walls.

Inside the redoubt I counted 47 dead Russians and one officer; as far as I was able to judge they had all been killed by rifle bullets. Another curious thing about the Japanese shells in this fight was that something apparently went wrong with the percussion fuzes, for in Sha-to-tzu and on the north-east side of it the whole country was strewn with unexploded percussion shells, both common and high-explosive. Standing in one place I counted no less than twenty-three which I could see without moving, but there was not a single shrapnel amongst them. I have never seen anything like so many blind shells before.

As I said just now, the Japanese did not lose as heavily in this last attack as might have been expected, nevertheless the

scene before the redoubt was a terrible one; the dead Japanese soldiers lay in rows, some of them in the open, some of them behind bags or haversacks full of earth, while the fields behind were dotted with dead bodies.

One company of the 11th Regiment was reduced to 17 men. A Japanese officer on the spot told me that the Russians had left about 400 dead behind them in and about Sha-to-tzu, but I do not think there were nearly so many.

About 1 p.m. Lieut.-General Kigoshi himself came into Sha-to-tzu, and the division was at once ordered to march on Mukden. This march was quite uneventful; we arrived at the railway station after dark. The Russian settlement at Mukden is quite a small one, and clusters round the railway station, which is about a mile and a half from the west gate of the city. On our arrival we found the station buildings and some of the houses in flames; they had been fired by the Russians before retiring. In the interval between the departure of the Russians and the arrival of the Japanese the Chinese from the city had been busy looting and burning; they had removed almost everything that it was possible to remove, and had even tried to break into and set fire to the hospitals, but the Russian doctors and nurses kept them off with a show of rifles, so that they did not succeed in doing more than setting fire to a wing of one of the hospitals.

All this anarchy very soon stopped when the Japanese marched in. The looters were quickly hunted back into the town, and the Japanese soldiers made those of them whom they could catch disgorge their ill-gotten gains.

The division remained in the precincts of the station that night; some of the men got shelter in the houses, and some bivouacked in the open. The men were very happy and full of spirits after their victory; enormous quantities of frozen Amur salmon had been left behind in the various villages by the Russians, and almost every soldier had possessed himself of one, a treat indeed for men of a fish-eating race, and as they sat round their fires they toasted the fish on their bayonets and were thoroughly happy; this night of peace was a great change for them after the horrors of the past ten days.

During the battle the Russian wounded had been sent off to Harbin by train as fast as it was possible to move them. For this purpose there were thirty-seven hospital trains kept running day and night. Of this number twenty were regular hospital trains, and seventeen improvised ones. In spite of this there were still 800 wounded Russians and 200 wounded Japanese remaining in the hospitals on our arrival, with a large staff of doctors and nurses to look after them. A Russian doctor who could talk German took Lieut.-Colonel Macpherson and myself into his hospital, and here we found the wounded of both nations lying side by side equally well tended, and

apparently on very good terms with each other, conversation being carried on by signs.

The Weather.—The daily temperatures during the battle may be of interest; they are as follows (in degrees Fahrenheit) :—

Date.	Minimum.	Maximum.
1st March	Zero	35°
2nd ,,	18°	45°
3rd ,,	10°	32°
4th ,,	8°	32°
5th ,,	8°	28°
6th ,,	7°	38°
7th ,,	11°	42°
8th ,,	13°	43°
9th ,,	14°	53°
10th ,,	20°	52°

The dust storm of the 9th came up on a south-west wind and was practically the break up of the winter, for the ice began to melt, and on the morning of the 10th the river was impassable, a narrow strip had thawed completely and one could see the water flowing.

The cold of the Manchurian winter, though intense, is not unpleasant, if plenty of warm clothes, furs and ear pads be worn, except when the wind blows from the north, and then it is indescribably cold with a coldness that penetrates all clothing; the climate, however, is very dry and apparently healthy, for the amount of sickness in this big army is wonderfully small.

Collection of Wounded.—The stretcher bearers worked with great bravery and devotion during this battle, but their numbers were far too few to deal properly with the vast numbers of wounded that had to be brought in. The Japanese medical officers recognized this early, and employed Chinese bearers to work between the dressing stations and the field hospitals, while the soldier bearers were used almost exclusively for picking up the wounded on the battlefield itself under fire, and carrying them to the dressing stations.

It was very noticeable that a large number of wounded men managed to get back by themselves without any help, only the very badly wounded were carried in; I think that with European soldiers very many more would have to be carried, for the Japanese soldier bears pain well, and it is considered a point of honour among them not to show pain even when it is very bad. I saw one man with a bad wound in his knee. The doctor began to cut the man's breeches with a pair of scissors, and in doing so must have given him very great pain, for he began to groan; the doctor at once rebuked him, as I thought, rather roughly, for his weakness in showing his pain. This

fine spirit is most noticeable. The Russian wounded were more sensitive; I have heard them scream even before they were touched.

The collection of such large numbers of wounded over a large area, even under such favourable conditions as obtained here—that is to say, flat and open country, with a hard surface, and with no obstacles of any kind—is a very difficult matter, and I am afraid a great many wounded men in this battle perished from loss of blood, cold and misery, through the utter impossibility of picking them up soon enough. Many lay out all night on the frozen ground, and in some cases (I only saw one myself) the clothes were taken off badly wounded men before they were dead by Chinese prowlers.

There can be no doubt that a vast deal of suffering, and possibly a number of lives might have been saved had it been possible to pick up the wounded a little faster.

Sanitation.—Sanitation in the Japanese field army is conspicuous by its absence. There is absolutely no attempt at it. The usual arrangements in armies for the safeguarding of the water supply, the construction of latrines, and so on, are totally neglected. In consequence, the water supply was almost invariably very bad, while the state of villages where the troops had stopped was always indescribably dirty. This may not matter in the winter, but in hot weather I should think it would be certain to lead to serious epidemics. From the filthy state of the villages recently inhabited by the Russians, I fancy their ideas on the subject of sanitation are as elementary as those of the Japanese. The national habit of drinking very hot water is a great safeguard to the Japanese soldier. His water bottle is made of aluminium, and he heats his water for himself, not as a precaution against disease, but simply because he likes it better hot than cold. There is no such thing as boiling water as a sanitary precaution, as I have seen stated in some newspapers. I do not believe there is a water cart in the whole army, at any rate I have never seen one; there are, however, the great soup cauldrons on wheels captured from the Russians.

Horsemastership.—I think it is very generally admitted by foreigners that a knowledge of horsemanship is not a strong point among the Japanese. To begin with, they appear to our eyes to ride very badly and look loose and uncomfortable on horseback. It is most unusual to move faster than a walk, and the invariable mode of progression is in a long string one behind the other. A general with his staff and escort take up about a hundred yards of road, all moving in single file, and always at a walk. The horses are so used to this processional formation that they strongly object to move in any other, and it is sometimes difficult to make them walk alongside each other.

There are a few—very few—imported animals, mostly Walers; most of the animals in the army are Japanese or Chinese ponies, varying from 13 hands to 14·1. They have been badly treated for generations, and are consequently vicious and quarrelsome. The Japanese ponies are wretched creatures to look at, but apparently very hardy, for in spite of the fact that they are only fed twice a day, on barley, get but little or no fodder, and are hardly ever properly watered, they seem to carry on wonderfully well. The harness of the pack ponies is very badly fitted, but I saw very few galls among them.

The Chinese pony is quite a different type; he is smaller, seldom indeed more than 13 hands; he is a fine sturdy little fellow, and I can best describe him as closely resembling the chariot horses as depicted in ancient Assyrian frescoes.

The Japanese one-horse transport cart has been universally condemned, even by the Japanese themselves; so it is not worth describing.

I think I am right in saying that experience has shown us, all over the world, that the local means of transport are invariably the best; Manchuria is no exception to this rule, and I think there can be no doubt that in this country the Chinese two-wheeled cart is better than anything that could be introduced. It is a very heavy wooden cart on two wheels, which are fixed rigidly on to the axle. The wheels and axle all revolve together. The wheels are very strong, and are able to stand the tremendous strain of the jolts as the cart pitches into the deep ruts on the unmetalled tracks which do duty for roads in China.

The teams of these carts are wonderfully trained, and every animal is always doing his full share of the work. The teams vary from two to six animals, and are harnessed in the following manner:—One animal alone is in the shafts; he is the one on which devolves most of the work, for not only does he support the shafts, but all the onus of turning corners comes on him, and moreover he acts as a brake, for these carts have neither brake nor skid; these little wheelers are beautifully trained and know exactly the right time to sit back on the breeching strap. I have watched them going down the steep bank of the river, and it is a sight worth seeing; directly the cart gets to the brink of the short steep slope the wheeler at once sits right down on his breeching, and putting all his feet together, is pushed down the bank by the weight of the cart; in this way he checks the pace of the cart, but very often the gathering momentum of the heavily laden cart is too much for him and does not give him time to get on his feet again at the bottom of the slope, in which case he shoots along on his haunches across the ice.

While the wheeler is thus turning himself into a brake the leaders manage in some way, best known to themselves, to keep their legs clear of the mass of loose rope traces.


The wheeler is almost always a pony; the rest of the team is a mixture of mules, ponies and donkeys, and sometimes oxen.

Every member of the team does his work with an honesty which is quite touching, but every member, too, has his own pair of traces, so that no shirking can possibly pass unnoticed. There is sometimes a pair of reins for the wheeler, but the driving is done almost exclusively with whip and voice, and excellent driving it is too. The Chinese drivers are very cruel with their whips, and there is hardly a team in which one or two eyes have not been flicked out. The Japanese soldier never interferes with the native driver, as our men are inclined to do, and in consequence there are very few mishaps.


Attack Formation.—After the Sha Ho battle the Japanese began to consider whether, after all, the close formations, as taught by the Germans, which they had been using, were the best for fighting in such flat and open country. They had our experiences in South Africa to help them, and they decided to try what more open formations would do. What these formations were I will endeavour to describe.

A Japanese regiment consists of three battalions, a battalion of four companies and a company of three *sho-tai*, which I will call sections, though as a *sho-tai* has about 70 men the word section is rather apt to be misleading.

A company has only two formations, line and column of sections, though this can, of course, be varied by moving to a flank.




Company in line.



Company in column of sections.

A battalion can therefore be formed up as follows:—




Now, from any one of these five formations the battalions can be extended, so we see—

From (a) it extends in one line.
„ (d) „ three lines.
„ (e) „ four „
„ (b) „ six „
„ (c) „ twelve „

From the above formations the one most suitable to the front to be occupied by the battalion can be chosen, whether in first or second line. In the firing line, however, I believe I am right in stating that the Japanese invariably extend one or two companies in line. Under these new circumstances the Japanese so arranged their formations as to have the men extended to about six paces, and with a distance of from one hundred to one hundred and fifty paces between lines. This interval was calculated on the basis that any one shrapnel shall not hit more than one line.

The following diagram will show the formation of the 42nd Regiment in its advance from Ta-tai during the battle of Hei-kou-tai; it was the first occasion on which it was used:—



Artillery Fire.—The massing of the guns and the concentration of fire was, in my experience, the system adopted by the Japanese; the Russian guns were a little more dispersed. The ranging and shooting on both sides were excellent, but the actual effects were exceedingly small. The moral effect of a storm of shells, particularly when they are high-explosive, is bound to be very great, and to try the nerves of fresh troops, but I think the men get used to it very quickly, and notice that although it makes a great deal of noise it really does very little harm to life or limb.

Infantry Fire.—It is, of course, very difficult to judge whether the shooting of the infantry is good or bad. The Russians were almost always behind earthworks or in villages, so I am unable to give an opinion on the powers of the Japanese infantryman as a marksman; the Japanese, however, were almost always in the open, and I think their casualties must have been infinitely greater had the Russian infantry been able to shoot even moderately well. The Russians often fired volleys, the Japanese never. However, the Japanese all agree that their enemy has improved vastly both in shooting and tactics since the early days of the war.

Cavalry.—The Japanese cavalry, so far, has played no important part in the war. To start with, it is too weak in numbers to have any chance of operating with any hope of success against the greatly superior numbers on the Russian side. It was very little used. It fought very bravely, as infantry, at Hei-kou-tai, but as a mounted arm I do not think the Japanese would have missed it had it not been present at all.

The Russian cavalry has been very disappointing, for, with the exception of Mishchenko's raid on Ying-kou, it has shown no enterprise or initiative.

Dead Soldiers.—In a great many places very little trouble has been taken over the burial or cremation of the soldiers killed in battle. The Japanese dead are generally collected in groups of about twenty and burnt, and the remains covered with earth, and, as a rule, some sort of monument of shells or wood is erected to mark the place. The Russian dead were almost always laid in one of the many trenches, and the trench filled in, or partially so.

The Spirit of the Japanese Army.—By far the most remarkable feature in the Japanese Army is the wonderful feeling of devotion to the Emperor and their country that pervades all ranks and arms. From this feeling springs the marvellous bravery of the incomparable infantry and all the many soldierly virtues that are so marked in this wonderful army.

From this feeling springs also the curious fact—a fact which I think must be unique among all the armies of the world—that

the personal element is quite unknown. Orders are issued and carried out as a matter of course, quite mechanically.

The names of units and of individuals are suppressed by the authorities; all are considered as part of the one great machine and all have but one aim and object in view, and that is that Japan may win.

Thus it will happen that many gallant deeds of corps and many heroic actions of individuals will never be known to the world, and of both there are not a few.

(8) The Battle of Mukden: Operations of the 8th Division, Second Japanese Army.

REPORT by Captain D. S. ROBERTSON, Royal Scots Fusiliers
Tokio, 19th June 1905.

Plates.

General Map - - - -	Map 55.
Operations of 8th Division 1st March - -	„ 58.
Attacks by 8th Division on Yang-shih-tun and Kan-kuan-tun 4th–8th March - -	„ 59.

The 8th Division, recruited in the extreme north of the main island of Japan, was one of the last divisions to embark, arriving in Manchuria only towards the end of October, too late for the Sha Ho battle. During the winter it was kept in reserve in rear of the left flank of the Second Army, in and around the village of Lan-chi, near the junction of the railway to the Yen-tai coal mine. From these winter quarters it was hurriedly sent, on the 25th January, to repel the attack of Grippenberg and Mishchenko upon the Japanese left, and, during the fighting which ensued, the division succeeded in driving the Russians out of Hei-kou-tai, where it took up its quarters until the 28th February. From the 1st March onwards the division advanced up the right bank of the River Hun, driving the Russians before it into their line of redoubts round Mukden. It formed the left of the Second Army, and was connected with the Third Army on the extreme left by the 1st Cavalry Brigade.

General Description of Country.—The country traversed by the division differs in some respects from the country in the region of the Sha Ho, occupied during the winter by the Second Army. In this latter part of the country scarcely a tree is left standing, but across the River Hun they are scattered everywhere over the country singly and in clumps. Though lying in the plain of the Liao Ho, and therefore as a whole very flat, there is a certain amount of cover almost everywhere in this region, in addition to the cover from view afforded by the trees. The country is intersected by roads which in many cases are worn down two or three feet below the surface by the traffic of the heavy Chinese carts. Small nullahs, branching out of the Hun River, are very common, and in every direction there are Chinese graves—small mounds of earth three or four feet high, or even more. Sandhills occur frequently near the river. The entire country is dotted with villages, most of which are within a mile of each other. Fighting therefore takes the form of attacks on

successive villages, the capture of one village enabling the troops to be formed up for the attack on the next one, generally at a distance of one thousand five hundred yards or less. The villages are as a rule surrounded by a mud bank with a ditch outside and are fairly compact, outlying houses being the exception. The houses belonging to the richer farmers in the villages, as well as the temples, are usually of burnt bricks with tiled roofs and are solidly built, but the smaller houses are made of unbaked mud bricks and are thatched. The villages afford cover against shrapnel and rifle fire, but are quickly reduced to ruins by high-explosive shells. With the exceptions above, the ground between villages consists of cultivated fields, chiefly of *kaoliang* or tall millet, with few boundaries between them, and is absolutely flat.

The bed of the River Hun varies in width from about two hundred to five hundred yards, though near Mukden it is one thousand yards broad, merging imperceptibly into the sandy plain. The stream is about one hundred and twenty yards broad on the average. The course of the river is winding, and the banks are as a rule perpendicular, and about fifteen feet high, though at re-entrant bends they are sometimes low. It was therefore difficult for carts to cross the river, and to get over this difficulty the Russians had constructed roads into the river bed at frequent intervals. During the first ten days of March the river was frozen hard. It had been much used for transport during the winter, judging by the numbers of small sledges at Hei-kou-tai. About a mile west of the River Hun and flowing in a parallel direction to it for over twenty miles was a small stream with steep banks, which also formed an obstacle to the passage of carts. This stream joined the Hun River below Hei-kou-tai.

The advance of the 8th Division was made between these two rivers, its right on the River Hun and its left on the small stream to the west.

Constitution of the 8th Division.—The combatant portion of the division was as follows:—

Divisional Commander	Lieut.-General Baron Tatsumi.
Infantry - - -	4th Brigade: — Major - General Yoda.
	5th Regiment (three battalions).
	31st Regiment (two battalions, 3rd battalion with Army reserve).
	16th Brigade:—Major - General Kamada.
	17th Regiment (three battalions).
	32nd Regiment (three battalions).

Artillery - - -	8th Regiment (six batteries) mountain artillery. Three batteries field artillery. Six field guns captured from the Russians.
Cavalry - - -	8th Cavalry Regiment.
Engineers - -	8th Engineer Battalion.

From time to time detachments of infantry composed of men of the 2nd Reserve, kept under the immediate command of General Oku, were sent to reinforce the 8th Division, but I was informed that this was merely a temporary arrangement, and that these troops still belonged to the Army reserve.

*Outline of Operations.**—The operations of the 8th Division from 1st to 10th March may be conveniently divided into four phases:—

The first phase lasted one day only, the 1st March. It consisted of an attack, lasting all day, on the outlying parts of the important village of Chang-tan (C 3 s.w.). The Russians were driven out of the hamlet of Yueh-pu-tzu, lying four hundred yards south of Chang-tan, but continued to resist doggedly in the southern outskirts of the latter village until night, when they retired. In this attack the 8th Division lost 1,500 men.

The second phase consisted of an energetic pursuit of the retreating Russians, and lasted during the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th of March. The Russian resistance was not stubborn, and the rear guards only remained in the villages long enough to delay the Japanese advance, always retiring without great loss. During these three days the division advanced from Chang-tan to within seven miles of Mukden, and the losses were under 150.

The third phase began on the evening of the 4th March, when the retreat of the Russians came to an end. They had reached their line of defence works outside Mukden, and here they held the 8th Division at bay during the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th. During this time repeated attacks were made by the Japanese upon these works, but all of them failed. The casualties were over 2,000.

The fourth phase consisted of the sudden transfer of the division to the north, to fill the gap between the Second and Third Armies, and prevent the Russians from penetrating at this point. As the Russians did not take the offensive here, the 8th Division, after its transfer on the 9th, again took up the *rôle* of pursuit, following up the Russians to about eight miles north of Mukden, till ordered on the 11th to cease pursuit.

---

* *See* Map 55.

*Dispositions during February.** — The outpost line taken up by the 8th Division up to 28th February extended from the River Hun, about one mile south of Yueh-pu-tzu, to Tung Chang-chia-wo-peng. The main force of the division was quartered in the villages of Tu-tai-tzu, Tung Yen-tai-tzu, Hei-kou-tai and Su-ma-pu,† with head-quarters in the latter village. On the right was the 5th Division, Second Army, with head-quarters in Ta-tai,‡ and a detachment in Fei-tsai-ho-tzu, and on the left was the 1st Cavalry Brigade. At the end of February the Third Army, under General Nogi, advanced northwards on the left of this cavalry brigade, and on the 1st March an attack was made by one of its divisions on Ssu-fang-tai,§ in co-operation with the attack of the 8th Division on Yueh-pu-tzu and Chien Nien-yu-pao.

Russian Dispositions.—The line taken up by the Russians extended through the fortified villages of Chien Nien-yu-pao and Yueh-pu-tzu to the east. The troops, as far as could be ascertained, consisted of the 1st and 5th Rifle Brigades at Chang-tan and Yueh-pu-tzu, and the 2nd Rifle Brigade at Chien Nien-yu-pao. Part of this latter brigade was believed to be moving round in rear of Chang-tan, to reinforce the 8th Army Corps facing the 5th Division, Second Japanese Army. There were emplacements for three batteries to the west of Chang-tan, with other emplacements in rear of these facing south-east, but I only counted twenty-one guns firing. To the east of Chien Nien-yu-pao there were three other batteries.

Defences at Yueh-pu-tzu.—I did not have an opportunity of seeing the defensive works at Chien Nien-yu-pao, but those at Yueh-pu-tzu were not strong. This latter village consisted of less than a dozen houses and compounds, and was really part of Chang-tan. About one hundred and fifty yards south of the village stood a detached house surrounded by a wall which had been strengthened by earth and loop-holed; abattis also had been laid down in front. In addition to this, a trench about one hundred and fifty yards long, with traverses, had been dug on the west side of the house to face south. The house was held by a strong Russian advanced post. The defences of the village of Yueh-pu-tzu itself consisted of a natural bank on the outskirts of the village, with very shallow and hastily-made trenches, about one hundred yards long on each side of it. The front, which faced the Japanese advance from the south, was not more than three hundred yards broad. There were no signs of trenches between Yueh-pu-tzu and Chien Nien-yu-pao. A field of millet, about five hundred yards south of the village, had been left uncut in the autumn, and the broken stalks still gave cover from view.

* *See* Map 58. † About a mile south of Hei-kou-tai.
‡ About 3 miles east of Hei-kou-tai. § Square B 3 west, of Map 55.

Operations of the 1st March—Artillery Preparation.—At 7.30 a.m. artillery fire was opened by the Japanese on the three Russian batteries east of Chien Nien-yu-pao, and on the guns west of Chang-tan, which at that time were sixteen in number. The Japanese artillery was distributed as follows :—* **1st Mar.**

18 field guns - On right bank, west of Fei-tsai-ho-tzu.
18 mountain guns - Further west, and on the same line.
6 captured guns - About 800 yards north-east of Tung Yen-tai-tzu.
18 mountain guns - South-east of Tung Chang-chia-wo-peng.

In addition to these guns, the heavy artillery of the 5th Division east of Fei-tsai-ho-tzu also assisted in the attack.

The Russian batteries replied to this fire about 8.30 a.m. by bombarding the spare gun emplacements near Tung Yen-tai-tzu, and the villages of Fei-tsai-ho-tzu and Tung Chang-chia-wo-peng. About 11.30 a.m., however, they succeeded in locating the Japanese guns, and began to concentrate fire on them, making very accurate practice. They did not keep up a continuous fire, but kept constantly changing the objective. The Japanese gunners took cover during the fire, but when the Russians changed the target they were quick to seize the first opportunity of again serving the guns.

Meanwhile the heavy artillery of the 5th Division east of Fei-tsai-ho-tzu bombarded Chang-tan and Yueh-pu-tzu. The Russian heavy artillery situated near Chou-kuan-pu† replied by a vigorous bombardment of Fei-tsai-ho-tzu, which was set on fire in many places.

Infantry Advance.—At 11.30 a.m. the infantry was given the order to advance. During the night the attacking troops had advanced to eight hundred yards of the village of Yueh-pu-tzu, and had laid down rows of sandbags to form a low breast-work about 2 feet high. Before dawn the firing line had taken up its position lying down behind these low parapets, and it remained there during the artillery preparation. The dispositions from right to left were as shown on the plate :—*

2nd Battalion 32nd Regiment - On left bank of the river.
1st „ 32nd „ - „ right „ „
3rd „ 32nd „ - „ „ „ „
2nd „ 17th „ - „ „ „ „
1st „ 17th „ - „ „ „ „
3rd „ 17th „ - In reserve east of Tu-tai-tzu.

The first troops I saw advancing were the 2nd Battalion 32nd Regiment on the left bank of the river. They were advancing in three or four lines at about five paces interval, and were being heavily fired on by the Russian shrapnel. The

* *See* Map 58. † About 2 miles east of the northern end of Chang-tan.

Russian artillery appeared to be now devoting its attention entirely to these troops, and only occasionally fired on the Japanese guns, who continued to pour a heavy fire on Yueh-pu-tzu. Shortly afterwards the troops on the right bank of the river also began to move forward. They were at about two to four paces interval, but as the advancing lines merged one into the other, and groups of wounded men were streaming back, it was quite impossible to distinguish how many lines there were or at what distance apart. From front to rear their depth was about six hundred yards. The advance at first was very slow, but afterwards section or half section rushes, which seemed to be about thirty to forty paces, were made with great rapidity. About 12.30 p.m. the 3rd Battalion 17th Regiment also deployed, advancing on the left of the 1st Battalion 17th Regiment so as to take Yueh-pu-tzu in flank. The attacking troops were subjected to a very heavy shrapnel and musketry fire, in the smoke and dust of which they were hidden from our view except at occasional intervals. The musketry was at its loudest at 1.25 p.m., a continuous roar in which the Russian volleys could only be faintly heard. The attacking lines had then advanced to 300 yards from the detached house south of Yueh-pu-tzu, and the 3rd Battalion 17th Regiment had taken up a position on the left of the 1st Battalion 17th Regiment, and threatened the retreat of the Russians from the detached house. The Russians now began to leave this house under cover of the fire from Yueh-pu-tzu. Taken in flank, however, by the 3rd Battalion 17th Regiment their reteat to Yueh-pu-tzu was cut off, and in their attempts to escape to the river bed, they had to cross the line of fire of the 32nd Regiment, and over 30 were killed.

Yueh-pu-tzu was now almost indistinguishable amidst the smoke of the Japanese high-explosive shells and the burning houses. The Japanese infantry had reached a line three hundred yards from the detached house when the Russians retired. Here they had laid down sandbags and made rough attempts to dig trenches. The sandbags were brought up under fire, and it was at this place that most of the casualties occurred. Owing to the smoke it was almost impossible to distinguish what was going on beyond this, but the next advance appears to have been made to Yueh-pu-tzu village itself, when it was evacuated by the Russians at 2 o'clock.

Attack on Chien Nien-yu-pao.—Shortly after the occupation of Yueh-pu-tzu at 2 o'clock preparations were made for an attack on Chien Nien-yu-pao. The three mountain batteries and two of the field batteries west of Fei-tsai-ho-tzu took up a more advanced position shown on the plate,* where they were hidden by some withered millet crops, and commenced to bombard Chien Nien-yu-pao. They were shrapnelled fairly heavily while changing position, but I saw no casualties. The Russians then continued to fire on the old positions, evidently

* *See* Map 58.

not realizing that the batteries had moved off. The latter recommenced firing at 2.45 p.m., and during the next hour the artillery duel was kept up pretty steadily on both sides.

The infantry advance began at 3.30 p.m. The 2nd Battalion* 5th Regiment, which had been in Tung Yen-tai-tzu during the morning, had left that village at 1.30 p.m., and marched up the hollow road towards the north, where it remained under cover. This battalion must have been discovered by the Russian balloon, which ascended from near Chang-tan about 3.30 p.m., as at 4 o'clock the Russian batteries commenced to shell the spot where it was lying concealed. It began to deploy about 4.15 p.m, and advanced in three lines at about two hundred yards distance due north on Chien Nien-yu-pao. The interval between men was about two paces. There were at least two of the companies of the battalion deployed, and the companies or company kept in reserve were not visible. At 5 p.m. they were severely shrapnelled, but still advanced steadily without halting. At 5.15 p.m. the advance by rushes began. These rushes appeared to be by sections or half sections, not less, but, as at Yueh-pu-tzu, it was difficult to see owing to the smoke and dust caused by the Russian shrapnel. The Japanese succeeded in advancing to about one thousand yards from the position, but were not able to make further progress. I could not see the attack of the two battalions 5th Regiment from Tung Chang-chia-wo-peng, but their advance was also checked at about the same distance, and the musketry fire coming from their direction, which had been continuous for over an hour, ceased at 5.30 p.m.

Lieut.-General Tatsumi had still two battalions of reserve infantry at Tung Yen-tai-tzu, which had been sent him by General Oku, but he did not press the attack, and the operations of the day came to an end. From 5.30 p.m. until dark there was no movement of troops, only strings of ammunition and baggage carts going up the river bed to Yueh-pu-tzu, and stretcher bearers carrying the wounded back to the field hospitals. The Russians occasionally dropped shells into Yueh-pu-tzu, but by 6 o'clock this had also ceased. The troops remained during the night in the positions occupied, and Lieut.-General Tatsumi and the head-quarter staff took up their quarters in "dug-outs" at a sandhill on the opposite bank of the river from Hei-kou-tai. Here the divisional telephone office was situated connecting with each unit of the command, and the general and staff had remained at this spot during all the fighting.

The failure of this attack on Chien Nien-yu-pao was probably due to insufficient numbers, as with only three battalions Major-General Yoda, who commanded the attacking troops, was unable to employ the usual outflanking tactics which had succeeded in the case of the 3rd Battalion 17th Regiment at Yueh-pu-tzu. It made the carrying out of

* 600 strong.—D. S. R.

Lieut.-General Tatsumi's original plan impossible. This, I was informed at the time, had been to reinforce the 16th Brigade at Yueh-pu-tzu under Major-General Kamada with two battalions of the 31st Regiment, which were to be sent back from the Army reserve, where they had been up till now. After the capture of Chien Nien-yu-pao, the 16th Brigade and the two battalions 31st Regiment were to move forward on Chang-tan. These two battalions arrived from Kou-tzu-yen* about 4.30 p.m., and advanced up the river bed, halting south of Yueh-pu-tzu. During the night they remained in the river bed, and they formed part of the divisional reserve under Lieut.-General Tatsumi during the subsequent marches. Both battalions were weak, one about 520 and the other 600. In fact all the battalions whose strength I had an opportunity of estimating were under 700 strong, the average strength of companies being about 160 rifles.

The result of the operations† was therefore the capture of Yueh-pu-tzu (B 3 S.E.) and the approach to a position close to Chien Nien-yu-pao (B 3 S.E.) The Russians still held on to this latter village and to Chang-tan (C 3 S.W.) itself, but by the evening the 9th Division, Third Army, had occupied Ssu-fang-tai (B 3 west), and the 5th Division, Second Army, Wang-chia-wo-peng (C 3 S.W.), and the Russians, feeling their position in Nien-yu-pao and Chang-tan precarious, retired from these villages during the night. There was no attempt at a night attack on the part of the Japanese, and the Russians got away with practically no loss. The number of Russian prisoners taken in Chang-tan was seven.

Judging from the hasty entrenchments at Yueh-pu-tzu the attack of the 8th Division came as a surprise to the Russians, and I do not think they expected the Japanese to attack from that quarter at all, as all the defences of Chang-tan were arranged to meet an attack from the east and south-east. Though the southern side of the village was defended, it was very narrow, and had an attack been expected from Hei-kou-tai one would have thought the Russians would have prepared a trench in extension of the southern face. There was no sign of one. Like most of the larger Chinese villages, Chang-tan was surrounded by a mud wall, with a ditch outside. This wall and ditch had been slightly improved by the Russians, but no head-cover, obstacles, or communication trenches appear to have been provided. This was in marked contrast to Hei-kou-tai, where the Japanese had managed to entrench themselves in spite of the frozen soil, which was like a rock down to four or five feet below the surface. The difficulty of digging had been got over by burning heaps of manure on the ground, and leaving it to smoulder for several days. A large number of spare emplacements for guns had been made also in this manner.

* Six miles south-east of Chang-tan. † *See* Map 55.

Operations of 2nd March.—The operations of the three next days were of the same general character, consisting of attacks on the villages held by the Russian rear guards.* The Japanese attacks were almost invariably made both in front and flank, and by the time the detachments sent to outflank the enemy's position had succeeded in working round, and the frontal attacks had been fully developed, the Russian rear guards had generally retreated to the next village. They held the villages long enough to cause the Japanese to deploy for attack, and although they never retired until this attack had got well under weigh, the only case of a rear guard holding on too long was on the evening of the 2nd March when the troops in Piao-to-tzu were surprised by the Third Army. These rear guards were always very strong in artillery, which remained in action until the last moment, covering the retreat of the infantry, who generally got away with little loss. **2nd Mar.**

Order of March.—The advance on the 2nd March was continued at daybreak in two columns.

Left Column—Major General Yoda—from Chien Nien-yu-pao. 5th Regiment (three battalions). Three batteries mountain artillery

Right Column—Major-General Kamada—from Yueh-pu-tzu. 16th Infantry Brigade (17th and 32nd Regiments). Three batteries field artillery.

The Reserve, consisting of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 31st Regiment, three batteries of mountain artillery, one battery of six captured Russian guns, and two battalions reserve infantry, left the neighbourhood of Hei-kou-tai at 10 a.m., with Lieut.-General Tatsumi and the head-quarter staff.

Right Column.—This column received orders to cross the River Hun, and, driving the Russians northward, to advance up the left bank as far as the village of Ma-tou-lan (C 3 east), in co-operation with the 5th Division on its right. But the 5th Division had not been able to get as far as had been expected, and the right column, on reaching Wang-hsi-tai (C 3 centre), was fired on from the opposite bank, where the Russians were still holding out in force in the village of Chou-kuan-pu (C 3 south) against the attack of the 5th Division. All three battalions of the 32nd Regiment were therefore deployed to co-operate in this attack. The three field batteries of the column also came into action. As this attack took the Russians in Chou-kuan-pu in flank, it materially aided the 5th Division in the capture of the village. From 3 p.m. until 5 p.m. I was able to see part of the attack of the 5th Division, as some of the infantry crossed over to the right bank above Chang-tan. They advanced in six lines, following each other at over three hundred yards distance, and the men were extended to twenty paces. A

* *See* Map 55.

few scouts preceded the advance, following one another at a distance of one hundred yards. When they reached the river bank they formed up in a thick line, almost shoulder to shoulder

About 4 p.m. the three mountain batteries and the battery of captured guns, all of which belonged to the reserve of the 8th Division, came into action against Chou-kuan-pu from behind a low sand-hill one mile north-east of Chang-tan. Their fire was returned by a Russian battery which left Chou-kuan-pu about 4.15 p.m., and, taking up a position on the river bank north of the village, fired a few salvoes at the Japanese guns. It never succeeded in getting the range, however, all the shots falling short, and after a quarter of an hour's firing it limbered up and went north. Shortly after 5 p.m. the four batteries of the reserve suddenly ceased firing, and at the same moment I saw some of the 5th Division enter Chou-kuan-pu from the river, carrying a large Japanese flag. The Russians were now in full retreat from Chou-kuan-pu, and at 5.30 p.m. the 8th Division artillery again commenced firing, this time on the road near the left river bank along which the Russians were retreating. This fire was kept up until dark, and probably caused the Russians great loss, as it took them in flank.

Left Column.—While this was going on, the left column continued its advance from Chien Nien-yu-pao (B 3 S.E.). But owing to the resistance of the Russians in Tung Nien-yu-pao, Ying-chia-tzu (B/C 3) and Ho-chia-chuang (C 3 west), it was late in the afternoon before it reached Hsiao Pa-li-pu-tzu (C 3 west), and here it remained during the night, sending out outposts to Nan San-tai-tzu (C 3 west). The Russian rear guard was in Piao-to-tzu (C 3 centre), while a large force took up its quarters in Shuang-shu-tun (C 3 north). Meanwhile the Third Army on the left had been pushing on, and a detachment from the 9th Division, which had occupied Pei San-tai-tzu (C 3 west), attacked the Russian rear guard in Piao-to-tzu in flank just before dark. This came as a complete surprise to the Russians, who were driven out of the village to Shuang-shu-tun with considerable loss. A stand had been made at some Chinese graves about half-way between the two villages, while the Russians in Shuang-shu-tun, who had settled down for the night, hastily roused themselves and fled in disorder to Li-ta-pu (C 3 N.E.), where only a short rest could have been obtained before they had again to move on at dawn under the unceasing pressure of the Japanese. When I arrived at Shuang-shu-tun the next morning there were signs that a considerable number of Russians had left in what appeared to have been a panic. Everything they could not easily carry away had been left behind, and the ground was strewn with almost every imaginable article of the Russian soldier's kit. The commonest thing of all was the wadded quilt, which

appears to be issued to the men either in lieu of, or in addition to, blankets. The thick felt boots worn by the soldiers had been also left in large numbers.

With the exception of the artillery the reserve of the 8th Division was not engaged, and accordingly it remained in the village of Ho-chia-chuang (C 3 west) for the night. The head-quarters of the division also remained in this village, while the right and left columns took up their quarters in Wang-hsi-tai (C 3 centre) and Hsiao Pa-li-pu-tzu (C 3 west) respectively.

Though the 8th Division was not heavily engaged during the 2nd March, it was a trying day for the troops, owing to a fall of snow which a cold piercing wind blew in the faces of the men.

The casualties were under 50.

The Russian forces opposed to the division consisted of the 1st and 5th Rifle Brigades, though shoulder straps of the 2nd and 3rd Rifle Brigades and of the 42nd Division were also found, as well as caps of the 43rd, 137th and 143rd Regiments.

Operations of 3rd March.—In the early morning of the 3rd **3rd Mar.** the Russian rear guards were in the villages of Hsin-ma-tien* (C 3 north), Shuang-shu-tun (C 3 north), and Ma-tou-lan (C 3 east). The dispositions of the division were similar to those of the previous day. The left column was ordered to continue the pursuit, and the right column was ordered to cross the river and advance up the left bank.

Left Column.—This column left Hsiao Pa-li-pu-tzu (C 3 west) at 5.30 a.m., and passing through Piao-to-tzu, captured by the 9th Division, Third Army, the previous evening, occupied Shuang-shu-tun about 8.30 a.m. After leaving this village the left column was considerably delayed by fire from the left bank of the river, as the Russians were still in occupation of the villages on that bank, and it was not until 11 a.m. that Li-ta-pu (C 3 N.E.) was occupied. The left column was now well in advance of the right column, and as the Russians were in considerable strength on the opposite bank, and threatening to cut off the column, it was unable to get any further until 2 o'clock in the afternoon. The column then continued its advance towards Hou-chia-pu (D 3 N.W.), which it reached about 3.30 p.m.

About 4 o'clock a further advance was made in the direction of Ku-cheng tzu (D 3 N.W.), but the precaution of sending a flank guard to Ta-tzu-shan-pu (D 2/3) seems to have been omitted. As a result of this there were no troops in front of the reserve of the division, which advanced in column of route through Li-ta-pu against Ta-tzu-shan-pu. While in this formation they were fired on by the artillery of the Russian rear guard in Ta-tzu-shan-pu. The column accordingly at once deployed to attack this village. To assist in this attack the

* *See* Map 55.

left column deployed one battalion of the 5th Regiment, whilst another battalion of the same regiment occupied Ku-cheng-tzu. The Russian infantry in Ta-tzu-shan-pu offered only a very slight resistance, but their artillery continued in action, retiring gradually to Wai-chia-pu (D 2/3).

The latter village was defended by the 21st Regiment of the 61st Division of reserves. Major-General Yoda deployed two battalions of the 5th Regiment to attack it about 6.30 p.m. The guns of the left column and those of the reserve came into action behind Ta-tzu-shan-pu and subjected Wai-chia-pu to a severe bombardment. The Russians, however, evidently had no intention of holding it, as before the Japanese attack had developed they set fire to the village, and retired to Tu-tai-tzu (D 2 S.E.). By 8 o'clock Wai-chia-pu was occupied by these two battalions of the 5th Regiment, but most of the houses were in flames, and the troops found considerable difficulty in getting quarters for the night.

Right Column.—This column crossed the Hun River, and I lost sight of it for the rest of the day. The following information was given me by the divisional staff as to the movements of the column :—Crossing the river near Tou-tai-tzu (C 3 centre), it occupied this village without much resistance being offered, though it was strongly defended by earthworks. The column then reached Ma-tou-lan (C 3 east) at 10.30 a.m., Hsin-kai-ho (D 3 west) at 2 p.m., and La-ta-pu at 2.30 p.m., driving out the Russian rear guards in these villages. Chang-tang-pu (D 3 north), however, was found by the advanced guard to be held by one regiment of Russian infantry and two batteries of artillery. The column did not attempt to attack this village, but re-crossed the river at La-ta-pu. Owing to the steepness of the banks, the guns and wagons of the column retraced their steps to the bridge near Ma-tou-lan, where they re-crossed. The column remained during the night in Hou-chia-pu (D 3 N.W.). Without the divisional orders and reports it is impossible to say in what way this column co-operated with the 5th Division, which was also moving up the left bank.*


Divisional Reserve.—The head-quarters of the division, with the reserve, left Ho-chia-chuang (C 3 west) at 6 a.m., reaching Shuang-shu-tun at 9.30. The left column of the division at this hour was attacking Li-ta-pu (C 3 N.E.), but on the left bank of the river the Russians were still as far south as Ma-tou-lan, and the right column, which had crossed to the left bank near Tou-tai-tzu (C 3 centre), had not made much progress. Consequently when the divisional reserve reached Shuang-shu-tun they found the Russians still in possession of the villages across the river. In Yang-fang-shen, a village situated just opposite Shuang-shu-tun, a detachment of Russian infantry was posted, and their fire considerably interfered with the progress of the division. Lieut.-General Tatsumi accordingly, finding that the right

* *See* Report No. (7), page 160.

column was still south of Ma-tou-lan, ordered an attack on Yang-fang-shen with the divisional reserve. Two companies of the 31st Regiment were sent across the river at 9.45 a.m. to attack from the south, while two other companies occupied a small mound on the right bank from which to bring flank fire to bear on the village. But the Russians at 10 a.m. began to retire, and by 10.30 a.m. their artillery was shelling the village they had just vacated, as well as the two companies lining the small hill. The latter, being behind cover, suffered no casualties. At 10.40 a.m. the two companies of the 31st Regiment which had crossed the river entered the village. The Russian artillery fire only lasted for about fifteen minutes. When it had ceased the troops lining the small hill formed up in the bed of the river, and, joining the rest of the divisional reserve, left Shuang-shu-tun at 11 a.m. and followed the left bank of the river to near Li-ta-pu (C 3 N.E.).

After this small action the divisional reserve proceeded to Li-ta-pu along the river bank. The right bank here was about thirty feet high, and very steep. About half way to Li-ta-pu a road had been cut in this steep bank down to the river, and there were signs that troops had crossed recently from the left bank. The road to Li-ta-pu then crossed a small stream by a badly-constructed pile bridge, and from now onwards there were many marks of a hasty retreat. Li-ta-pu was reached at 12.15 p.m., where about 20 wounded Russians, chiefly belonging to the 8th Army Corps, were found. It looked as if the Russians opposite the 5th and 4th Divisions, Second Japanese Army, were retiring to the right bank to confront the 8th Division, while the Rifle Brigades which opposed the 8th Division at Yueh-pu-tzu on the 1st March went north to oppose the Third Army. I saw no more signs of these Rifle Brigades.

At 4 p.m. the divisional reserve left Li-ta-pu. At this hour the left column was in Hou-chia-pu (D 3 N.W.), so that, as noted above, there were no troops in front of the divisional reserve advancing in column of route to Ta-tzu-shan-pu (D 2 3). No firing had been heard from this direction for over an hour, but the Russians were still in the village, and four horse artillery guns were posted on its northern side. The column advanced for about three-quarters of a mile from Li-ta-pu, when suddenly Russian volleys were heard from the direction of Ku-cheng-tzu, and a Russian patrol was seen disappearing among the trees on the river bank. The column at once stopped, and a staff officer and two patrols were sent out to reconnoitre. Before they had gone far, the Russian guns opened fire, and their shrapnel began to burst in close proximity to the column. But before any casualties occurred, a rapid deployment was made by the infantry, while the divisional



staff and cavalry escort scattered in a very short time, and took cover behind a small clump of trees on the left of the road. The artillery turned back to Li-ta-pu. Two companies 1st Battalion 31st Regiment were at the head of the column as escort to the general, and these deployed to the right of the road to about three paces interval. The 2nd Battalion 31st Regiment had not yet left Li-ta-pu, so three companies at once came out and deployed to the left of the Li-ta-pu–Ta-tzu-shan-pu road. Each of these three companies deployed two of its three sections to ten paces interval, the third section of each following in rear of the other two sections at one hundred yards distance, but not extended. The fourth company followed at six hundred yards distance, moving at first to the flank in column of sections. As soon as the three leading companies had deployed two sections each, and had taken up the proper alignment and direction, the third section of each company extended also, and reinforced the other two, filling up the intervals between men. This must have mixed up the sections considerably, and is not what Japanese officers tell me is the usual mode of reinforcing. However, in this case it was done. The line must have been about three thousand yards long, but I could not see how far it stretched. While this deployment was going on, two battalions of reserve infantry came up from in rear, and moved off along the road to Hsiao-tzu-shan-pu,* which was reached shortly after 5 o'clock.

After the first few salvoes the Russian guns north of Ta-tzu-shan-pu limbered up and retired to Wai-chia-pu, where they took up a new position, and fired on the Japanese in Ta-tzu-shan-pu. The divisional commander and the artillery of the divisional reserve left Li-ta-pu for the second time at 5.30 p.m., reaching Ta-tzu-shan-pu shortly after 6 o'clock. It seems probable that if the Russians had allowed the column to advance from Li-ta-pu for another one thousand yards before opening fire, or if they had made use of rapid fire, Lieut.-General Tatsumi's column would have suffered very considerably. As a matter of fact there were no casualties. Wai-chia-pu was attacked by the left column as already described. The head-quarters of the division remained during the night in Ta-tzu-shan-pu.

4th Mar. *Operations of 4th March.*—This day was the last day of pursuit until the main Russian army retired on the 9th. The advance was much slower than on the two previous days, and the distance covered was only about six or seven miles. As the right column, under Major-General Kamada, had re-crossed from the left to the right bank of the Hun River on the previous day, and formed up in Hou-chia-pu (D 3 N.W.)† behind the divisional reserve, the 8th Division was now in one column, with the 4th

* One mile north-west of Ta-tzu-shan-pu. † *See* Map 55.

Brigade, under Major-General Yoda, leading. The distribution of the division was as follows:—

Advanced guard:—

Vanguard—
Half a section of the 8th Cavalry Regiment.
1st Battalion 31st Infantry Regiment.
1 company 8th Engineer Battalion.
1 battery mountain artillery.

Mainguard—
2nd Battalion 5th Infantry Regiment.
3 batteries mountain artillery.
3 batteries field artillery.

Right flank guard—
1 section 8th Cavalry Regiment.
2nd Battalion 31st Infantry Regiment.
1 battery mountain artillery.

Left flank guard—
1 section 8th Cavalry Regiment.
1st Battalion 5th Infantry Regiment.
3rd Battalion 5th Infantry Regiment.
1 battery mountain artillery.

Main body of division—
16th Infantry Brigade.

Occupation of Tu-tai-tzu.—The advanced troops left Wai-chia-pu (D 2 south) at 6 a.m., and came suddenly upon the Russians in the morning fog, strongly entrenched in the village of Tu-tai-tzu (D 2 east). This village was a much stronger village for defence than any I have yet seen on the right bank of the Hun, and the Russians offered a more stubborn resistance than any they had made since the 1st March. The bank which generally encircles Chinese villages had been thickened, and a trench about seven to eight feet deep, with almost perpendicular sides, had been dug outside, evidently before the winter set in. Though the ditch was only about ten feet wide, it was impossible to leap it, as the bank sloped very steeply from the crest to the bottom of the ditch, the frozen earth standing at the steepest possible slope and giving no foothold. The banks were four to five feet high and not loopholed.

By 8.30 a.m. the attack had developed. The mountain artillery of the vanguard and right flank guard came into action south-east of Wai-chia-pu, and the attack was made by the 1st Battalion 31st Regiment directly against the village of Tu-tai-tzu, while the 1st Battalion 5th Regiment, concealed to a certain extent by some clumps of trees, advanced against the Russian right. The Russians were greatly assisted by fire from the opposite bank of the River Hun, which delayed the Japanese advance considerably. The Russian rear guard did not make such a successful retreat as usual, probably owing to the fact

that it was surprised in the morning mist, which was always very thick just as it was getting light. The Japanese were within six hundred yards of the village when they were discovered, but they were almost as much surprised as the Russians. The latter left from 40 to 50 killed and wounded in the village, besides an officer and over 30 men who were taken prisoners. A number of casualties were caused during the Russian retreat to the next village. The retreating troops followed the line of the small stream, which was very well marked out by the trees and bushes on its banks, and made a good mark for the Japanese gunners to range on. Their practice was very good, judging by the number of shells which lay about on the ice, and by the number of Russians lying dead in and near the bed of the stream. From 15 to 20 Japanese were killed in the attack, chiefly at a range of about five hundred yards from the village.

*Occupation of Ning-kuan-tun and Yu-lin-pu.**—The opposition encountered in the next two villages, Ta Yu-shu-pu and Hsiao Yu-shu-pu, was not great, but delay was caused by two batteries of Russian artillery near the village of Mo-chia-pu, which took the advance in flank at a range of 3,000 yards. However, the Japanese pushed on, and by 11 a.m. both villages were occupied by the advanced troops. At 12 noon an order was received by Major-General Yoda to advance through Yu-lin-pu (D/E 2) to Kan-kuan-tun (E 2 west centre) with the vanguard of his force, and with the left flank guard to advance through Ning-kuan-tun (D 2 east) and Yang-shih-tun (D 2 east) to Liu-kuan-tun. To the north-east of the two villages (D 2 east) of Ta Yu-shu-pu and Hsiao Yu-shu-pu lies a railway embankment, constructed by the Chinese Eastern Railway Company before it was decided to run the railway close to Mukden. It runs generally in a south-east direction from near the village of Ta-tzu-pu (D 2 N.W.), but east of Hsiao Yu-shu-pu it bends towards the south to the bridge across the Hun River near Mo-chia-pu. From this bend to the river the embankment was defended by the Russians, and the right flank guard was unable to advance, being heavily fired on by about three companies of infantry on the embankment, as well as by the two batteries at Mo-chia-pu. Accordingly it halted till 9.30 p.m., when it joined the main force of Major-General Yoda's column behind the embankment on the road from Hsiao Yu-shu-pu to Yu-lin-pu. Meanwhile the left flank guard pushed on, and meeting with very little resistance, crossed the railway embankment near Ssu-chia-tun and occupied Ning-kuan-tun about 4 p.m., in co-operation with a detachment of the 9th Division, Third Army. The vanguard of Major-General Yoda's force (1st Battalion 31st Regiment) reached Yu-lin-pu about the same time.

It had been learned from Chinese spies that the Russian line of defensive works was near the railway line close to Mukden,

* For these operations, *see also* Map 59.

so the 8th Division continued to push on to Kan-kuan-tun and Yang-shih-tun. The dispositions taken up by 5 p.m. were as follows:—

Artillery—
- 4 batteries mountain artillery on sand-hills east of Hsiao Yu-shu-pu.
- 2 batteries mountain artillery in Yu-lin-pu.
- 2 batteries field artillery in front of embankment.
- 1 battery (6 guns) captured guns in front of embankment.
- 1 battery field artillery in Ning-kuan-tun.

Infantry—
- 1st and 3rd Battalions 5th Regiment in Ning-kuan-tun.
- 1st Battalion 31st Regiment in Yu-lin-pu.
- 2nd Battalion 31st Regiment and 2nd Battalion 5th Regiment behind embankment.

The rest of the 8th Division was in Ssu-chia-tun and Hsiao Yu-shu-pu.

First Attack on Yang-shih-tun and Kan-kuan-tun.

The attack began with an artillery bombardment of the three villages (E 2 west), Kan-kuan-tun, Sha-to-tzu, and Mo-chia-pu, which was replied to by two batteries at Mo-chia-pu, one battery north of Sha-to-tzu, and one battery south of Sha-to-tzu, but the Russian artillery was steadily reinforced from now onwards. The batteries near Mo-chia-pu gave particular trouble owing to their flanking fire. The 5th Division had been expected by the late afternoon, but they were still far behind in Tu-tai-tzu (D 2 S.E.), and so these batteries at Mo-chia-pu continued to obstruct the progress of the 8th Division. One of the two mountain batteries which had pushed on to Yu-lin-pu received a very severe bombardment from these batteries, and from the batteries at Sha-to-tzu. All the horses were killed, and it was put out of action. The other mountain battery took up a position north-west of Yu-lin-pu, where it was screened from the Russian artillery to a certain extent In the night time emplacements were made for this battery out of furniture taken from houses in Yu-lin-pu, as well as sandbags, ammunition boxes and anything which gave cover. I saw a suit of Russian uniform filled with earth and bricks used in this emplacement. The battery was within 1,300 yards of the Russian infantry in Kan-kuan-tun and 2,500 yards of the Russian battery at Sha-to-tzu. This battery was later on joined by two more.

The left column in crossing the embankment and advancing on Ning-kuan-tun was also heavily shrapnelled by these Russian batteries, but little damage resulted. As it was now getting late, the infantry attack was not pushed on against Yang-shih-tun and Kan-kuan-tun, but the troops occupied themselves in strengthening their positions in Yu-lin-pu and Ning-kuan-tun,

while scouts were sent out to reconnoitre the vicinity of Yang-shih-tun and Kan-kuan-tun.

Lieut.-General Tatsumi and the divisional staff took up their quarters in Hsiao Yu-shu-pu.

Operations from 5th to 8th March.—The Russian retreat had now ended, and the 8th Division during the next four days brought up all available men and guns, and attacked them in the fortified villages of Yang-shih-tun and Kan-kuan-tun, again and again with the greatest determination. All the attacks ended in failure, but though Lieut.-General Tatsumi failed to break through the line and reach the railway south of Mukden, his energetic attacks caused the Russians to reinforce these villages heavily with men and guns, which otherwise might have been used to repel General Nogi's Army, or to penetrate between it and the Second Army.


*Defensive Works at Kan-kuan-tun and Yang-shih-tun.**—The Russian defensive works in these villages, though not so elaborate as those at Liao-yang, were nevertheless strong and well concealed. The ground in front of the villages is typical of the kind of country over which the Japanese had to attack from one village to another. Though the ground was flat for the most part, hollow roads, Chinese graves, low banks and slight undulations, gave a certain amount of cover to the attacking troops, who took advantage of it to the fullest extent. It was not, however, nearly sufficient for the troops engaged, who brought up sandbags, and attempted, unsuccessfully, to make cover by scraping up the frozen surface of the ground with the entrenching shovel. The field of fire in front of the villages was therefore excellent, and all the trees which interfered with this fire had been cut down. The most striking thing in the defensive works was the skill shown in their concealment. The folds of the ground had been utilized to the fullest extent, both as cover and for concealing the works, which were almost invisible at a distance of one hundred and fifty yards.

Kan-kuan-tun.†—At the south corner of Kan-kuan-tun, and slightly in advance of it, was a small infantry redoubt A, with a perimeter, excluding gorge, of 40 yards, and a command of 6 feet.

A parapet and trench B, of similar command, continued the line for 200 yards to the north-west. In front of this trench a line of abattis had been laid, and another parapet C, of the same length but of slightly different trace, continued the line still further to the north-west. The line was now carried on by a parapet D made of bean-cakes evidently placed where it was to distract the attention of the Japanese from the other trenches, as from a distance it looked like a conspicuous sand-bag parapet. The rest of the defences consisted of the wall

* *See* Map 59. † *See* sketch opposite.

To face page 198.



1408 07

Weller & Graham Ltd Litho London

and ditch surrounding the village. At the southern side of the village a conspicuous trench E had been dug about one hundred yards from the redoubt and main trench. This also looked as if it had been made in order to deceive the Japanese as to the position of the firing line, as it showed no traces of having been occupied.

*Fu-kuan-tun.**—Between Kan-kuan-tun and Yang-shih-tun lay another group of houses called Fu-kuan-tun, with a line of trenches in front of it about 200 yards long, one of which had no parapet, the men firing from the level of the ground The earth from the trench had been heaped up behind to make a background to conceal the heads of the men firing. The sunken road near the village had also been turned into a parapet, and each man in the firing line had hollowed out for himself a niche in the bank, in which he was perfectly safe, even from high-angle shrapnel, though not of course from high-explosive shell.

Yang-shih-tun.—Yang-shih-tun had a small redoubt in front of it, of nearly the same type as the one at Kan-kuan-tun, but with a command of three and a half instead of six feet, and a perimeter, excluding gorge, of 150 yards. This redoubt was strengthened by parapets 60 yards long on each side of it, and abattis and military pits were used as obstacles in front. The hollow road on the northern side of the village had been defended for about 500 yards, and the rest of the defences consisted of the village wall.

Including redoubts and trenches, the line of defence of the two villages was about 2,500 yards long.

On the left of the Russian line, looking towards the Japanese, lay the two villages of Sha-to-tzu (Hsia Sha-to-tzu, and Shang Sha-to-tzu), defended by well-concealed redoubts, and on the right, about 1,600 yards to the north-east, quite in the open with no villages near, was another infantry redoubt with a perimeter, excluding gorge, of 100 yards. Neither this redoubt nor the villages of Sha-to-tzu were attacked by the 8th Division. The distance of Kan-kuan-tun and Yang-shih-tun from Mukden city is about seven miles.

All the defences of these three villages had been constructed so as to be mutually supporting. Military pits and abattis were the only form of obstacles, and they were only used in front of the two redoubts. The garrisons of the redoubts and trenches lived in underground shelters inside the redoubts, and behind the trenches; communication trenches led to these from the rear. The reserves were in the deep trench in rear of the village. Head-cover was provided in the trenches, though not in the redoubts, by forming loopholes with bricks, sods, ammunition boxes, &c., but there was no example of overhead cover for the men in the firing line.

---

* *See* Map 59.

5th Mar. *Second Attack on Kan-kuan-tun and Yang-shih-tun.**—The attack which had been discontinued the previous evening was ordered to take place on the morning of the 5th. Lieut.-General Tatsumi's plan was to make a holding attack upon Kan-kuan-tun and Sha-to-tzu with two battalions in Yu-lin-pu, while the main attack was made upon Yang-shih-tun with the troops in Ning-kuan-tun, consisting of the 1st and 3rd Battalions 5th Regiment and the 17th and 32nd Regiments; these two latter had advanced to Ning-kuan-tun during the night.

From about 3 to 4 a.m. a little musketry was heard from the direction of Kan-kuan-tun, caused by the Russians firing on the Japanese patrols, who had advanced very close to the works. The musketry was independent, and not volley-firing, which the Russians appear to be giving up. At 7 a.m., as the patrols became visible to the Russians in the early morning mist, the musketry began again, and continued till 9.30 a.m. The Japanese replied to this fire from Yu-lin-pu, as they wished the Russians to think that the attack was coming from that quarter.

Artillery Preparation.—At 8 a.m. the Japanese artillery began firing at the Russian guns near Sha-to-tzu. The latter had been reinforced since the previous evening, and they continued to be steadily reinforced during the day. The 5th Division, to which was assigned the task of attacking Mo-chia-pu, was still far behind, so the Russian batteries at Mo-chia-pu were able to bring a very deadly enfilade fire against the 8th Division guns. These were unable to stand up against it, and after attempting a change of position on the sand-hill to protect themselves from this fire, a change which exposed them to enfilade fire from Sha-to-tzu, they left the sand-hill altogether and, crossing the embankment, came into action about twenty yards on the far side of it. They were now comparatively safe from fire from the batteries at Mo-chia-pu, but the embankment made an excellent target for the Russians to range on, and during the whole of the 5th a continuous bombardment was kept up on the Japanese guns by the Russian artillery near Sha-to-tzu. The practice of the Russian artillery was excellent. Having the range exactly, it was able to search both sides of the embankment very thoroughly, and on this occasion it concentrated its fire steadily on the same target, instead of constantly changing the objective in the usual manner. We found afterwards several hundreds of shells lying near the embankment, and there was scarcely a square yard that had not a shrapnel bullet lying on it. The Russian batteries at Mo-chia-pu, finding that the Japanese guns had left the sand-hill, began to concentrate their fire on Hsiao Yu-shu-pu, where Lieut.-General Tatsumi's head-quarters were, and on the ground between the villages over which reinforcements might be

* *See* Maps 55 and 59.

expected to advance. This fire had the effect of keeping everyone in Hsiao Yu-shu-pu under cover but did not interfere with the infantry reserves concealed behind the sand-hills. In spite of the heavy fire which these batteries brought to bear upon the village during the morning and early afternoon, I saw no casualties at all.

Infantry Advance.—The advance of the infantry from Ning-kuan-tun began about 9.30 a.m. The 1st and 3rd Battalions 5th Regiment moved forward against Yang-shih-tun, following the line of the roads between Ning-kuan-tun and that village. The 1st Battalion 17th Regiment, deploying at the south-east corner of Ning-kuan-tun, advanced against the southern side of Yang-shih-tun, while the 2nd Battalion 32nd Regiment moved against Fu-kuan-tun, on the right of the 1st Battalion of the 17th Regiment. No opposition was at first encountered. The Russians almost invariably open fire at 1,500 yards, and as the infantry advanced without being fired on, it seemed as if the Russians had already retired. Seeing the apparent success of the attack, Major-General Yoda ordered the 2nd Battalion 5th Regiment, behind the sandhill near Hsiao Yu-shu-pu, to advance across the embankment to Yu-lin-pu, and just about the time this battalion began to move off, the left attack arrived within 700 yards of Yang-shih-tun and Fu-kuan-tun. Suddenly a heavy fire opened from the Russian lines. The Japanese infantry, advancing over the open ground, suffered severely, and being unable to get on, fell back a short distance, the 17th to a small stream, and the 1st and 3rd Battalions 5th Regiment to some broken ground about 800 yards from Yang-shih-tun, and in line with this stream. The attack of the 2nd Battalion 32nd Regiment met with no better fortune. When the Russian fire began, they were about 1,000 yards from Kan-kuan-tun, but they succeeded by rapid rushes in advancing another two hundred yards or so to a position in line with Yu-lin-pu. Here they remained, while reinforcements followed in quick succession to the same spot. These reinforcements appeared to suffer very little during their advance. They were extended to at least five paces, and moved very rapidly, continuing the reinforcement till about 12 noon.

At this hour Major-General Yoda received a report from Major-General Kamada, the commander of the troops in Ning-kuan-tun, to say that as the enemy at Yang-shih-tun appeared to be retiring, he proposed to attack once more, and asking if Major-General Yoda would detach part of the 31st Regiment in Yu-lin-pu to co-operate in this attack A reply was sent back to say that the orders were to co-operate with and assist the 5th Division in their attack on Sha-to-tzu, and that, as the enemy was in considerable strength at this place, it was not possible to detach any more troops. The combined attack, therefore, did not take place at this stage. Major-General Yoda, however, in case the 31st should later on advance against

Kan-kuan-tun, ordered two companies of the 2nd Battalion 5th Regiment, now in Yu-lin-pu, to occupy the broken ground south-east of Yu-lin-pu, which faced Sha-to-tzu.

At 2 p.m. information was received that the 5th Division had not yet reached the embankment, so that the original plan of an attack on Kan-kuan-tun in co-operation with the attack of the 5th Division on Sha-to-tzu could not be carried out. Accordingly it was decided to attack Yang-shih-tun again, and Major-General Yoda was ordered, at 2.40 p.m., to assist this attack with the two batteries of field artillery at the embankment, while continuing to fire at Sha-to-tzu with the mountain guns.

An advance was again made, about 4.30 p.m., both by the troops in Ning-kuan-tun and by those in Yu-lin-pu. The left attack got no further than in the morning, being met with an overwhelming fire from Yang-shih-tun. The right attack sent forward one company of the 31st Regiment against Kan-kuan-tun, which succeeded in reaching some broken ground 350 yards from the Russian trenches. The Russians let them approach to 400 yards, and then opened a deadly fire, which caused many casualties. This company could now neither advance nor retreat, and had to remain in this place till dark, when it retired to Yu-lin-pu.

The 5th ended without any further progress having been added to that of the previous day, but the 5th Division had now arrived at Ta Yu-shu-pu, and had drawn off the attention of the Mo-chia-pu batteries. Accordingly twelve 15-cm. and six 9-cm. howitzers were sent by the Army commander to the sand-hill which the mountain guns had been compelled to vacate in the morning. With the aid of these heavy guns it was expected that the Russian resistance would be broken down during the following day.

Divisional head-quarters remained in Hsiao Yu-shu-pu. During the evening an order arrived at head-quarters from the commander of the Second Army to the effect, that after a bombardment of the Russian positions of Yang-shih-tun and Kan-kuan-tun, next morning a general attack would take place in co-operation with the 5th and 3rd Divisions. The latter division had been in reserve under General Oku, but as the Third Army had now advanced northwards to outflank the Russian right, it took up its position on the left of the 8th Division. To the 3rd Division was assigned the task of attacking the villages in front of Chang-shih-tun, while the 5th Division was ordered to attack Sha-to-tzu and Mo-chia-pu. The detachment of the 9th Division which had occupied Ning-kuan-tun had now gone north with the rest of the Third Army, so Ning-kuan-tun was now occupied by the 8th Division only. Accordingly it was decided to press home the attack on Kan-kuan-tun, as well as on Yang-shih-tun, instead of making merely a containing attack on the former village, as had been planned at first.

*Artillery Bombardment.**—The dispositions of the troops on the 6th March were similar to those of the previous day. From 8 a.m. the heavy guns on the sand-hill began bombarding Kan-kuan-tun and Yang-shih-tun, but made little impression on the Russian defences, as they had not located the trenches and redoubts. The field and mountain guns also directed their fire on these two villages. In reply to this fire, the Russian 15-cm. howitzers, about fourteen in number, behind Yang-shih-tun and Kan-kuan-tun bombarded Yu-lin-pu and Ning-kuan-tun, while both heavy and field guns fired also on the Japanese artillery, and at intervals dropped shells all over the open ground between the villages, often without any apparent target. This artillery bombardment continued all day, the Russian guns being reinforced hour by hour, till in the afternoon there were at least ten batteries, or about eighty guns, on the line from Yang-shih-tun to Sha-to-tzu. The Japanese had at first ten batteries field and mountain guns of the 8th Division, besides eighteen howitzers, and in the afternoon a regiment of six field batteries from the army reserve, arrived at Ssu-chia-tun (D 2 centre, east). **6th Mar.**

Infantry Attack.—While this artillery bombardment was in progress, infantry reconnaissances were being made from Ning-kuan-tun and Yu-lin-pu, as a result of which it was reported that the Russian defensive works lay along the stream in front of the villages. This was afterwards found to be inaccurate, but it was ascertained that the best way to attack Kan-kuan-tun was from the south-west, even though exposed to artillery fire from Sha-to-tzu, as there was a little cover in this direction, whereas the ground to the north-west of Fu-kuan-tun, though more sheltered from the Russian guns, at Sha-to-tzu, was absolutely flat and devoid of cover.

The order to attack was received by the troops at Yu-lin-pu about 12.50 p.m., and they accordingly made preparations, sending word to the 5th Division on the right, which was about to attack Sha-to-tzu. Two companies of the 5th Regiment which had returned from Yu-lin-pu during the night to their position behind the embankment, and a company of the 2nd Battalion 31st Regiment, were now ordered up to Yu-lin-pu. These three companies crossed by half sections, dribbling a few men at a time across the embankment. They were seen by the Russians at Sha-to-tzu, who began to shell them severely, but without causing them many casualties. Major-General Yoda followed himself at 1.30 p.m., with two more companies of the 2nd Battalion 31st Regiment. At 2.40 p.m. the advance began. The men were at closer interval than I had seen previously, being apparently at not more than two paces. As soon as they began to move, the Russians poured a very hot fire on them, both shrapnel and musketry, and the casualties

* *See* Maps 55 and 59.

were very numerous, as might have been expected with such a small extension, and at such a close range. It looked as if fifty per cent. either were shot down or retired wounded. Those who seemed to suffer most were the companies of the 32nd Regiment, which advanced over absolutely flat ground, exposed to flanking fire from Fu-kuan-tun. They reached a point about 450 yards from Kan-kuan-tun, but could get no further. As the Japanese continued the advance, about two battalions of the Russian reserves came from the rear part of the village to reinforce the troops in the trenches, who, as I was told by one of the Japanese who survived the attack, had already begun to retreat. The fire now became so heavy that no further advance could be made, and those who had reached the broken ground 350 yards from Kan-kuan-tun remained there. The 2nd Battalion 32nd Regiment reached a point about 450 yards from Kan-kuan-tun, on the left of, and a little behind, the 1st Battalion 31st Regiment. By 3.15 p.m. the musketry fire had almost died away. Another attempt was made at 4 o'clock to reinforce the troops in the firing line with five companies of the 2nd Reserve Regiment, but this attempt did not succeed.

I could not see the advance of the infantry from Ning-kuan-tun, but the attack was unsuccessful, and it was unable to obtain a foothold on the ground in advance of the positions on the previous day. The 5th Division, also, did not succeed in its advance on Sha-to-tzu.

The failure of the attack was, I think, due to insufficient artillery preparation, and to the fact that the Russian trenches had not been located. The redoubts and trenches in Kan-kuan-tun and Yang-shih-tun showed practically no sign of damage from heavy artillery fire, though the villages suffered very much. The heavy guns had only been in action during a few hours, and had not been able to silence the Russian artillery, and the mountain guns at Yu-lin-pu did not give very much assistance to the infantry attack. During most of the morning they were heavily shelled by the Russian guns at Sha-to-tzu, at a range of 2,000 yards, and it was only at intervals that I saw the guns served. As the Russians had shelters only a few yards behind the trenches, they were able to remain under cover during the bombardment, and when the infantry advance began, to line the parapet at once. A frontal attack across the open against such powerful works had little hope of success, even when attempted by Japanese infantry, unless the attacking troops were able to make entrenchments, and to destroy the defensive works by artillery fire. In this case the works were not destroyed, and as it was impossible to make intrenchments in the frozen ground, the Japanese were never able to build up a strong firing line within decisive range of the villages.

Darkness fell on the 6th with the troops in much the same positions as on the previous day. But another attack was planned to take place at dawn the next day, and during the

night the troops were re-formed, and arrangements made for this attack.

*Fourth Attack on Yang-shih-tun and Kan-kuan-tun.**— The attack on the 7th March was ordered to be made from Ning-kuan-tun on Yang-shih-tun, and from Yu-lin-pu on Kan-kuan-tun. The former was commanded by Colonel Tsugawa, 5th Regiment, and the latter by Captain Oyama, adjutant of the 4th Brigade. About 1,300 men were collected from various units by Colonel Tsugawa, and an attempt was made to work round with part of these to the north corner of Yang-shih-tun, and attack at dawn in co-operation with the rest. Unfortunately for this attack, the troops got too far to the north, and lost their way in the dark, so that when dawn broke they were still some distance from Yang-shih-tun, and could not co-operate in the attack. Some of the 5th and 17th Regiments, however, succeeded in gaining the shelter of some Chinese graves in rear of the redoubt, and within fifty yards of it, and some actually got into the village, but they were taken in flank by the Russians who were concealed along the hollow road on the north of the village, and fired on from the redoubt, and the attack again failed. Between two and three hundred men were killed on this spot. The attack on Kan-kuan-tun met with no better fate. Captain Oyama collected about 400 men from the troops at Yu-lin-pu, and made a gallant attempt to storm the village. This attack was better timed than the other, but the Russian fire was too heavy, and the Japanese had to retire, with heavy loss. **7th Mar.**

No more attacks were made on these villages, and the rest of the 7th was spent in reorganizing the scattered units. The men lying behind the sandbag banks did not appear to be fired on very much by the Russian infantry, though they seemed to be getting up and changing their positions constantly. Reinforcements were being dribbled up by twos and threes. The Russian artillery at Sha-to-tzu continued to fire on these troops with shrapnel during most of the day, and it also bombarded the open plain west of Ning-kuan-tun in the same manner as on the previous day. During the morning, numbers of wounded streamed back from Ning-kuan-tun, some walking, others carried by Chinese stretcher bearers, and they were constantly fired on by the Russian artillery from Sha-to-tzu. At that range (3,500 to 4,000 yards), I do not think the Russian gunners could have clearly distinguished their target through the haze, which generally lasted till past noon. They frequently bombarded this part of the ground for half-an-hour at a time when nothing was there. Both Ning-kuan-tun and Yu-lin-pu were severely bombarded by the Russian heavy artillery, and most of the houses in the latter village were

* *See* Maps 55 and 59.

destroyed. The Russian batteries at Mo-chia-pu retired a short distance owing to pressure from the 5th Division.

8th Mar. *Operations of 8th March.*—There is nothing to note regarding the operations of the 8th Division during the day. It had been intended to attempt again to break through the Russian line, this time by advancing against Sha-to-tzu, but it was eventually decided to give the troops another day's rest, possibly in view of the exertions which were to be required of them the next morning. So no further attacks were made. The artillery bombardment continued spasmodically on both sides throughout the day. An attack on Sha-to-tzu was made by the 5th Division, but the Russian works were as strong as those of Kan-kuan-tun and Yang-shih-tun, and the 5th Division fared no better than the 8th.

This was the last day that the main force of the 8th Division remained in Ning-kuan-tun and Yu-ling-pu. At midnight a sudden order came to the division to march northwards round the rear of the 3rd Division to the neighbourhood of Fun-tai (E 1 west).* This sudden move was ordered because it was feared that the Russians might penetrate between the Second and Third Armies, as on the 7th they had made a strong counter-attack on the village of Yu-hung-tun (E 1/2), near Li-kuan-pu, occupied by the 3rd Division. The line occupied by this division was a very long one, extending from Fun-tai through Fei-chia-tun (D/E 1) to Li-kuan-pu, and as the Third Army, towards the north, was also on a very wide front, an energetic counter-attack by the Russians at the gap between the 3rd Division and Third Army might have had a very disastrous effect. As this movement was secret, the foreign attachés were sent back to the Second Army Head-Quarters at Hsiao Chin-tsui-tzu (D 2 centre). The following account was given me by an officer of the divisional staff:—

Operations from 9th to 11th March.—Leaving the 1st and 2nd Battalions 31st Regiment in Yu-lin-pu (D/E 1), and the 17th Regiment in Ning-kuan-tun (D 2, east), the remainder of the division marched northwards, taking the route through Ssu-chia-tun (D 2 east) behind the embankment, so that the movement should not be visible to the Russians. (It turned out that this precaution was unnecessary, for during the whole of the day an extremely thick dust storm hid everything from view.) The troops were divided into two detachments. The 3rd Battalion 31st Regiment, which had been sent back from the Army reserve on the 7th to join the division, together with a battalion of reserve infantry, and one battalion 32nd Regiment, left their former positions at 6 a.m., and marched through Chang-shih-tun (D 2 east) and Hou-ming-tun (D 1 south) to Ku-chia-tzu (D 1 east). The original intention had been to advance to Fun-tai (E 1 west), but seeing that the Russians were not

* *See* Map 55.

making any attempt to penetrate the line (possibly owing to the dust storm), these three battalions remained in Fun-tai. Meanwhile the rest of the 8th Division left at 7 a.m. and assembled near Te-chang-yin-tzu (D 2 centre), advancing from there through Hsing-ming-tun (D 2 north) and Hou-ming-tun to Chia-tien (D 1). Here it deployed on the line Fun-tai–Chang-wang-chiao (E 1), extending its left as far as possible to the north of this. The troops who had been in occupation of this line returned to their own divisions. Four 15-cm. howitzers, and six 15-cm. howitzers (old pattern), took up a position north of Liu-chia-huang (E 1 west), while three batteries field artillery were brought up to Ta-shih-chiao (E 1 west), and six batteries mountain artillery to a position a little south of this. Emplacements for this artillery were made during the night.

On the 10th, early in the morning, the main force of the division, consisting of the 5th Regiment (three battalions), assembled on the road between San-chia-tzu (D 1 east) and Ta-shih-chiao. At 10 a.m. the Russians opposite the 8th Division began to retire to the north, heavily fired on by the Japanese artillery. Accordingly the division began to pursue the retiring enemy in two columns :—

Left Column (Major-General Kamada).
- 32nd Regiment.
- 1 battalion reserve infantry.
- 3 batteries field artillery.

Right Column.
- 2 battalions reserve infantry.
- 3 batteries field artillery.

The right column advanced from Fun-tai (E 1 west), and the left from Hsiao-shu-tun (E 1 centre), with the 3rd Battalion 31st Regiment and six batteries mountain artillery between the two columns. The 5th Regiment followed in rear. The artillery of the left column, together with two of the mountain batteries, opened fire upon the Russians near Ta-ping-chuang, continuing the fire until about 2.30 p.m., when the right arrived near this place. Here the troops halted, and the 5th Regiment (three battalions) and the 3rd Battalion 31st Regiment, under Major-General Yoda, took up the pursuit, following up as far as the railway line between the north gate of Mukden city and the northern Imperial Tombs. The 3rd Battalion 5th Regiment passed through the railway station, which was occupied at 4.20 p.m. by the right wing, and entered Mukden by the west gate, coming out again by the north gate and halting at Liu-chia-ah (F 1). The left wing advanced to the ground between the railway and the city, just north of the Mukden–Hsin-min-tun road, where it remained.

11th Mar. On the 11th, Major-General Yoda's Detachment continued the pursuit towards Wu-ni-chiu and Yun-kuan-tsui, the rest of the division following along the railway. When the head of

the main body reached Liu-chia-ah the division was ordered to stop pursuit, and retire on Fun-tai and Fei-chia-tun (D/E 1), with head-quarters in the former place.

The operations of the division now ceased.

General Notes.—Though the 8th Division placed no restrictions upon the foreign officers attached to the division in regard to where they went during the actions, very little information was given as to the operations in progress. We were provided with maps compiled during the winter, but they were inaccurate, and a later and corrected edition had been issued to the Japanese officers, which we did not see. The foregoing account of the operations was written from what I saw myself, supplemented by such information as I was able to obtain from other sources. As I was ordered back from Manchuria before the detailed information regarding the operations of the Second Army was issued, I have not had an opportunity of correcting any possible discrepancies between this account and that given to the foreign attachés by the staff of the Second Army.

Infantry Formations.—The infantry formations used by the 8th Division were, as a general rule, similar to those which we now employ, the principle of thin lines and great depth being adhered to. The only case I saw where there was no depth was the surprise in the afternoon of the 3rd March, when the reserve of the division pushed on in advance of the right and left columns, and this was quite an exceptional case, as only slight opposition was to be expected. The particular formation depended entirely upon the battalion commanders. As a rule, in the attack on a position, one or two companies from each battalion were deployed at first, being reinforced later on by one or two more, on one of the flanks, if possible. The fourth company was kept in reserve to the last moment. The supports were usually echeloned in rear, and when sent up to reinforce troops in front, generally tried to come up on the flank of these troops, or to fill up by complete units, gaps caused in the firing line. The system of sending up one section to reinforce another section directly in front by filling up intervals between individual men was avoided as much as possible, on account of the mixing up of units thus caused. Intervals between men in the firing line varied considerably. In some cases I saw men at twenty to thirty paces interval, in others at two paces only, but the average interval seemed to be about four paces. The supports were generally at about two paces interval, while the reserves were brought up in line or in column of route, even within shrapnel range of the enemy, though they deployed at once if this fire was opened on them. It was only in the earlier stages of the attack that it was possible to get an idea of the formations and extensions. Later on, the ground seemed to be dotted all over with advancing figures in no formation at all.

The system of dribbling up reinforcements, man by man, or a few men at a time, was largely employed in the fighting at Yang-shih-tun and Kan-kuan-tun, where men were constantly seen running out from the villages of Yu-lin-pu and Ning-kuan-tun to reinforce the troops behind the rows of sandbags. The distance to be covered was very short, but I saw this system employed for bringing up some of the reserves from the railway bank to Yu-lin-pu, a distance of nine hundred yards. In this case two companies were brought up, five men at a time, with about one hundred yards distance between the groups.

In the attack the advance was made without stopping till the zone of Russian shrapnel fire was reached, and if this fire was exceptionally accurate and heavy, the men lay down and waited for the firing to slacken before again advancing. But this did not often happen, and halts were distinctly discouraged. It was always impressed on the men that more loss was caused by halting than by pushing on. The long range infantry fire of the Russians had very little effect on the Japanese advancing lines, which continued to move on without halting. Though the Russian musketry fire has improved since the battle of the Sha Ho, it is still bad, according to Japanese officers, who say it is always much too high. The Russian infantry nearly always began to fire at one thousand five hundred yards distance, but at Yang-shih-tun they let the Japanese come up to seven hundred yards, and then suddenly opened fire. Up to one thousand yards from the enemy's position the advance appeared to be very slow, but was continuous, no halts being made. When this point had been reached firing usually commenced, the men advancing by rushes from this position, covered by fire from the remainder, who lay down and attempted to scrape up a little earth for cover. These rushes seemed to be made, not so much by sections, or half sections, as by individual men or small groups of men pushing on as fast as possible in their own time. They advanced in turn from different parts of the line, getting up and rushing forward very rapidly. The rushes were generally about thirty yards only, this being the longest distance a Japanese soldier, carrying a heavy pack, can run at such a rapid pace without getting too much out of breath to be able to use his rifle to advantage. A noticeable thing at this stage of the attack was the heavy and continuous fire kept up all the time the advance was made, showing that the forward rushes were well covered by fire.

As far as it was possible to see, the attack was carried out precisely in the manner I saw practised during the winter months. The men were trained in small batches of twenty or so, under non-commissioned officers, and great attention was paid by these non-commissioned officers to the way the forward rushes were supported by the fire of the remainder; the men, before getting up to rush forward, ascertaining that those who had advanced before them had begun to fire from their new

positions. The importance paid to this was very noticeable, men being constantly sent back if they had begun their advance too soon. The men were also trained to carry out this advance without orders from the non-commissioned officer, who merely superintended. This was practised so often that each soldier must have known instinctively what to do when the actual attack was carried out, and the success of the Japanese attack is undoubtedly largely due to the fact that the strongest possible fire was kept up continuously by the attacking troops during the time they were advancing.

Infantry Equipment.—Considering the heavy packs which the Japanese soldiers carried, even while going into action, the rapidity of their rushes was wonderful. Each man carried his kit pretty well as he pleased during the operations. Out of ten men who paraded in Mukden for the benefit of the foreign attachés, no two were exactly alike, but the accompanying photograph of one of them gives an idea of the equipment generally carried. The weight of this pack alone was 37 lbs. All the articles of kit were strapped to the knapsack, making a compact load which could be instantly taken off by simply unbuckling two straps. This was invariably done when a halt was made for even five minutes.*

In the kit shown on the photograph the following articles were carried :—

Knapsack. (Containing 6 packets biscuits, a bag of rice, 2 packets ammunition of 15 rounds each, spare gloves and socks, a towel, and materials for cleaning rifle.)
Overcoat.
Entrenching shovel.
Straw boots. (For winter only.)
Chinese shoes. „ „ „
Mess tin. (Containing rice.)
Straw rice box.
† Section of shelter tent.
† Sandbag.
† Blue cloth holdall.
† Blanket.

In addition to these a water-bottle and haversack were slung over the shoulder, and a waist-belt, with bayonet and three pouches, was worn. During the operations the greatcoat was worn, not carried as in photograph. The total number of rounds carried by the soldier on the march was 150, of which 30 rounds were in the knapsack. Before going into action extra ammunition is issued. The amount of this is not fixed by regulation, but depends on the requirements of the situation. The men carry this extra ammunition in their blue holdalls, in their knapsacks, haversacks, pockets and caps. Before going

* The pack was often taken off during the attack and used as cover. Against shrapnel it was found to be of great use when thus used.—D. S. R.
† Not shown on the photograph.

[*To face page* 210.]

Japanese Infantry Equipment.



into an important action a man will be given as much extra ammunition as he can carry, the whole of the battalion reserve being issued if necessary. An extra supply is also brought up by reinforcements, in addition to their own ammunition. The ammunition ponies are pushed well forward during an action. At Yueh-pu-tzu they followed the infantry up the river bed to within three hundred yards of the village, where they halted under cover of the river bank. During the fighting from the 4th to the 8th March I did not see any ammunition ponies crossing the railway embankment to Yu-lin-pu, as they were brought up at night.

Enveloping Attacks.—In the attack the Japanese always try to work round to the enemy's flank, at the same time as they attack vigorously in front. This frontal attack is more than a holding attack, and is always made with a strong force and pushed with the greatest energy. This principle of out-flanking was carried out even by the smallest units, and was well exemplified in each attack made by the 8th Division during the operations. At Yang-shih-tun and Kan-kuan-tun, however, it was not possible to make a flank attack, as the Russian line of defence was continuous, though the attack at dawn on the north-west corner of Yang-shih-tun might be called a local flank attack so far as the 8th Division was concerned. In the last stages of the attack, when the Japanese infantry reach a point three hundred yards from the enemy, they always try to place fresh troops on a flank so as to enfilade the Russian trenches at the moment when the final assault is made. This was successfully done at Yueh-pu-tzu on the 1st March by the 3rd Battalion 17th Regiment. The advance from two hundred yards from the enemy's position to the position itself is made if possible in one rush, covered by the fire of the reinforcements which have placed themselves on the enemy's flank. These reinforcements are in a position to bring a heavy fire to bear on the Russian troops as they begin to retire, and it is while retiring that the Russians suffer so severely, not while defending the trenches.

Night Attacks.—No attacks were made at night by the 8th Division, as Lieut.-General Tatsumi does not believe in this mode of fighting, except with small units, considering that if made with larger numbers than a company of two hundred rifles, night attacks are not likely to be successful. The Russians occasionally made small counter-attacks at night on the Japanese troops attacking Kan-kuan-tun and Yang-shih-tun, but instead of attacking with the bayonet only, they used musketry fire. These attacks were probably made to prevent the Japanese from creeping up nearer to the Russian trenches in the dark. Owing to the frozen ground the Japanese were not able to practise the tactics which they employed in the Sha Ho fighting, in October 1904, of digging trenches in the night, and massing troops in them ready to attack at dawn.

Had this been possible Kan-tuan-tun and Yang-shih-tun would probably have been captured.

Entrenchments under Fire.—In regard to the question of entrenching under fire, the operations of the 8th Division have shown that attempts to improvise cover by digging in ground frozen to at least four feet below the surface are quite useless, when made under fire of an enemy not yet shaken. During the winter I have seen men digging for half-an-hour with the entrenching pick and shovel without success, and as they were frequently practised at this, it must have been realized that it was impracticable, though in the attacks on Yang-shih-tun and Kan-kuan-tun each forward rush was marked by attempts to entrench. Even with the heavy pick used by the engineers it was difficult to make any impression on the ground. It was probably partly owing to this experience that sandbags were carried as part of the equipment of the men. These sandbags measured 36 inches by 28 inches when empty, but only about 2 feet by 18 inches when filled with earth. They were used to make cover during the night, behind which the attacking troops assembled before daybreak. This cover was made as near as possible to the Russian position, being generally from eight hundred to six hundred yards off. The bags were usually laid on the ground vertically, though in some cases they were brought up first and emptied on the ground so as to form a low bank on which the sandbags, when re-filled, were laid horizontally. As the earth with which these bags were filled consisted generally of small lumps of frozen earth almost as hard as stones, this parapet was very often bullet-proof, though not in all cases, as bullets could easily pass through between the lumps of earth, and many men were shot dead while lying behind them. At At Yueh-pu-tzu the sandbags were laid down at first at distances varying from 800 to 600 yards from the village, and they were carried on under fire as close as 300 yards to Yueh-pu-tzu. In the attack on Kan-kuan-tun they were laid down at 1,400 yards, 1,100 yards, 700 yards, and a few at 400 yards from the Russian trenches outside the village. As the sandbags, even when only partially filled, are very heavy, it was only possible, under fire, to carry them twenty to thirty yards at a time, and these rushes were very slow. The equipment was, however, frequently discarded at this stage. This method of carrying up sandbags under fire, though successful to a certain extent at Yueh-pu-tzu, did not seem to have been employed so much in the attacks on Kan-kuan-tun, as there were very few bags lying on the ground nearer than 700 yards from the village, those near the Chinese graves, 400 yards from Kan-kuan-tun, having been brought up at night.

Frontal Attacks.—The attacks made on the Russian defences from 4th to 8th March support the theory that frontal attacks across the open against an unshaken enemy are impracticable, unless entrenchments are constructed. Those attacks were

undoubtedly made with the object of breaking through the line of defence of the Russians, and not merely to hold them in their trenches and cause them to reinforce the line at the expense of the other parts of the defence. It was not due to the employment of an insufficient number of troops that the attacks did not succeed, and the numbers of dead lying on the battlefield, more especially on the right of the 8th Division, where the 42nd Regiment of the 5th Division had about fifty men per company killed in the attack on Sha-to-tzu, prove that men had not been spared in making the attacks. The failure seems due to the fact that the task was an impossible one unless either pressure on a flank caused the defending troops to retire, or a concentrated artillery fire prevented them from using their rifles at the critical moment when the Japanese infantry made their assault, or the attacking troops were able to entrench themselves in a position at decisive range where they could bring up reinforcements to overwhelm the enemy with superior fire. The success of former frontal attacks made by the Japanese is probably due to one or other of these reasons, but, as noted before, none of these advantages was on the side of the 8th Division in its attacks on Yang-shih-tun and Kan-kuan-tun. The Russian line opposite the division was continuous, so that pressure could not be brought to bear on a flank; the exact position of the trenches and redoubts was not discovered, so that the artillery fire had little effect on the Russian troops defending them; while entrenching was not possible.

Russian Defensive Works.—The defensive works of the Russians west of the Hun River were weak when compared to their elaborate system of defences in the region of the Sha Ho. They consisted merely of half-hearted attempts to improve on the natural defences of the Chinese villages by strengthening the mud banks surrounding them, and deepening the ditches. In addition to these natural defences, short trenches had been dug, as described previously, at Yueh-pu-tzu, which was the nearest point to the Japanese forces. Abattis also had been laid down in front of this village. Near Mukden, however, the Russian defensive line consisted of a semi-circle of redoubts, generally, but not invariably, about two hundred yards in front of the villages, with the intervening ground and villages between the redoubts strengthened by means of trenches. Obstacles took the form of military pits, and abattis in front of the redoubts, the latter being used sparingly. Wire entanglements were scarce, but the defensive works showed signs of being uncompleted and possibly these obstacles would have been constructed later on. Sites for redoubts had been selected with great judgment, generally on slight undulations, which very often formed the parapet itself. The slopes of the parapets were always very gentle, and the works were generally invisible at a few hundred yards, even when no attempts were made to conceal them by such devices as placing broken millet stalks in

front of the parapet. There was usually no necessity to clear a field of fire round the defensive works, but such trees as interfered with the field of fire were always cut down. The chief defect in the defences seemed to be the absence of head-cover, which compelled the defenders to expose their heads and shoulders each time they fired. This is probably another reason for the success of the Japanese, who make a practice of continuing their shrapnel fire until their attacking troops have actually reached the enemy's works, regardless of the losses that they may cause to their own infantry. The defenders are therefore prevented from using their rifles with the confidence which they would have if they were able to fire through loopholes. The result is that at the very moment when a steady and well-directed fire might probably cause such losses to the attacking troops as to make a further advance impossible, the defenders are compelled to take cover from the Japanese. shrapnel. The only places at which I saw head-cover used were the trenches in front of Kan-kuan-tun and Fu-kuan-tun, where loopholes had been constructed with sods and ammunition boxes. I saw no cases of overhead cover, though the niches hollowed out in the sunken road at Fu-kuan-tun served the same purpose.

Transmission of Orders, &c.—Communication between the Army and the divisions, and between the divisional general and the units of his command, even to battalions in the first line, was kept up by means of the telephone. A very thin wire covered with silk was used as a rule, except between the Army and the divisions, but on the 1st March the ordinary field telephone was used between the divisional commander near Hei-kou-tai, the 4th Brigade near Tung Chang-chia-wo-peng, and the 16th Brigade, whose head-quarters were in the river bed south of Yueh-pu-tzu. The thin wire is very light, and as poles are not necessary, it is easily carried and rapidly laid, material, such as millet stalks or sticks, found on the spot, being used instead of poles, or the wire simply laid on the ground. It, however, seems to be unsatisfactory, as it is very easily damaged. For example, telephonic communication with Yu-lin-pu from the 4th to the 8th March, was interrupted during 12 hours out of 24, on an average, owing to damage to the wire from shell fire. When telephonic communication was interrupted, orderlies had to be used, for although semaphore signalling was practised during the winter, it was not employed during this battle, and the Morse system of signalling is not in use. The cavalry belonging to the 8th Division was almost entirely used up as orderlies to supplement the telephone. A telephone office was always established at the place where the general took up his position during the battle, as he remained at this spot so long as no forward movement of any great distance was made. During the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th March, when the operations took the form of an advance, the general always halted about noon in one of

the villages for an hour or two, and the head-quarter telephone office was at once established in the same Chinese house. During this midday halt, reports and orders were received and issued.

Casualties.—The following is a hospital return of men wounded during the fighting from the 1st to the 8th, and is, I think, reliable :—

Bullet wounds - - -	4,251
Shell „ - - -	1,022
Bayonet „ - - -	14
Other „ - - -	115
Total - -	5,402

The number of men killed during the fighting from the 4th to the 8th, as recorded on the soldiers' graves, was as follows :—

Near Yang-shih-tun - -	9 officers and 525 men.
Near Yu-lin-pu - - -	8 officers and 283 men.

I had no opportunity of seeing the graves at Yueh-pu-tzu and Nien-yu-pao, but the number of men killed was certainly not less than 200. Taking it at this figure the total casualties of the division would be :—

Killed - - - -	1,025
Wounded - - -	5,402
Total - -	6,427

This total, which is inclusive of non-combatants, is only approximate, as the wounded who died in hospital would be included in the number of killed.

I was unable to obtain any reliable figures as to the strength of the division, as this was kept secret from me, depending as it did upon the number of reserve troops attached. Taking a battalion at 650 rifles which was about the average strength of those I saw, the strength of the 12 infantry battalions would be 8,000 rifles. Though technically speaking no reserve battalions may have belonged to the division, some were certainly attached during the operations, but I had no opportunities of seeing how many there were.

Artillery.—The fact that the retreat of the Russians from Chang-tan to Yang-shih-tun was not a rout is largely due to the way that they used their artillery to cover the retreat of the infantry. Favoured by the hard ground they were able to keep the guns in action against the advancing infantry until the very last moment, and then get them away without losing a single one, and although they were unable to stop this advance, they caused the Japanese columns constant delays by compelling them to deploy for attack at each village to which they came. The guns used in these rear guard actions seemed to be those

of the horse artillery, judging from the sound, which was different to that of their field guns. This may account for the fact that the Russians were able to remain in action so long, and get away so successfully, though the ground was so hard and the country so flat that even their field guns were able to move very rapidly.

The Russian artillery on most occasions did not appear to concentrate its fire on one object for any length of time, but kept constantly changing the target, though from the 5th to the 8th March it certainly kept up a continuous fire on the Japanese guns near the railway embankment at Yu-lin-pu, when the Russian artillery in the neighbourhood of Sha-to-tzu concentrated its fire on these guns during the whole of the 5th, and a considerable portion of the 6th and 7th. The way in which the Russian artillery changed its target was most noticeable, and it threw away a large quantity of ammunition in firing at random at apparently no particular object. For hours at a time, also, the Russian artillery frequently directed its fire at villages well behind the firing line, especially during the afternoon, when the baggage trains were coming up, but the damage it caused was very slight. However, it undoubtedly had the effect of delaying the columns.

The damage done by the Russian shrapnel to the Chinese villages was not great, and with the exception of the small thatched houses, which were sometimes set on fire, they hardly suffered at all, and troops sheltered behind the houses were comparatively safe. I did not see any instances of the use of high-explosive shells in the Russian field guns. The 8th Division had no heavy artillery opposed to it until it reached Yu-lin-pu. This place was bombarded during the 6th, 7th, and 8th March by about fourteen Russian 15-cm. howitzers, in rear of Yang-shih-tun, and almost entirely destroyed. Ning-kuan-tun was bombarded in the same way, but being a much larger village it did not suffer nearly so much. When troops occupied villages during a bombardment from the Russian howitzers they usually took shelter in the ditch in rear, and if the villages were occupied for any length of time deep narrow trenches were dug outside for the troops.

Both the Japanese and the Russian guns were well concealed, but as the country did not lend itself to the concealment of a large number of guns concentrated in one place, it was often comparatively easy to identify the position of guns, both by the flash and the dust which was raised. At Yueh-pu-tzu, however, the Japanese successfully concealed the position of the guns for the best part of the morning. The emplacements had been prepared beforehand, having been selected without attracting the attention of the Russians, and constructed at night.* A number of spare emplacements had been prepared, some of which were very conspicuous, being intended to deceive the Russians

* The guns also were sometimes placed in position at night.—D. S. R.

as to the position of the guns. They were successful in this, as the Russians bombarded them during most of the morning. In this engagement the Russian guns, in emplacements near Chang-tan, were also well concealed. These emplacements had not been damaged at all by the Japanese fire, and very few Japanese shells were lying near them after the battle. The Russian batteries at Mo-chia-pu, which had given so much trouble to the 8th Division by their enfilade fire, were extremely well concealed, having been placed along a hollow road about four hundred yards behind the embankment, completely out of sight. The fire of these batteries was directed from a look-out post in a tree, as only the embankment was visible in front of the guns.

I never saw guns come into action in the open without cover of some sort being constructed for the gun detachments. This generally took the form of short ditches on each side of the gun wheels, with parapets in front. These parapets were usually revetted with millet stalks, both by Russians and Japanese, though those of the latter were always more neatly finished off. Occasionally broken millet stalks were stuck in the ground in front to help to conceal the guns. When time permitted the small ditches were covered with branches and earth to afford overhead cover to the gun detachments.

In supporting the infantry attack the Japanese guns were always pushed well forward to as close a range as possible from the enemy's position. At Yu-lin-pu, for example, the mountain guns were within 1,300 yards of the Russian infantry in Kan-kuan-tun, and 2,500 yards of the Russian artillery near Sha-to-tzu. They seemed to concentrate their fire on the infantry in Kan-kuan-tun only, not on the guns at Sha-to-tzu. But these mountain guns were constantly silenced by infantry fire, and it is questionable whether they were of very great assistance to the infantry attack.

There was an undoubted tendency on the part of the Japanese infantry to attack without a sufficient artillery preparation, and their infantry officers seem to think that artillery co-operation, though of great help to the infantry attack, was by no means a necessity. This may possibly be due to the effect produced on them by the Russian shrapnel, which does not appear to have caused the Japanese infantry much loss.

Excepting during the pursuit of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th of March, the guns of the division were always massed as much as possible. In the attack on Yueh-pu-tzu seven batteries were concentrated south of the village, and the remaining three near Chang-chia-wo-peng. From the 5th to the 8th six batteries were in position near the railway embankment at Yu-lin-pu, being joined in the evening of the 5th by eighteen howitzers, which took up a position on a sand-hill six hundred yards in rear. On the evening of the 5th also, six batteries of field artillery came into action behind the embankment, about one thousand five hundred yards from the other guns.

High-explosive shells were used by the Japanese field artillery, but without very great effect on the Chinese villages. Many of these shells failed to burst. The shell cases of the Japanese shrapnel were split open in a good many instances, but all the Russian cases I saw were intact. Those left lying on the ground after the battle of the Sha Ho in October were, however often broken.

During the whole of the operations the thing which impressed me most in regard to the artillery was its co-operation with the infantry in the last stages of the attack, when the Japanese guns continued their fire on the Russian trenches until they were taken, regardless of losses they might cause their own infantry. They kept up their fire until the Japanese flag displayed by the assaulting infantry showed that it was no longer necessary. The Japanese consider that any losses they may cause their own infantry can only be slight compared to those which would be incurred were the defenders left free at the critical moment to pour an accurate and concentrated fire on the attacking infantry at a distance of only a few hundred yards.

(9) The Battle of Mukden.—Operations of the Third Japanese Army.

REPORT by Colonel W. H. BIRKBECK, C.B., Manchuria, 10th April 1905.

Plate.

Map of the operations of the Third Army - Map 60.

Appendix.

Translation of two *Kanjos* issued to Japanese troops.

1. The movement of the Third Army from Port Arthur began on the 18th January, and it reached its appointed position west of Liao-yang on the 19th February.

On the 20th February the advance of the Manchurian Armies was decided. It was known that the right flank of the Russians extended as far as Ssu-fang-tai (B 4) only. Their cavalry was facing the Japanese cavalry on the line of the Hun Ho. The task assigned to the Third Army was to turn the Russian right flank. Every precaution had been taken to conceal the real direction of General Nogi's movement, and to induce the Russian commander to expect an attack against his left flank; the turning movement of the Third Army was undoubtedly a surprise.

2. The country west of the Hun Ho is practically a level plain, with few perceptible undulations, thickly dotted with villages built chiefly of sun-dried bricks, and with enclosures surrounded by mud walls, varying from four feet to seven feet high, and two feet to three feet thick. The larger villages contain one or two substantial burnt-brick houses, with stout defensible brick walls.

The roads, except the Hsin-min-tun–Mukden road, which is a regular Manchurian unmetalled high road, are mere cart tracks from village to village; but during the month of March, when the country is still frozen, it is everywhere passable by all arms, whether roads exist or not.

There are a good many trees dotted about, in small clumps near the villages, in groves surrounding the graveyards, and along the roads; the grove in which stands the Northern Tombs, five miles north of Mukden, is the only wood worthy of the name.

The nullahs are not serious obstacles at this time of the year, even to carts, as there are plenty of points of passage, but they give good cover.

The villages undoubtedly form the most important feature of the battlefield. To anyone who has been in India, the plains of the Punjab, with their mud-built villages, will convey a perfect impression of the country west of Mukden.

27th Feb. 3. On the 27th February the Third Army was situated as follows:—*

9th Division at Ta-sha-ling (B 6).
1st Division at Huang-ni-wa (A 6).
7th Division at Hsiao-pei-ho (A 6).
Corps Artillery and Reserve Brigade in rear.
The advance began in four columns.
9th Division to Ma-ma-chieh (A 5)—Hei-to-tzu (A 5).
Corps Artillery and Reserve to Liang-shui-kou (A 5).
1st Division to Lao-huan-to (A 5) and Shuang-shu-tzui (A 5).
7th Division to Ka-li-ma† and Ma-shan-chia-tzu (south) (A 5).
2nd Cavalry Brigade to Ku-chang-tzu (A 3), on the right bank of the Liao.

The columns reached their destination without serious opposition, driving back parties of Russian cavalry in their front.

The 2nd Cavalry Brigade was in touch with Russian cavalry throughout the day.

28th Feb. 4. The orders for the 28th February were as follows:—

9th Division to the line Ssu-fang-tai (B 4) Chang-chia-wo-peng (A 4).
Corps Artillery and Reserve to Ta-tzu-ying (A 4).
1st Division to Ta-huang-wo-peng (A 4).
7th Division to Chin-tzu-kang (A 3), along the Liao.
2nd Cavalry Brigade to Yang-chia-wo-peng (A 2).

Russian cavalry opposed the march at Wu-pang-niu (A 5)–A-shih-niu (A 4)—Niu-hsin-ta (A 4) but were easily driven off by the advanced guards.

The columns reached their destinations, with the exception of the 9th Division, which was unable to enter Ssu-fang-tai (B 4), and remained to the west of that village, upon a line Hsiao-pien-wai (A 4)—Chang-chia-wo-peng (A 4).

The Corps Artillery and the reserve brigade remained with Army Head-Quarters at A-shih-niu (A 4) Much more serious opposition had been expected on this day, but, in its absence, it was decided by Army Head-Quarters that the Third Army

* The Third Army was originally composed of the 1st, 7th, 9th, and 11th Divisions, but the 11th Division was detached after the capture of Port Arthur to form part of the Ya-lu Army under General Kawamura.

† 7 miles west of Ta-tzu-ying (A 4).

should push on next day, and orders for the advance were issued as follows:—

5. Orders for the 1st March (from left to right):— **1st Mar.**

Cavalry to Ta-min-tun (A 2), with detachment to Hsin-min-tun (A 1).

7th Division to Po-lin-tzu (B 3)—Hu-shan-tzu (B 3).

1st Division to Pi-chia-kang-tzu (B 3)—Huo-shih-kang-tzu (B 3).

9th Division to wait until the second and third columns reached the line of Su-chia-an (B 3), and then to attack Ssu-fang-tai (B 4) from the south and west.

Corps Artillery and reserve brigade to Yu-chia-tai (A 3) with Army Head-Quarters.

The 7th and 1st Divisions met the Russian cavalry in force on the line Po-lin-tzu—Hu-shan-tzu, and, driving them off, pushed beyond that line.

The 9th Division attacked Ssu-fang-tai at noon, but so strongly was it entrenched, and so stubbornly defended, that in spite of the support of the Corps Artillery in the afternoon, it was midnight before the village was taken.

The Corps Artillery first came into action at Su-chia-an (B 3), driving about fifteen Russian squadrons out of Tai-ping-chuang (B 4), who retired to the north-east and then entering Tai-ping-chuang, supported the attack of the 9th Division on Ssu-fang-tai.

Thus, the Third Army began its task of turning the right of the Russian lines, which extended from Ssu-fang-tai to Chang-tan (B 4) on the Hun Ho, and thence to the eastward.

6. The orders for the 2nd March were— **2nd Mar.**

Cavalry to Ma-shan-chia-tzu (C 2 north) on the Hsin-min-tun—Mukden road.

7th Division to La-mu-ho (C 2).

1st Division to the neighbourhood of Sha-li-ho (C 3).

9th Division to Lin-chia-tai (C 3), if possible.

The 9th Division was unable to reach Lin-chia-tai (C 3), because the left of the Second Army with which connection had to be maintained could make but slow progress.

Though they had lost Ssu-fang-tai, the Russians still held their defences eastwards opposite the Second Army, and marching round the right flank of these, the 9th Division reached Piao-to-tzu (C 4), where it met strong Russian forces, and remained facing them throughout the night.

1st and 7th Divisions reached their respective destinations at noon. Information was now received at Army Head-Quarters from spies (it was untrue, but was then believed to be reliable) that large bodies of Russians were in full retreat northwards from Mukden, and it was decided to push the Third Army on as far as possible.

By 3 p.m., the 7th Division reached the line (C 2) Yeh-ssu-niu-liu—Teng-mi-huang, and the 1st Division the line (C 3) Ta-tzu-pu—Te-chang-yin-tzu.

At 6 p.m. the Corps Artillery and the reserve brigade reached Sha-li-ho (C 3).

The 1st Cavalry Brigade from the Second Army was now attached to the Third Army, and was posted at Pan-chia-tai (C 3) to keep up connection between the 9th and 1st Divisions.

At 5 p.m., some Russian batteries, supported by about one brigade of infantry, and shortly followed by a whole division, appeared in front of the 1st and 7th Divisions, advancing in the direction of Sha-li-ho and Teng-mi-huang (C 2).

This attack came on exactly between the 1st and 7th Divisions, and was easily repulsed by the cross-fire of both divisions to which it was exposed.

Russian troops remained in Lan-shan-tai (C 2), whence fire was exchanged with the Japanese throughout the night.

So ended the first Russian offensive movement against the Third Army.

3rd Mar 7. Owing to the distance which separated the 9th Division from the 1st and 7th Divisions, and the necessity of awaiting the advance of the Second Army, it was impossible for the 1st and 7th Divisions to attempt a further advance on the 3rd March, but they were not destined to remain in idleness, for at 7 a.m. thirty Russian guns opened fire from Kao-ming-tai (C 2, 3), and the 16th Russian Army Corps began an attack against the line (C 2) La-mu-ho–Teng-mi-huang–Sha-li-ho.

The Corps Artillery at Sha-li-ho engaged the Russian guns, and as on the previous day, the cross-fire of the 1st and the 7th Divisions repulsed the Russian attack with heavy loss.

Further north, about twenty-five Russian squadrons, supported by a brigade of infantry with guns, advanced from the direction of Lao-pien (C 1) at 1 p.m.

The 2nd Cavalry Brigade, supported by two battalions (one battalion of the 7th Division and one battalion of the reserve brigade), met this attack at Ta-fang-shen (C 1), and though the Russians advanced to within some seven hundred yards of the village, they retired in the evening without making any very serious attack.

The cavalry on both sides fought dismounted.

The progress made by the Second Army on this day enabled the 9th Division to reach Lin-chia-tai (C 3), where it was in touch with the 1st Division, as well as with the left of the Second Army, which stood on the right bank of the Hun Ho.

4th Mar. 8. The orders for the 4th March were :—

9th Division to Mukden railway station.
1st Division to the Northern Tombs, 5 miles north of Mukden (E 2).
7th Division to Chang-chia-tzu (E 2).

The 9th Division reached Chang-shih-tun (D 3), after encountering considerable opposition, but finding the Russians strongly entrenched on the line Yang-shih-tun (D 3)—Chang-shih-chang (D 2), was unable to proceed.

The 1st Division reached Wu-chai-tun (one mile west of Fun-tai (D 2)), where information was received that Yu-hung-tun (D 2) was occupied by a Russian regiment. A portion of the 1st Division attacked, and gained a footing in the western part of the village, but found the Russians too strongly posted to complete the occupation.

The 7th Division reached Ta-shih-chiao (D 2) without opposition.

The position of the Russians was now clear; their line of entrenchments extended from Fang-shih-tun (D 2) on the right by Yu-hung-tun—Chang-shih-chang—Yang-shih-tun (D 3) to Mo-chia-pu on the Hun Ho, and thence in front of the Second Army to Lin-sheng-pu (D 4) on the Sha Ho.

A Cavalry Division was now formed under one command, consisting of the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigades, two batteries of field artillery (of which one was armed with captured Russian guns) and a battery of six machine guns; it reached Chien-hsin-tai-tzu (D 1), north of the Mukden—Hsin-min-tun road, on this day.

9. The Third Army now found itself opposed in force, and unable to advance westwards; it was decided to outflank the Russian position by edging the Third Army northwards. **5th Mar.**

This decision entailed a flank march in the immediate presence of the enemy, and it was effected by taking the 9th Division out of the line, and placing it between the 1st and 7th Divisions.

The Japanese commanders were well aware of the difficulty and danger of such an operation, but they counted correctly upon the want of enterprise and inactivity so often displayed by their enemy, and the movement was carried out successfully.

As heavy fighting was expected on the 5th March, the withdrawal and transfer northwards of the 9th Division, whose fighting line was five hundred paces from the Russian trenches, was, of course, not contemplated till after nightfall, and the Third Army remained stationary throughout the day of the 5th March.

During the night of the 5th March the 8th Division of the Second Army reached Chang-shih-tun (D 3), and relieved the troops of the 9th Division, which at once moved northwards.

10. The task of the Third Army was now to outflank the Russian line, which extended to Fang-shih-tun (D 2), and on the morning of the 6th March at 10 a.m. the situation was as follows:— **6th Mar.**

The 7th Division had left Ta-shih-chiao (D 2) and was moving to the line (D 1), Ping-lo-pu—Ku-shi-an.

The 1st Division extended from Fun-tai (D 2), northwards, towards the Mukden—Hsin-min-tun road.

The 9th Division was moving up in rear of this line, after relief by the Second Army, to Ta-shih-chiao, to take its place between the 1st and 7th Divisions.

The Corps Artillery, reserve brigade and Army Head-Quarters were at Ma-san-chia-tzu (C 2).

The Cavalry Division was at Erh-tai-tzu (D 1), opposed to Russian cavalry coming from a north-easterly direction.

At 11 a.m. an exciting incident occurred. The Head-Quarters of the 9th Division, and of its leading brigade, had reached Ta-shih-chiao (D 2) in advance of the division, the head of which was still at some distance, when one and a-half brigades of Russian infantry, with guns, appeared marching on Ta-shih-chiao from the north-east.

For the moment, one company of the 1st Division, left in Kao-li-tun (D 2), and the above staffs of the 9th Division, formed the only available defence of Ta-shih-chiao, and the moment was a sufficiently anxious one. Messengers were hastily sent to call up the reserve brigade from Ma-san-chia-tzu and to hurry on the leading brigade of the 9th Division, which came up and deployed at the double.

The reserve brigade arrived soon afterwards, and the Corps Artillery coming into action at Hou-cheng (D 2), drove back the Russian attack by 3 p.m., and the situation was assured.

On the night of the 6th March the Russians held the line (D 2) Tsao-hua-tun—Chuan-wan-chiao—Fang-shih-tun (D 2) in front of the Third Army, and thence southwards in front of the Second Army.

7th Mar. 11. The Third Army expected on this day to reach the line (E 2) Chang-chia-tzu—the Northern Tombs, and orders were issued accordingly:—

1st Division to the Northern Tombs.
9th Division to Liu-tiao-tun (E 2).
7th Division to Chang-chia-tzu (E 2).

On this day two and a-half brigades, which formed the general reserve of the Manchurian armies, were sent by Marshal Oyama to Ma-san-chia-tzu (C 2).

The 7th Division reached the line Ssu-tai-tzu (D 2)—Chang-chia-tzu, whence trains were observed going north on the railway, but no general retreat had begun.

The 9th Division, supported by the Corps Artillery, attacked Tsao-hua-tun (D 2), which it captured at nightfall, only after a stubborn resistance and heavy loss on both sides.

The 1st Division attacked Chuan-wan-chiao (D 2), which it only occupied at nightfall, when Tsao-hua-tun fell, and the Russian line was withdrawn to the line (D 2 N.E.) Pa-chia-tzu—Hsiao-chi-tun.

The Cavalry Division advanced to Li-chia-pu-tzu (D 1) and Ta-hsin-tun (D 1): a detachment attempted to cut the railway

at Hu-chia-tai (E 1), but only succeeded in destroying a small portion before it was driven off.

The reserve brigades at Ma-san-chia-tzu came under General Nogi's command.

12. The orders issued were— **8th Mar.**

1st Division to Hou-chin-chia-wo-tzu (D 2).
9th Division to the road crossing over the railway 2 miles north-north-east of Mukden.
7th Division to Liu-tiao-tun (E 2).

In the morning, information was received of the retreat of the Russian forces from the Sha Ho during the night of the 7th March, and it became all the more imperative for the Third Army to push forward and intercept the retreat.

The 1st Division met a strong Russian counter-attack from the direction of Hsiao-chi-tun (D 2), and was driven back on Chuan-wan-chiao (D 2), where it maintained its position, driving the enemy back on Hsiao-chi-tun by evening.

The 9th Division, of which one brigade had lain in front of Pa-chia-tzu all the previous night, attacked and carried that village, with the support of the Corps Artillery, early in the morning, inflicting very heavy loss on the Russians.

The 7th Division attacked (E 2) Wang-chen-chung and San-tai-tzu, but, after fighting all day failed to carry either village.

The Cavalry Division held its ground about Hsiao-hsin-tun (D 1), opposed to a strong force of Russian cavalry, strengthened by a detachment of infantry.

The Second Army was still stopped by the Russian entrenchments on the Yu-hung-tun (D 2) line, and with the exception of the capture of Pa-chia-tzu (D 2 N.E.) the Third Army made no progress on this day.

Meanwhile the Russian forces in its front were increasing every hour.

Night attacks were contemplated by all three divisions for this night, but news was received from Marshal Oyama's Head-Quarters of the commencement of the Russian retreat from Mukden northwards, and of the enveloping movement of the Fourth and First Armies from the east towards the railway. The Third Army was therefore ordered to co-operate with this movement, by again edging up northwards and westwards so as to surround Mukden.

The orders issued for this day were to the following **9th Mar.** effect:—

The 9th Division was again to be taken out of the line, and placed further north on the left of the 7th Division, its place being taken by the 1st Division, which was to move up northwards.

Only in a country where free lateral communication is unimpeded could such a movement be possible, and it was again successfully carried out.

Leaving a small force at Chuan-wan-chiao (D 2) to fill the gap, until relieved by troops of the Second Army, the main body of the 1st Division moved north to Ssu-tai-tzu, and thence attacked San-tai-tzu (E 2) (against which the 7th Division had failed on the previous day) and Ta-kuan-tun (D 2).

The attack on San-tai-tzu (E 2) was partially successful, and a portion of the village was occupied, but that against Ta-kuan-tun failed.

The 7th Division attacked Wang-chen-chung (E 2) during the night of the 8th March, and failed, but attacked again on the morning of the 9th March.

A strong wind was blowing on this day, and a continuous dust storm made it difficult to see more than a few hundred yards.

Approaching through this dust a Russian brigade came unexpectedly upon the left flank of the 7th Division and compelled it to retreat with heavy loss on its reserves at Chang-chia-tzu (E 2).

The Russians followed, but were driven off, and in the afternoon the attack on Wang-chen-chung was renewed by the original brigade, now reduced to little more than a regiment.

At 6 p.m. the Russians again made a strong counter-attack with a force estimated at a full division, and again drove the Japanese back on Chang-chia-tzu, but the arrival of a brigade of the Army reserve saved the situation, and the Russians retreated east.

The 9th Division concentrated at Tao-chi-tun (D 1) and advanced with its main body on Shu-kou-tzu (E 1), detaching one brigade in the direction of Hu-chia-tai (E 1).

After driving four Russian battalions out of Kuo-chih-tun (E 1), the 9th Division main body occupied Kuo-shan-tun (E 1), where it remained facing the enemy, who occupied the next village, Tung-chang-shang.

On account of the dust storm, the Corps Artillery was unable to take part in this day's operations.

The Cavalry Division remained at Ta-hsin-tun (D 1) and Hsiao-hsin-tun (D 1).

10th Mar. The envelopment of Mukden was not yet complete, for the Fourth and First Armies had not yet reached the Tieh-ling—Mukden road.

The Third Army was therefore required to make a fresh effort on this day to join hands with the Fourth and First Armies.

The 1st Division, having failed on the 9th to take Ta-kuan-tun (D 2), determined to carry it by a night attack.

The Russians held, not only part of San-tai-tzu and the whole of Ta-kuan-tun, but also a line of trenches uniting the two villages.

Four battalions of the 1st Division succeeded during the night in penetrating this line, and reached the grove in which

stand the Northern Tombs, where they established themselves in the outer walled enclosure of the Tombs.

The Russians, however, again occupied their line San-tai-tzu—Ta-kuan-tun, although the four battalions in the enclosure in rear held out against all attacks.

On the morning of the 10th March, fresh troops of the 1st Division again attacked Ta-kuan-tun, and after desperate fighting occupied it at 4 p.m.

The retreating Russians lost heavily from the flanking fire of the isolated battalions which had held out in the Tombs enclosure.

At 5 p.m. both the grove surrounding the Tombs and the whole of San-tai-tzu were in the hands of the 1st Division.

The 7th Division succeeded in occupying Wang-chen-chung (E 2) at 6 p.m. in the evening, but only when the Russians drew off to follow in rear of their retreating columns.

Aided by two batteries of the Corps Artillery, the 9th Division attacked Tung-chang-shang (E 1) on the morning of the 10th, and after repulsing a strong counter-attack by a full Russian division, occupied the village at 2.30 p.m.

This division advanced its line a few hundred yards beyond Tung-chang-shang (E 1), but could make no impression on the Russian line beyond, until the evening, when the Russians withdrew to follow their retreating columns.

The left brigade of the 9th Division attacked Wei-chu-hsi (E 1) in the morning, but failed to take it, and the Russians held the line Wei-chu-hsi—Shu-kou-tzu till nightfall.

The Corps Artillery occupied a line from Kuo-chih-tun (E 1) to Chang-chia-tzu (E 2) throughout the day, whence it played with shrapnel upon the Russian columns plainly visible retreating between the railway and the Tieh-ling road.

At 3 p.m. one regiment of the Corps Artillery ceased firing for want of ammunition.

On the evening of the 10th March, the 9th Division opened communication by signal with the First Army.

At noon on the 10th March, the Fourth and First Armies reached the neighbourhood of Yu-lin-pu (E 2) and Pu-ho (E 1) respectively; thus, though the Russians were not completely surrounded, the gap through which they escaped was so narrow that their losses from shrapnel fire must have been enormous.

The stubborn tenacity with which the Russians held their line throughout the 10th March from Wei-chu-hsi (E 1) along by Shu-kou-tzu and Wang-chen-chung, west of the railway, and the exhaustion of the Japanese Third Army, alone prevented that Army from forming a junction with the Fourth and First Armies, and enabled the rear of the Russian column to get away.

The Third Army lost in all 15,000 men, of which the losses of the 9th Division, which had borne the brunt of the attacks, came to 6,000. The attack on Tsao-hua-tun (D 2) on the

8th March cost this division 1,500 men from one brigade, and the Russians 3,000, of whom 600 were found dead.

The attack of its second brigade against Pa-chia-tzu on the following day found 1,500 dead Russians in that village, while its losses nearly equalled that of the first brigade.

The 7th Division lost equally heavily on the 9th March against Wang-chen-chung (E 2).

It is not therefore surprising that the divisions of the Third Army were unable on the 10th to accomplish the task before them; and in the absence of an adequate force of Japanese cavalry and horse artillery, the remnant of the Russian Army escaped capture.

Attached are translations of two *Kanjos*—official letters of recognition—from Marshal Oyama to the Commander of the 9th Division, and from the Commander of the Third Army to the Commander of his Corps Artillery, which emphasize not only the extraordinary bravery and endurance of the 9th Division, but also the admirable tactical handling of the Corps Artillery, which, by its close co-operation and support, enabled the infantry to succeed in apparently impossible attacks.

The Corps Artillery lost altogether 14 officers and 350 rank and file, and fired 550 rounds per gun. In this battle they used about fifty per cent. of high-explosive shell. It is remarkable how useless shapnel is against troops sheltered behind the walls of a Manchurian village, and the Japanese troops so placed suffered practically no loss from the Russian artillery fire. The effect of the Japanese shell is, on the other hand, plainly visible in the total destruction of the villages against which their fire was directed.

The Third Army Head-Quarters were throughout connected by telephone with the Manchurian Army Head-Quarters, whose influence is apparent in the foregoing narrative upon the general direction of the Third Army's movements.

NOTE.—The foreign attachés who witnessed the Russian retreat on the 10th March from Kuo-chih-tun are full of admiration for the way in which the Russians held the line Shu-kou-tzu (E 1)—San-tai-tzu (E 2)—Ta-kuan-tun (D 2) against the Japanese Third Army all day long while their columns streamed northwards east of the railway line.

Russian batteries were posted in the villages along their line west of the railway and kept up a heavy shrapnel fire against which the Japanese could not advance, and between the villages were extended lines of infantry. The Japanese guns replied, playing with shrapnel on the retreating columns till, at 3 p.m., half the Corps Artillery and the Divisional Artillery of the 9th Division ceased fire for want of ammunition.

Towards evening the Russian covering force drew off in good order, from its left flank first, each portion retiring in turn over the railway and following on in rear of the columns.

The Japanese divisions, exhausted and reduced by days of hard fighting, lay all day powerless to pierce the Russian line, and it was not till the enemy withdrew that they could advance to the railway.

APPENDIX.

Translation of a Kanjo, *or official letter of recognition, from Marshal Marquis Oyama, commanding the Imperial Japanese Armies in Manchuria, to the 9th Division.*

During the engagement in the vicinity of Mukden the 9th Division, which had kept in touch with the left wing of the Second Army since the attack on Ssu-fang-tai, pressed the enemy back towards Mukden, and pressed him very closely.

Shortly afterwards, when the Third Army turned in a north-easterly direction, the division proved itself to be the backbone of the Army, and drove back the stubborn enemy at Tsao-hua-tun and Pa-chia-tzu.

Lastly, in the neighbourhood of Kuo-chih-tun the division, greatly reduced in numbers, intercepted a superior force of the enemy and turned the left flank of the Russian Army.

I recognize the great merit of the actions performed by the said division, and I hereby confer this *Kanjo.*

(Signed) MARSHAL MARQUIS IWAWO OYAMA,
Commanding the Imperial Japanese
Armies in Manchuria.

17th day of March: 38th year of Meiji.

Translation of a Kanjo, *or official letter of recognition of services, from General Baron Nogi, commanding the Third Imperial Japanese Army, to the 2nd Field Artillery Battalion.*

During the engagement on the 7th March 1905 in the neighbourhood of Chuan-wan-chiao and Tsao-hua-tun, the attack delivered on these two villages by the 1st and 9th Divisions met with a serious check.

At this critical moment the 2nd Field Artillery Battalion, leaving its position near the village of Hou-cheng and regardless of losses, advanced for two thousand yards over perfectly open ground under the enemy's fire. The battalion then took up its position near the village of Kao-li-tun and poured a heavy concentrated fire on the enemy, thus giving great assistance to the attack.

Again, at the attack on Tung-chang-shang village by the 9th Division on the 10th March, 1905, the 2nd Battalion of

the Field Artillery Brigade advanced for about one thousand five hundred yards under a severe fire, and coming into action at a distance of only five hundred yards from the Russian position, opened a heavy fire on the enemy, thereby affording support to the attacking infantry.

Moreover, when the enemy delivered a vigorous counter-attack, this battalion aided materially in repulsing it by the intensity and accuracy of its fire.

In recognition of the valour and great merit of the above deeds, I have the honour to confer this *Kanjo*.

(Signed) General Baron Kiten Nogi,
Commanding Third Imperial
Japanese Army.

(10) Battle of Mukden; Action of the Cavalry of the Third Japanese Army.

REPORT by Colonel W. H. BIRKBECK C.B., Manchuria, 22nd April 1905.

(*See* Map 60.)

At first sight one is inclined to accuse the Japanese cavalry of want of enterprise and of hugging the infantry columns, from which it was never separated by more than five miles, but on further consideration one is compelled to admit that its course of action was correct.

The Japanese cavalry labours under certain disadvantages; the Japanese themselves are not natural horsemen, and their horses, which are mere ponies, are indifferent beasts and ill-suited for cavalry.

The men are trained to fight both mounted and dismounted, but only as a means to an end, and that end is reconnaissance.

The most intelligent among the recruits of the year are drafted to the cavalry, and the individual training given in scouting, map-reading, &c., is most thorough, and the many brilliant exploits of officers' patrols, which have penetrated to Harbin, Kirin, and Tieh-ling during the recent winter, show its value.

Thus, though individually most daring and intelligent scouts and good fighters, the Japanese cavalry is collectively inferior in quality to the other two arms, while in numbers it amounts only to some sixty squadrons, unsupported by mounted infantry, or by horse artillery, until the recent battle, when a horse battery was improvised.*

The Russians, on the other hand, are credited with 25,000 mounted men, *i.e.*, about one hundred and fifty squadrons, including Cossacks.

Having, then, so few mounted men, and knowing the enormous Russian superiority in numbers, the Japanese commander is wise to be careful of his cavalry, for, like Admiral Togo with his battleships, he cannot afford to risk his squadrons at close quarters with a superior weight of metal, however base.

During the first three days, the 27th and 28th February and the 1st March, the Third Army had only one cavalry

* Thirteen regiments of divisional cavalry, each three squadrons, and two cavalry brigades, each of eight squadrons, was the peace strength. —W. H. B.

brigade, which could not hope effectively to conceal the march of the columns upon a front of 12 miles, and therefore confined its efforts to protecting the outer flank and to making sure that there was no considerable Russian force on the right bank of the Liao, pushing with that object to Hsin-min-tun (A 1).

Means other than by employing a cavalry screen had always been successfully taken to induce in the Russian Commander's mind the belief that the real Japanese turning movement was to be directed against his left flank, and the advance of the Third Army, once it had crossed the Hun, needed no further concealment.

On the first day (27th February) eight Japanese (*i.e.*, one brigade) and about fifteen Russian squadrons were in contact, but when the Japanese cavalry crossed the Liao, and the Russian squadrons fell back in a north-easterly direction before the advance of the infantry columns, they became separated, and it was not apparently till the 3rd March that they met again on the Mukden—Hsin-min-tun (A 1) road, after which they were constantly in close opposition without decisive result.

My request to Army Head-Quarters for information as to the strength of the Japanese detachment which reached Hsin-min-tun on the 1st March, and the opposition encountered, has not met with success.

On the 2nd March the 1st Cavalry Brigade, from the Second Army, was placed at Pan-chia-tai (C 3) to fill a gap in the line of the Third Army, and the following evening it joined the 2nd Cavalry Brigade upon the exposed flank, and on the 4th March a cavalry division was formed at Chien-hsin-tai-tzu (D 1) with two batteries of field artillery and one of six machine guns.

On the 3rd March the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, supported by two battalions of infantry, successfully staved off the advance of twenty-five to thirty Russian squadrons at Ta-fang-shen (C 1) on the Mukden–Hsin-min-tun road upon the flank of the army.

From this day onwards the Japanese cavalry (now a full division of sixteen squadrons) found itself constantly opposed by greatly superior forces.

I am not aware what were its numbers, but presumably the bulk of the Russian cavalry would be used in this open country rather than in the hilly region upon the other flank. In these circumstances the Japanese cavalry could never go far from infantry support; but by occupying villages and holding them with artillery, machine gun, and rifle fire, it succeeded in maintaining its position upon the exposed flank of the Third Army, where it was ready to follow up the retreating Russians, which presumably it has done, though, as information of its movements subsequent to the 9th March is at present denied me, I cannot say.

The positions at Li-chia-pu-tzu (D 1), Ta-hsin-tun (D 1), and Hsiao-hsin-tun (D 1) were well chosen, for the ground rises perceptibly, north of Mukden, to a ridge upon which these villages stand, giving a fair view over a good deal of the surrounding country.

On the 7th March a detachment succeeded in slightly damaging the railway near Hu-chia-tai (E 1), but this was easily repaired. It is sufficiently surprising that no further damage was done to the line during the 8th and 9th, for it would have been worth a considerable sacrifice to prevent the escape of the eight hundred cars which left Mukden during the night of the 9th March.

The inaction of the Russian cavalry is difficult to account for. The army is credited with 25,000 mounted men, or about 150 squadrons; upon its right flank were the flat, open valleys of the Hun and the Liao, and opposed to it only one division, or 16 squadrons of Japanese cavalry; the river and streams were all frozen and passable anywhere; the country was full of villages stacked full of *kaoliang*, which is excellent forage; the country was frozen, but frozen dry with a few inches of friable dust on the top, not slippery and snow-covered as in Europe; within reach was the line of communication of the Third Army lengthening out from Liao-yang, up which convoys of Chinese carts were continually bringing the food and ammunition necessary to supply the fighting line throughout the ten days' battle; a circuit of seventy miles would have brought them on to the railway south of Liao-yang, the main line of supply of all the Japanese armies; and yet absolutely no offensive movement seems even to have been attempted.

The attachés on the Russian side may possibly explain this inaction; to us it is incomprehensible, unless it be that the Russian dragoon has been so emasculated by his training as to have lost all the *élan* and enterprise of the true cavalry soldier. If this be the true explanation, there is no more conclusive argument in support of the retention in our cavalry training of all that relates to *l'arme blanche* than the inaction of the Russian cavalry armed with the rifle and bayonet and taught *primarily* to fight on foot.

(11) The Battle of Mukden; with special reference to the First Japanese Army.

Report by Lieut.-Colonel C. V. HUME, D.S.O., Royal Artillery.
Tokio, 8th July 1905.

Plate.

Map illustrating daily position of the Japanese Armies during the battle - - - - - Map 61

Covering Letter.

1. I have compiled the accompanying report on the battle of Mukden mainly from information received from General Kuroki's staff, but have added my own observations and also information obtained from other sources. The report deals primarily with the operations of the First Army, but as I was given the general situation of each of the other Armies on successive days, I am able to give you a comprehensive sketch of the strategy (or "grand tactics") of the battle. Accurate accounts of the operations of the Second and Third Armies will be forthcoming from our attachés with those Armies, but those of the Ya-lu and Fourth Armies will probably remain for some time the mere sketches I have been able to obtain.

2. The composition of the various armies was kept secret from us, and the only one I can speak of with any certainty is the First Army. This was composed as follows:—

Guard Division complete, plus three four-gun batteries of Russian field guns.
2nd Division complete.
12th Division complete.
Umezawa Brigade (reservists), plus four six-gun batteries of field artillery.
Awaibara Brigade (reservists).
One battery of 12-cm. guns—made some time ago in Japan, of bronze, from an Italian pattern.
One battery of 15-cm. howitzers on field carriages.
About twenty-four 9·5-cm. howitzers or mortars, carried on beds in transport carts.
Each regular division had 14 machine guns.
The Umezawa Brigade acted independently on the Sha Ho, while the Awaibara Brigade was attached to the 12th Division.

In the pursuit these two brigades formed the reserve of the First Army till, on the 10th March, Umezawa was sent to prolong the line held by the Guard and came under the general officer commanding Guard Division. The heavy guns and howitzers were used in the fighting on the Sha Ho and were mostly placed on the Kuan-shan Ling (E 5), but when the pursuit began on the 8th they were left hopelessly in the rear, and I do not think any of them ever succeeded in getting into action again.

3. The other armies were constituted somewhat as follows :—

The Ya-lu Army comprised the 11th Division from Port Arthur and probably three or four reserve brigades.*

The Fourth Army comprised the 6th and 10th Divisions. It had, in previous battles, comprised the 5th and 10th Divisions, but during the winter it had only held a short line, and the 5th had been held in reserve together with the 8th Division. At the end of January the 5th and 8th Divisions, together with the 2nd Division from the First Army, were sent west to fight at Hei-kou-tai, and after that battle the 2nd Division returned to the First Army, the 5th and 8th remained and formed the centre and left of the Second Army on its new alignment, while the 6th Division from the right of the Second Army was transferred to the Fourth Army to replace the 5th Division. The Fourth Army also comprised the 1st Independent Field Artillery Brigade and four 28-cm. (11-inch) howitzers brought up from Port Arthur.

The Second Army comprised the 4th, 5th and 8th Divisions.

The Third Army comprised the 1st, 7th and 9th Divisions.

The reserve, kept in hand by Oyama, consisted of the 3rd Division and three reserve brigades.

To each of the Second, Third and Fourth Armies may be added two or three reserve brigades, some heavy guns and howitzers, and one or two batteries of captured Russian field guns.

4. In addition to the foregoing there were :—

The 2nd Independent Field Artillery Brigade, probably with either the Second or Third Army.†

The 1st Cavalry Brigade (Major General Akiyama), connecting the Second and Third Armies.

Where the 2nd Cavalry Brigade was I do not know.‡

Introductory Remarks.

1. The battle of Mukden was fought along a very extended front. During the winter the three Armies which had fought and won the battle of the Sha Ho held a line about 35 miles

* One reserve division.

† Apparently 9 batteries were with the Second Army and 27 with the Third Army.

‡ The previous reports show it was with the Third Army.

long, from Pen-hsi-hu (E 6) on the right to west of Lin-sheng-pu (C 5) on the left. After the battle of Hei-kou-tai (B 5) the left was extended to the Hun at that place, and the front then measured 50 miles in length. When the Ya-lu Army was in position on the right and the Third Army concentrated in rear of the left, the front from Chien-chang (G 6) to Hsiao-pei-ho (B 6) was between 90 and 100 miles long, and this length of front was maintained during the first part of the advance. These distances do not include the front occupied by the Japanese cavalry, which was beyond the left flank of the line. When the Russians subsequently retreated from Mukden, the Japanese line from Fu-shun (E 4) on the right to west of Mukden on the left was reduced once more to about 35 miles in length.

2. The country fought over has been much described and will be again described in the detailed accounts of the operations of the divisions of the First Army. A short general account is therefore all that is required here. The Ya-lu and First Armies operated entirely in the hills. The Fourth Army advanced to the Hun through a line of country where the hills blend with the plains, affording the Russians a series of strong defensive positions separated by flat open ground. The Second and Third Armies operated in the plain, where the obstacles consisted of entrenched river beds and walled villages. The whole country was bare and bleak; the low hills and every bit of level were covered with the frozen ridge and furrow of the *kaoliang*, millet and bean fields, and the few patches of wood on the stony hills had been thinned, or cleared altogether, to provide fuel for the opposing armies during the winter.

3. In the hills the line of the Sha Ho and Tung-kou (E 5) valleys run generally east and west, and it was along this line that the First Army fought from the 24th February till the 8th March, when the pursuit began. Where the Guard and 12th Divisions fought the sole of the valley is flat and bare, and from half a mile to one mile wide. On the Japanese side, Ma-erh Shan (D 5 south), Hua-kou-lin Shan,* Wai-tou Shan (D 5 S.E.), Hsiao-liu-yu Shan† and Kuan-shan Ling (E 5 S.W.) were the main peaks, rising from four hundred and fifty to six hundred feet above the valley, while Ma-chuan-tzu Shan (D 5) and Te-te Shan (D 5) were spreading under features, the highest points of which were under two hundred feet above the Sha Ho. On the Russian side there was a belt of hills opposite the Guard, two hundred to three hundred feet high and a mile or so wide, separating the Sha Ho and Yang-tai-jen-shan (E 5) valleys and running eastwards into the tangled mass of high, steep mountains. Along this belt ran the Russian entrenched position with three lines of trenches and numerous obstacles, and

* Not marked on map; it is near Hua-kou (D 5 south).
† Not marked on map; it is near Hsiao-liu-chia-yu (D 5 S.E.).

extending as far east as Ma-chun-tan (F 5 N.W.). A little north of the Yang-tai-jen-shan valley the valleys run north and south and drain into the Hun, the hills sinking and the valleys widening as they approach the Hun.

4. Where the First Army crossed the Hun valley it was flat, bare and open, and from three to five miles wide. Immediately along the north bank rose bare, rolling hills, one hundred and fifty to three hundred feet high, which extended, with occasional higher ridges, up to the valley of the Fan (E 2). Along the north bank of the Hun and at other points in these hills some entrenchments had been made, and in front of Chu-chan (D 4 east) were a couple of infantry redoubts on the river bank. These latter were not used, the pursuit being pushed too rapidly to allow the Russians time to organize a proper defence of the line of the Hun.

5. The valley of the Fan (E 2) is narrower than that of the Hun, and the hills on the north bank are steeper and higher, formidable hills which were, however, but lightly entrenched here and there. Where the 2nd Division fought near Chang-chia-lou-tzu (E 2), the valley narrows to a gorge, five hundred to eight hundred yards wide, the hills on each side rising almost sheer and those on the north bank dropping to the river edge. In other parts the valley is from one to three miles wide. North of the Fan valley these hills continue, a good deal broken up by wide valleys, till they sink into the valley of the Tieh-ling river (E 2).

6. Along the north side of this latter valley a line of hills runs in an easterly direction, starting from a point just south-east of the town of Tieh-ling. On this ridge had been constructed the elaborate works of the much-talked-of Tieh-ling position, and from its western end the entrenchments were carried in front of Tieh-ling across the level to the Liao. I rode over to Tieh-ling one day and had a look at the west end of the ridge, and a more perfect exposition of field fortification and engineering I never saw. The ground was argillaceous and cut like cheese, and the deep trenches in three lines, the covered ways, obstacles, gun emplacements, sandbag revetments and the communications, both lateral and to the rear, cut in the steep slopes, were laid out and finished in the most perfect style. The Russians are reported to have employed three thousand Chinese coolies during a period of four months to make them.

7. The rivers are very much like those of North India, but though their banks are higher in the plains than they are in the hills, they never cut so deep into the ground as Panjab and South African rivers do. Their bottoms, in the hills, are generally sandy or pebbly and sound, but stretches of deep mud and quicksand are to be found. Withies and reeds grow in patches along their courses. In the hilly country traversed by the First Army the rivers varied much in width. The

Sha Ho was practically no obstacle, its channel being under one hundred yards wide, only a foot or eighteen inches deep, and frozen hard. The Hun and Fan are, however, formidable obstacles even when low, though fords are to be found opposite the main villages. Near Chu-chan (D 4 east) the bed of the Hun was about one thousand yards wide, the river flowing in two channels, the main one of which was a couple of hundred yards, and two to four feet deep, with a strong current. Four or five miles west of Fu-shun the bed was over a mile wide, the river again flowing here in two channels. In other parts it was narrower, the single channel containing more water. The Fan is like the Hun, but on a somewhat smaller scale, though at the points at which I crossed it the volume of water was considerable.

8. When the battle began the weather was very cold. The thermometer fell to zero (Fahrenheit) at nights and, though the days were generally bright, a piercing north wind blew frequently, bringing occasional blizzards of fine snow with it. But even then the sun was beginning to gain power, and when the pursuit began the thaw was pronounced. There was a good deal of anxiety as to whether the Hun would be reached in time to enable the troops to cross on the ice, and as it turned out they were only just in time. At some spots the ice bore all right, but at others the centre of the main channel was uncovered for a few yards, and the men had to step off the ice into two feet or so of water, and then on to the ice again. The officer commanding a regiment of field artillery with the Fourth Army told me he succeeded in getting his regiment over on the ice on the 10th March, but that the following day it was with the greatest difficulty that even a Japanese transport cart could be got over. As far as I know, the First Army only found one bridge standing, a ricketty wooden one put up by the Russians at Wan-pu-chieh (E 4), a few miles west of Fu-shun, which proved of the greatest value to the 2nd Division.

The Battle on the Sha Ho.

1. There was no pursuit after the battle of the Sha Ho, for at that time the Japanese had not made their preparations for a really big blow at the Russian field army. It is quite possible that the number of men available was sufficient for the purpose, but ammunition was somewhat short, and, with Port Arthur holding out, it was impossible to make quite sure that the supply to the field army would be sufficient to enable it to fight a decisive and prolonged battle After the battle of the Sha Ho therefore, the Japanese directed all their efforts to collecting men and material, and then they had to go into winter quarters. In ordinary years the cold is intense enough to stop operations during the winter, but last winter was a comparatively mild one, and it was not the weather that prevented the Japanese

advance from taking place earlier than it did. Had everything been ready, they would have pushed on after the battle of Hei-kou-tai, as the amount of frost-bite at that battle was not very great, but they then had to wait for the concentration of the Third Army, the bulk of which was massing behind the left of the line, while one of its divisions (the 11th) was on its way to join the Ya-lu Army.

2. From the middle of October to the middle of January the Manchurian armies occupied the line shown on the map,* with their left across the Sha Ho. The First Army occupied a line from the Ping-tai-tzu valley (E 5 west) on the right to a point in front of Ha-ma-tang (D 5) on the left. Pen-hsi-hu (E 6), behind the right, was separately defended. The right of the First Army was a very important position, as it was the extreme right of all the Armies. Lao-yeh Ling (E 5 s.w. corner) was the easternmost point held. The front line was held on the right by one and a half divisions (12th Division and a reserve brigade), while two reserve battalions were in position round Pen-hsi-hu. The whole line was naturally very strong. The Guard held from Hua-kou Ling† to Lien-hua Shan.† The Umezawa Brigade was between the 12th Division and the Guard, while the 2nd Division filled the gap between the Guard and the Fourth Army. As will be seen from the map, the front occupied by the 2nd Division (D 5) was a very short one and projected to the front. It was too short for a whole division, but it was intended that the 2nd Division should, if necessary, be used as a general reserve to the Army, or be at General Kuroki's disposal for any special purpose.

3. The line as above indicated was held till towards the end of January, when, the battle of Hei-kou-tai taking place, the 2nd Division from the First Army, the 5th Division from the Fourth Army, and the 8th Division, were sent away to the west. At that time the Third Army was concentrating west of Liao-yang, while one of its divisions (11th) was marching eastwards along the coast road to join the Ya-lu Army on the right. Before the battle of Hei-kou-tai, the extreme left of the Manchurian Armies had been at Wan-chia-yuan-tzu (C 5), cavalry watching the gap between that place and the Hun; but after the battle the left of the line was prolonged to Hei-kou-tai. The general reserve of the Army of Manchuria consisted of about two and a half divisions (one complete division and three reserve brigades). This was the situation when the battle of Mukden began.

4. Reconnaissance, intelligence, and information from prisoners enabled the Japanese to form what was afterwards

* *See* Map 61.

† Not on Map 61. Their position can be inferred from the block showing the position of the Guard Division (D 5).

found to be a substantially correct estimate of the strength and dispositions of the Russian armies. From east to west their troops were disposed thus (the order in which the corps are given is that in which they stood) :—

East of the Railway.

(1) Part of the 71st Reserve Division.
(2) 3rd Siberian Army Corps—3rd and 6th Divisions.
(3) 2nd Siberian Army Corps — 5th and 1st Reserve Divisions.
(4) 4th Siberian Army Corps — 2nd and 3rd Reserve Divisions.
(5) 1st Army Corps—22nd and 37th Divisions.
(6) 6th Siberian Army Corps.—72nd and 55th Reserve Divisions.

On the Railway.

(7) 17th Army Corps—3rd and 35th Divisions.

West of the Railway.

(8) 5th Siberian Army Corps—¾ 61st and 54th Reserve Divisions.
(9) 10th Army Corps—9th and 31st Divisions.
(10) 8th Army Corps—14th and 15th Divisions, ¼ 61st Reserve Division, 1st, 2nd and 3rd European Rifle Brigades.
(11) 1st Siberian Army Corps—1st and 9th Divisions.
(12) Between the Hun and Liao was Mishchenko with—
  (*a*) The Don Cossack Division ;
  (*b*) A mixed Dragoon Division ;
  (*c*) Ural-Baikal Cossack Division ;
  (*d*) Caucasus Cossack Division ;
  (*e*) Orenburg Cossack Division ;
  (*f*) 4th Brigade of Railway Guards ;
  (*g*) Some mounted scouts.
(13) On the extreme Russian left was Rennenkampf with—
  The main body of the 71st Reserve Infantry Division ;
  The Siberian Cossack Division ;
  The Trans-Baikal Cossack Division.
(14) The general reserve consisted of the 16th Army Corps (25th and 41st Divisions), which was placed on the main road behind the 17th Army Corps.

5. Just before the battle began, the 2nd Division came back to the First Army. The orders to the First Army were to hold its position and to send a detachment to threaten the Russian left. So, on its return from Hei-kou-tai, the 2nd Division was sent to Kao-tai-tzu (E 6), 6 miles north-east of Pen-hsi-hu, in readiness to advance against the enemy's left.

6. The general strategy had for its object the eventual turning of both Russian flanks, the extension of the Japanese line by the addition of the Third and Ya-lu Armies to its flanks having been made for this purpose. The country in which the Ya-lu Army was to operate was of such a difficult character that a rapid and unexpected advance was out of the question, so the Ya-lu Army was to advance first and draw the enemy's attention to that flank before the Third Army started. The concentration of the Third Army, whose outflanking movement was to be the main one, had therefore to be carried out very carefully. If at the end of January the Third Army had been concentrated between the Hun and the Liao, its subsequent advance would have been easier and shorter; but to have done this would have meant making the Russians a present of the plan of campaign, and so General Nogi concentrated his Army west of Liao-yang, near the junction of the Hun and Tai-tzu Rivers.*

7. The general plan having been discussed and settled orders for the advance were finally issued on the 20th February. They were to the following effect:— **20th Feb.**

(1) The Ya-lu Army, which was on the line Wei-tzu-yu (G 6) —Pao-tzu-yen (G 6), to advance on the 23rd February in two columns on Fu-shun. The right column to advance from Wei-tzu-yu, *viâ* Ma-chuang-tzu (G 5) and Wu-lung-kou (G 5), through Ku-chia-tzu (F 4) on Fu-shun. The left column to advance from Ching-ho-cheng (F 6) *viâ* Ma-chun-tan (F 5 N.W. corner) and Shi-fou-chang (E 4) on Fu-shun. The object of this Army was to get to the enemy's left rear by the above-mentioned roads.

(2) The First Army to be ready to attack on the 27th if necessary, the 2nd Division to take Wang-fu Ling (E 5 centre) by the 27th.

(3) The Fourth Army to hold the line from the left of the First Army to Lin-sheng-pu (C 5) on the railway, and to be ready to advance at any time.

(4) The Second Army to attack from Shen-tan-pu (C 5) towards Lai-shen-pu (C 5), wheeling to its right.

(5) The Third Army to advance on the 26th and attack the enemy's right flank, wheeling to its own right.

(6) The reserve of the Manchurian Armies to be concentrated near Ta-tung-shan-pu (C 5 south).

8. On the 24th the 2nd Division, after driving off some small parties of the enemy, reached the line Te-ti—Pa-jih-ti (E 5 south), and on the 25th advanced to the line Fun-tu Ling—Erh-ma Ling (E 5). This movement required support, so on the 25th the right brigade of the 12th Division wheeled to its left behind the 2nd Division and took up a line from the heights south of Ta-ho-pei-tung-kou (E 5) to the heights south of Huang-mu-chang (E 5). On the 26th, the 2nd Division took Wang-fu Ling after a severe fight, and the 12th Division took the height south of Sung-shu-chu-tzu (E 5) **24th to 26th Feb.**

* *See* footnote *, page 60.

9. On the 25th the artillery was put into position. The 12th Division guns were placed on Kuan-shan Ling (E 5 S.W.) and east of Hsiao-liu-yu Shan* ; Umezawa's guns west of Hsiao-liu-yu Shan* ; the Guard batteries on Te-te Shan (D 5) and Wai-tou Shan (D 5). When on the 26th the 2nd Division attacked Wang-fu Ling, the Guard and 12th Division guns kept up a hot fire to engage the enemy's attention and to make him unmask his guns and show their positions. In reply the Russians showed about sixty guns, many less than expected. The Russians generally keep a number of guns in reserve positions, but on this occasion the Japanese were unable to find out whether they had followed their usual custom.

10. On the 23rd the Ya-lu Army took Ching-ho-cheng (or Chenhochen) (F 6 N.E.), and on the 25th it reached the line Hsi-chuan-ling (G 5)—Ta Ling (F 5); on the 26th it reached the line Wu-lung-kou (G 5)—San-lung-yu (F 5). Nothing had as yet happened on the left. The Russian forces in front of the Ya-lu Army and the 2nd Division then began to increase in strength.

27th and 28th Feb.

11. On the 27th the First Army continued its bombardment of the Russian positions. The 2nd Division took the highest point of Wang-fu Ling, attacking at midnight 26th–27th, and on the 27th tried to gain the height east of Kao-tai Ling (E 5). But snow stopped it, and at the same time a strong force of the enemy (four and a half battalions and a battery) appeared on its right at Hsiao-pu (E 5). On the 28th the artillery of the Guard and 12th Divisions continued its fire. The 2nd Division spent the day reconnoitring the broken and difficult country in its front. Hitherto the Japanese had thought that Kao-tai Ling was the extreme left of the Russian line, but this day's reconnaissance showed that it extended through Hsiao-pu to Ma-chun-tan (F 5 N.W.).

12. From the opening of the battle, Colonel Matsumoto, General Kuroki's artillery staff officer, took command of the four groups of guns of the 12th Division, Umezawa Brigade and Guard Division, which were in action along a front of over five miles. The sixty Russian guns opposed to them, instead of increasing in numbers, decreased, and it seemed as if the superior strength of the Japanese must have caused them material damage. Not only did the guns decrease in number, but those that remained withdrew from their advanced positions and took up concealed ones, avoiding the Japanese guns, which therefore sustained little or no damage.

13. On the 27th the Ya-lu Army was in the same position as on the 26th, but on the 28th the right column reached Ti-ta (F 4) and the left column Chiu-ping-tai (F 5). There was no change in the positions of the Fourth and Second Armies on the

* Not marked on Map 61 ; it is near Hsiao-liu-chia-yu (D 5 S.E.).

27th, but on the 28th the left wing of the Second Army advanced a little.

14. On the 27th the Third Army began to move, and it crossed the Hun to the line Ma-ma-chieh (B 6 north)–Ka-li-ma (A 5), wheeling to its left, its right on the Hun, its left on the Liao. The line it occupied this day was the enemy's advanced line of observation, and it was occupied without resistance. Continuing its advance, the Third Army occupied, on the 28th, the line Chang-chia-wo-peng (B 5), Chen-tzu-kang (B 4) (on the Liao), without resistance. Strong opposition had been expected near Ssu-fang-tai (B 5), where Mishchenko's main body was located, but none was met with.*

15. From the 1st March the main attack began, and the whole line attacked. The situation on that day was as follows:— **1st Mar.**

(1) The 2nd Division had been ordered to take the height east of Kao-tai Ling (E 5), but though it attacked it they were unable to take it, and when night fell the Russians were still holding their position.

(2) The 12th Division tried to cross the Tung-kou (E 5 west) valley to attack Tung-kou Shan,† but the valley was enfiladed from Che-tou Ling (E 5), and they were unable to get across.

(3) Umezawa at 5 a.m. occupied Hou Sung-mo-pu-tzu (D 5).

(4) The Guard took Yao-chien-hu-tun (D 5 centre) before daybreak. Ma-chuan-tzu Shan, Te-te Shan and Wai-tou Shan were three very important tactical points, so the Japanese had strongly entrenched them, and four battalions had been told off to hold them. The main force of the Guard was at Ma-erh Shan. When therefore the 2nd Division went away from the left of the Guard in January, the gap behind Ma-chuan-tzu Shan was filled only by the 16th Regiment, which the 2nd Division had left behind for the purpose.

(5) The left wing of the Second Army had advanced a little and occupied Chang-tan (B.C. 5).

(6) The Third Army advanced to the line Chang-wo-peng (B 5)—Hsiao-min-tun (B 5), its right thrown back to Ssu-fang-tai (B 5).

(7) The Ya-lu Army was in the same position as on the 28th, the enemy's position in its front being too strong for it. The ground over which the 2nd Division and Ya-lu Army fought was of such a difficult nature that numbers did not count in advancing against the formidable Russian positions.

16. On the 2nd March the course of events was as follows:— **2nd Mar.**

(1) The 2nd Division made a fierce attack on the height east of Kao-tai Ling (E 5 centre), but was stopped, mainly by machine gun fire.

---

* *See*, however, para. 5, page 221.

† A ridge parallel to the river Tung-kou (E 5 west).

(2) The main body of the 12th Division crossed the Tung-kou valley (E 5), and by midday had occupied the first and lowest line of advanced trenches of the Russian position. They tried to press on in the afternoon but failed.

(3) The Guard Division remained in position.

(4) The Ya-lu Army made no advance.

(5) The Fourth Army took possession of the Russian advanced trenches, and got within two hundred or three hundred yards of the main position, but could get no further.

(6) The Second Army, pivoting on its right, reached Chou-kuan-pu, on the Hun, and Pao-hsiang-tun (C 5), driving back the enemy.

(7) The Third Army advanced without serious resistance. The right of the line was thus stopped while the left was able to push on. The Second Army had hard fighting and advanced slowly, taking well-defended villages one after the other. The Third Army met with but little resistance, and advanced rapidly.

3rd Mar. 17. On the 3rd March the events were as follows :—

(1) On the 2nd March the 12th Division was across the valley, and within from seven hundred to one thousand two hundred yards of the enemy; on the same day the 2nd Division was also stopped close to the enemy. So things on the right had come to a standstill, and, in order to relieve the situation, it became necessary to throw the Guard Division across the valley. It advanced, together with the 16th Regiment, in the small hours of the 3rd March, and though they suffered severely they succeeded in taking the most advanced line of Russian trenches. They pushed on to attack the main position, but their losses became too heavy, and at daybreak the attack stopped.

(2) The 2nd Division also failed to accomplish its object, and had to stop its attack. Not only were its losses very heavy, but owing to the hot fighting on a narrow front, the troops got so mixed up that it was necessary to stop to rearrange them. The attack on the hill east of Kao-tai Ling (E 5 centre) was also suspended, and the division withdrew a short distance and collected its wounded. It was this latter action which caused Kuropatkin to report that he had repulsed twenty battalions there. This was a gross exaggeration, but what he said about the Japanese having used their dead as cover was true. The Japanese losses at Kao-tai Ling were 3,000.

(3) The Ya-lu Army was still in the same position.

(4) The Fourth Army had made no advance.

(5) The Second Army advanced to the line San-chia-tzu (C 5 centre)—Chang-tang-pu (C 5 north) (on the Hun), still wheeling to its right, and always in touch with the Third Army through the 1st Cavalry Brigade

(6) The Third Army advanced to the line Lin-chia-tai (C 4 south)—Te-sheng-ying-tzu—Teng-mi-huang—Huang-shang—

Tsao-chia-tai (C 4), its left almost touching the road from Mukden to Hsin-min-tun. On this day it had a fight, and a very successful one too. The 16th Army Corps, the Russian general reserve, advanced to meet it, and a big fight took place, the Russian divisions advancing one after the other, and being successively defeated. This was a new phase of fighting, both forces being in motion, and is the only case that has occurred during the campaign, if we except collisions between small bodies.* In a few minutes the enemy was driven back with heavy loss. Reports received by the First Army put the Russian losses at 3,000 left on the field, while the Japanese casualties only reached 300. This action does not show the Russians in a favourable light where a real field battle is concerned.

18. On the 4th March the situation of the First Army was a somewhat difficult one, for although the 2nd Division was stopped at Kao-tai Ling, it became necessary for the First Army to try and assist the Ya-lu Army to advance. The Japanese left was close to Mukden, but the right was still far in rear, and should the Russian main force make a determined counter-attack against the left, the right could in no wise co-operate, and the situation would become precarious. But as the 2nd Division had been brought to a standstill, the First Army could not get on until the Ya-lu Army had made some progress. So, on the 4th March the Ohara Brigade of the 2nd Division, with two batteries of mountain artillery, was sent towards the left of the Ya-lu Army. **4th Mar.**

19. As regards the remainder of the First Army, the position was as follows:—The 12th Division had been unable to advance beyond the line it held the previous day, and reconnaissance showed the country in its front to be a most difficult and broken one. The Guard Division was in a dangerous position: there was no communication between its front line, clinging to the foot of the Russian position, and the reserves on the south side of the fire-swept valley during the day. Umezawa was really the general reserve to the First Army, but his troops were used to assist the divisions on either side of him, so the actual reserve available was very small. Moreover, the First Army was extended along a front of 25 miles without any concentrated reserve behind it. The situation was therefore apparently full of risks, but the Japanese willingly accepted them as they were operating in a mountainous country, and had a strongly entrenched line close at hand to fall back on.

20. On the 4th March, therefore, the problems before the First Army were—

(1) How to reinforce the Ya-lu Army?

(2) How to concentrate its troops more effectually, and at the same time ease the situation of the Guards?

* The battle of the Sha Ho in its earlier stages, however, was a *bataille de rencontre*.

(3) How to prevent the Russians from making good their retreat when the time should come? (Their right wing was already giving way, and their centre and left must eventually go too.)

21. To meet problem (1), the Ohara Brigade concentrated at 10 a.m. on the 4th at Yang-tai-jen-shan (E 5), and advanced on Ma-chun-tan (F 5 N.W.); at 3 p.m. on the 5th it reached the line Hsi-kou-ling—Tung-ku-ling-tzu, about 9 miles south-west of Ma-chun-tan. To meet problem (2), it was necessary to bring the 12th Division back across the Tung-kou valley (east of Tung-kou) to Ping-tai-tzu (E 5 S.W.), a ticklish operation, as its advanced line was only from seven hundred to one thousand two hundred yards from the Russian trenches; also, to render secure the position of the Guard, it was necessary to take possession of the position north of Pien-niu-lu-pu (D 5 S.E.). Further, to meet problem (3), it was necessary to keep in close touch with the Russians to prevent them from slipping away.

22. So the following movements took place simultaneously:—

(1) At Ping-tai-tzu there were already about five battalions of the 12th Division. On the night of the 4th, the troops of the 12th Division east of Tung-kou were secretly withdrawn to the south side of the valley, the operation being successfully accomplished, in spite of the three batteries of mountain guns and 9·5-cm. howitzers, whose withdrawal it involved. Leaving four battalions on the south side of the valley and observation posts only on the north side, the remainder made a flank march and concentrated at Ping-tai-tzu.

(2) The attack on the position north of Pien-niu-lu-pu (D 5 S.E.) was made by the five battalions at Ping-tai-tzu. These took the Russian advanced line and at the same time covered the flank march of the troops from Tung-kou, which it was necessary to conceal from the enemy.

23. The combined operation worked out most successfully, although the General Officer commanding the 12th Division had pronounced it impossible, and the Russians did not learn of the withdrawal till midday on the 5th. The position was then as follows:—

(1) The Guard Division was across the valley on the left.

(2) Five battalions of the 12th Division were across the valley at Pien-niu-lu-pu.

(3) The remainder of 12th Division, less four battalions, was at Ping-tai-tzu.

(4) Four battalions of the 12th Division were on the south side of the Tung-kou connecting with the 2nd Division.

(5) Umezawa was behind the interval between the Guard Division and Pien-niu-lu-pu.

As the 12th Division had a reserve brigade attached to it, the General Officer commanding the First Army thus had the

best part of a division in hand as reserve, and the Army was well in touch with the enemy.

24. On the 4th March there was no change in the position of the Fourth Army. The Second Army occupied the line Lai-shen-pu (C 5 centre)—Su-hu-pu (on the Hun) (C 5 north).

25. On the 5th March the following were the main events:— **5th Mar.**

(1) The left wing of the Fourth Army advanced. After the Second Army took Lai-shen-pu, the Fourth Army wheeled to its right and, after some severe fighting, drove back the Russians and occupied the line Ta-su-chia-pu (C 5 N.E.)—Han-cheng-pu (on railway C 5).

(2) The Third Army got on well; its left wing reached Ta-shih-chiao (C 4 north), on the Hsin-min-tun road, and its right wing Yang-shih-tun (C 4 S.E.) on the 5th.

(3) The right division of the Second Army was then given to the Fourth Army, and on the night of the 5th the remainder of the Second Army crossed the Hun and came up in line on the right of the Third Army. The 1st Cavalry Brigade, which had been connecting these two armies, was then transferred to the extreme left.

(4) The general reserve advanced in rear of the Second Army, and one of its divisions was given to the latter to replace the one transferred to the Fourth Army. The Second Army was across the Hun by the 6th.

(5) The right division of the Third Army made way for the Second Army and marched round the rear of its own Army to the extreme left. This movement was a difficult one, as it had to be carried out in the presence of the Russians; it was completed by the 7th.

Thus the Second Army was between the Hun and the Hsin-min-tun (B 3) road, while the Third Army was north of the Hsin-min-tun road, almost round Mukden on the north. The former faced east and the latter east by south with its left flank thrown back.

25A. On the 6th and 7th of March the situation changed but little as far as the position of the Japanese line was concerned. On the right the Ohara Brigade approached Ma-chun-tan (E 5 N.E.) and joined in the attack, and as it neared that place, the Russians began withdrawing a bit, and the Ya-lu Army was able to make a little progress. **6th and 7th Mar.**

26. On the 7th, however, some very noticeable movements took place among the Russian forces in front of the First Army. Their guns diminished notably in numbers; groups of infantry were seen retiring at intervals into the Kang-ta-jen-shan (D 5 east) valley; fires broke out in their position and in the villages in rear of it. In front of the Guard Division the Russians came out of their trenches under a Red Cross flag to collect their dead and wounded, a five or six hours' truce taking

place on that section of front. The report of this reached First Army Head-Quarters too late to stop it; had it come earlier, the privilege might not have been granted by the Japanese. The incident smacked somewhat of sharp practice on the part of the Russians, for they carried off their wounded but left many dead behind. Permission for such a truce must be given by the Commander-in-Chief; an Army commander cannot give it on his own responsibility. As it was, the Russians, having made up their minds to retreat that night, took the permission for granted, and allowed no time for the message to get through.

27. Putting all these incidents together, Marshal Oyama decided to issue orders on the night of the 7th for a general attack to take place on the following morning. But at 9 p.m. came the news that the Russians were already off, and so the order for attack was changed to one for pursuit.

The Pursuit.

1. The pursuit began on the night of the 7th–8th March. The orders for the pursuit, issued by Marshal Oyama, were briefly as follows. (From the time of issue, wording, &c., of the orders, it will be seen that the whole operation had been prearranged, and that all that was wanted was the word to "Go on.")

The orders were dated Yen-tai, 8th March, and were received at First Army Head-Quarters at 12.20 a.m. on that date :—

(1) The enemy in front of the Fourth Army began retreating on the night of the 7th–8th March. No information has as yet been received regarding the enemy in front of the Ya-lu Army.

(2) The First Army will commence its pursuit at midnight, 7th–8th March. The Fourth Army will commence its pursuit at 3 a.m. on the 8th, but when it reaches the line Su-chia-tun Railway Station (C 5 N.E.)—Ta-chang-erh-tun — Wan-chia-ling — Chang-ling-tzu (D 5 north), the General Officer Commanding will rearrange his troops and be ready to press on still more rapidly.

(3) I intend to pursue in earnest and to turn the enemy's retreat into a rout.

(4) The First Army will pursue to the Hun Ho near Hsing-lung-tien (E 4) with its main force.

(5) The Fourth Army (less the 4th Division and the Tomioka Detachment) will pursue, and will rearrange its troops on the line Ta-chang-erh-tun—Wan-chia-ling—Chang-ling-tzu, ready for further pursuit to Tieh-ling (E 2). From the time of receipt of this order, the 4th Division and the Tomioka Detachment will be under the command of the General Officer commanding the Second Army.

(6) The Second Army will strike at the enemy near Mukden and then rearrange its troops south-west of the city.

(7) The Third Army will attack the enemy near Mukden, and then concentrate its troops north of the city.

The remaining orders detailed the lines of pursuit for the different armies, and the last order was to the effect that no troops were to remain in the city.

2. On receipt of the above, General Kuroki issued the following orders :—

Hua-kou (D 5 south),
8th March, 12.30 a.m.

(1) The enemy in our front has begun to retreat.

(2) The Army is to press the enemy to the utmost.

(3) The divisions will pursue with the following objectives :— 2nd Division to advance on Hsing-lung-tien (E 4) (7 miles west of Fu-shun) *viâ* Hai-lang-chai; 12th Division to advance on Ssu-fang-tai* (D/E 4) *viâ* Pai-shen-chai (D 5 east); the Guard Division to advance on Wang-shih-lang-kou (D 4 S.E.), protecting the left flank.

(4) The Umezawa and Awaibara Brigades will form the general reserve of the Army, and will concentrate near Tsai-chia-tun (D 5 east), and follow the advance.

(5) I am at Hua-kou Ling.

3. On the 8th March, the Army reserve, about one division strong, was concentrated at Pai-shen-chai (D 5 east). The 16th Regiment, hitherto with the Guard, was sent off north-east and rejoined its division (2nd), reconnoitring Kang-ta-jen-shan (D 5 east) on the way, as it had been ordered to do. The reason the Guard Division was given an objective in rear of the other divisions was that the strength and dispositions of the enemy in front of the Fourth Army were unknown, and the Guard had to protect the left flank of the First Army. The Russians in front of the Fourth Army had, as a matter of fact, begun retiring on the night of the 7th–8th, but on the 7th there had been a severe engagement on the left of the Fourth Army. **7th and 8th Mar.**

4. The pressure of the Russians against the Second Army became much greater on the 7th, and that Army had severe fighting on the line Li-kuan-pu (C 4)—Mo-chia-pu (C 4 south), where there is the old railway bridge over the Hun. The Russians occupied the bridge-head there and offered such a determined resistance that the division (the 4th) on the right flank of the Second Army, which division had been previously allotted to the Fourth Army, had to be sent back (*see* Oyama's orders, para. 1) to the Second Army, and it fought on the left bank of the Hun.

* Not to be confounded with Ssu-fang-tai (B 5).

5. The Third Army made some progress, and on the 8th reached the Northern Tombs (D 4 N.W.),* but there the Russians made a very determined counter-attack. The pressure against the Second and Third Armies thus became greater and greater. South of Mukden, between the Hun and the Fu-shun branch railway line the Russians had constructed very strong entrenchments, so that the Fourth Army gave up the idea of attacking the enemy south of Mukden and, leaving a part of its force in front of these entrenchments, took its main force round south-east of the city, keeping touch with the First Army on its right. On the 8th the Guard and 12th Divisions caught up the Russian rear at Ta Chang-wang-chai (D 4 S.E.) about 4 p.m., and, driving it forward, continued their advance.

9th Mar. 6. The pursuit continued that night, and on the 9th the following was the situation :—

(1) Of the First Army, the 2nd Division was in the morning at Chin-tai-tzu-shui (E 4), on the left bank of the Hun, south of Hsing-lung-tien ; the 12th Division was in the morning at Ssu-fang-tai (D/E 4), and the Guard Division at San-chia (D 4), on the Fu-shun railway. That afternoon a severe sand storm raged, view and communication between divisions were interrupted, and as all the telegraph and telephone lines went down, no information from divisions reached Army Head-Quarters ; nor could any division get reliable information about the Russians on the north bank of the river. The Guard crossed the river on the afternoon of the 9th, the main body of the division halting at Chu-chan (D 4 east). Part of the 12th Division crossed the river near Ta-tzu-pu (E 4), and got as far as Hu-shan-pu (E 3/4), five miles north of the river, by nightfall. A small detachment of the Guard reached the same village. The main forces of the 12th and 2nd Divisions remained on the south bank. The Army reserve reached Tung-tai, two or three miles south of Ssu-fang-tai.

(2) The Russians in front of the Ya-lu Army retired at the same time as the remainder, and that Army also started in pursuit on the 8th. It also, with the Ohara Brigade of the 2nd Division, got close to the south bank of the Hun, near Fu-shun, on the 9th.

(3) The Fourth Army advanced in touch with the First, and reached the south bank of the Hun by the afternoon of the 9th.

(4) There was no change in the positions of the Second and Third Armies, but the pressure on them became greater, and the left flank of the Third Army was in a somewhat dangerous situation. During the 7th, 8th and 9th Marshal Oyama had been sending forward his general reserves to reinforce these

* This does not agree with Map 61. The Tombs were not wholly captured by the 1st Division, Third Army, until the evening of the 10th March.

two Armies, so it became urgently necessary that the First and Fourth Armies should advance quickly to the north of Mukden.

7. On the 10th March the following was the situation:— **10th Mar.**

(1) The Fourth Army crossed the Hun on the night of the 9th—10th and the following morning, and began moving northwards.

(2) The First Army moved towards Pu-ho (D 3), protecting the right flank of the Fourth Army with the Guard Division. The 2nd Division attacked the Russians on the hills north of Ti-ta (E 4) and Fu-shun, while the 12th Division attacked the hills north of Hsing-lung-tien (E 4). Both divisions were successful in their attacks before noon and, crossing the river, continued the pursuit. In front of the 2nd Division there were at this time seven battalions and three batteries of Russians, and in front of the 12th Division six battalions and one battery. Driving off the enemy, the 2nd Division reached the line Lan-ni-wa (E 3)—Huang-tan-tun (E 3), about six miles north of Fu-shun. The 12th Division reached Hu-shan-pu (E 3 4). The Guard attacked the enemy (about a regiment and a battery) north of Chu-chan (D 4) and, driving him back, continued the pursuit. Later it encountered about a brigade of Russians near Ta-lien-pu-tzu (D 3), one and a half miles south of Pu-ho, but succeeded in driving it back also, and at 2 p.m. took up a position whence it could bring fire to bear on the Tieh-ling road. On this day (10th) General Kuroki sent the Umezawa Brigade from the Army reserve to join the Guard Division and prolong the line of that division to the right. The Guard Cavalry continued its advance to Pai-kuan-tun (north of Hu-shan-pu, E 3 S.W.), meeting many large Russian detachments, which it attacked and drove off in confusion.

(3) The retreat of the Russians from Mukden began on the night of the 9th—10th, and when the Guard appeared on the main road they were in full retreat in many columns along the road and railway. The Guard artillery fired shrapnel at them with much effect, while the infantry pushed machine guns well to the front, and inflicted severe losses. Hijikata used his Russian guns (three four-gun batteries) with great effect, owing to their superior range, but when he reached Ta-lien-pu-tzu (D 3) he only had ten rounds per gun left. He sent men to search the positions which the Russian artillery had occupied, and they returned with one hundred and forty rounds, which kept him going till the end of the battle. His share of the captured ammunition then amounted to ten thousand rounds.

(4) The Ya-lu Army reached Fu-shun on the 10th, and a part of it pushed on up the Fu-shun—Tieh-ling road.

(5) Thus on the evening of the 10th, the First and Third Armies waved to each other, as it were, across the Mukden—Tieh-ling road, eight or nine miles north of the former town. They were not, however, strong enough to effectually close the neck of the bottle.

11th Mar. 8. On the 11th March the continuous pursuit was beginning to tell on the men of the First Army.

(1) On this day the 2nd Division reached Ting-chia-kou (E 3 centre), while the 12th Division, turning north-west, reached Yi-lu (D 3 east). The Guard had been ordered to advance to Shen-tai-tzu, just north-west of Yi-lu, but it came across a large force of retreating Russians trying to make their way north on the east side of the road. With but little fighting it took nearly 4,000 prisoners, mostly of the 5th and 19th European Rifles, the latter surrendering near Pan-chia-tai (D 3 south). Two regimental colours also fell into their hands, though the Russians did their best to destroy them. The Guard Division therefore was unable to push on as projected, and spent the day near Pu-ho and rearranged its troops.

(2) The Fourth Army, on the 11th, rearranged its troops about Ta-wa (D 4).

(3) The Second Army was west of Mukden.

(4) The Third Army pushed on in touch with the First and reached the line Shen-tai-tzu (D 3)—Shih-fu-ssu (C 3). The latter place is on the Fa-ku-men road, on the left bank of the Liao.

(5) The main body of the Ya-lu Army was near Fu-shun on the 11th, a detachment being pushed out to the north.

9. Thus ended the battle of Mukden.

10. The Russians encountered by the First Army between the 24th February and 11th March consisted of—

The 3rd, 5th and 6th Siberian Rifle Divisions.

The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Siberian Divisions.

Part of the 71st and 72nd Reserve Infantry Divisions.

These troops had faced the First Army all the winter. The foregoing do not include the troops met on the Mukden road.

11. The First Army lost about 10,000 officers and men, and captured about 5,000 prisoners, exclusive of those who died in the Japanese hospitals. The *Japan Times* gave the losses of the First Army as follows :—

	Officers.	Men.
Killed - - -	71	1,758
Wounded - - -	284	8,318
Missing - - -	2	52
	357	10,128

12. The heaviest losses were incurred by the Second and Third Armies, the former of which is reported to have lost 28,000. A member of Marshal Oyama's staff put the Japanese losses during the battle down at 71,000.*

* The latest reports put the Japanese losses at 71,014; in round numbers: First Army 10,000, Second Army 22,000, Third Army 18,000, Fourth Army 13,000, Ya-lu Army 6,000.

Tieh-ling.

1. It was only during the battle of Mukden that the Japanese managed to capture from the Russians a large quantity of maps which explained to them the geography of the country north of Mukden. These maps showed them that if Tieh-ling was to be properly defended by the Russians, the line of hills along the north bank of the Han Ho (or Fan Ho) must be of great importance in any such scheme of defence. A plan of the Tieh-ling defences was captured at the same time. General Kuroki therefore came to the conclusion that if the First Army could only take the line of hills in question, Tieh-ling would practically be at the mercy of the Japanese. So, although his troops required a good rest, he determined to push on as quickly as possible and attack the position on the Fan Ho, force the passage of that river, and capture the hills along the north bank. Marshal Oyama thought it was asking the troops of the First Army to do too much, and did not require this effort of them; but General Kuroki considered it best to get possession of the hills first and then to decide the question of further advance.

2. General Kuroki therefore rested the First Army during the 12th, remaining on the line occupied on the 11th. He rested, that is to say, the bulk of his army, for he sent forward about a brigade from the 2nd Division, a brigade from the 12th Division, and Umezawa from the Guard Division. The brigade of the 2nd Division reached Fang-chia-tun (E 3) (north of Li-chien-hu-tun and some four miles from Piao-chi-tun) by the evening, driving back the Russians all day. The brigade of the 12th Division drove them from Chen-chien-hu-tun (E 3 N.W.) and occupied it. Umezawa reached Shen-tai-tzu (D 3 north), pushing back about a battalion of Russians. On the evening of the 12th the Russians were on the line of hills on the north bank of the Fan, and busy throwing up entrenchments as far west as the Liao at Chu-chu-shan (D 2). The main body of the Guard was still at Pu-ho (D 3 south). **12th Mar.**

3. On the 13th March— **13th Mar.**

The 2nd Division advanced to Fang-chia-tun.

The 12th Division advanced to Chen-chien-hu-tun (E 3 N.W.).

Umezawa advanced to a line from Shao-shi-shan on the left (5 miles north of Shen-tai-tzu (D 3) on the railway) to Fan-chia-tun (E 2/3) (on the main road) on the right.

The other Armies rested where they were, but the Third Army sent a detachment (the Akiyama Detachment) to Chu-chu-shan (D 2), while the Fourth and Ya-lu Armies sent forward the Maida and Hishijima Detachments respectively. These two detachments advanced behind the left and right flanks respectively of the First Army, the former reaching Hsia-chia-hu (D 2) on Umezawa's left.

From this line the First Army reconnoitred on the 13th and found that the Russian force in its front consisted of about two divisions, while west of the railway there were about four divisions still retiring in columns on Tieh-ling.

4th Mar. 4. On the 14th March the 2nd Division attacked the Russians on both banks of the Fan at Chang-chia-lou-tzu (E 2). The Russians stubbornly defended successive lines of commanding and precipitous hills, and on this day the division only succeeded in taking part of the position and did not entirely occupy it till the night of the 14th—15th. The Russians fought desperately, and a captured officer informed the Japanese that the defenders had been ordered to hold it to the last man. It is inconceivable that the Russians should have constructed such strong and elaborate works near Tieh-ling and have neglected the line of the Fan which, if fortified, must have caused the Japanese an infinity of trouble, and the possession of which would enable the Japanese to dominate Tieh-ling.

During the 14th the 12th Division shelled the Russians in its front. Umezawa reconnoitred and shelled the Russians, who were entrenching.

5th Mar. 5. On the 15th March the general officer commanding the 2nd Division received orders to reconnoitre Tieh-ling, but not to commit himself to a fight.

The 12th Division was ordered, after taking the hills north of the Fan, to be ready to assist the 2nd.

Umezawa was ordered to reconnoitre Tieh-ling, advancing along the main road.

The Maida Detachment of the Fourth Army was ordered to advance west of the railway to Hsia-fan-ho (D 2 east).

The Akiyama Detachment of the Third Army was ordered to reconnoitre along the Liao, to the north of Tieh-ling.

The 2nd Division learned that the Russians had about two divisions and thirty guns in Tieh-ling, but that only fifteen or sixteen guns were in position. At 5 p.m. a loud explosion was heard north of Tieh-ling, and that evening the railway station was set on fire. So the general officer commanding the 2nd Division inferred that the enemy was abandoning the town, and he sent forward patrols who entered it at 9 p.m. The town was effectively occupied at 12.20 a.m. the following morning. Only a few shell had been fired into it.

6th Mar. 6. Again telegraphic communication was interrupted, this time by the Russians, and orders from Army Head-Quarters did not reach the front in time to stop the general officer commanding the 12th Division from pursuing north of Teh-ling on his own initiative. On the 16th he reached Chung-ku (E 1), 13 miles north of Tieh-ling on the main road, and inflicted some further loss on the retiring Russians. The Guard also advanced to Tieh-ling on the 16th, so on that date the main force of the First Army was about Tieh-ling and Chung-ku.

7. Here the pursuit ended, for the First Army then received orders to take up a line along the left bank of the Fan and to hand Tieh-ling over to the Fourth Army. This re-distribution began on the 17th, and the First Army then took up the position it occupied for some time afterwards.

8. In this pursuit the First Army had about 1,000 additional casualties, and the Japanese calculate that the Russian loss was ten times as great. Most of the Japanese losses were incurred by the 2nd Division in crossing the Fan Ho.

Comments.

1. As mentioned in para. 6 of the section of this report on "The Battle on the Sha Ho," the strategy of the Japanese had for its object the outflanking of both Russian wings, their line being secretly lengthened for this purpose by the addition of the Ya-lu Army (based on the Ya-lu) to the right, and of the Third Army to the left, flank. The three central Armies were on a given date to assume an offensive attitude, unmask the heavy guns they had secretly brought up into position, seize and occupy advanced positions and take every opportunity of pushing forward. The Ya-lu Army (General Kawamura) was then to make the first advance and attract the attention of the Russians to their left flank, and when this object had been gained, the Third Army was to move rapidly forward and get round to the north-west of Mukden and cut the Russian line of retreat on Tieh-ling. In the meantime Kawamura was to fight his way through the hills, get to Fu-shun and, by advancing thence on Tieh-ling, also cut the Russian line of retreat from Mukden. The other Armies in the meantime were to conform to the advance of the flanks, the Fourth Army moving direct on Mukden and the First and Second Armies wheeling inwards and joining up the Fourth Army with Kawamura and Nogi respectively.

2. The advance of the Ya-lu Army produced immediate effect. It is pretty certain that the Russians meant to launch another attack against the Japanese left about the 26th February, and to assist this operation Rennenkampf had been moved from the left of the Russian line towards the right. Kawamura's advance, however, sent him hurrying back again to his original position. What further effect his advance had it is difficult to say, but it is pretty certain that in consequence of the repeated attacks of the Ya-lu Army and the 2nd Division, reinforcements were sent to the Russian left. Foreign press correspondents captured at Mukden assert that Kuropatkin hurried very strong reinforcements to his left to meet Kawamura's advance and then, when Nogi's advance declared itself, hurried them back to Mukden where they arrived too exhausted to be of much use. What measure of truth there was in this statement accounts

from the Russian side will probably show, but that Kuropatkin was completely deceived and practically lost the battle through marching and countermarching large reinforcements to and from his left, is not to be credited. A senior general staff officer to whom this story was told by a captured correspondent was at first inclined to attach some importance to it, but he told me afterwards that it could not be true, as from reports received after the battle he was sure that the Japanese right never had more than four divisions opposed to it. And further, we know that Kuropatkin never moved his general reserve towards his left, because Nogi met it and defeated it on the 3rd March.

3. The Ya-lu Army began well, and its initial advance produced the desired effect, and greatly facilitated Nogi's advance; but its subsequent task, the outflanking of the Russian left, proved too much for it. What the composition of the Ya-lu Army was has been kept secret, but in addition to the 11th Division from Port Arthur it probably comprised a couple of reserve divisions. The country it had to advance through was a mass of hills, unknown and unmapped as far as the Japanese were concerned, a country easily defensible by inferior numbers. Moreover, the Japanese thought that the line of defence works constructed by the Russians during the winter only extended as far east as Kao-tai Ling (E 5 centre), and it was not till the 28th February that reconnaissance showed that it extended through Hsiao-pu (E 5) to Ma-chun-tan (E 5 N.E.). The Ya-lu Army was brought to a standstill on the 28th near the latter place, and remained there till the pursuit began on the 8th March. Its actions during the fighting and afterwards during the pursuit were kept shrouded in mystery. It eventually reached Fu-shun, but it is safe to infer that it dropped out of the running altogether as far as its outflanking movement was concerned, and merely acted as a flank-guard to the First Army, which, as matters turned out, was obliged, and able, to take over its duties to a considerable extent.

4. As regards the First Army, General Kuroki was given a very free hand as to whether he should attack the Russian position in his front, and as to how and when such an attack should be made. He was to act as the situation demanded. The 12th Division tried to take the position in its front on the 2nd March, but was withdrawn again on the 4th, and on the night of the 2nd—3rd March, Kuroki pushed the 2nd Brigade of the Guard and the 16th Regiment (2nd Division) over the valley and attacked the Russian position about Tang-chia-tun,* in order to try and relieve the existing situation. But the position was too formidable and well-defended to be taken by a frontal attack, and after suffering very severely, the Guard

* Not on map; it is about 3 miles south-west of Tsai-chia-tun (D 5 east).

stopped the attack. It hung on, however, to the ground it had won, and, till the pursuit began, it occupied bits of dead ground among the foot-hills on the north side of the Sha Ho, throwing out firing lines sheltered behind low sand-bag parapets. These latter were commanded at short range from the Russian trenches, and the men behind them could not move hand or foot during the day-time. Then on the night of the 4th—5th, five more battalions of the 12th Division were thrown across at Pien-niu-lu-pu (D 5), and they found themselves in a similar predicament. Some 2,800 yards separated these two attacking forces. This was the situation in front of the Guard and 12th Divisions till the pursuit began, and in the meantime the 2nd Division had been trying to assist the advance of the Ya-lu Army by attacking on the left of the latter.

5. The advisability of launching the whole First Army in a desperate frontal attack against the Russian position had been much discussed by General Kuroki and his staff from the time the Ya-lu Army had found it was unable to make headway. Moreover, the Fourth Army had also been brought up short, in spite of the 28-cm. howitzers with which it bombarded Wan-pao Shan (D 5). Some members of the staff gave their decision in favour of such an attack, though they knew it would entail tremendous losses, but calmer counsels prevailed, and Kuroki held his Army ready for as rapid a pursuit as possible when the time should come. When that time did come, he sent it forward, telling divisional commanders to push straight on to the Hun, even if they dropped half their men on the way. The divisions pushed on so fast that the Russians were unable to organize a proper defence of the line of the Hun and, though the 2nd and 12th Divisions experienced opposition at the river, the Guard Division crossed practically unopposed, and advancing in touch with the right of the Fourth Army, wheeled to its left and was able to bring fire to bear on the Mukden—Tieh-ling road on the 10th March. That day the position of the Guard was a somewhat precarious one, for until the rest of the First Army could come up into line with it, its right flank was only protected by the divisional cavalry. The latter, however, did excellent and effective work under its enterprising commander.

6. But though the Guard Division was able to command the Tieh-ling road on the 10th, it was not strong enough to block it effectively, nor would the Russians allow the Third Army to block it from the west. So all that day and night the Russian columns streamed away between them. On the 11th the road was blocked by the Fourth Army, and three parties of Russians who had been headed off the road and tried to break through east of it were easily captured by the Guard, to the number of about 4,000. But the bulk of the Russian Army had escaped

from Mukden. Its retreat, however, was a rout, and what a rout it must have been I never realized till I came down by rail to Mukden, on my return to Tokio, and saw the remains of many hundreds of carts of every description which the Russians had abandoned and burned, and the enormous quantities of felt boots and other articles of clothing which strewed the line of retreat. And this was eight weeks after the battle, when the Japanese had collected all serviceable material (including over 400 ammunition wagons) and the Chinese had swept up what was left.

7. Thus, owing to the failure of the Ya-lu Army to force its way through the mountains, all the Russians between the Mukden—Tieh-ling and Fu-shun—Tieh-ling roads escaped, and only a partially effective blockade of the Tieh-ling road was possible. Superior numbers at the decisive point were again wanting. Whether the Japanese could have done better is hard to say without a fuller knowledge of the subject, but judging from results and from the facts as they have been presented to me, I think the Japanese were too confident of their power to push Kawamura's Army through the mountains, and that they would have done better to have put more strength on their left and to have pinned their faith on Nogi cutting the Mukden—Tieh-ling road. I think they tried too much on too extended a front, and it would have been an extraordinary thing if the Russians had allowed the flanks of a line one hundred miles long to have converged so as to surround them. At the same time, it was the *grand coup* that the Japanese meant to try for in the hopes of ending the war, and they did all they could to deserve success. A complete system of telegraphs and telephones brought the whole of this long line under the control of Marshal Oyama on the railway; strong entrenched positions, on which they could fall back if necessary, provided against the danger of the line being broken by a determined counter-attack; and orders were issued for the pursuit to be pushed on to the utmost so as to allow the Russians no chance of rallying once they began to retreat.

8. I am diffident in criticizing strategy which met with so much success, but I think the results would have been even greater if the left outflanking force had been stronger than it was. The effect which a strong mounted force would have produced on the retreating Russians would also have been enormous, and on this occasion the Japanese sincerely regretted their weakness in cavalry and the absence of horse artillery. The First Army played an important part in the battle, and the value of its rapid pursuit was incalculable. The opinion of the Chief of the Staff of the First Army is that General Kuroki had two strokes of good luck:—The first was when he decided *not* to attack the Russian position on the Sha Ho in earnest, for then the heavy losses he must have incurred would have

greatly lessened his power of pursuit; and the second was when he was able to get across the Hun with comparatively slight opposition.

9. The Russians again failed to make use of their strength in cavalry. The Third Army expected to find Mishchenko barring its advance in the plains, but he was not there. The Japanese attribute his absence to the effect of a successful cavalry raid on their part.

(12) The Battle of Mukden: Operations of the 2nd Division of the First Japanese Army.

REPORT by Captain B. VINCENT, Royal Artillery.
22nd May 1905.*

Plates.

General Map - - - - Map 61
Operations of the 29th Regiment at Wan-pu-chieh (Kapugai) on the Hun Ho, 10th March - - „ 62
Action at Fu-shun, 10th March - - - „ 63
Operations of the 30th Regiment at the Fan Ho, 13th March - - - - „ 64
Position of the 2nd Division, 14th March - - „ 65

During the winter the 2nd Division, under Lieut.-General Nishijima, was in position in the Japanese defensive line south of the Sha Ho, between the left of the Guard Division at Lien-hua Shan,† and the right of the Fourth Army, just east of Shih-kou Shan.†

The front held was purposely short, as the division was intended to act as a general reserve for the Army if necessary.

When Grippenberg attacked the Japanese left near Hei-kou-tai,‡ on the 26th January, the 2nd Division, less one regiment (the 30th), was sent with the 5th Division, Fourth Army, to reinforce the 8th Division in that direction.

On its return from Hei-kou-tai, the 2nd Division was sent off to the extreme right of the Army, near Kao-tai-tzu (E 6), in order to be in position for a movement against the Russian left, in conjunction with the Ya-lu Army, under Lieut.-General Kawamura.

The 16th Regiment was left behind at Ha-ma-tang (D 5) to occupy the gap between the Guard and the Fourth Army.

* Captain Vincent was not present during the battle, rejoining the First Army on the 21st March. His report, he states, is compiled from accounts elicited from regimental and other officers and study of the ground, at the Hun Ho and Fan Ho, in company of officers who had been present and commanded during the fighting.

† Not on map. Their position can be inferred from Map 61 (D 5), the block showing the winter line of the 2nd Division.

‡ *See* Map 61.

Extract from First Army Orders, dated Pan-la-shan-tzu (D 6 north), 2 p.m., 21st February.

"(2) The Ya-lu Army will commence to advance on the 23rd inst.; the right column through Chin-tou-ku (G 5), Ma-chuang-tzu, Wu-lung-kou, Ku-chia-tzu; the left column by the road from Ching-ho-cheng through Ma-chun-tan (E/F 5) to Fu-shun.

"The Army will endeavour to get round the enemy's left, and will be in the vicinity of Ma-chun-tan on the 27th instant.

"(3) The First Army will take up its position to attack the Russian left on the 27th."

At the same time the 2nd Division was reinforced by the 29th Reserve Regiment of two battalions (Major Kani), the 39th Reserve Regiment of two battalions (Major Honda), three squadrons (one from the Guard and two from the 12th Division) under Colonel Aiyura (12th Cavalry), and the 1st Battalion 12th Mountain Artillery (Major Iwatake).

The I./2 Field Artillery (Major Yamamoto) was sent to the 12th Division in exchange for the mountain guns.

23rd Feb. On the 23rd February the main body of the 2nd Division was in the neighbourhood of Wei-ning-ying (E 6), with outposts at Chi-chia-pu-tzu and San-chia-tzu (E 5 south), situated on the two main roads from the north which debouch into the valley of the Tai-tzu Ho.

The field artillery (three batteries) was at Kao-tai-tzu (E 6).

At this time the Russian advanced posts were on the line Hsin-kai Ling* (east)—Pien-ling (E 6)—Shu-kou (D 5) (west), and it was known that there were considerable bodies of Russians at Yang-tai-jen-shan (E 5) and at Kao-kuan-sai (E 5).

Divisional Orders, 23rd February.

(1) The cavalry detachment (Aiyura) will remain on the left bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, near Shang-niu-hsin-tai (E 6), to cover the right rear of the division.

(2) The Honda Regiment (39th Reserve) will drive the Russians from Chien-chang-tzu (E 6), and then occupy the heights east of it, in order to cover the right flank of the division.

(3) The Ishibashi Brigade, with one mountain battery, will drive the Russians from Kao-yen Ling, just south of Kao-kuan-sai (E 5).

(4) The Akiyama Cavalry Detachment (2nd Division Cavalry) will remain behind the right wing of the Ishibashi Brigade, and be ready to push on the moment the brigade drives the enemy back.

* Not on Map 61; it is 15 miles south of Chien-chang (G 6).

(5) The Kani Regiment (29th Reserve) will occupy the heights south of Ta-yu (E 5), and will get in touch with the 12th Division.

(6) The remainder of the division will remain in its present quarters, in readiness to advance.

24th Feb. In accordance with the above orders, the troops commenced their respective movements at daybreak on the 24th.*

The Ishibashi Brigade took the heights at 9.10 a.m., and then pushed on and occupied Kao-kuan-sai (E 5) by 4 p.m.

About seven squadrons of Russian cavalry opposed the brigade. It was said at the time that they belonged to the 2nd and 5th Siberian Cossacks.

The Kani Regiment accomplished its object without difficulty by 9.30 a.m., having found only about five hundred Russian infantry and cavalry in front. The field battery which had been told off to the advanced guard of the division came into action early on the heights near Chi-chia-pu-tzu, and fired on the enemy on the heights near Ta-yu at 3,300 yards range. The Russians, however, retired at once.

The Honda Regiment carried out its orders by 11 a.m.

Thus the Russian advanced posts were driven back everywhere, and the division prepared for a general advance next day, in accordance with the following plan received from Army Head-Quarters.

Army Orders for 25th February.

"The advanced guard of the 2nd Division will occupy the country north-west of Kao-kuan-sai, and a detachment will be thrown forward to the north of Erh-ma Ling to get in touch with the right of the 12th Division.

"The main force of the division, under the protection of the above-mentioned troops, will concentrate before midday (25th) in the vicinity of Kao-kuan-sai.

"The main body of the cavalry will ensure the safety of the right flank, and will keep in touch with the Ya-lu Army."

The Ya-lu Army occupied Ching-ho-cheng (F 6) on the 23rd, but the divisional staff were unaware of this when orders were issued on the evening of the 24th as follows :—

(1) The advanced guard will occupy a line from Hua-ling westwards towards Erh-ma Ling, and the main body will advance to Kao-kuan-sai.

(2) The 30th Regiment (Kawasaki) and one mountain battery will proceed towards Yang tai-jen-shan and will drive back the enemy in that direction as far as possible.

(3) The Akiyama cavalry will operate with the Kawasaki Regiment and cover its right front.

* *See* square E 5 of Map 61.

The Honda Regiment and Aiyura Cavalry on the right received no fresh orders, so remained in the same position as on the 24th.

At daybreak on the 25th the movement commenced. Some Russians had thrown up light entrenchments near the road, but a field battery with the advanced guard came into action west of Hua-ling, and soon drove them out. **25th Feb.**

A little past noon the advanced guard reached Hua-ling, and about the same time Erh-ma Ling was occupied by the Kani Detachment.

At 11.30 a.m. the leading battalion of the main body of the division with the other two field batteries, reached Kao-kuan-sai, and continuing its march, at 12.30 p.m. the main body reached Yang-tai-jen-shan. The Russians set fire to their stores there and retreated.

A detachment from the main body was sent to occupy the heights on the right flank and did so by 2 p.m. Major Honda also marched to Yang-tai-jen-shan, and the Aiyura Cavalry moved up to Feng-kou to keep in touch with the Ya-lu Army.

On the left the Kani Regiment joined up with the 5th Reserve Brigade (Awaibara), which was on the right of the 12th Division.

The Ya-lu Army occupied Ta Ling, and extended eastwards with its right on Hsi-chuan-ling (G 5).

Army Orders for 26th February.

"The positions at Wang-fu Ling (E 5) and Che-tou Ling will be occupied on the 26th, and reconnaissance made in the direction of Hai-lang-chai.

"On the 27th, if the situation permits, the position at Hai-lang-chai will be attacked."

In the orders issued on the evening of the 25th, the divisional staff believed that the main Russian line of defence extended only eastwards as far as the col at Hsi-ku-ling.

The division was ordered to attack as follows:—

(1) The right (Ohara) Brigade—30th Regiment and 39th Reserve Regiment, one battery mountain artillery (total, five battalions, one battery), will advance by the road Yang-tai-jen-shan–Hsi-ku-ling, and will attack the positions east of the road Kao-kuan-sai—Kao-tai Ling.

(2) Left wing (Ishibashi) Brigade—4th and 29th Regiments (six battalions) and No. 3 Mountain Battery will attack the positions west of the Kao-kuan-sai—Kao-tai Ling road. (One battalion of this brigade marched between the two columns in order to keep connection.)

(3) The three field batteries will come into action near Ewan. (Ewan is merely a farmhouse near the road in the valley.)

(4) The divisional reserve (29th Reserve Regiment and one mountain battery) will be near Hua-ling.

(5) The cavalry will cover the right flank.

26th Feb. The right column (Ohara) advanced at dawn on the 26th* and drove back the enemy from the line Hsi-ku-ling—Pei-ta Ling, and arrived on the heights east of Hsi-ku-ling about 3 p.m. Then a blinding snowstorm commenced and obliged Ohara to stop the advance. During the evening the enemy's position in front was reconnoitred, and found to be very strong.

The left column (Ishibashi) took the heights east of Wan-fu Ling at 7.30 a.m., and came under fire from ten Russian guns. The rest of the day was spent in reconnoitring the position in front as far as the snowstorm permitted.

The II./2nd Artillery were in position by dawn on the 26th. Nos. 5 and 6 Batteries came into action east of Ewan and No. 4 south-east of the same place.

No. 4 opened fire at 8 a.m. against some Russian infantry visible on the skyline east of Kao-tai Ling at a range of 6,000 yards.

At 8.20 a.m. the same battery fired at two mountain guns whose flashes could be seen about 1,000 yards east of Kao-tai Ling.

At 8.30 a.m. a Russian field battery (eight guns) opened an indirect fire from a concealed position in the direction of Kao-tai Ling.

At this time heavy artillery fire could be heard in the direction of 12th and Guard Divisions.

The Japanese batteries did their best to find the Russian field battery, and fired towards the sound, noting the direction of the enemy's shells. The Russian battery, however, continually changed its position behind the long continuous line of defence, and kept up an effective fire daily till the 8th March without its whereabouts being discovered by the Japanese gunners.

The two batteries east of Ewan also fired on the Russian trenches east and west of the Kao-tai Ling road, but the trenches were very well made, and the fire appeared to have little effect. At 2 p.m. the snow put a stop to the firing.

On the 26th the Ya-lu Army occupied the line San-lung-yu—Wulung-kou.

The Russians were reported to be considerably reinforcing their left in front of the Ya-lu Army and the 2nd Division.

The orders for the 27th February were the same as for the 26th, namely, to attack Kao-tai Ling.

27th Feb. General Ohara placed the 39th Reserve Regiment on the right, and the 30th Regiment on the left, and intended to attack the Russian position across the valley by a turning movement from the east with the 39th Reserve Regiment under the protection of the mountain battery south-east of Hsi-ku-ling.*

* *See* square E 5 of Map 61.

About 9 a.m., when the 39th Reserve Regiment began the movement, some Russians appeared on the heights east of the road from Pei-ta Ling to the north.

Now, these heights are among the highest and steepest in the district, and extremely difficult to attack. It was, therefore, necessary to change the direction of the attack of the 39th, and in the situation in which the troops now found themselves it was impossible to do so.

The advance was stopped, and a portion of the 39th Reserve Regiment was deployed against the heights to the east, from which the Russians now opened fire.

Meanwhile information arrived that two Russian battalions and a battery had arrived at Hsiao-pu. A little later two and a half more Russian battalions reached the same place.

By 1 p.m., therefore, there were four and a half battalions and one battery at Hsiao-pu, and it looked as if they meant to attack. General Ohara evidently thought so, and ordered the brigade to take up a defensive position.

One battalion of the 29th Reserve Regiment from the divisional reserve was sent to reinforce the brigade.

The Russian position looked very strong and well entrenched, so the attack was given up for that day.

The Russian artillery at Hsiao-pu opened fire at 2 p.m. with two or three guns, and about 4 p.m. the Russian artillery commenced firing from a concealed position somewhere near Redoubt 23.* Later it changed its position further west, using indirect fire, so that its positions were never discovered.

This went on till dark, the situation remaining unchanged.

The left column (Ishibashi) commenced the attack on the Russian position north of Wang-fu Ling at 4 a.m.

On the afternoon of the previous day the 1st and 3rd Battalions 4th Regiment knew that they would have to attack the Russian redoubt north of the pass next day, and sent out reconnoitring parties.

The falling snow was very favourable for reconnaisance work, and the patrols managed to get within a few hundred yards of the Russian position. They reported that the Russians had constructed obstacles, chiefly wire entanglements, in front of their position; so during the evening of the 26th parties were organized for the purpose of destroying these obstacles. Volunteers from both battalions were called for, and thirty men from each were chosen. Of the 1st Battalion all thirty carried hand-grenades, and of the 3rd Battalion twelve carried hand-grenades and the remaining eighteen wire-cutters. The officer who had been with the reconnoitring parties during the day, was put in command.

The night of the 26th—27th was the coldest during the battle, the thermometer registering 8° below zero Fahrenheit, the maximum temperature by day being 23° Fahr.

* 3 miles north-east of Hsi-ku-ling.

The mountain, on the crest of which the redoubt had been constructed, rises somewhat abruptly north of the pass, the crest being about four hundred and fifty feet above the valley.

From there a ridge extends north-east to Redoubt 17, a work which is about one hundred feet lower than the one north of the pass.

It was intended to capture the latter before daybreak, and then to wheel the left of the brigade eastwards along the valley under cover of darkness, in order to attack the position west of the pass at Kao-tai Ling.

At 4 a.m. the 1st and 3rd Battalions 4th Regiment, three companies in each, commenced to advance.

The 3rd Battalion, on the right, moved up a long narrow ridge, which extended for about eleven hundred yards from the valley to the crest.

One section of No. 10 Company led the way along the ridge in files, followed at a distance of 100 yards by another section in similar formation.

The officer commanding the battalion kept the third section of the 10th Company, with the 9th Company, in reserve.

The 1st Battalion had to attack from the saddle at the pass, and could only use one ridge. The commanding officer ordered the volunteers with the wire-cutters and hand-grenades to go in front, and followed himself with the other companies.

The snow which had fallen on the previous day made the slopes very slippery, so much so that it took one and a half hours hard climbing in the dark to ascend the ridges.

At 5.50 a.m. the 9th Company was fired upon by some Russians in a trench, whereupon one section attacked and drove the Russians back.

Soon afterwards the 10th Company reached other trenches lying further to the west, but the Russians had already withdrawn to the main redoubt.

Now the Russians opened fire from the redoubt, and the Japanese had to deploy along the slopes.

The 12th Company had also received orders to attack the redoubt, but had gone astray in the darkness, and now found itself separated from the rest in front of Redoubt 17, and came under a hot fire at about 400 yards range.

The officer commanding the company now realized his mistake, but decided to stay where he was and contain the enemy rather than allow them to fire at the rest of the force.

The wire-cutters were now sent forward, followed by the grenadiers, who lit their bombs with cigarettes, and threw them into the Russian trenches.

At about 6 a.m., when it was still dark, the rest of the Japanese infantry, who had been awaiting the destruction of the obstacles, moved nearer. No. 1 Company on the left got among a lot of large rocks but could not see to fire, so the officer

commanding deployed No. 3 Company close up to the trench from whence it opened a heavy fire on the redoubt.

At 6.30 a.m. the Japanese infantry were within fifty yards of the Russian trenches, and very hot firing took place.

A little later Russian batteries opened fire from the directions of Kao-tai Ling and Che-tou Ling.

At 7 a.m. the Japanese mountain battery south of the pass also opened fire, but its shrapnel burst right in among the 1st Company, which had in consequence to withdraw again under cover of the rocks.

Later, however, the battery's fire was more accurate, and supported the infantry attack to a considerable extent.

Soon after 7 a.m. the cutting of the wire entanglements had been completed, the volunteer party having lost fifty per cent. of its number.

The companies now made their way through the gaps in the wire, and about 7.45 a.m. lay down to get their breath close to the foot of the Russian parapets. The defenders then hurled bombs and stones among them, and a bayonet fight ensued.

At 8 a.m. the Japanese assaulted the redoubt. First one section of the 9th Company, then the remainder, and at 8.15 a.m. the whole redoubt and neighbouring trenches were in possession of the Japanese.

Of the 1st Battalion, only one company assaulted, while the other two fired.

The six companies lost about 200, of which the 3rd Battalion had 2 officers killed and 3 wounded, 20 men killed and 104 wounded.

The Russians left about 100 corpses, and 65 prisoners were taken. The officer commanding I./4th Regiment said that it was the hottest affair the regiment had been in since "131," at the battle of Liao-yang, on the 2nd September.

After capturing this redoubt, orders were issued to proceed and attack the Russian main position to the north-west.

The Russian artillery and machine guns commenced firing in every direction into the valley, and it was soon seen that the danger zone which it had been intended to have crossed in the dark was now impossible.

Major-General Ishibashi therefore decided to attack Redoubts 17 and 18 by night, and proposed doing so to the commander of the division, who, however, ordered him to wait, as the 12th Division had not yet come up, as expected, on the left.

The day was therefore spent in reconnaissance.

Fortunately, the dead body of a Russian officer had been found, with a plan showing all the redoubts and their numbers.

Before daybreak Nos. 5 and 6 Batteries advanced some 1,500 yards up the valley, No. 4 Battery remaining in the same position south-east of Ewan.

At 7.20 a.m. Nos. 5 and 6 opened fire on the Russian infantry east and west of Kao-tai Ling at about 4,100 yards.

Two Russian mountain guns appeared north of Wang-fu Ling and two more east of Kao-tai Ling, which, together with the eight field guns mentioned before, opened a fairly accurate fire on the Japanese batteries, causing, however, only 16 casualties.

During the morning several companies of Russian infantry could be seen occasionally advancing from their trenches as if to counter-attack, but they did not come on.

During the 27th February the right wing of the Ya-lu Army advanced to Ku-chia-tzu (F 4), but the left wing was unable to get on, and remained in the same position as on the 26th.

This was another reason why the commander of the division ordered Major-General Ishibashi not to make a night attack. The loss would have been too great, and it was a matter of little importance whether the position in question was taken next day or the day after.

There was the sound of heavy artillery firing all day in front of the Ya-lu Army.

28th Feb. On the 28th February, therefore, the Ishibashi Brigade restricted itself to reconnoitring the enemy's position, and the Ohara Brigade on the right waited in position, expecting a Russian attack, which, however, never came off.

Up till now it had been thought that the left of the Russian main defences was at Kao-tai Ling, but the day's reconnaissance showed that it extended through Hsiao-pu to Ma-chun-tan (E/F 5).

The mountainous and difficult nature of the country certainly was all in favour of the defence.

The field artillery occupied at dawn much the same position as on the previous day.

No. 6 Battery changed from the left of the road north of Ewan to a spur east of it.

During the day the field artillery and the mountain battery south-east of Wang-fu Ling fired a few rounds at Redoubts 17 and 18.

The temperature on the night of the 27th/28th was 1° below zero Fahrenheit, and the maximum during the day registered 35° Fahrenheit.

The right column of the Ya-lu Army advanced a little to a position south of Ti-ta (F 4), and the left reached Chiu-ping-tai (F 5).

1st Mar. The cavalry closed up a little to the right column, still covering its right. Major-General Ohara remained in the same position awaiting attack, but beyond making a few demonstrations the Russians did nothing.

The left column (Ishibashi) commenced the attack on Redoubts 17 and 18 before dawn.

Two battalions 4th Regiment (Kawauchi) and one company of engineers attacked Redoubt 17, while the II./29th Reserve Regiment (Kani) and two companies 29th Regiment attacked Redoubt 18.

The attack was supported by the three field batteries in the valley near Ewan and by the mountain battery south-east of Wang-fu Ling.

Plate 1* was taken from a map shown to me by a staff officer, and shows clearly the relative positions of the redoubts west of the road over Kao-tai Ling.

By dawn the men of the 4th Regiment had got to within 200–300 yards of Redoubt 17, and those of the 29th Reserve Regiment a little farther than this from Redoubt 18.

At 7 a.m. No. 5 Battery opened fire on the Russians in and near Redoubt 17 with high-explosive and common shell, at 4,500 yards range.

At 7.10 a.m. No. 4 Battery, south-east of Ewan, searched for the Russian field guns at extreme ranges of 6,000 yards and upwards.

At 7.30 a.m. all the field batteries changed on to the point of attack at Redoubt 17, the range from No. 4, the furthest off, being 5,100 yards.

Meanwhile the infantry attacking Redoubt 17 appeared close up to the works, but unable to get on. Volunteers were called for from among the company of engineers to go forward and cut the wire entanglements. The whole company stepped forward, but only 50 men were chosen, and these advanced under a 2nd Lieutenant, whom I afterwards met. He said that his men rushed up to the entanglements under an awful fire from rifles and hand-grenades.

The men lay on their backs pretending to be killed or wounded, and thus worked their way up to the wire, and succeeded in cutting it. Of the 50 who started 28 were killed or wounded.

The first line of the 4th Regiment then rose up and rushed forward with the bayonet. The Russians and Japanese could be seen struggling on the parapet. The artillery kept on firing near the redoubt, and by 8.50 a.m. the works were captured.

A short time later, about 9 a.m., the Kani Regiment assaulted and captured Redoubt 18, the artillery firing at it up to the moment when the Japanese infantry entered the trenches.

Then suddenly the Russian artillery opened fire into their lost positions. The Japanese guns tried to respond, and thus the artillery duel continued, with much noise but little loss among the Japanese gunners, and probably none on the side of the Russians, whose guns were cleverly hidden as usual.

The artillery fire throughout the morning seemed to be both accurate and effective.

---

* Not reproduced. The redoubts have been inserted on Map 61.

The range to No. 18 was about 3,300 yards, and direct fire was used.

I was told afterwards by an infantry officer of the divisional staff that the capture of this position was largely due to the good co-operation of the artillery with the infantry—praise not often bestowed on the Japanese artillery.

The same day the Ya-lu Army attacked the Ma-chun-tan position, but the Russians defended it with great obstinacy, and the Japanese made no progress in this direction.

2nd Mar. On the 2nd the Ohara Brigade still remained in the same position.*

The 29th Regiment (Shimada) had orders to attack the Russian position east of the road at Kao-tai Ling, namely, Redoubts 23, 20, and 21.

In order to support the attack, Nos. 5 and 6 Field Batteries changed their positions to behind a spur west of Ewan and north-east of Wang-fu Ling.

These batteries opened fire at daybreak on the Russian trenches, assisted by No. 4, which still remained south-east of Ewan in its former position.

The latter was "slated" by the Russian field battery north of the pass for two hours unceasingly, but the gunners had good cover, and their casualties only amounted to 9.

These three batteries fired 3,400 rounds during the day, the greatest number fired on any one day during the battle.

The mountain battery also supported the attack.

The position to be attacked was indeed a strong one. Looking at it from the valley near Ewan, a continuous ridge ran eastwards from where the road crossed the pass of Kao-tai Ling, surmounted by several peaks. The Russian trenches were placed some little distance down the slopes, and were all of the excellent pattern they have now learned to make, *i.e.*, deep and narrow. Above all the other peaks, the one crowned by Redoubt 21 stood out against the sky.

Before dawn on the 2nd the 29th Regiment, less two companies which were with the Kani Detachment in the right column, assembled 1,500 yards north of Ewan.

The regiment took with them six or seven machine guns, which were to do excellent service during the day.

At dawn the attack commenced (temperature about zero Fahrenheit).

By 9.30 a.m. the five companies on the right assaulted and captured Redoubt 23, but No. 20 was far more formidable, and the other five companies attacking it made little progress.

Colonel Shimada, commanding the regiment, was killed, and Major Tanakadate, took command. The latter gallantly climbed the hill in front of his men under an intense fire. Only one

---

* *See* square E 5 of Map 61.

officer and a few men kept up with him, and being so few, he could not take it, and the whole party were killed.

Throughout the day occasional short advances were made. The machine guns proved especially useful in making the Russians keep their heads below the parapets.

Whenever the machine gun fire was turned on to any particular point the Russians did not dare expose their heads, and gave the Japanese infantry a chance of advancing a few yards.

The Russian machine guns also fired a great deal, and caused many casualties among the Japanese.

Finally, about 6 p.m. the redoubt was captured, and then the whole regiment prepared to advance against No. 21.

The latter, however, looked too formidable, and as it was now late, nothing further was done that day.

I asked some of the officers of the 29th Regiment whether the noise of the Russian machine guns was very disconcerting when near. They said that when attacking within a thousand yards of the enemy's position the noise of these guns is drowned by the general uproar of gun and infantry fire, of bursting shrapnel and high-explosive shell.

The only feeling any of them experienced at the time, they told me, was an intense excitement and a supreme desire to get on as fast as possible—"One sets one's teeth and never thinks of the danger."

Of the men of the ten companies of the 29th Regiment which took part in this day's assault, two-thirds were killed and wounded, including the colonel and one battalion commander killed.

The Ya-lu Army remained at the same place, unable to advance.

On the 3rd March an attack was made before dawn by the troops already in possession of Redoubts 20 and 23, but the enemy's position, including Redoubt 21, was so strong that a direct assault was considered futile. **3rd Mar.**

The line remained within two hundred to six hundred yards from the Russian trenches up to the 7th March, during which time frequent attacks and counter-attacks were made, chiefly during the night time.

The condition of the troops in the firing line during this time was terrible. Not only had their losses been severe, but units were at first mixed up anyhow along a narrow front. The average temperature at night was about 7° or 8° Fahrenheit, and below zero on the night of the 6th.

In the daytime the maximum varied between 28° and 32° Fahrenheit.

The Japanese casualties during three days amounted to about 3,000, and it is a fact that the frozen dead were used as cover.

During the night of the 2nd/3rd, No. 6 Battery advanced a little to the north-west, No. 5 remaining about two thousand yards north of Ewan on the left of the road.

At 7.10 a.m. No. 6 opened fire with shrapnel at 3,000 yards range. Five minutes later No. 4 opened, and at 7.35 a.m. No. 5 also commenced firing. All concentrated their fire on the Russian trenches in front of the 20th Regiment.

At 9.10 a.m. No. 4 began again to search for the Russian field battery, which was using indirect fire from behind the position.

At 11 a.m. the Russian fire became very hot, especially against No. 6 Battery, which was effectually silenced throughout the day.

The Russian artillery fire was so effective that it was impossible to move in the valley, and all communication was cut off between the batteries and the ammunition wagons in rear. The infantry reserves coming up had to avoid this shell-swept zone altogether.

It was an interesting example of the moral effect of accurate artillery fire from a concealed position on batteries whose positions are known.

On the evening of the 3rd March the Commander of the 2nd Division, on receipt of orders from Army Head-Quarters, changed his plan of attack.

The Ohara Brigade was despatched eastwards, and ordered to fight its way along the valley from Yang-tai-jen-shan to Meng-chia-pu-tzu and Tung-ku-ling-tzu, the object being to try to turn the flank of the Russians opposing the Ya-lu Army at Ma-chun-tan.

The 11th Reserve Regiment joined the 2nd Division from the 12th this day, and was sent to Major-General Ohara.

4th Mar. At 10 a.m. on the 4th the Ohara Brigade assembled at Yang-tai-jen-shan for the move towards Ma-chun-tan (E/F 5).

The general had received orders to leave the 39th Reserve Regiment between Hsi-ku-ling and Pei-ta Ling (the position in which the brigade had been since the evening of the 26th February), and taking with him the 30th Regiment, the newly arrived 11th Reserve Regiment, and two mountain batteries, to attack Tung-ku-ling-tzu.

Under cover, therefore, of the 39th Regiment, Ohara withdrew with his forces, and assembled them as above.

On the 4th the Ishibashi Brigade did not move.

No. 6 Battery, which had received such a "hammering" the day before, changed its position before dawn to behind a spur a little north of where No 4 had been up to now, and the latter advanced to a new position north-east of Ewan, and later moved one section (2 guns) down to where No. 5 had taken up a new position in the valley.

The above details are merely interesting in showing how the Japanese field batteries were obliged to shift their positions

every night, in order to try and avoid the fire of their well hidden adversary, the Russian field battery behind the ridge at Kao-tai Ling.

Neither the Ya-lu Army on the right nor the 12th Division on the left made any progress during the day. Thus the whole right of the First Army appeared to be reduced to a standstill.

5th Mar. At 3 p.m. on the 5th, General Ohara deployed his brigade, with the 30th Regiment on the right and the 11th Reserve Regiment on the left. The two mountain batteries came into action north-east of Meng-chia-pu-tzu, and opened fire on the Russian position in front.

The Russians occupied the cross line of the ridge on each side of the col at Tung-ku-ling-tzu, but were not numerous.

To the west towards Pei-ta Ling the enemy appeared to be in greater force.

General Ohara sent one battalion of the 11th Reserve Regiment north-west of Meng-chia-pu-tzu to contain the enemy in that direction, and ordered the rest of the force to attack.

The 30th Regiment (2½ battalions) reached a point on the crest of the ridge about eleven hundred yards east of the pass, driving the Russians before them. They then gradually worked their way along the ridge towards Tung-ku-ling-tzu, pushing some companies towards the north, the Russians slowly evacuating the position.

About 3 p.m. a battalion of the 11th Reserve Regiment advanced from Meng-chia-pu-tzu towards the heights west of Tung-ku-ling-tzu, where the Russians had made a small redoubt. The fire of two machine guns was directed against this redoubt, and the infantry managed to get within three hundred or four hundred yards of it. They did not push on, however, as it was seen that the 30th Regiment were rapidly progressing, and that as soon as the latter should arrive at the col the Russians would be bound to evacuate the redoubt.

The Russian artillery opened fire with two guns from somewhere north of the pass, and with four guns from a concealed position north-west.

This fire, however, did little damage, no casualties at all occurring in the mountain battery.

At 6 p.m., when the 30th Regiment reached the col, they threatened the line of retreat of the Russians in front of the 11th Reserve Regiment, and, as had been anticipated, the defenders of the redoubt retired.

Then the whole Japanese line extended along the crest line of the ridge, and fired at the retiring Russians.

The latter (284th Regiment) took up another line of defence some two thousand yards further north, on the road and the heights on either side of it.

6th Mar. The situation on the left remained unchanged.

In the morning Ohara continued his forward movement, the Russians retiring gradually along the valley, and utilizing every little rise on either side to check the Japanese advance.

The mountain battery moved up to the pass Tung-ku Ling but the morning was foggy, and it could see nothing to fire at till midday.

Russian guns, the positions of which were never discovered, fired in every direction, but without result.

During the day the brigade was only able to advance about three thousand three hundred yards.

No progress was made by the troops on the right or left of the 2nd Division during the day.

7th Mar. On the 7th March Ohara continued his advance, with about three battalions in the front line and two in the second.

The Russians continued to retire gradually as on the previous day, but stopped near the village of Ta-fang-tzu, where it appeared they received reinforcements; at the same time a large number of Russians appeared on the heights near San-chia-tzu, and sixteen guns opened fire from that neighbourhood.

Ohara was obliged to stop, as the ground to the north was very difficult and the enemy numerous. However, either his presence there had the desired effect, or the Russians in front of the Ya-lu Army had already received orders to retreat, for the left wing of that army, after having been "held up" since the 27th February, managed to advance a little this day.

This forward movement of the Ya-lu Army's left also had the effect of supporting the Ohara Brigade, and relieved it from a very dangerous situation.

During the afternoon of the 7th, from the left of the 2nd Division a Russian column was seen retiring through Hai-lang-chai (E 5 N.W.). Later the enemy was also seen to evacuate the redoubt west of No. 17, and fires broke out all along the valley, the Russians having set fire to their stores.

The commander of the division ordered Major-General Ishibashi to send out patrols to reconnoitre the enemy's position. The patrols were sent out at dusk, but they were absent a long time, and before their reports arrived it was evident the Russians were retreating. A huge fire broke out at Hai-lang-chai, and for the first time for many nights the Russians made no sorties from the trenches in front of Ishibashi. Up till now the Russians had often made as many as three or four attacks during one night.

News also arrived from the 12th Division Head-Quarters at Pien-niu-lu-pu (D 5 east) that a body of Russians was retreating in disorder from Chang-kou (west of Sung-shu-chu-tzu) towards Kang-ta-jen-shan (due north of Pien-niu-lu-pu).

About midnight news arrived from Army Head-Quarters to say that the Guard Division had occupied a position across the

line of retreat of the Russians, and at the same time ordering the 2nd Division to pursue.

Later the patrols reported that the enemy's position in front had been evacuated.

First Army Orders for the Pursuit.

Hua-kou (D 5 south), 12.30 a.m., 8th March.

(1) The enemy in front of the First Army is retreating.

(2) The Army will pursue the enemy vigorously.

(3) Each division will commence the pursuit immediately, as follows :—

2nd Division by Hai-lang-chai (E 5 N.W.)—Hsing-lung-tien (E 4), west of Fu-shun.

12th Division by Pai-shen-chai (D 5 east)—Ssu-fang-tai (D/E 4), west of Hsing-lung-tien.

Guard Division will guard the left flank of the Army by Wang-shih-lang-kou (D 4 south).

(4) The Umezawa Brigade and the 5th Reserve Brigade (the 11th Regiment) will follow in reserve, and will rendezvous at Tsai-chia-tun (D 5 east). The 16th Regiment (2nd Division) and one reserve battalion, attached to the Guard Division, will be under the orders of Major-General Umezawa.

(5) I shall be at Hua-kou until further orders.

(Signed) KUROKI.

The First Army issued orders for a vigorous pursuit, dated **8th Mar.** Hua-kou (D 5 south), 12.30 a.m. the 8th March, in which the 2nd Division was assigned the direction Hai-lang-chai—Hsing-lung-tien.

At 3 a.m. on the 8th divisional orders were issued, but the troops were late in starting owing to the difficulties of sorting themselves in the dark.

It was 11.30 a.m. before the main body of the division began to cross the pass at Kao-tai Ling.

During the night the field artillery changed its position. One battery and four guns came into action north and south of the road from Ewan to Wang-fu Ling, and two guns were posted so as to fire down into the valley south of Hai-lang-chai.

At dawn no enemy could be seen from the peak north of Wang-fu Ling, and at 8.30 a.m. the three field and one mountain battery were ordered to Ewan.

The division advanced in three columns :—

Right :—

Major-General Ohara, 30th Regiment, 11th Reserve Regiment, four squadrons, two mountain batteries, one company engineers, half bearer company.

Direction—Yin-shu-pu—Shih-fu-chang (E 4) — Fu-shun (E 4 north).

* *See* squares E 5 and E 4 of Map 61.

Centre:—

Colonel Kani, 29th Reserve Regiment No. 5 Field Battery.

Direction—From Tung-ku-ling-tzu—Yang-chou-yen-tzu (E 4 south)—Ta-kuan-tun.

Left:—

The Divisional Head-Quarters, the Ishibashi Brigade (4th and 29th Regiments), 39th Reserve Regiment, Nos. 4 and 6 batteries of field artillery, one mountain battery, two companies of engineers, and half bearer company.

Direction—From Kao-tai Ling through Che-tou Ling and Hai-lang-chai to Hsing-lung-tien (E 4 west).

The Ya-lu Army also began to pursue on the 8th, with its left moving in the direction of Fu-shun.

The right column of the 2nd Division (Ohara) spent the night of the 8th/9th near Yin-shu-pu (E 5 north), and without again meeting the enemy, reached the Hun Ho near Ta-kuan-tun (E 4) on the afternoon of the 9th.

Then, as some Russian infantry were visible on the heights north-east of Wan-pu-chieh, the mountain batteries came into action, and opened fire on them across the river.

The centre column (Kani) after one day's march was obliged to send its field battery by the road over which the left column was advancing, the state of its own road being too difficult for guns.

The column arrived on the evening of the 9th at the Hun Ho, close to Chang-liu-tzu, a mile south-west of Ta-kuan-tun (E 4 centre). During the afternoon a detachment opened fire against a column of Russians retiring in front of the left column. On arrival at Chang-liu-tzu, it was rejoined by the field battery. The latter had been fired upon by a body of Russians near the river, when making its way across country, but the infantry escort (one company) deployed and drove the Russians away.*

The left column (Ishibashi):—

The two field batteries with this column also had great difficulty in getting along, especially in passing over the col just north of Hai-lang-chai (E 5 N.W.), where a battalion of infantry and a company of engineers had to assist in dragging the guns up by hand.

During the night of the 8th/9th the column was reinforced by the 16th Regiment (Taniyaima), which hitherto had been in the reserve of the Army, and had operated with the Guard Division in their attack across the Sha Ho.

That night the troops bivouacked along the road in the villages, and had no encounter with the enemy.

---

* This is the only instance during the whole war, that I have heard of, when an escort was actually called upon to protect guns.—B. V.

At 11.30 a.m. on the 9th the column reached Hei-shui-tzu.* About this time a column could be seen passing along a parallel road to the left towards the river, but it was not known whether it consisted of Russians or Japanese.

It seemed most probable that they were Russians, and some infantry were sent out to reconnoitre.

They proved, however, to be part of the 12th Division pursuing the Russians.

A little later, about noon, on reaching Chin-tai-tzu-shui, news arrived that a Russian transport column was retiring towards Fu-shun along the road to Mukden, on the north bank of the Hun Ho.

The two field batteries got orders to fire on them, and came into action near Chin-tai-tzu-shui, opening fire at ranges between 5,000 and 6,000 yards. Just about then, however, a terrific dust storm commenced, and put a stop to the firing, as it was impossible to see more than a hundred yards.

At 4.30 p.m. the division advanced eastwards along the Ta Piao-tun (E 4 centre)—Hsiao Piao-tun† road, and halted for the night in these villages, about 11 p.m.

The commander of II./2nd Field Artillery with the 12th Division told me that on the occasion of the return of the Russian transport column toward Fu-shun his batteries were with the Shimamura Brigade, and thinking that there was no enemy in front, they came into action on the sandy bank of the Hun Ho to cover the crossing of the infantry near Ssu-fang-tai, but owing to the dust saw nothing to fire at.

Later a long column of Russian transport was indistinctly seen moving along the north bank of the river within 2,000 yards range.

The batteries, not knowing what the Russian force might be, were nervous at being so near, so before firing a shot threw up cover behind some willows. Having made these preparations, all three batteries opened fire simultaneously. The Russians were surprised, and fell into disorder, the majority retreating back along the river bank towards Fu-shun.

A Russian mountain battery opened fire from their left front, but could not find the Japanese gun positions. They fired, however, on the 4th Regiment close by, and the batteries ceased firing so as not to draw the Russian fire on their own infantry. The latter, however, had only two killed and six wounded.

On the evening of the 9th the Divisional Head-Quarters at Ta Piao-tun received the following information :—

The Guard and 12th Divisions have crossed the Hun Ho.

Fu-shun has been occupied by the Ya-lu Army.‡

* A village just south of Chin-tai-tzu-shui (E 4).

† Just east of Ta Piao-tun.

‡ The advanced guard of the Ya-lu Army had actually entered the town, but finding the Russian force very strong in front, had retired.—B. V.

The right column 2nd Division (Ohara) has occupied the bridge at Fu-shun.

The leading battalion of the 16th Regiment (divisional advanced guard) is in possession of the bridge south of Wan-pu-chieh, and the rest of the regiment has arrived at Hsiao Hsin-tun, near Hsin-tun.

The left column (Ishibashi) has arrived at Ta Piao-tun.

Also, about one battalion of the enemy was reported to be in the hills north of the river near Wan-pu-chieh, but there was no enemy in the village itself. The mountain batteries of the right column fired at this battalion during the evening.

Orders also came from Army Head-Quarters for the 2nd Division to advance next day by the Fu-shun—Ma-niu-tai-pu road.

An officer of the divisional staff told me later that, as a result of these various reports, it was thought that there was only a weak Russian rear guard in front, which would be easily driven back next day, if it had not already withdrawn during the night. Orders were therefore issued, not for an attack, but for the march as follows:—

"The Ohara Brigade will be the advanced guard of the division, and after crossing the bridge south of Fu-shun will proceed through the town along the road through Ma-niu-tai-pu.

"The Kani Detachment will follow the Ohara Brigade through Fu-shun, and will await the arrival of the main body of the division at Ma-niu-tai-pu.

"The Divisional Head-Quarters and left column will cross the river by the bridge at Wan-pu-chieh, and then march through the hills to Ma-niu-tai-pu.

"During the first part of the march the 16th Regiment will form the advanced guard of the Division."

How mistaken the Japanese were in their estimate of the situation will be seen from the following account of the battle which took place next day:—

10th Mar. The valley of the Hun Ho* is a wide, open, sandy plain, lined by partially-wooded rocky hills up to four hundred feet in height on the north side, which in places end abruptly in cliffs at the river's edge.

On the south side the valley, as far as the branch railway line from Mukden, consisted at the time of the battle of bare, open, stubble fields with here and there a village and a few trees.

The river at the bridge of Wan-pu-chieh is a shallow stream, then frozen, about one hundred and fifty yards in width, and there is another branch between it and the village fifty yards wide. The bed of the river resembles very much those of

* *See* Maps 62 and 63.


Northern India—bare expanses of sand, with a few odd clumps of willows and osiers.

Fu-shun is a walled city about six hundred yards square, standing in the middle of a cultivated plain, and completely commanded from the heights on three sides of it. The wall, which is of the ordinary Chinese pattern, has a causeway and parapet on the top, and is about twenty feet high. The city is entered by gateways in the centre of the north and south walls.

Wan-pu-chieh is a large village of perhaps fifty or sixty houses, surrounded by several clumps of trees.

The Russians had made a very strong line of defence works all along the heights north of the river. Excellent roads connected the different sections of the defence, well graded with immense labour in the frozen soil. The trenches were, on the whole, very well placed, and not at all conspicuous from the front.

Section of a Russian Trench.



The gun emplacements were also made with splinterproof detachment pits.

In some places the hills are rounded with steep ravines, caused by the heavy rains, the hills being connected by narrow ridges.

The position absolutely commands the flat country south of the river, and is on the whole an ideal position for defence.

The Russians had infantry trenches on all the salient points between Hsing-lung-tien and Fu-shun.

At 4.30 a.m. on the 10th the division began to move. The Divisional Head-Quarters and foreign attachés, with the main body of the Ishibashi Brigade, advanced slowly eastwards along the Ta Piao-tun—Yu-lin-pu road towards the bridge south of Wan-pu-chieh. At 4.45 a.m. some infantry fire could be heard in the direction of the bridge.

It appears that some Russian infantry were in position near the bridge and opened fire on the advanced party of the 16th Regiment. It was a case of mutual surprise, and the Russians fell back at once towards the village of Wan-pu-chieh.

As day was breaking some mounted men could be seen on the skyline of the hills north of the river, and as these hills had been reported clear of the enemy the evening before the foreign attachés thought that they were Japanese patrols.

Suddenly an orderly galloped up to head-quarters and reported that about a brigade of Russian infantry was in front, in occupation of the hills near Wan-pu-chieh.

Rifle fire now became hotter, and it was evidently a case of surprise. Major-General Ishibashi took hold of the nearest battalion of the 29th Regiment, and deployed it along the river bed. No. 6 Field Battery was ordered up at once at a trot, and brought into action along the road under cover of some osiers, but did not open fire, as it was still too dark, and a mist hung over the river.

The two mountain batteries of the right column also took up a position east of the bridge.

About 7 a.m., when the mist cleared a little, some Japanese infantry of the 16th Regiment could be seen near Wan-pu-chieh, but the village was so commanded from the heights on either side that the infantry had to retire and seek shelter in the dead ground at the foot of the hills near the river bank.

Russians could now be plainly seen all along the heights between Wan-pu-chieh and Fu-shun, and it was evident that reinforcements had arrived during the night, or else the Japanese reconnaissance of the day before had been entirely misleading.

The whole of the 16th Regiment was now across the river, and Colonel Taniyama having received orders the night before to occupy Wan-pu-chieh, made the leading battalion fix bayonets and rush the village. The other two battalions then came up in support, and a fierce exchange of infantry fire took place between the Japanese in the village and the Russians on a little rocky hill to the east.

Colonel Taniyama sent two companies to occupy this height, which they succeeded in doing. It was not yet broad day. One of these companies remained on the rocky knoll and the other returned to Wan-pu-chieh.

Patrols were also sent out to reconnoitre the heights north and west of the village, who discovered, as the day cleared, Russians on all sides.

The Japanese could not advance beyond the village, so Colonel Taniyama informed the commander of the division of the situation, and saying that if he received no further orders he intended to wait at Wan-pu-chieh till dark, and make a night attack.

At midday he received information from the Divisional Head-Quarters that the 29th Regiment was to attack on his left.

Meanwhile the general and staff were in the open some five hundred yards west of the bridge, and the attachés were sheltering themselves behind some Chinese graves near the same place. At 7.30 a.m. the mountain batteries east of the bridge opened fire, followed by the field battery at 8 a.m. No 4 Field Battery also came into action west of Ta Piao tun. All directed their fire on the Russian infantry north of Hsia-fang-shen and west of Wan-pu-chieh.

About the same time, at least three Russian batteries opened fire from among the hills north of Fu-shun and two guns from

a concealed position north of Hsia-fang-shen. Several of the Russian shells burst close up to the battery and all round the divisional staff, but the gunners had had time to throw up rough entrenchments on the side of the sunken road, and were well hidden by the osiers, so suffered no damage.

This firing went on all the morning, and just before the attack of the 29th Regiment, to be described later, all the batteries concentrated their fire on the point of attack.

At 5 a.m. on the 10th the Ohara Brigade also began to move, with the 30th Regiment (Kawasaki) in the advanced guard.

At 7.20 a.m. the main body of the advanced guard arrived at the bridge south of Fu-shun.*

A small party of the advanced guard had already reached the gate of the town, and sent back word to say that the heights north of the town were occupied by a large force of Russians.

At 7.45 a.m. Colonel Kawasaki reported to the general that there were at least three battalions of Russian infantry north of Fu-shun and some artillery, the positions of which was not yet known.

Just about this time the officer commanding the advanced guard received an important despatch in the shape of a note from a Chinese official in the town, saying that the Russians had left it hurriedly and intended to retreat.

A mountain battery came into action about one thousand yards south of the town, and opened fire against the heights.

The 30th Regiment then entered the town. The 3rd Battalion came under a cross fire from three directions, and a hot interchange of fire took place between the north wall and the Russians entrenched round the monument a few hundred yards away.

At first Colonel Kawasaki thought of sending one battalion round by the left of the town to assault the monument hill, but saw that it would have been enfiladed by machine gun and infantry fire from the left, so sent all three battalions into the town instead, as it was equally impossible to move round by the right.

At 8.20 a.m. another mountain battery arrived and both batteries were ordered to concentrate a rapid fire on the monument.

At 8.40 a.m. two Russian mountain guns opened fire from the north-west, using indirect fire from some undiscovered position.

At 8.45 a.m. the position of the Japanese on the wall was as follows:—

Two companies on the right (east) of the gate, one company on the west, two machine guns on each side, and another on the western wall, firing in that direction.

---

* *See* Map 63.

At 9.50 a.m. one mountain battery was firing at the tower and the other in the direction of the Russian guns (now four) north-west.

By this time the 30th Regiment had had about 100 casualties.

At 10.15 a.m. the Russians near the tower were reinforced by a company and a machine gun. Two other machine guns were also firing from the north-west.

The enemy concentrated all his fire on the Japanese machine guns, but the parapet of the wall afforded great protection and little loss was incurred.

The ranges between the Japanese machine guns on the wall and those of the Russians to the north-west were 1,900 and 2,700 yards.

About 10 a.m. the fight became hottest, and about 11 a.m. it slackened off.

Early in the afternoon the Russians began to retreat, and by 4.20 p.m. their numbers had considerably decreased.

As soon as it was seen that the Japanese troops had established themselves north of Wan-pu-chieh, the heights north of Fu-shun were attacked, and taken without much difficulty.

During the morning the two squadrons of the 2nd Divisional Cavalry Regiment, which had certainly not distinguished themselves in reconnaissance work the day before, had considerable losses from artillery fire. They suddenly emerged from some trees near the river south-south-east of Fu-shun, as if making for the shelter of the southern wall. A few scouts who were riding in front were hit, and then the main body, instead of making a dash for the wall and safety, hesitated in the open, and then moved to the right, where the mountain battery horses were sheltered in a dip of the ground. Meanwhile the Russian guns opened a rapid fire on them, killing or wounding many men, and about two hundred horses. They followed them with their fire to the dip where the battery ponies were, and killed or wounded 80.

It has been seldom during the war that artillery has had such a chance.

The Kani Detachment arrived at 8 a.m. near the Fu-shun bridge, but by now the ice had been broken by the fire of the Russian artillery and machine guns, so the detachment took cover in a cutting, and No. 5 Field Battery came into action, near the river bank.

At 10.20 a.m. this battery opened against the only four Russian guns visible, and claims to have silenced them.

Later the battery came under heavy cross fire from Russian guns on the right and left front, and was obliged to cease firing and build up cover with sandbags.*

* The Japanese field batteries all carry four to six sandbags on each of the axletree seats.—B. V.

With the exception of the above-mentioned four guns, the rest of the Russian artillery was invisible.

At 2.15 p.m. all the Russian guns were silent except those north of the tower.

At 4.30 p.m. the battery fired at one or two Russian companies which were seen retiring north of Wan-pu-chieh, and drove them off in disorder.

At 4.50 p.m. a report came that a large Russian column was retiring past Ma-niu-tai-pu, and the battery fired in its direction at ranges between 6,000 and 7,000 yards.

The casualties in the battery during the day were only 9.

About 1 p.m. some two hundred Russians, under two officers, advanced across the saddle towards the rocky point east of Wan-pu-chieh, which was held by a company of the 16th Regiment.

The company apparently did not see their approach, owing possibly to the rocks and scrub. Colonel Taniyama, however, saw the whole thing from the village, and sent an orderly to warn the company, and then two more companies as reinforcements.

The Russians came on with great determination and quickness, and succeeded in pushing back the left flank of the company before the other two companies arrived. They were then driven back, leaving 130 dead, including two officers, on the field.

The rest of the 16th Regiment had suffered severely; the colonel himself was wounded, and they were still unable to advance from Wan-pu-chieh, in fact, were in much the same position as the 30th Regiment in Fu-shun.

The 4th Regiment was south of the bridge at Wan-pu-chieh, unable to cross on account of the Russian artillery to the north-east, which concentrated its fire on the bridge. The 39th Reserve Regiment (Honda) was also south of the river.

The companies of the 29th Regiment (Toyoda), all of which except one had crossed the bridge, were under the circumstances the only troops available to send against the Russian position, and thereby relieve the pressure on the rest of the Japanese line. They therefore received orders to attack the heights west of Wan-pu-chieh.*

The regiment had got across before the Russian artillery opened on the bridge, but one company was mixed up with the baggage, &c., south of the river, and had to remain there with the 4th Regiment.

The other eleven companies moved west down the river bank, and the colonel went forward alone to reconnoitre. On arrival at the first position shown on the map he came under fire from the Russian infantry on the heights; at that time he could see that the 16th Regiment were in difficulties in the

* *See* Map 62.

village, and though no orders had yet reached him, he made up his mind to attack at once.

The officer commanding 1st Battalion suggested that the right wing was in a bad way, and that it would be better to await further information, but the colonel only thought if the rest were in difficulties it was all the more reason to attack.

In front lay about 1,800 yards of bare sand, the width of the island being about 1,300 yards. The Russians had marked out ranges in the sand, so it was necessary to cross by rushes of about three hundred yards.

The colonel now received orders to attack, and called up his three battalion commanders for instructions. While they were standing together, about 1 p.m., several Russian volleys were fired at them, but without damage.

The highest point west of Wan-pu-chieh was fixed upon as the centre of the attack. The 1st Battalion took the left, the 2nd the right, and the 3rd followed in reserve.

The colonel himself advanced straight for the highest point, between the 2nd and 3rd.

Very little was known of the enemy's position, especially on the right front, and many casualties occurred while crossing the small river in full view of the Russian position. The 1st Battalion also suffered heavily from the Russian fire from the direction of Hsia-fang-shen. The river is about fifty yards wide, and the ice was broken in places, but bore fairly well.

Meanwhile the artillery, by order of the commander of the division, concentrated its fire on the rocky point west of Wan-pu-chieh, where some Russian machine guns were supposed to be. The Japanese shooting was bad.

After crossing the small river, the 3rd Battalion in reserve closed up to the firing line, the men running across the open in twos and threes. The whole line then advanced to the road, and suffered very heavily in doing so, Major Nakamura, of the 1st Battalion, being killed, and many other officers killed and wounded.

The road, which afforded little cover, was about three hundred yards from part of the Russian trenches, so the losses became terrible.

The colonel, who remained south of the little river, now got a message to say that only 30 men of the 2nd Battalion remained unhurt. This, however, was an exaggeration, though it is a fact that only seven officers in the whole regiment still remained untouched.

The colonel now reported to the commander of the brigade that the regiment had suffered great loss, that the Russians in front were more numerous than had been supposed, and begged for reinforcements.

It meant annihilation to remain in the road, so the colonel ordered his men to throw away everything except rifles and ammunition, and to make a rush for the foot of the hills. He

did not expect more than one battalion would be sent as reinforcements, but decided to assault as soon as it should arrive.

Three men had been despatched with the above report, and during an hour, while awaiting an answer, he ordered preparation for a bayonet attack up the steep hill sides. Then about 3.30 p.m. a message came from the 1st Battalion that about two companies of Russians on the left were beginning to retire north-north-east. The colonel waited a little longer, and then seeing that the Russians evidently meant to retire, he ordered the assault at once.

Just as his men began to climb the hills, the Russians could be seen retreating in three directions. The heights were steep and slippery, and the men were tired, so that by the time they reached the trenches, the Russians had gone.

The enemy in front of the 16th Regiment were also retiring, so a portion of the 29th deployed to the right facing east, and fired on them, following them along the heights for about three thousand yards.

The colonel also advanced for about two thousand yards north of the Russian line of defence, and then received an answer to his report, ordering him to occupy the Russian trenches, but saying nothing about sending reinforcements to assist him.

The Russians had set fire to the houses on the left of the valley, either to clear the field of fire or in order to retreat under cover of the smoke.

The casualties in the 29th Regiment at this fight were 350. The eleven companies started, each man carrying 200 to 250 rounds of ammunition, but the companies were weak, the regiment having lost 1,054, including 17 officers, at Kao-tai Ling.

It was interesting to note that when crossing the 1,800 yards of open sand the distances between men averaged two to three paces.

The officer commanding 3rd Battalion told me later that he always trained his men to advance with two to three paces interval, but that the tendency is always for the men to herd together and close in. Any wider extension he thought made command too difficult.

This is the opinion of many other officers with whom I have spoken.

By 4.30 p.m. the Russians in front of Fu-shun were also retiring, but in good order.*

The 39th Reserve Regiment, which had been sitting all day south of the Hun Ho, was now ordered across on the ice, and established themselves in the Russian trenches.

The Ohara Brigade also occupied the trenches north of

* *See* Map 63.

Fu-shun, and the remainder of the division spent the night in the valley between Hsing-lung-tien and Fu-shun.

The Russian strength in front of the division during the day was probably about—

1 regiment in front of Ohara.
2 or 3 battalions in front of Taniyama.
1½ battalions in front of Toyoda.

With regard to the artillery, it is difficult to say how many guns the Russians had. Probably there was one field and one mountain battery north of Fu-shun, and one field battery west of Wan-pu-chieh. The field battery positions were never discovered by the Japanese.

In my opinion this action of the 10th March was one of the most interesting in the whole war. The Japanese were undoubtedly surprised, and the Russians, had they been there in greater force, and ready, might have "smashed" the 2nd Division. As it turned out, the splendid infantry of this division carried the thing through as usual, but at the expense of about 2,000 casualties.

11th Mar. On the 11th, the 2nd Division left the Ma-niu-tai-pu* road to the Ya-lu Army, and moved over to the Lien-tao-wan road. The Ohara Brigade had therefore to march west, and the 29th Reserve Regiment (Kani) had orders to advance on the left of the main column by Fen-shui-ling (E 3). The divisional advanced guard arrived about 5 p.m. at the village of Pai-kuan-tun, and it was then reported that two Russian battalions held the pass over the watershed between the Hun Ho and Fan Ho, an easy pass with a rise of about two hundred feet on either side. The 30th Regiment, which was in the advanced guard, deployed for attack at dusk, and a field battery fired a few rounds. The Russians, however, retired, and the Divisional Head-Quarters spent the night in Pai-kuan-tun.

12th Mar. The division had intended to rest on the 12th, but it received orders to continue its march. The Ishibashi Brigade, one mountain and one field battery, were in front. The Russians occupied the low hills north of Piao-chi-tun, but only in small numbers.

The Ishibashi Brigade waited till dark with the intention of attacking, but the Russians retired.

A Russian column was also seen moving west down the valley of the Fan Ho, and it seemed at the time that Ishibashi lost a chance by not attacking it. The 2nd Division was, however, all alone in front of this position, expecting the 12th Division to come up on the left, and the 11th Division Ya-lu Army on the right, but neither came.

13th Mar. On the 13th March the division had orders to reconnoitre and attack the Russian position on the Fan Ho.

---

* *See* squares E 4 and E 3, Map 61.

At 7 a.m. the main body started to Piao-chi-tun, where it halted; officers' patrols were now sent out to reconnoitre, and the men of the field artillery began to dig gun pits in the plain.

Russians could be seen in occupation of the heights across the river north of Chang-chia-lou-tzu (E 2), and in the valley of Su-ya-tun, in all perhaps five or six battalions and one mountain battery.

The Fan Ho is a disappointingly narrow and shallow river considering the width of its valley, and consisted at the time of about fifty yards' width of ice, passable at any point.

The continuous line of mountains north of the river made an excellent defensive position, crossed on either side of the highest point north of Chang-chia-lou-tzu by steep passes, suitable for pack transport only.

The plain, which is about two thousand yards wide in front of the pass, narrows into a neck about five hundred yards in width just east of Su-ya-tun. The latter is a small village in the centre of a plain surrounded on three sides by mountains.*

The commander of the 2nd Division decided to attack the Russian position, across the above-mentioned narrow gorge, at the same time demonstrating on his right against the enemy near Chang-chia-lou-tzu.

To carry out this plan it was necessary first to drive the Russians across the river valley from the heights south of Su-ya-tun.

The 30th Regiment was detailed for this duty. Major-General Ohara was also ordered to capture the most advanced Russian positions north of the river before dawn on the 14th. At the same time the artillery was ordered to be in position before dawn to support the attack, and one battery fired a few rounds from Piao-chi tun† during the afternoon.

Orders for the 14th March :—

The Ishibashi Brigade was ordered to demonstrate on the right (east).

The 39th Reserve Regiment (Honda) was to cross the valley at Chang-chia-lou-tzu before dawn, and to attack the high mountain north of that village.

The 29th Reserve Regiment (Kani) was to act as divisional reserve.

About 3 p.m. the main body of the 30th Regiment arrived at the small village of Pao-chia-tun,‡ and Colonel Kawasaki, taking with him one company, climbed to point "A" to reconnoitre.

At 3.30 p.m., when he arrived on the crest-line of the hill, about two companies could be seen towards the north end of

* *See* Maps 64 and 65. † Map 61, square E 3.
‡ *See* Map 64.

ridge "B," and about two companies scattered about among the low knolls at the south extremity. Russians could also be seen on the higher ridge "C." Altogether perhaps 1½ battalions were visible.

The officer commanding I./30th now came up to the colonel and said that he could drive all the Russians north of the river with his battalion alone, and received permission to do so.

The company, with the colonel, now came under heavy shrapnel fire from four Russian mountain guns near the pass.

The valley between "A" and "B" is about one thousand yards wide, and quite open with the exception of one small group of houses.

At 5 p.m. the battalion began to attack. No. 1 Company met with little opposition, the Russians on that part of the ridge retiring by the saddle to the mountain "C," but they came under a heavy rifle fire from the Russians on the north end of "B," and the commander of the battalion was slightly wounded.

At 5.30 p.m. one section took the little pointed knoll "D."

The Russians on the north end of the ridge held out stubbornly, and did not retire across the valley towards Su-ya-tun until the Japanese turned two machine guns on to them from the south end of the ridge.

The machine guns opened at 6 p.m., and by 6.50 p.m. the 4th Company had taken the high point "C," the Russians retiring across the river.

The Japanese only lost 11 killed and wounded.

Two Japanese mountain guns also took part in the action, firing over ridge "A."

A field officer told me that he had expected a far more determined resistance on the part of the Russians, and was quite prepared to incur heavy losses in carrying out his orders to drive the enemy across the river. One must give the commander of the Russian rear guard credit for having disposed his 1½ battalions in such a way as to have quite deceived the Japanese patrols as to his true strength. He kept the Japanese busily employed till dark, and withdrew skilfully with little loss.

The colonel had taken the precaution to back up the attack of the 1st Battalion with two companies of the 2nd Battalion, whose appearance near point "D" excited the wrath of the officer commanding the 1st Battalion, who wanted to have the field to himself. This officer, whom I have often met, is a shrewd soldier of the hard-fighting type, who doubtless would not hesitate to attack the whole Russian army with his one battalion if he had a chance.

That evening Colonel Kawasaki sent one section to occupy the high point "C," and posted two companies along the heights to guard the left flank.

At 11 p.m. the regiment received orders to attack the Russian position north of the river before daybreak.

During the latter part of the night the 2nd Battalion (Major Sadamatsu) moved north down the valley to the river, and the colonel went to the north extremity of "B" to reconnoitre, but could see nothing in the darkness.

At 5.50 a.m. the 2nd Battalion deployed across the river at the narrowest part of the valley.* Nos. 5 and 6 Companies leading, No. 8 Company about three hundred yards to the right, and No. 7 close behind in reserve. The river was easily passed, and all the companies reached the foot of the hills without difficulty and began to climb up the steep slopes. **14th Mar.**

No. 8 Company made for the long narrow spur on the right, and came under very heavy fire.

Two machine guns and two companies were posted among the rocks on the north point of "B," and the 1st Battalion was on the same ridge a little further back.

The mountain batteries came into action as shown on the map,† and the two nearest opened fire at dawn on the trenches in front of the 30th Regiment, the other against the pass in front.

The ridge occupied by the Russians north of the valley is about one hundred and twenty feet high, and very steep on the river side. It took about twenty minutes for the leading men to reach a point about three-quarters of the way up.

By 6.40 a.m. the first line arrived just under the top, and the Russians could be seen standing up on the skyline throwing bombs and stones, and firing down on the ascending Japanese.

By this time most of the 8th Company on the right were *hors de combat*, having come under oblique fire from both sides as well as frontal.

At 6.50 a.m. two companies of the 16th Regiment appeared in the valley on the right, and commenced firing, but for some reason or other did not advance.

At 7 a.m. a Russian company was seen near Su-ya-tun advancing against the Japanese left flank, but the two machine guns were turned on to it, and it withdrew again to the village.

All this time a heavy fire was going on between the Russians at Su-ya-tun and the Japanese left flank on the heights near "C."*

The fight was now raging along the crest of the mountain in front—only about seventy men of No. 8 Company were left. The men of Nos. 5 and 6 Companies were scattered along just under the crest line, and looked as if they were shooting, but really most of them were dead.

The Russians were still standing up to fire, in spite of the shrapnel from the Japanese mountain artillery, one battery of which fired 300 rounds against this portion of the position.

---

* *See* Map 64. † *See* Map 65.

I was told by a Japanese colonel that the Russians fired at every wounded Japanese soldier until he was dead, and heaved down stones on the top of the wretched men clinging to the steep and slippery slopes.

Nos. 11 and 12 Companies were now ordered up to reinforce, and at 8.50 a.m. Colonel Kawasaki ordered the assault.

What remained of Nos. 5, 6, and 7, together with the whole of No. 12, all the officers in front, with drawn swords, bugles blowing, dashed up towards the col, but were met by a fierce counter-attack, in which nearly the whole lot were killed or wounded.

The attack was regularly "wiped out," and every Japanese, officer and man, seemed to have been killed. The Japanese had forgotten to bring hand-grenades, and suffered much from those thrown by the Russians, as well as from the stones which were showered down upon them.

The officer commanding the 12th Company and the adjutant of the 3rd Battalion reached a point three yards from the top, but were both instantly shot through the head. A non-commissioned officer also reached the crest-line, but was killed. Nearly all the Japanese were shot about the head and neck, and, owing to the close range, bones were smashed to atoms.

At 9.10 a.m. the 9th and 10th Companies advanced across the valley from the left, and fortunately had very few casualties when crossing the open.

The 1st Battalion was also sent round by the right to try to turn the left flank of the Russians on the ridge.

This battalion had about 800 yards of open ground to advance over, but the officer commanding ordered his men to march as if on parade, and not to mind the shrapnel and rifle bullets, telling them that if it was their fate to be shot, they would be shot whatever precautions they might take. By the time the battalion reached the foot of the slopes, however, the Russians had already commenced to retire.

Meanwhile, at 9.30 a.m., Colonel Kawasaki, with the regimental flag and one company, moved straight across the valley from the left, and came under heavy rifle fire. Just as they reached the river five or six shrapnel fired by the Russian mountain guns near the pass burst near them. The 2nd lieutenant carrying the flag, the regimental adjutant, and most of the orderlies were shot.

At 10 a.m. a sergeant of No. 10 Company reached the crest-line alone, and saw about two battalions of Russians retiring along the slopes on the northern side. He shouted to his comrades, who now rushed up, and could be seen standing on the crest-line, pouring what proved to be an effective fire into the retreating Russians.

When the colonel reached the crest, a regiment of Russian infantry could be seen north-west of the position, and also about one battalion on the heights west of Su-ya-tun.

He paid little attention to them, however, thinking that if they intended to make a night attack they would be more careful not to expose their position and numbers during the day.

I was also told that if it had not been for the effective fire of the mountain batteries, which shelled the ridge a few yards in front of their own men, it would have been impossible to have taken it.

A few shells also came from the field batteries south of Chang-chia-lou-tzu, but their observation was faulty.

The Russians left 200 corpses and 450 rifles on the position, and many who had been wounded during the retreat were carried away after dark. The colonel had issued strict orders to his men not to fire on the Russian wounded.

The 30th Regiment lost 180 killed and 420 wounded.

While the 30th Regiment had been engaged in this attack the Japanese right had done little. The field batteries bombarded the heights north of Chang-chia-lou-tzu, at the foot of which the 39th Reserve Regiment had established itself, but without being able to advance up the steep slopes.

Fearing a counter-attack from the north of Su-ya-tun, where Russian reinforcements could be seen arriving, Major-General Ohara ordered the 6th Regiment to cross the valley and support the 30th Regiment on the heights.

The two battalions which formed the main body of the 16th Regiment doubled across the valley in rushes of about one hundred yards, as hard as they could go. As the pace of the men of course varied, all formation was soon lost, and it appeared like a mob of men racing across the open.

The Russian field battery north-west of Su-ya-tun, which had given so much trouble all the morning, still fired, also the mountain guns north of the pass had not yet retired, so that several shrapnel burst over the Japanese in the valley.

All the Russian fire, however, was indirect, and the shrapnel burst for the most part too high.

One officer on the 2nd Division staff stated afterwards that three or four Russian shrapnel burst among a company during this rush, and killed or wounded about one hundred men. The officers commanding the 30th and 16th Regiments, however, do not corroborate the statement. Only about twenty men were seen to drop in various places, but the stretcher bearers were busy in the valley for a long time afterwards.

The Russians still stuck to their second position north-east of the pass, and as their troops north of Su-ya-tun looked threatening, Major-General Ohara halted his brigade. The brigade remained in this position till dark, always expecting an attack from the north-west on their left.

During the night the Russians retreated towards Tieh-ling.

A company of the 39th climbed up to the highest point during the night, and found the trenches had been evacuated. At dawn they signalled to the others, and the whole Russian position was soon occupied.

A closer inspection of the Russian position showed what a splendid one it was for a defensive action. For an army retreating on Tieh-ling it seemed to be certainly the most favourable position in which to fight a prolonged rear guard action. Apparently, however, it had not struck the Russians in this manner, as they had only made light entrenchments. The passes on the east and west side of the high mountain north of Chang-chia-lou-tzu were well defended by trenches, and at the latter gun pits had been constructed but not used.

The mountain battery had fired all day from a position some six hundred yards in rear, using indirect fire, a well chosen position which was never discovered by the Japanese artillery.

Again, the possession of this position meant the command of the line of retreat towards Tieh-ling on either side of it, and was, therefore, very important to both Japanese and Russians.

If the 12th Division had come up on the left, it would have been a comparatively simple matter to have made the Russians retire by a turning movement from the west.

However, the officer commanding the 2nd Division was doubtless anxious to be first into Tieh-ling, and did not wait.

The bravery and tenacity displayed by the 30th Regiment in attacking and capturing such a formidable position by a direct frontal attack, unsupported by other troops, is worthy of record.

One cannot help wondering whether any other soldiers in the world have developed to such a high degree the two most necessary constituents of bravery, namely, patriotism and self-sacrifice, as the officers and men of the Japanese infantry.

15th Mar. The Divisional Head-Quarters spent the night of the 14th/15th at Pao-chia-tun. The general intended to rest his troops on the 15th, but orders came to press on and attack the main Russian position at Tieh-ling.*

At 10 a.m. the Ishibashi Brigade, with the artillery and engineers, started along the Tzu-yu-tai—Weng-chia-chai-tzu—Tieh-ling road.

At 3 p.m. the Divisional Head-Quarters arrived at a pass south of Weng-chia-chai-tzu, where the Russians had made an excellent road. From here the Tieh-ling line of defences could be plainly seen, the most formidable works being between two tall pagodas on the crest of the ridge some two miles apart. On the left front were the Liao plains and the railway. At the south-west end of the city the Russian settlement and magazines. The latter were on fire, and the flashes of a

* *See* square E 2, Map 61.

battery could be seen coming from the midst of the flames and smoke.

Apparently the Russians had set fire to all their stores, and their rear guard was defending the burning stuff.

About twenty to twenty-four Russian guns could be seen on the main position, but of these only twelve fired. The Japanese thought that the Russians had heavy artillery in the fortifications, so that the commander of the division ordered his batteries to entrench before opening fire.

At 3.30 p.m. Colonel Tada, commanding the 2nd Artillery, received orders to bring his batteries into action.

At 4 p.m. the digging began, but the ground was frozen and the work slow.

At 6 p.m. the guns of the Umezawa Brigade opened fire on the left, near an old Chinese fort, on the Russian batteries near the west pagoda.

At 6.15 p.m. the 2nd Division artillery opened fire, the delay being due to waiting for as many guns and infantry as possible before exposing the position.

For the first time during the war six batteries of a division of the First Army came into action in one line.

The field batteries were on the left and the mountain batteries on the right, extended along the ridge just behind the crest line.

The divisional staff were on a high hill about one thousand yards behind, and most of the Russian shell burst harmlessly in the valley between this and the artillery position.

The ranges to the Russian line of forts were between 4,300 and 5,000 yards, rather too far for the mountain guns.

The Russian artillery did not answer until some time after the 2nd Division artillery opened fire, and it looked as if they were only dummy guns after all. Then they opened a rapid fire, but with no results, most of the shrapnel bursting in the valley behind the Japanese artillery position.

At 6.30 p.m. the railway bridge north of Tieh-ling appeared to be burning. The railway station was also in flames, and it became evident that the Russians did not intend to make a stand. Men could be seen running about setting fire to everything.

Before night the Russian artillery retired through Tieh-ling, but the smoke and darkness coming on prevented the Japanese artillery from doing any harm.

The Japanese artillery bivouacked some 2,000 yards behind their position, and at 11 p.m. the 2nd Division advanced guard occupied the Russian line of fortifications without resistance.

At 1 a.m. on the 16th the 4th Regiment entered Tieh-ling.

16th Mar. On the 16th March the division entered Tieh-ling and remained there, occupying at the same time the ground to the west of the city. The 12th Division advanced past it in pursuit

The troops were tired out, and needed rest, having been constantly fighting or marching for a whole month.

Out of a total of about 10,000 casualties in the First Army, the 2nd Division had incurred about 7,000.

At a *Shokonsai*, or ceremony for the dead, held at Chang-chia-lou-tzu about a month later, it was interesting to see the still depleted battalions drawn up in the plain. The loss in officers had been terrible, and must always be so in the Japanese army, where the men expect such reckless bravery on the part of their leaders.

(13) The Battle of Mukden.—Operations of the 12th Division First Japanese Army.

REPORT by Captain J. B. JARDINE, 5th Lancers, Tokio, 8th July 1905.

Plates.

General map - - - - - Map 61.
Operations of the centre column (Major-General Shimamura) on 2nd March 1905 - - - „ 66.
Operations of Major-General Imamura's Brigade on 10th March 1905 - - - - „ 67.

Contents.

Page
(1) Operations - - - - - - 295
(2) Supply and Transport - - - - - 337
(3) Remarks of a Medical Officer of the 12th Division - 342
(4) Remarks and Opinions of Japanese Infantry Officers 343

(1)—*Operations.*

*Position before the Battle.**—As far as the First Army was concerned, prior to the 25th February, which may be considered the day on which the battle of Mukden commenced, the 12th Division under Lieut.-General Inouye was in and about Shih-chiao-tzu (E 6) holding the entrenched line it had occupied all the winter. The enemy's defensive line in front is shown on the map.* It was very strongly entrenched along its whole length, and the Russian artillery in front of the division was invariably dispersed in single batteries and in half batteries. That part of the Japanese line adjoining the village of Pien-niu-lu-pu (D 5 east), which has been termed by the Russians Benniaputse, was closer to the enemy's entrenchments than any other of the First Army. Here too were the main positions of the 12th Division artillery. The line occupied by the division throughout the winter was the extreme right of the First Army. The

* *See* Map 61, mainly squares D 5 and E 5.

village of Pien-niu-lu-pu was an object of dispute all the winter, but the normal state of affairs was that the Russian held the northern and larger part, while the Japanese the southern and smaller. The Sha Ho—a river practically without banks—lies between them. It was no obstacle, as it was frozen all the winter and at the time of the final capture of the village by the Japanese (5th March). As a matter of fact, it is always fordable by infantry except after heavy rain.

Composition of the Division.—The composition of the 12th Division was the same as at the battle of the Sha Ho, *plus* the Awaibara Brigade. Major-General Shimamura commanded the 12th Brigade, *i.e.*, 14th and 47th Regiments. Major-General Imamura (*vice* Major-General Kigoshi promoted) commanded the 23rd Brigade, *i.e.*, 24th and 46th Regiments. Total, 3 brigades. The division exchanged three of its mountain batteries for three field batteries of the 2nd Division. The additional artillery with the division was one field battery, three mountain batteries, three 9-cm. mortar batteries, one 12-cm. mortar battery, one 15-cm. mortar battery (each mortar battery had four mortars), two field guns and two captured Russian field guns, in all nine batteries: seven on Kuan-shan Ling and two near Ta Liu-chia-yu. Two squadrons of the 12th Cavalry Regiment acted on the right flank of the 2nd Division during the battle and pursuit, connecting with the Ya-lu Army. One squadron therefore remained with the division.

Position of the First Army before the Battle.—With regard to the position of the other parts of the First Army immediately before the battle, the 2nd Division was in and about Wei-ning-ying (about 5½ miles east of Pen-hsi-hu). The Guard Division was on the left, or west, of the 12th Division, *i.e.*, its line ran between Wai-tou Shan and Te-te Shan, and the Umezawa Brigade was in reserve, but holding an infinitesimal part of the whole line between Hsiao Liu-chia-yu (D 5 S.E.) and Wai-tou Shan. First Army Head-Quarters were at Pan-la-shan-tzu (D 6 north). The line of communication of the 12th Division was as follows:—Dalny—Liao-yang (by rail)—Hsia-fu-tun (a village about ten miles north-east of Liao-yang)—Ta-yao (south of Yen-tai Colliery)—Yin-chiang-pu-tzu (D 6) by cart. The Umezawa Brigade also received supplies by this line. In addition to this, a small quantity of supplies for the division came *viâ* An-tung—Lien-shan-kuan (light railway)—Chiao-tou—Pen-hsi-hu (by cart).

Enemy in front of the 12th Division at the Outset.—The supposed composition of the Russian troops in front of the division was:—Part of the First Army under Lenevich, whose head-quarters were reported to be at Kang-ta-jen-shan (D 5 east). From Shan-chu-tzu Shan (D 5 centre) to the pass about one and a quarter miles north-west of Tung-kou (E 5

west) was the 1st Siberian Reserve Division. From that pass to Che-tou Ling (E 5) was the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division. Close to Che-tou Ling was the 6th East Siberian Reserve Division or part of it. The Russian artillery consisted of four and a half batteries of field guns, one of mountain guns, and one of 15·2-cm. mortars, mostly in half batteries; but of course true observation of the gun positions was impossible.

It may perhaps be mentioned here that it is notorious that the Russians kept many guns in reserve. During fighting it often seems as if they had not the proper proportion of guns to infantry. The following is an extract from *Instructions to Officers above the rank of Captain*, issued by General Kuropatkin on the 9th January of this year:—"It is important that we should keep large numbers of guns in reserve until we know the enemy's positions, but up till now we have kept them back too long, while the Japanese have sent all of theirs to the first line, with a resulting disadvantage to us." These orders were picked up, amongst many others, on the field during the battle of Mukden.

Order issued by Marquis Oyama before the Battle.—The following is an extract from the orders issued by Marshal the Marquis Oyama before the battle:—

> "The aim of the battle is to decide the fate of the war, so it is not a question of occupying certain points or taking tracts of country. It is essential that the enemy should be dealt a heavy blow, and as in all battles fought up to now pursuit has been very slow, it is absolutely necessary on this occasion to pursue as promptly as possible and to the utmost."

From this it will be understood that all orders afterwards were given with this end in view, *i.e.*, the crushing of the Russian field army.

In a discussion as to where the main force of the 12th Division should be employed, before orders for the battle were made out, some of the staff favoured an attack on Pien-niu-lu-pu (D 5 S.E.), an easy matter, and that part of the Russian position in rear of it, but the necessity for supporting the 2nd Division led the commander to decide on attacking Che-tou Ling (E 5 centre).

Divisional Orders, 24th February 1905.—The following orders were issued by the officer commanding the 12th Division, dated 11 a.m. 24th February, at Shang Shih-chiao-tzu (E 6 N.W.):—

> (i.) There is no further change as regards the situation of the enemy. To-day the 2nd Division will occupy Te-ti, Kao-yen Ling, and the ground south of Ta-yu, while to-morrow (25th February) it will occupy the high ground north-west of Kao-kuan-sai and Erh-ma Ling (E 5 centre).

On the 26th February the 2nd Division, if possible, will occupy Wang-fu Ling (E 5 centre). The Guard Division will take over Wai-tou Shan (D 5 S.E.) to-day from the Umezawa Brigade, and will hold it with 1 battalion, 8 guns (Russian field battery) and some engineers.

(ii.) The division will attack on the 25th February.

(iii.) By dawn on the 25th February the Right Column (Awaibara) will take up a line close to Hung-ling-tzu (E 5 south) and Hsiung-kai Ling, occupying the hills north-west, Shang-ta-pei-kou (E 5), and north of Lao-yeh Ling (E 5 south). It will keep touch with and protect the left flank of the 2nd Division. Part of the Right Column also will occupy Ta-ho-pei-tung-kou (E 5 south).

(iv.) By dawn on the 25th February the Centre Column (Shimamura) will be close to Shang Shih-chiao-tzu (E 6 N.W.) with part of its force in the valley lying south of Tung-kou (E 5). It will occupy Hsia Ho-pei,* Ta Ho-pei (E 5), and the northern part of the valley leading to Tung-kou village. The column will arrange for the security of the two mountain batteries that will accompany it.

(v.) The Left Column (Imamura) in touch with the troops on Wai-tou Shan will occupy by dawn on the 25th February the line Kuan-shan Ling (E 5 S.W.)—Pien-niu-lu-pu—Hsia Ping-tai-tzu—Hsiao Liu-chia-yu (D 5 S.E.).

(vi.) The artillery will be ready to open fire on the 25th February from their positions. Two mountain artillery batteries will join the Centre Column and, preparing a position on Ho Shan† during the night 24th/25th February, will be in position there on 25th February. The two captured field guns will take up a position close to Tung Ling (E 5 S.W.) on the night of the 25th/26th February.


(vii.) The whole reserve of the division will concentrate at the south end of Shang Shih-chiao-tzu (E 6 N.W.) on the 25th February before noon.

With regard to these orders, the plan was to occupy the hills on the left bank of the Tung-kou River (part of the Sha Ho running east from Pien-niu-lu-pu) while supporting the 2nd Division. After reconnoitring the enemy's position and the intervening ground, while still keeping touch with the 2nd Division, the Right and Centre Columns were to decide the time and place for attack. All troops of the First Army west of Pien-niu-lu-pu were to stand fast. From the foregoing and from later events, it will be seen that the division had closer relations with the 2nd Division than with either the Umezawa Brigade or the Guard throughout the battle. The howitzers and mortars were to open fire for the first time. Their presence and position were therefore to be a surprise.


* 2 miles south-west of Ta Ho-pei (E 5).
† A hill west of Ta Ho-pei (E 5).

The following changes took place in the commands of Shimamura and Imamura in carrying out the divisional orders of the 24th February:—

The distribution of the 12th and 23rd Brigades prior to the 25th February was thus:—



For the movement, the 14th Regiment was withdrawn from the centre and the 46th Regiment was taken from the flank, both regiments then coming under the command of Shimamura, *i.e.*, the arrangement during the movement was thus —



This was done because the position of the 14th Regiment during the winter had been more or less across the Ping-tai-tzu valley, where the ground was simple, and the regiment on its left could easily and naturally extend to fill the gap, together with the 24th, whose position all the winter had been perhaps the most important. These two regiments (47th and 24th) of course knew well the ground to their front, and therefore it would have been undesirable to withdraw either of them. To carry out the orders of the 24th February it was of small importance which regiments were employed, but as a matter of fact the 46th had more knowledge of the ground on which the attack was to be made than any other. It should be noticed that Imamura's line was very extended, but on the other hand it was very strongly entrenched.

The divisional reserves were one battalion 11th Regiment (Awaibara), one battalion 46th Regiment, and one battalion 47th Regiment.

Operations of the Rear and Centre Columns, from the 24th February to the 4th March.—At 7 a.m. on the 25th the Centre Column (Shimamura) occupied positions as marked on the map,* and the Right Column (Awaibara) the ground east of it. Both **25th Feb.**

* Not reproduced. It showed three companies on the line between Huang-mu-chang and Ta Ho-pei (E 5 s.w.) covering two batteries, with the rest of the column echeloned back to Hsia Shih-chiao-tzu.

moved into position while it was dark. There was no opposition. The mountain guns were in position by 4 a.m., as also were the I. and II./46th.

26th Feb. The map* shows the positions on the 26th. To support the 2nd Division in occupying Wang-fu Ling, Awaibara, advancing, occupied the line of hills south of Sung-shu-chu-tzu—hills north-east of Ta Ho-pei. He met with some opposition at the former place, but the enemy fell back on their line north of Sung-shu-chu-tzu. This day the Russians unmasked fourteen guns at Che-tou Ling which could rake the valley east of Chang-chi-sai, and also shell Wang-fu Ling. Their positions had been well taken up. In the course of the morning news arrived that large bodies of Russians had moved from the south of Mukden in the direction of Hai-lang-chai, Kao-tai Ling (opposite the 2nd Division), and Ma-chun-tan (E/F 5) (in front of the Ya-lu Army). In the course of the day the Ya-lu Army took Ching-ho-cheng, and moved on Ma-chun-tan, but met with much opposition. During the night 26th/27th February the 2nd Division took Wang-fu Ling. This was the coldest night during the battle, the minimum being 8° below zero, Fahrenheit.

27th Feb. The situation remained the same on the 27th. The 2nd Division took the high hill north of Wang-fu Ling which dominated that place, before dawn, but failed to take Kao-tai Ling. It was reported that the right flank of the 2nd Division was threatened and in danger of being turned. To cross the river and attack was desirable in view of the situation, but such a movement would have entailed breaking connection with the 2nd Division, so the Right and Centre Columns stood fast, the valley of the Tung-kou separating them from the enemy.

28th Feb. No change in the situation took place on the 28th, but a battalion from the divisional reserves moved forward north of Hsiao Ho-pei.† The 2nd Division and Ya-lu Army made no progress. During the night 28th February/1st March, two field batteries from Hsiao Liu-chia-yu (D 5 S.E.) joined Awaibara.

1st Mar. The situation on the 1st March was as before. In the afternoon the Right Column was heavily shelled. It was reinforced in the morning by one battalion from the divisional reserve which was sent to occupy the high ground north-east of Chang-chi-sai to conform with the expected forward move on the 2nd Division. But the latter not taking place, and on coming under a hot shell fire from Che-tou Ling and Shu-kou Shan (E 5 west), before reaching the place ordered, the battalion halted. It shortly afterwards received an order to stay where it was. In the early part of the afternoon two or three companies of the enemy

* Not reproduced. It showed the bulk of the column entrenched on a line facing north-east between Huang-mu-cheng and Ta Ho-pei, with Awaibara's column 1¼ miles in front of the centre of the position.

† 2 miles south-west of Ta Ho-pei.

threatened Awaibara's right, but were at once driven back. On this day the Fourth Army began its attack on the Russian positions. During the night 1st/2nd March a divisional order came to the Right and Centre Columns to attack the hills north of Chang-chi-sai.

In accordance with this order, by 4 a.m. on the 2nd March the first line of the Centre Column was on the lower slopes of the hills on the left bank of the Tung-kou, the Right Column conforming to its movements. By the time the first lines had reached the stream, the enemy had abandoned their positions at the foot of the slopes on the right bank* and retired on their main entrenchments. A thousand yards in rear of the advanced troops marched Major-General Shimamura with the reserves and batteries. The Centre Column advancing from the river occupied the hilly ground between it and the Russian position. The guns (two mountain batteries) came into action as soon as possible and covered the advance of the infantry to the ridge beyond, which was occupied at 7 a.m. without much resistance, except from the enemy's retiring patrols. Shimamura's infantry on arrival at this point came under heavy rifle fire, but took what cover they could get and commenced entrenching themselves, in one place within seven hundred yards of the enemy. **2nd Mar.**

Up to this, Shimamura had lost only 28 men—all wounded. Now he could see the character of the ground in front that lay between him and the Russian main line of trenches, and it by no means improved on closer acquaintance. Shu-kou Shan was seen to be steeper and rougher than had been supposed; the Russian entrenchments were very complete, and machine guns were cleverly posted to sweep all approaches. An unbroken line of abattis lay one hundred yards down the slopes below the trenches, and in places wire entanglements had been constructed. Moreover, the gully to the immediate front of the Russians was extremely steep and difficult to cross. The position of the two columns was insecure—one might almost say precarious. It was natural that the troops should be anxious to face the task in front of them as soon as possible without waiting for the 2nd Division which was still "held up" at Kao-tai Ling.† Wiser counsels, however, prevailed, and the commander of the division on learning the situation ordered the two columns to stand fast. The regimental officers could not understand this decision for delay; but, to put it shortly, the staff did not think under the circumstances an attack advisable on a position of such strength, entailing as it surely would a great loss in officers. Naturally it was a difficult matter to explain this to the parties concerned. All day the Russian machine guns in front of Awaibara were very active; both columns were heavily shelled from time to time, and rifle fire went on. The Russian artillery (two batteries west of Maru-yama and one battery on the saddle east of Maru-yama paid particular attention to the mountain batteries. Sometimes they shelled the ground on the left bank of the

* *See* Map 66

† 3½ miles east of Che-tou Ling.

Tung-kou which had been occupied by Awaibara the day before. Besides these there were other Russian guns which could not be located. The original fourteen guns on Che-tou Ling were reduced to eight, which shelled the two field batteries of the Right Column from time to time. At 4.30 p.m. a snow-storm put a stop to gun fire for the day. Nothing of importance happened during the night, but two batteries of mortars were moved under cover of darkness from Kuan-shan Ling, three miles south of Chang-chi-sai, to get to a position in the little valley immediately in rear of Shimamura's infantry. The journey took longer than was anticipated, for dawn found them just east of Chang-chi-sai.

3rd Mar. On the 3rd March with great difficulty, in daylight, the mortars crossed the river one by one in spite of shelling, and arrived a little after midday. They opened fire at 3 p.m. from the position marked on the map. Shimamura and Awaibara had orders to attack with the help of their two batteries, but the latter could not continue firing long, as ammunition ran short, owing to the impracticability of bringing sufficient across the Tung-kou under fire. As a matter of fact, the attack had just commenced (4 p.m.), when it was counter-ordered by Lieut.-General Inouye, who also sent word that an attack was inadvisable in view of the fact that the 2nd Division had made no progress against the Russian position at Kao-tai Ling. The 12th Division Head-Quarters had also heard that the Ya-lu Army had made no progress in its attack at Ma-chun-tan, and was at the time awaiting reinforcements, on the arrival of which the attack would be resumed. When the counter-order arrived, a part of the Awaibara column had advanced from its position and had already suffered some loss from machine gun fire, but it waited where it was until dark and then retreated.

The Russian guns this day from time to time continued to waste shells on the ground formerly occupied by the Awaibara column on the left bank of the Tung-kou. Probably they thought there must be strong reserves there. The casualties of the Right Column this day were 221.

4th Mar. According to orders from the officer commanding the division preparations were made for the attack at 1 a.m. on the 4th, but it was again counter-ordered. During the night 3rd/4th the divisional reserves were moved to the hills on the left bank of the Tung-kou, lying to Shimamura's left rear, to fill up the gap, presumably as a precaution. Before dawn the 11th Regiment (Awaibara) was put under the orders of Major-General Ohara (15th Brigade, 2nd Division) so that the Right Column was reduced to two regiments. All day the two columns standing fast in their positions awaited a further advance by the 2nd Division. Nothing noteworthy occurred. In the course of the day the commander of the division decided to change his point of attack. This movement was carried out on the night of 4th/5th March, the Right and Centre Columns withdrawing from the positions

which they had been holding on the right bank of the Tung-kou, almost without a shot being fired, as soon as it was dark.

*Events at the Artillery Positions at Kuan-shan-ling and with the Left Column from the 25th February to the 4th March.** On the 25th February the guns of the 12th Division under the control of the officer commanding the artillery of the 12th Division, exchanged fire from time to time with the enemy's guns. As mentioned before, two mountain batteries were absent with Shimamura. There was apparently little result. **25th Feb.**

A light snow-storm all day on the 26th February prevented the guns of either side from opening fire. This snow-storm delayed the advance of the 2nd Division. **26th Feb.**

There was intermittent shelling by both sides all day on the 27th. From and including the 27th February the 12th Division artillery was placed under the orders of the officer commanding the artillery of the First Army, whose observation post was on the summit of a hill west of Hsiao Liu-chia-yu. The enemy's guns did not reply very strongly, and those that did reply only amounted to 40. The most active were those west of Shu-kou and four 15·2-cm. howitzers somewhere north of Pien-niu-lu-pu. **27th Feb.**

In the night of the 27th/28th gun and rifle fire was heard in the direction of the 2nd Division. Henceforward, until pursuit began, this shelling by night on the part of the enemy was quite a feature of the operations. After daylight shelling in front of the division was intermittent. The Japanese howitzers and mortars opened at 10.30 a.m. on the enemy's guns west of Shu-kou Shan and close to Shan-chu-tzu Shan, shelling from time to time until noon. There was little reply from the Russians until shortly after midday, when they opened a very heavy fire on the guns (three batteries) of the Umezawa Brigade in position between Hsiao Liu-chia-yu and Wai-tou Shan. In answer to this all the guns at Kuan-shan Ling, with the exception of the mountain battery, shelled heavily the Russian positions within range from right to left, and at 12.30 p.m. the Russian guns ceased firing. Shelling for the rest of the day was for the most part intermittent, but now and again the Japanese artillery fired heavily for ten minutes at a time. The Russian replies were weaker as the day wore on. **28th Feb.**

Fourteen degrees below zero, Centigrade, was registered on the night of the 28th/1st. At 5 a.m. some troops of the Umezawa Brigade took Sung-mu-pu-tzu (D 5 east), which was held by two Russian companies. Up to noon gun fire was infrequent. From that hour until 2 p.m. gun fire increased, but for the rest of the day little shelling took place. In the evening news arrived that the Third Army had as yet met with little opposition and had reached a line Hsiao Hsin-min-tun (B 5), **1st Mar.**

* *See* Squares D 5 and E 5, Map 61.

Lai-chia-pu-tzu (B 4), and that the Fourth Army had begun to advance. There was also news that the enemy's forces at Kao-tai Ling and Ma-chun-tan (E/F 5) were still increasing.

2nd Mar. On the 2nd March, as mentioned before, the Right and Centre Columns had in the early morning seized and occupied the lower slopes of the hills on the right bank of the Tung-kou. From 8.45 a.m. until noon the howitzers and mortars on Kuan-shan Ling shelled Shu-kou Shan intermittently. At 4.30 p.m. a snow-storm put a stop to gun fire for the day. At 9 p.m. it commenced snowing and raining.

3rd Mar. On the 3rd March the situation remained unchanged. There was intermittent gun fire all the morning, but in the afternoon the Japanese guns on Kuan-shan Ling heavily bombarded the enemy's position, including the village of Pien-niu-lu-pu. The reply of the Russian guns was feeble, except from a battery west of Shu-kou Shan whose position could not be located. The direction was known, but not the range. An attack by the Left Column on Pien-niu-lu-pu had been ordered for this afternoon, but it was countermanded.*

4th Mar. Thirteen degrees below zero, Centigrade, was registered on the night of the 3rd/4th, and there was a bitter north wind blowing in the morning. At 3.30 a.m. there was a heavy exchange of rifle fire between North and South Pien-niu-lu-pu. As mentioned before, the position of the reserves was changed. The 12th Division was still awaiting a forward move by the 2nd Division. The guns on Kuan-shan Ling were silent this morning, and on my asking a staff officer of the division if the guns were going to do anything in the afternoon, he said: "On a day like this, when there is no fighting, our guns are under the control of the Director of Artillery of the Army. At other times they are under the control of the divisional commander; so I don't really know." In answer to further questioning, he said: "This system has its advantages and also its disadvantages, as mistakes are liable to occur when the guns are under the orders of the Director of Artillery." The Japanese artillery on Kuan-shan Ling was silent all day.

In the afternoon the commander of the 12th Division determined to change his point of attack, issuing orders to the following effect:—

> "The objective of the division's attack will now be Pien-niu-lu-pu and the enemy's positions on the slopes immediately north of that village. The aim is to inflict as much loss on the enemy as possible, and occupy part of his positions, by the capture of which the troops will be enabled to keep close touch with him up to the time of his eventual retreat in front of the Second and Third Armies. It is most necessary that the captured part of

* *See* operations of Right and Centre Columns on this date, p. 302. — J.B.J.

the enemy's position should be held by as few troops as possible, in order that as many men as possible may be available for the pursuit."

In accordance with the above order, the Left Column, commanded by Major-General Imamura (24th and 47th Regiments, 1 troop, 2 machine guns, 1 company engineers, and 200 men of the medical corps), took Pien-niu-lu-pu and the enemy's first line of trenches north of it by dawn on the 5th. The Centre Column, as mentioned before, retired during this night from its position on the right bank of the Tung-kou and by daylight was in and about the valley of Shih-chiao-tzu (E 5/6) in reserve. Its guns, both mortars and mountain, returned to their original positions. The new position of the Centre Column was:— 14th Regiment in and about Ta Liu-chia-yu (D 5 S.E.), two battalions 46th Regiment in and about Hsia Shih-chiao-tzu, and one battalion 46th Regiment on Kuan-shan Ling artillery position close to the mountain battery. Shimamura on arrival received orders to be prepared for an advance at any moment after midday. The Right Column (Awaibara) now consisting of 2 regiments, 2 field batteries, 6 machine guns, 1 troop, and a number of stretcher bearers, retired without a casualty at the same time as did the Centre Column from its position on the right bank of the Tung-kou. By dawn (5th) it was holding a position as marked on the map,* its right on a hill north-east of Hsia Ta-pei-kou, and its left on a hill north-east of Kuan-shan Ling. It therefore on the morning of the 5th March still covered the left of the 2nd Division and formed the right of the 12th Division. **4th, 5th Mar.**

Roughly, at dawn on the 5th March, the position or distribution of the 12th Division was like this:— **5th Mar.**



* Not reproduced. Four battalions were shown east of Huang-mu-chang in line and one in column in reserve.

so, when the pursuit began, the commands were easily re-adjusted and Imamura and Shimamura resumed command of their original brigades.*

The Attack of the Imamura Column on Pien-niu-lu-pu and Positions in rear of it, 5th March 1905.—The column, being in the same position as on 25th February, received, on the evening of the 4th March, orders to attack Pien-niu-lu-pu and slopes north of that village, and take the enemy's first line of trenches in the early morning. The following are briefly the orders issued by Major-General Imamura:—

> "The 24th Regiment, first driving the enemy out of Pien-niu-lu-pu, will, with a section of engineers, take the enemy's first line on the slopes north of it. The 47th Regiment, supporting the attack of the 24th, will take the enemy's first line of trenches on the slopes north of Hu-chia-tai.† One section of engineers will accompany it. The brigade reserves will be two companies of the 24th Regiment and one company of the 47th Regiment. The latter's position will be on the hilly ground north-west of Hsia Ping-tai-tzu, the former's in the valley running south-east of Pien-niu-lu-pu, close to the left bank of the Sha Ho. The operations will begin at 4.30 a.m."

As I have already stated, the southern part of Pien-niu-lu-pu had always been held by the Japanese. For some reason or other it was not until 5.30 a.m. (5th March) that the 24th Regiment attacked the village—one battalion against the village itself, while the other passed east of it. Little resistance was encountered. The Russian captain in command, who was captured, said he had orders to retire if attacked in strength. Judging the evening before that an attack was impending, he had withdrawn most of his men and had remained with a small body. When retiring on the approach of the 24th Regiment he fell into a ditch and was captured. The 24th, pressing on after a half re-form in the village, drove the Russians out of their first or lower trenches, but coming on stronger defences and redoubts well protected by wire entanglements, it halted. It then made good the ground it had taken by using the spade when necessary. In touch with the 24th was the 47th Regiment, which, after the first line of trenches had been taken, was counter-attacked, but repulsed the Russians with loss.

The order to the 47th Regiment was that it was to support the 24th in its attack on Pien-niu-lu-pu, and, passing on, take the Russian first line of trenches on the slopes north of Hu-chia-tai. This was carried out by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, one company of each being posted at the foot of Hsiao Liu-chia-yu Shan and north of Ta Liu-chia-yu. The advance was

---


* *See* page 299. † 1½ miles north-west of Pien-niu-lu-pu.

made by the two battalions in line, each battalion having two companies in the first line and one company in support. The 2nd Battalion was on the left, the 3rd Battalion on the right. They advanced at 5.30 a.m.; two companies of the 1st Battalion were part of the divisional reserve, the other two were part of the brigade reserves. On arrival at the river, on the right bank of which the Russians had a line of sentries, the 3rd Battalion came under a severe flanking fire from the trenches just north of Pien-niu-lu-pu, and suffered many casualties. It pressed on, however, with the 2nd Battalion, and arriving at the foot of the slopes, the officer commanding the regiment put two machine guns in position on its right. By 6.30 a.m. both battalions had taken the first line of trenches, the Russians retreating on their second and much stronger line. Hand-grenades were used by both sides. The Japanese used the bayonet freely, but the Russians relied more on rifle fire. The 3rd Battalion took whatever it could and hastily entrenched or converted the Russian trenches to its own use. The 2nd Battalion, however, managed to get much closer to the Russian second line. The 3rd Battalion lost one captain and one lieutenant killed and one lieutenant wounded. The total casualties were 62 killed and 224 wounded, the heaviest losses being incurred while it received the enfilading fire.

I have mentioned above that the 24th halted after taking the village. It is most probable that owing to this the Russians immediately in front of the 24th Regiment were free to bring this enfilade fire to bear on the 47th, which was most likely unaware of this delay on the part of the 24th, for it was outside the village. As a Japanese officer said, such things are only to be expected in night attacks. The loss of the 2nd Battalion was 250. It was impossible to ascertain the Russian casualties, but later on, when the pursuit began, 300 Russian dead were found in the neighbourhood of the first line of trenches. About two battalions of Russians were engaged in this fighting.

Formation of the Troops in the Night Attack.—With regard to this night attack, the procedure was as follows:—Each battalion had two companies in the first line, the formation of each company being as shown on page 308.

There were 15 grenadiers per battalion with the first line and 10 in reserve. That is to say, 5 grenadiers per company and 10 in reserve. The grenadiers and 10 scouts formed an extended line 30 paces in front of an extended section which was followed at 50 paces by the remaining two sections of the company—in line. In the final rush or charge, the duty of the leading section was to join the 15 men (grenadiers and scouts) and close with the enemy. All bayonets were fixed. It was undoubtedly the grenadiers who caused the enemy's retreat; but at the end there were not more than three or four of them alive. The advanced section had the bulk of its



men killed. With the grenade is carried a fuze or slow match for igniting it. The grenades are made by the engineers with dynamite. 30 seconds is the usual time allowed for explosion. If conditions are favourable a grenade will kill 10 men.*

5th Mar. The 5th March was a very fine day with little wind. The Imamura Column after making good its position with the spade, exchanged rifle fire with the enemy from time to time all day. At 1.30 p.m. one company (regimental reserve) reinforced the 47th Regiment from the left bank of the Sha Ho. To avoid casualties the men crossed the plain and river, over the ice, at fifteen paces interval. Although they were fired on by guns and some rifles they had no casualties. This company was in time to participate in repelling a counter-attack made at 5 p.m. by three companies of the enemy on the left flank of the II./47th. At 7 p.m. the two companies forming part of the column reserve moved off in the dark to join the 47th Regiment, and at 9 p.m. another company arrived from the divisional reserve.

During the day I observed the following:—The Russian guns opened at 9.40 a.m., to which the Japanese merely replied with an occasional shell. At 11.40 a.m. the Russian artillery was still very active, but there was very little reply from the Japanese. "Sniping" was perpetually going on between Imamura's front line and the enemy's trenches at a distance of a few hundred yards. As far as the enemy's guns were concerned the Imamura Column was in dead ground. On visiting the Russian position on the 8th March, the care the Russians had taken to hide and give their guns cover was noticeable. Owing to the extreme use of indirect fire I saw no battery

* At the end of this report some opinions are given on night fighting in general, which I have collected from time to time from the various infantry officers I have met.—J. B. J.

position in which the guns could shell attacking infantry within a point four hundred yards from the foot of the slopes on which were the entrenchments. At 1.45 p.m. the Japanese 15-cm. howitzers at about 4,800 yards shelled some Russian infantry in single file moving from the rear up an open nullah to the trenches. They fired about 25 shells apparently without effect. Their shooting was inaccurate. At 2.35 p.m. the two Japanese mountain batteries and the single mountain battery on the north end of Kuan-shan Ling opened on the Russian entrenchments immediately north of the latter. The entrenchments were practically on the edge of a cliff or very steep slope running down to the River Tung-kou and in front of the right of Imamura's line. After five minutes the Russian field guns and howitzers with rapid fire reduced the two batteries to silence. At 3 p.m. the Russian field guns and howitzers turned their attention to the single mountain battery and shelled it severely for one and a half hours without getting a reply. A tremendous expenditure of shrapnel without result, for every Japanese gunner was under cover the whole time. It is true that the Russian howitzers fired perhaps fifty common shell in all, but for every one of these their field guns fired ten shrapnel. All this time there were signs of the Russian forces increasing, and far away beyond their positions, on the plain near Kang-ta-jen-shan (D 5 east), great moving to and fro of troops could be seen from Kuan-shan Ling. At 4.30 p.m. firing died away, and the situation was the same at nightfall, no further advance being made by the division. The Ya-lu Army occupied Ma-chun-tan (E/F) this day.

On the 6th March the guns of both sides were silent. At 1 a.m. three companies of the enemy made a counter-attack on the II./47th, while one section only fired on the 3rd Battalion. The fighting was very hot for two hours, but the enemy never got within thirty yards, the Japanese using their machine guns with great effect. The three companies made four vigorous charges. Grenades were used by both sides. This attack was simultaneous with an attack on the Guard Division, which was also repulsed. Although the enemy was driven back everywhere, firing went on until 6 a.m. The casualties of the Imamura Column amounted to about 200. It was not reinforced. "Sniping" went on all day in front of Imamura, but the situation remained the same. Little movement on the enemy's part could be detected—in fact, it was the quietest day since the battle began. **6th Mar.**

The night of the 6th/7th was quiet—that is to say, no actual attack was made either by the 12th Division or the Russians, but musketry went on and the enemy's guns fired from time to time. The usual "sniping" went on all day in front of Imamura. On the plain near Kang-ta-jen-shan Russian transport could be seen throughout the day moving between the various villages. The Russian artillery was noticeably weaker **7th Mar.**

than formerly, and the howitzers did not open fire. There was no gun fire until 11.30 a.m., when the field gun on the slope of Hsiao Liu-chia-yu Shan opened on the trenches beyond Imamura. A Russian battery replied, but firing ceased in ten minutes. All was quiet until 3.20 p.m., when, with the object of finding out whether the Russians had changed their gun positions or withdrawn their guns, the mountain battery on Kuan-shan Ling opened. It shelled heavily the trenches on the cliff opposite, across the river, for half-an-hour, and only one Russian field battery replied. At 5 p.m. a regiment could be seen moving off in a north-westerly direction on the plain near Kang-ta-jen-shan. At 6 p.m. the whole artillery of the 12th Division opened a heavy fire on the Russian positions, to which there was no reply. At dusk the Russian camp fires were seen to be more numerous than heretofore. All these things looked very much as if the Russians meant to retreat. In fact, as soon as it was dark they commenced to do so. Shortly after nightfall Major-General Imamura was sent orders to attack and was reinforced by the 46th Regiment, but previous to receiving them, as there were so many signs of retirement, he had been given other orders to follow the Russians as soon as they went. So it happened that when the order to attack arrived, he was already in pursuit and had reached Kang-ta-jen-shan, the Shimamura Brigade following later. This was about 1.45 a.m. on the 8th March. Here he halted until dawn. The two field batteries with Awaibara were ordered to return to Ta Liu-chia-yu during the night (7th/8th). Passing through Hsia Shih-chiao-tzu they got fresh orders to join the advanced guard of Shimamura without delay. The 3rd Battery had already joined him.

8th Mar. *Orders for the Pursuit.*—The orders for pursuit were issued by the commander of the division at 7.0 a.m. on the 8th March at Shang Ping-tai-tzu (D/E 5), and were as follows :—

(1) The enemy opposing the division is in retreat. The 2nd Division will pursue the enemy in the direction of Hsing-lung-tien, on the Hun Ho (D 4) *viâ* Hai-lang-chi (E 5 N.W.). The Guard Division will pursue in the direction of Wang-shih-lang-kou (D 4/5).

(2) The division will pursue in the direction of Ssu-fang-tai (D/E 4) *viâ* Pai-shen-chai (D 5 east).

(3) The right wing will move *viâ* Kang-ta-jen-shan (D 5 east), Ying-pan, Hsiao-yu, Tung-chia-kou, and Pan-chia-tun. The three batteries of mountain artillery will accompany it.

(4) The left wing will advance *viâ* Tsai-chia-tun (D 5 east), Pai-shen-chai, and Chu-chia-tun (D 4 S.E.). The three field batteries will accompany it.

(5) The divisional reserve will be the III./46th, one squadron and one company of engineers with the staff of the engineer battalion. It will follow the left wing after

concentrating at the south side of Pien-niu-lu-pu. The officer commanding the division will be at the head of the reserve.

(6) The Awaibara Brigade will follow the troops mentioned in No. 5.*

(7) The three batteries of rifled mortars and the battery of 15-cm. howitzers will follow the second line regimental transport. The 12-cm. guns will remain in their positions and await further orders. The regimental transport (second line) will follow the reserve.†

Prior to these orders, the original brigade commands were reformed by the regiments moving up into their places,‡ *i.e.*, the 14th Regiment moved up on the left of the 47th, and the 46th on the right of the 24th.

The force under Imamura (right wing) was now as follows:—The 23rd Infantry Brigade (minus 1 battalion of the 46th Regiment, which joined divisional reserve), 1 troop, 6 machine guns, 1 company engineers, a body of the medical corps (bearer company) and 3 mountain batteries.

The force under Shimamura (left wing) was as follows:—The 12th Infantry Brigade, 1 troop, 6 machine guns, 1 company engineers, a party of the medical corps, and 3 batteries of field artillery.

The force under Awaibara was as follows:—2 regiments of infantry, 2 troops, 1 company engineers, and some of the medical corps.

The orders mentioned above were carried out, but there was some difficulty in assembling the reserve, for the Awaibara Brigade was some distance away. On this account the officer commanding the division hardly expected its concentration before 3.30 p.m. at Pien-niu-lu-pu, but, as a matter of fact, it was ready to start just after midday. It was then that the orders came from Army Head-Quarters that the brigade was to join the Army reserve, which it did at Tsai-chia-tun. In consequence of this, the divisional reserve was reduced to the strength mentioned in para. No. 5 of the order. While the right and left wings were pressing on, the general commanding the division halted during the morning at Pien-niu-lu-pu and I

---

* This brigade was also in reserve, but as soon as it reached Tsai-chia-tun in the afternoon, 8th March, it came under orders of General Kuroki, *i.e.*, became part of the Army reserve.

† With regard to the apparently peculiar place in the order of march assigned to the small number of cavalry available, it must be remembered that this squadron furnished patrols in front of Imamura and Shimamura. It also furnished patrols for keeping connection with the neighbouring column. Nevertheless, when the Japanese are opposed by cavalry, and not inferior mounted infantry, they will doubtless attach more importance to the possibilities of this arm in war. Had the Japanese had more cavalry, very much might have been effected during this pursuit.—J. B. J.

‡ *See* Map 66.


received permission to visit the Russian positions north of the village, after examining the village itself.

Pien-niu-lu-pu and the Russian Position north of it.—The village of Pien-niu-lu-pu, as mentioned before, is divided by the Sha Ho into two parts, of which that on the right bank (which was in the hands of the Russians) is four or five times larger than that on the left bank. The former is about one hundred yards, the latter about three hundred and seventy yards, from the river. The ground between them is dead level, and in ordinary seasons cultivated. In the larger part there was not a house intact. Nearly all the roofs had been at one time or another set on fire by shells, and not a building could be considered habitable. The only attempt at putting it in a state of defence that I could see was the loopholing (very roughly done) of some of the outer walls of the compounds of the houses next the river. These walls were of poor quality sun-dried brick, stones, and mud, chiefly the last-named. They were about one and a half feet thick at the top. There had been an attempt to loophole some walls in rear, in the centre of the village as a second line, but it had not been done with any forethought or care. It seemed as if the Russians had never meant to hold the village, if strongly attacked. The field of fire between the two parts of the village was as good as it could be, *i.e.*, the ground was flat and devoid of cover, the river having practically no banks. I saw several Russian corpses as I rode over the ground, evidently of men who had been killed while patrolling by night. It had naturally been impossible to get them away. Throughout the winter months fighting between both parts of the village had taken place, and "sniping" had continued more or less night and day. The Japanese force in the southern part was ordinarily two companies.

The position in front of the 12th Division was extremely strong, and the Russians, having had plenty of time on their hands through the winter months, had been able to make it as strong as some parts I have seen of the Port Arthur defences; I am referring, of course, to some of the outlying works of that place, such as Kuropatkin Fort. At Pien-niu-lu-pu the Sha Ho bends north-east and becomes the Tung-kou. The slopes of the hilly ground on the right bank, which west of that village are more or less gentle and intersected with nullahs, are steep, especially those immediately north of Kuan-shan Ling. The maps I am afraid gives very little idea of this.* Generally speaking, there were two lines of entrenchments. These were by no means continuous. Nullahs very often prevented them being so, and in such a case, the nullah would be carefully blocked with obstacles, which as a rule were under the rifle fire of some part of the defence. Redoubts and half-closed works

* *See* Map 66.

were used often for the second line, and occasionally they formed a third, from one thousand to two thousand yards away from the river on knolls dominating the surrounding ground. These redoubts and half-closed works brought flanking fire to bear in all directions. As the ground rose to the rear, if the forward trenches were captured, the redoubts dominated them. In front of most of the trenches, particularly those of the second lines, there were obstacles such as abattis and wire entanglement; sometimes one, sometimes the other, and sometimes both. Military pits were placed here and there in suitable places, with an entanglement of barbed wire on the top. Round the redoubts and half-closed works was invariably barbed wire entanglement. The trenches were well planned and executed. The soil was so suitable that many were veritable models of field fortification, such as one sees at a military school. No doubt the large amount of time available for their preparation accounted for this. They were always for men standing, with traverses at useful points. The entrenchments were invariably made without a ditch. In lieu of it was a barbed wire entanglement, with or without military pits, ten yards down the glacis. The trenches were made, in fact, like many made by the Boers in South Africa, *i.e.*, dug vertically into the ground itself, with little or no parapet.



The earth was used to improve the glacis or was scattered in rear of the trench. Such entrenchments seemed ideal for bringing rifle fire to bear upon the attack, but hand-grenades would work fearful havoc in them. Apparently to obviate this, I saw that steps had been made here and there to enable the men to leave the trench and charge with the bayonet down the glacis on the enemy should he be able to pierce a way through the entanglements. In such trenches I do not see how the defence can await the onset of bayonet and grenade. To impede the attackers should they gain entrance to a trench, the Russians had made a kind of parrot cage of barbed wire. Lying ready to hand, it could easily be flung into the trench and would effectually block it, especially in the dark. This had been done in some places, evidently at the moment before leaving the night before (7th/8th). There was the usual absence of head-cover, so noticeable in this war, but I noticed in several places, where "sniping" had been going on between the Russians and the Imamura Column, that head-cover had been hurriedly and feebly improvised. In a few places, however, the parapet had

been crenellated; but the Russians, and the Japanese, for the matter of that, have not learned the lesson so many of us did early in the South African War in regard to this, namely, that blue sky is a fatal background to a loophole. In contra-distinction to the procedure in the earlier stages of the war, all gun positions were for the employment of indirect fire. I saw one position for a battery of eight guns (from appearances they must have been field guns) at the bottom of a valley from which the guns fired over a ridge four hundred yards away. There were many gun positions, but some had been seldom or never used, a proof of this being that the holes in the ground to give the gunners cover were full of ice and snow. Splinterproof underground dwellings communicating with the trenches were in evidence everywhere. Roads out of sight of the enemy had been made, communicating with the different parts of the defence. There were everywhere evidences of the haste with which the position had been abandoned: full boxes (open and unopen) of small arm ammunition in every trench, food, cooking pots, clothing, axes, spades, and rifles (although I did not notice more than twenty of the last named) were lying about. No doubt, if the enemy is within a few hundred yards, the reason for haste, if retreat is ordered, is obvious, but the abandonment of such a quantity of ammunition can hardly be excused, and savours more of a flight than the orderly retirement of troops that had, comparatively speaking, suffered little loss.

8th Mar.—(*cont.*) Before commencing an account of the pursuit, it must be mentioned that the division got orders to pursue independently of the other divisions, *i.e.*, its movements did not actually depend on those of other divisions; of course it received orders from time to time from General Kuroki.*

As mentioned before, the two brigades (Imamura and Shimamura) pressed on after the enemy at dawn. In advance of the brigades their cavalry patrols soon came in sight of the Russian rear guards, but of course were quite unable to harass or delay them.

Throughout the pursuit it was continually being brought home to one that the division laboured under great disadvantages owing to its lack of cavalry. One regiment with a couple of horse artillery guns on this, the first, day of pursuit, could have harassed and delayed the Russians so much as to have brought about an important action much earlier in the day. It was urgent that the Russians should be roughly handled before reaching their positions on the Hun Ho. As it was, when the Japanese infantry did succeed in overtaking them, it was too late in the day for decisive results to be obtained.

At Kao-shih-tun (D 4 S.E.) Shimamura came up with the Russians at 4 p.m. On the Japanese field guns opening on the village of Chu-chia-tun, the Russians fell back and took up a

* *See* Map 61, square D 4.

fresh position at Ta Chang-wang-chai. Here a detachment of the Guard attacked the Russians from the west, and some portions of the Imamura Brigade did so from the east. It was now sunset (7 p.m.). The Russians again retired, and the action came to an end. The Russian force was about a regiment of infantry; it had no guns. There was a small Russian force on the hills north-west of Ta-chang-wang-chai, but it took no part in the action. It is noticeable throughout the pursuit how few guns were used by or accompanied the Russian rear guards, as far as the Russians pursued by the 12th Division are concerned. The Japanese had no casualties, and as it was getting dark no idea of those of the Russians could be obtained. Shimamura halted in and about the villages south of Ta Chang-wang-chai for the night. His outpost line was the line his troops reached. Imamura in the meantime had advanced to Wang-chia-pin-kua (E 4 S.W.), which he occupied for the night. On his approach to this place there had been some rifle fire, but the Russians—a small force—had soon fallen back. The divisional reserve halted at 8.30 p.m. for the night, in and about Kao-shih-tun (D 4 S.E.). During the day two hundred men of the transport collected all articles abandoned by the Russians in and about their position on the Sha Ho. The total was as follows:—226 rifles, 197 bayonets, 1 million rounds of rifle ammunition, 549 small shovels, 84 large spades, 28 axes, 152 small pickaxes, 300 rolls of wire (barbed and plain), 4,000 rounds of field-gun ammunition, and a quantity of howitzer ammunition.

9th Mar. According to orders, the right column left Wang-chia-pin-kua at 3 a.m. (about an hour before dawn) and marched towards Li-shih-chai (E 4) with the intention of reconnoitring the Hun Ho. The left column (Shimamura) also started from its bivouac at 5 a.m., and moved on Ssu-fang-tai (E/D 4), the 14th Regiment with the guns being advanced guard. Major-General Shimamura rode at the head of the batteries. His orders were to reconnoitre the right bank of the Hun Ho and cross, if possible. It was a great question whether the ice would bear or not. Divisional Head-Quarters with the reserve started at 4.30 a.m., and followed, as on the previous day, the left column. Along the road to Ssu-fang-tai we passed many articles of clothing and equipment abandoned by the enemy, as well as food (tinned beef) and a few rifles. Near the river the country rapidly becomes more open and level, and therefore, much more under cultivation, though it is bare at this season of the year. The enemy had houses containing supplies at nearly every village on the road we passed. These they had set on fire. They were still burning when we passed. The Japanese, however, saved and appropriated a certain amount of forage and flour. Shimamura's advanced guard reached Ssu-fang-tai without incident about 10 a.m., and the general sent forward patrols to the Hun Ho. The last Russian passed through Ssu-fang-tai at 3 a.m.

Movements of the Right Column.—In the meantime Imamura had passed through Tung-tai and arrived at Li-shih-chai (E 4) at about 11 a.m. without incident. Just before his arrival at the latter place, an order came from Lieut.-General Inouye that he was to push on and cross the river if possible. At about 11 a.m. the wind got up, and a dust storm raged for the remainder of the day. Often nothing could be seen beyond a distance of one hundred yards and hardly ever beyond half a mile. Leaving Li-shih-chai the advanced guard (46th Regiment) moved on Hsia Piao-tun in a north-east direction, when cavalry patrols informed the officer commanding the advanced guard "that they had just seen about four companies of the enemy cross the Hun Ho and move west. That the supposed position of the enemy north-east of Hsing-lung-tien on the other side of the river was strong, but the enemy did not seem to be in strength. That the enemy had guns in position there."

At this time it was known to Imamura that the left of the 2nd Division was moving, not far away, on Ta Piao-tun, but on connection being established by a cavalry patrol it changed its direction more to the east. Having received the above information from the cavalry patrols the advanced guard moved on, and on the head of the column reaching a village (not marked on map), that is between Hsia Piao-tun and Ta Piao-tun, the Russians, whose strength was 1 regiment of infantry, 4 squadrons and 1 battery, were seen to be on the point of crossing to the right bank of the Hun Ho. The leading company of the 46th at once opened fire on them. The Russian cavalry—or part of it, for it was difficult to see properly owing to the violent dust storm—charged the company in what appeared to be open order, getting within two hundred yards. But the company had already been warned by its own cavalry patrol and took refuge behind an adjacent wall. From this coign of vantage it opened rapid fire, which did not last long, for the cavalry at once retired in the dust to a small village, where it dismounted and returned the fire. The Russian cavalry apparently suffered no loss. Regarding this incident, I asked an officer of the 46th Regiment what would have happened had the company had no convenient wall to get behind. He replied, "The Russian cavalry seem to move with indecision. They were not in a formation suited to a charge, so could not have done much harm. Had it been otherwise, I don't think it would have been nice for the company." To my question as to whether they were in *Lava* formation or not, he replied, "I don't know that formation, but they were in extended order of some kind; it was really too dusty to make out exactly." I think it is very probable that they were in this formation.

It was after the Russian cavalry had been driven back that the infantry was seen to be taking advantage of the dust storm to threaten the right flank. It was driven back by one company of the leading battalion supported by two others

brought up by the officer commanding the regiment, without difficulty. Finally the Russians covered their crossing by holding Piao-tun and the small group of trees west of it. They did not hold these places long, and were all on the right bank by 3 p.m. From 2.30 p m, till 3.30 p.m. the Russian guns in position on the high ground on the right bank fired at intervals, but without doing any damage. They must have been firing at random, for the dust obscured everything and even the Japanese infantry patrols sent down to the river bank failed to discover much as to where the Russians were. At 3.15 p.m. patrols were sent out in several directions to get into touch with the columns on the right and left. All the afternoon "sniping" went on between the patrols on each bank of the river. A few of the Japanese got across, but the majority failed to do so, so that little could be discovered, except that Hsing-lung-tien was occupied by the Russians. The density of the dust storm was greater in the river bed than elsewhere. The I./46th entered Piao-tun at 3.30 p.m. and concentrated there. At 4 p.m. a brigade order came to the effect that the river was not to be crossed. Prior to the arrival of this order the 2nd Battalion had been ordered to do so in spite of the inability of the patrols to reconnoitre properly. The sun set without any change in the situation.

As ordered by the divisional commander, the right column halted in and about Li-shih-chai for the night. Its advanced guard stopped at Hsia Piao-tun with its outposts at the village north-east of it; outpost duty was performed by the I./46th with one company of the 2nd Battalion prolonging its left at and near the unnamed village between Hsia Piao-tun and Piao-tun. There was a strong detached post in Piao-tun. During the night one company of engineers was put under the orders of the commander of the advanced guard (O.C. 46th) to find a crossing or a place for a bridge if required. In the night the Russians on the opposite bank between Hsing-lung-tien and Fu-shun could be heard breaking the ice, which was rapidly melting.

Movements of the Left Column.—As mentioned before, Shimamura's advanced guard reached Ssu-fang-tai (D/E 4)* about 10 a.m. Patrols were then sent on to the river in the blinding dust-storm. After doing their best to locate the Russians, the patrols reported that columns of transport were passing on the opposite side of the river. The ground from Ssu-fang-tai to the Hun Ho is bare and flat, sloping very gently down to the river bed for about five furlongs. Had there been no dust-storm the Russian guns would have been able to sweep all this ground from their position on the heights above the right bank. At 12.15 p.m. the three field batteries came into action among the willows and on the sand

* *See* squares D 4 and E 4, Map 61.

of the dry river bed and shelled the Russian transport at 2,000 yards, throwing it into some confusion. These guns must have fired more or less at random, for to see at that distance was impossible. At the same time the leading infantry was deploying in the willows on the left bank, but its movements were greatly hindered by the dust-storm. A Russian battery replied, but failing to locate the Japanese batteries, fired beyond them, causing eight casualties to the infantry who happened to be there. On this account the Japanese artillery ceased fire. The map* shows the situation after the I. and II./14th had crossed the river on the ice—extended to render their passage safer. There was little or no opposition, and pressing on (the general told me that owing to the gloom he fully expected the bayonet would be more used than the rifle) the advanced infantry reached the foot of the hills, but the Russians had gone. The hills were crowned at 2 p.m., and as no Russians could be seen, although they were actually not far off, and the advanced troops, owing to the dust-storm, had lost touch with those in rear, the column halted. At 2.30 p.m. the Guard Division occupied Chu-chan (D 4 east). For an hour or so Major-General Shimamura was unaware of this, or whether the right wing had crossed or not. In the evening the 14th Regiment reached Hsia-tai (E 4 N.W.), where it halted for the night. The Guard Cavalry was at Hu-shan-pu (E 3/4). The remainder of Shimamura's force bivouacked on the hills north of Ta-tzu-pu (E 4 west). The Shimamura Column and the right column of the Guard were camped during the night in the form of an isosceles triangle, of which Hu-shan-pu was the apex and the Hun Ho the base. Divisional Head-Quarters and the reserve stayed at Ssu-fung-tai for the night.

During the night (9th/10th) about 4 a.m. the 14th Regiment was attacked from the south-east. The Russians, whose numbers it was impossible to ascertain, were repulsed, leaving 20 dead.

10th Mar. On the evening of the 9th† the orders to Major-General Imamura for next day were to drive the enemy in front of him away, assemble at Hsing-lung-tien, and march on to Hsia-tai. General Shimamura's force was made the advanced guard of the division, the remainder of the division being main body. Briefly, before describing the movements of the different units, the following events took place this day at Hsing-lung-tien. Imamura began attacking the line Hsing-lung-tien—Hsia-fang-shen,‡ *i.e.*, the line to his immediate front. Taking cover in their entrenchments prepared weeks or months before, the Russians resisted most stubbornly, their strength amounting to about six or seven battalions with a half battery. It took some time to make them withdraw from their positions. Shimamura

* Not reproduced. It showed five companies extended on the north bank (opposite Ssu-fang-tai) supported by two others.

† *See* Squares E 4 and E 3, Plate 61.

‡ 1½ miles east of Hsing-lung-tien.

ordered two battalions of the 47th and a battery to attack the Russian right flank and rear, if possible, and so relieve the pressure in front of Imamura. This movement was a success, for the Russians soon commenced to waver, and in the early part of the afternoon were in full retreat towards Lien-tao-wan (E 3/4) and the country east of it. By reforming in this direction, the Russians in front of the 12th Division united with those who were resisting the passage of the Hun Ho by the 2nd Division at Fu-shun and Wan-pu-chieh. Major-General Imamura concentrated in the afternoon at Hsia-tai and the villages south of Hu-shan-pu, his advanced guard passing the night close to the latter place. The Shimamura Brigade camped in and about Hu-shan-pu for the night. The Guard Division was all across the Hun Ho by the morning of the 10th, and by the evening was close to San-wa (D 4 north). The Russians opposing the crossing of the 2nd Division began to retire about 3 p.m.

Major-General Imamura's Force.—Long before dawn it was known that the Russians were still holding their positions.* At 5 a.m. the II./46th paraded at its quarters and commenced to advance towards Hsing-lung-tien, its 1st Battalion having reported that the Russians were still on the right bank of the river. There was a heavy morning mist and little could be seen, but the Russians could still be heard breaking the ice. The order to the 24th Regiment being to cross the river, push on and attack, it paraded before dawn and moved towards the river bank at a point just west of Piao-tun, where the ice was favourable for crossing. Coming under a hot fire on arrival at the river bank, the leading battalion halted, took cover, and awaited the remainder of the regiment. In the meantime the II./46th had been ordered to cross first, supported, if required, by its 1st Battalion in Piao-tun. Coming under heavy rifle and gun fire, the 5th Company got across and entrenched in the willows, losing 30 men on the way. The other three companies on this were ordered to halt on the left bank. This took place at about 6.30 a.m. On the Russian guns opening from the position marked on the map (which for convenience I will term the Redoubt†) rather to the surprise of the officer commanding the mountain artillery, who expected that they would have withdrawn in the night, the mountain batteries rapidly took up a position in the willows and replied. The morning mist hid them, as their position was on the low-lying ground close to the river bed, but on the other hand they could, after the mist had risen a little, locate the position of the enemy's. The Russian guns had little or no cover, nor, except from view, had the Japanese. Thanks to this mist, ten minutes after the Japanese guns found their target the Russian half battery was silenced and withdrew to a position further back (as indicated on the

---

* *See* Map 67. † The ridge marked A B on Map 67.

map). Every Russian shell went far over the batteries, whose only loss was three men wounded from rifle bullets. It was at 7.20 a.m. that the mountain batteries found their target. In front of Imamura the Redoubt was the nearest position held by the enemy and it was absolutely necessary to take it. To do so the general ordered the 46th to stand fast, and being reinforced by the 3rd Battalion of that regiment (from divisional reserve), he ordered it, with the 24th, to move to the left, and seizing the high ground west of the Redoubt, turn it. At this time a body of Russians had been seen moving along the right bank in the direction of Hsia-fang-shen, but the general trusted to the 2nd Division to deal with it. This strengthened him in his decision to attack from the west. By 8.10 a.m. the 24th Regiment had crossed the river close to Hsing-lung-tien in extended formation as the ice was thin, and occupied that village, meeting no enemy; and the III./46th, crossing also lower down, was on its left under cover in the willows west of the village. Imamura was now practically joined up with Shimamura.

Between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. the Russians on the hilly ground immediately north of Hsing-lung-tien showed signs of retreat under the shelling they were receiving from Shimamura's field guns. At 10 a.m. the 24th Regiment at Hsing-lung-tien was reinforced by two companies from the brigade reserve and six machine guns. All this time the 5th Company of the 46th had been exchanging fire with the occupants of the Redoubt. At 10.30 a.m. the mist had almost rolled away and one had a good view of the enemy's position. The rest of the day was fine and clear without wind. The Russian guns woke up again from their new position and shelled any small body of troops that attempted to cross the river near Piao-tun. Their new position did not admit of their shelling any ground further down stream, in fact, from this time on they played no important part in the action. I got to Hsing-lung-tien at 11.45 a.m., just as the 24th and the 3rd Battalion of the 46th advanced from the line of the river and village (Hsing-lung-tien) against the hills, as shown on the map. As a matter of fact, the III./46th was not actually deployed for attack as shown on the map, nor were the two left companies of the 24th. The formation of each company varied, viz., columns of sections, columns of files, &c. For the last three-quarters of an hour the mountain guns had been shelling the Redoubt with common shell and shrapnel, and during the advance of the infantry they shelled it heavily. The map shows the advance of the infantry, the 5th Company of the 46th standing fast and keeping up a hot fire on the Redoubt. The firing line was at one to two paces interval. The supports were in close order, but in single rank. The advancing infantry came under little fire from the high ground immediately in front of them but the Russians in the Redoubt at once opened fire on them as the line was clearing Hsing-

lung-tien and practically enfiladed it. At this the three right companies brought up their left shoulders and faced the Redoubt, while the remainder, moving very rapidly without firing a shot, reached the foot of the hills at 12 noon. There had been 49 casualties before reaching the foot of the hills, entirely from the fire from the Redoubt. The Russians fell back in front of them without making any stand.

The ground between Hsing-lung-tien and the hills is absolutely flat, so the three companies of the 24th attacking the Redoubt suffered considerably and made slow progress. The behaviour of the Russians in the Redoubt was most noticeable. In spite of the Japanese mountain guns, whose range was perfect and whose shells seemed to burst with accuracy and precision, these men kept on firing, ducking their heads to the common shell and shrapnel, but always bobbing up again. As they had no head-cover, their heads were clearly seen above the parapet, and some took no notice whatsoever of the Japanese artillery but continued to fire steadily. At 12.15 p.m. a party of Russians holding the east end (B) of the Redoubt, left it and crossed the flat ground to Hsia-fang-shen. Being shelled and receiving rifle fire from the 46th in Piao-tun, it suffered severely. By 12.45 p.m. the 24th Regiment and the III./46th had made some progress in the hills, and the machine guns advancing from Hsing-lung-tien had got into position. Three of the latter were turned on the rear of the Redoubt and three engaged the enemy in front. At 12.50 p.m., white flags appeared above the parapet of the Redoubt on its west side. At this moment the Japanese firing line (of the three companies) was five hundred yards from it. From 11.45 until a few minutes after the white flags were hoisted, the mountain guns had heavily shelled the Redoubt with shrapnel and common shell, but the trenches were so well made that the effect on the rifle fire from it was not as great as one would have expected. On visiting the trenches (A) afterwards, I found only eight dead.

At 12.55 p.m. a body of about 45 Russians, having apparently reconsidered their chances of escape, ran across the neck (the first position of the Russian guns in the early morning) from A to B. They were severely shrapnelled, but I found only one man lying dead on visiting the spot. In order to run more quickly they had abandoned everything, including rifles. The surrender was due to the fact that Japanese rifle fire from the west and the three machine guns prevented their retreat. At 1 p.m., the first Japanese (about half-a-dozen men) reached the trenches (A) and accepted the surrender, the Russians standing up, flinging down their rifles below and in front of the parapet, and waving shirts and caps. The prisoners numbered 112. According to the prisoners, the Redoubt contained two companies. The battalion commander surrendered with the others.

At 1.25 p.m. the mountain guns crossing the river at Piao-tun were shelled by the Russian guns, but suffered no loss. At this time the Russians in front of the 24th and III./46th were still resisting stubbornly, in fact, I saw in some places that the Japanese infantry was obliged to withdraw from the crests it was holding and temporarily leave the machine guns. At 1.40 p.m. a brigade order arrived for the regiments, which read as follows:—

> "Enemy has gone north-east. The brigade will advance towards Ssu-shih-wa.* The 24th Regiment will protect the right flank after occupying Ta-kou.† The 46th Regiment will march on Ssu-shih-wa.

It must be mentioned here, that as soon as the Hun River was crossed the only available maps were very bad. On this account, there was great difficulty in giving orders. At 1.55 p.m., the two mountain batteries that had crossed the river had got into position close to the Redoubt and had opened fire. There was no reply from the Russian guns, which must have retired. Heavy musketry could be heard in the direction of the 47th Regiment, but the firing was slackening in front of the 24th. At 2.15 p.m. rifle fire had almost ceased and the action was practically over.

The casualties of the III./46th were 80 officers and men. The other battalions of the regiment had no losses. The 24th Regiment lost 250 odd, of which 189 were lost by the three companies attacking the Redoubt. The 46th Regiment fired 45,000 rounds during the action. The three mountain batteries fired 1,050 rounds, of which 954 were shrapnel. The Russian force occupying the Redoubt and the hills east of it was one battalion. At 4 p.m. the Imamura Brigade assembled at Hsia-tai and halted.

At about 3.30 p.m. I rode from Hsing-lung-tien to the Redoubt. What I have termed the Redoubt was really a work as shown on the map. It was clear at once why the white flag had been hoisted. In rear of the hill on which the trenches are situated is a plain which was swept by fire from the Japanese infantry at 1,000 yards. The trenches had been excellently made for men standing, apparently months before. No doubt it was very convenient for the soldiers of the rear guard to find such good entrenchments ready for them on arrival, but to the meanest intelligence among them the thought must have occurred, "Our generals have great forethought, but do they always mean us to retreat?" The trenches at A and B were situated fifty feet or so above the plain in front. The highest point of A and B is about sixty-five feet above the plain. The slope to the front is considerably steeper than the sketch would lead one to understand. The trenches between A and B

* 2 miles north of Hsia-tai.
† 2 miles north-east of Hsia-tai.

were not continuous, and the only way of retreat the occupants of A could take, was to the rear, *i.e.*, across the open, unless they chose to run the gauntlet from A to B and thence to Hsia-fang-shen. To hold A after the enemy had got a footing on the hills west and north-west of it could have only one result, and one wondered why the battalion commander who was there himself did not retire earlier. Otherwise the position at A and B was all that could be desired, for there was a splendid field of fire down to the river bed and river itself, and also on both flanks. By marks made by the rifles on the parapet, the enemy holding B seemed to have paid little attention to the Japanese to their front in the willows, but to have confined it for the most part to oblique fire on the three companies of the 24th.

In regard to the passage of the river, the ice, though melting, was still strong in most places, and crossing was not difficult. It is true that the Russians broke up the ice close to the right bank, leaving, except in one place between Hsing-lung-tien and Piao-tun, a gap five feet wide, but this the Japanese bridged with some branches and pieces of wood. All horses were obliged to cross at the one place where the ice was not broken (near Piao-tun), and although it was under the fire of the Russian guns, there were few casualties. The Russian guns could only guess the whereabouts of the crossing. The willows on the right bank hid it from the view of the riflemen at A and B. Two days later it was impossible to cross the river on the ice—an example of how well the Japanese timed the operations, though of course there was in this a considerable element of luck.

In regard to the attack of the infantry, it seemed at the time that the direct attack on A and B by the three companies was unnecessary and inadvisable. They could have been better employed in the willows, paying attention to A and B from there together with the 5th Company of the 46th. In the meantime the remainder of the 24th and the III./46th might have advanced from a point west of Hsing-lung-tien with their regiment leading on Kao-chia-wan, and at the required moment have brought up their left shoulders. On the map the distance between the east corner of Hsing-lung-tien and the trenches at A is 1,500 yards. In reality it was not more than 1,200 yards at the most. The hills on the west of the Hu-shan-pu road are drawn too close to it and Hsing-lung-tien ; they were 1,500 yards from the latter point.

*Major-General Shimamura's Force.**—On the night of the 9th/10th March the 47th Regiment had bivouacked on the high ground north of Tai-yu-tsun.† The brigade orders to the regiment were to occupy the hilly ground close to Kao-chia-wan in the morning and endeavour to clear the way for and cover

* *See* Map 67. † 2 miles west of Hsing-lung-tien.

the advance of the main body of the 12th Division. At 5.50 a.m. on the 10th March the I./47th, which was in advance, met a section of the enemy in Ta-tzu-pu,* which retired on Kao-chia-wan. By 6.15 a.m. the 1st Battalion was occupying the high ground north-west of Kao-chia-wan. At 6.40 a.m. the mist lifted a little and the Reboubt A B could be seen. At 7.30 a.m. the 47th was ordered by Major-General Shimamura to advance and attack the enemy on the hills north and east of Kao-chia-wan. In accordance with their orders, the 1st and 2nd Battalions advanced and reached the foot of the hills at Kao-chia-wan and north of it at 8 a.m. At 8.50 a.m. the 1st and 2nd Battalions occupied a position on the hills north-west of Kao-chia-wan without much resistance. One battery of field artillery opened fire at 8 a.m.—range 4,800 yards—covering the advance of the 47th. At 9 a.m. the regiment pushed on, and in spite of stubborn resistance on the part of the Russians, who then amounted to five companies, they drove them east and occupied a position on the ridges north-east of Kao-chia-wan. The hottest fighting was in front of the 1st Battalion. At 12.10 p.m. another field battery came into action north-east of Hsia-tai. Firing at a range of 2,100 yards it assisted the advance of the 47th very much. The 14th Regiment stood fast throughout the action, but it furnished one company to protect the left of this battery. Major-General Shimamura's position was close to the guns. At 12.20 p.m. the III./46th (Imamura) had come up in line on the right of the I./47th. At the same time the II./47th, which had been somewhat in rear, came up on the left of the 1st Battalion. A few minutes later the advance was again ordered. For the 1st Battalion to reach the enemy meant descending into a hollow and ascending the far side. The width across the gully was about three hundred and seventy-five yards. The 1st Company stood fast, and, until the other three descending into the gully had reached the foot of the enemy's slope, kept up as hot a fire as possible, after which it moved on also. The enemy made a stout resistance all along the line, but beginning to waver in front of the 2nd Battalion at 1.30 p.m., had all retired to the north-east by 2.10 p.m. From 9 a.m. until 2 p.m. the I./47th lost 150 men, including its commander, who died of his wounds on the 18th March.

During the action the closest range at which the adversaries fought was 200 yards. The Russians lost heavily, for there were 50 dead in front of the 3rd Company alone. The mark C on the map represents a counter-attack on the left of the 1st Battalion shortly after noon, taking advantage of the fact that the 2nd Battalion had not quite got up in line. It was frustrated by the 7th Company. The 2nd Battalion lost 12 killed and 23 wounded. It fired 31,323 rounds of small arm ammunition. The enemy left 200 dead in front of it. The 1st

* 1 mile west of Hsing-lung-tien.

Battalion fired 64,822 rounds, and had 750 men in action. Its total losses on the day were 265 (including five officers, of whom two died of their wounds). Out of the total, 52 men were killed. The total casualties of the 12th Division were about 500. The Russians left the same number dead, and took away their wounded. Shimamura camped in and about Hu-shan-pu* (E 3/4) for the night. Among the enemy's troops were men of the 1st Siberian Reserve Division and 1st Siberian Sharpshooters' Division. The force opposing the 47th amounted to about three battalions. As mentioned before, the 2nd Division in the meantime attacked the Russians on the hills on the north bank of the Hun Ho between Wan-pu-chieh (E 4 north) and Fu-shun, who commenced to retreat about 3 p.m.

I beg to point out here what an immense advantage it would have been to the Japanese had they had some cavalry and horse artillery this day. Had their cavalry consisted of one regiment only it could have threatened the enemy's retreat *viâ* Lien-tao-wan. Had it consisted of a brigade, its opportunities must have been great if it had pushed on northwards at dawn.

Divisional Head-Quarters camped for the night at Ta-kou and Hu-shan-kou—villages a mile apart and a few miles south-west of Hu-shan-pu (E 3/4). They are not marked on the map.

The divisional orders for this day were as follows:—† **11th Mar.**

"The division will advance to the line Wang-chia-ho-tzu—Yao-pu, marching in two columns (as on the 9th March), in order to cut off the enemy retreating by the main road to Tieh-ling and the west of it. The Left Column will start from Hu-shan-pu at 7 a.m. and march to Yao-pu *viâ* Pu-hui-erh-chia, Lien-hua-pao, and Chu-lu-fu-yin. The Right Column will start from Hu-shan-pu at 7.30 a.m. and march to Wang-chia-ho-tzu *viâ* Shih-tai and Wang-kuan-tai. The duty of the latter is to watch the right flank of the division, and also patrol towards Yi-lu (D 3) (on the main Mukden—Tieh-ling road). The divisional reserves will parade at Pen-chia-tun‡ and follow the Left Column."

It is to be regretted that some of the villages mentioned cannot be located on any map correctly. On that account I have omitted to put them in the sketch. As we marched, it was always uncertain where a village was, or whether it even existed at all. It was therefore difficult for columns to adhere strictly to orders.

This day the Awaibara Brigade rejoined the division and became its reserve. The III./46th rejoined its regiment.

---

* *See* Map 61. † *See* square D 3, Map 61.
‡ Not on map, 2¼ miles south of Hu-shan-pu.

From the above orders it will be seen that the division was "switched off" from the Russians whom it had severely handled to deal with others who were problematical. Meanwhile its enemy of the 10th had fallen back and gone to swell the already large number opposing the 2nd Division. I hope to be able to give the official reason for this later on.

In accordance with orders, the right column started at 7.30 a.m., marching to Shih-tai, where it received fresh orders to push on to a point 2½ miles east of Yi-lu. The cavalry patrols reported Russians at Yi-lu, but could not ascertain their strength. At 3.30 p.m. Imamura reached San-chia-tzu (D 3 east) and came up with two companies of Russians deployed north of it. From 5 p.m. until sunset he pressed them north and halted at a place north-east by east of Yi-lu. Shimamura at 9 a.m. passed through Mu-shan-tun,* where I joined him. Divisional Head-Quarters had already arrived at this village, having been fired at on the way by a Cossack patrol which the escort drove off to the north-west. At 10 a.m. the left column passed Hung-lo-tzu.* Five minutes afterwards about thirty Russians with a white flag joined the column from the west. These men were escorted by two footsore privates and one wounded private of the Guard who had lost their way. The Russians had met them in the hills and surrendered to them. One and a half miles from Hung-lo-tzu,* the column entered abruptly the great Mukden Plain. Here it was most difficult to get a view of anything, the dust being so great, but Japanese columns could be seen moving in various directions. At the foot of the hills in the village of Lien-hua-pao (D 3 S.E.) was halted a regiment of the Umezawa Brigade. At noon the left column reached Ha-wa-chieh-tzu, 1½ miles north-east of Pu-ho, and halted. Information now arrived that the Guard Division had got to Pu-ho (D 3 S.E.) during the night (10th/11th). After the men's dinners, the column by order of Lieut.-General Inouye moved on, and reaching the main Mukden–Tieh-ling road at 3 p.m., advanced along it north. At this point Major-General Shimamura, not getting touch with the Guard Division which was supposed to be on his left, sent out a battalion as left flank guard. At 5.20 p.m. Yao-pu (D 3 east) on the main road was reached. The last of the Russians had passed this place at noon and were reported to be at Yi-lu, 5 miles north of Yao-pu. From local Chinamen I ascertained that no Russian wounded had at any time during the fighting passed along the high road, and that the first body of the enemy that passed the village in retreat did 20 miles on the night of the 7th/8th March. Without halting at Yao-pu, the left column moved on and came up with the enemy at Yi-lu. The Russians took up two positions, one south and one north of the village. The Russian strength was about six battalions with Cossacks and mountain guns. They

* Not on map.

held a ridge south of the village with one battalion, but on the Japanese field guns opening on them and two battalions deploying, they retired on a ridge immediately north of the village. The Russian guns opened, but could not reach the Japanese artillery. A battery at once galloped on, and coming into position on the ridge just evacuated by the enemy, shelled them, commencing at 2,000 yards, as they retired. The other two batteries shortly afterwards came into position also. The Russians hardly stopped on the ridge north of Yi-lu, but in the twilight retired north amid columns of dust. The Japanese infantry in the meantime, without much firing, pressed on through the village and occupied the ridge on the far side. Here was the outpost line for the night. The Russians left 20 dead. The Japanese casualties were 10 killed and wounded in the village. As Major-General Shimamura had just entered the village and was riding along the main street, about ten Cossacks came out of a side lane and, making no reply to the question, "Who are you," were charged by the general's escort. Two were cut down and two captured. The subaltern cut through a Cossack's wrist with his sword. The column took up its quarters in Yi-lu for the night. Divisional Head-Quarters and the reserve (Awaibara) halted at Yao-pu.

12th Mar. The division did not advance on the 12th March. The right column sent out a force (two battalions 46th Regiment, two squadrons and one battalion) to reconnoitre towards Chen-chien-hu-tun (E 3 north-west). The Russians were seen to be on the hills round the village, but they withdrew as the Japanese approached. The force camped close to Chen-chien-hu-tun for the night. All this day small bodies of Japanese scoured the country lying south of the division for Russian fugitives who were hiding in the hills, nullahs, and villages. An orderly bringing a message for the 12th Division was fired at out of these villages on his way.

13th Mar. The situation of the First Army on the 13th March was as follows:—On the right of the 12th Division was the 2nd Division. On the left of the 12th Division was the Umezawa Brigade, which for the last two days had been acting with the Guard. The latter division was in rear of the 12th Division. The successful action fought by the 12th Division at Hsing-lung-tien had enabled the 2nd Division to cross the Hun Ho. This morning the right column moved in a north-east direction from Wang-chia-ho-tzu (D 3 east) and took up a line on the range of hills east of Chen-chien-hu-tun and north of Hsiao-ho-pu* and Shih-fu-ho-tzu,* joining up with the detachment that had reconnoitred the day before. The column did not come in actual contact with the enemy, whose rear parties remained in and about Ku-kuan-tun (E 2 north of the Fan Ho) until sunset.

---

* Not on map. Its position can be inferred from the blocks showing the position of the troops.

The greater part of the column camped in and about Shih-fu-ho-tzu* for the night.

The left column left Yi-lu, and passing through Ma-liu-shan (D 3 east) occupied the range of hills north of Chen-chien-hu-tun with its main body in that village. No enemy were met with. Divisional Head-Quarters left Yao-pu at 10 a.m., and marching north-east passed Wang-chia-ho-tzu at 12.15 p.m. and Ku-chia-tzu (D 3 east) at 1.30 p.m. The last body of the enemy in retreat passed Ku-chia-tzu at 3 p.m. on the 11th. From Yao-pu the division entered very hilly country again. In the places between Yao-pu and Ku-chia-tzu there are small diggings for surface coal. Divisional Head-Quarters camped in the villages of Ta-yao† and Ku-chia-tzu for the night.

The enemy's position this day was on the right bank of the Fan Ho, on a range of hills immediately north of it from a point north of Ku-kuan-tun to a point north of Chang-chia-lou-tzu. By taking up this line on the Fan Ho, the various Russian rear guards were for the first time able to pull themselves together and offer a united front to the pursuit, for their line on the Fan Ho was an extremely strong one. The 2nd Division reached the neighbourhood of Pao-chia-tun* and then faced the heights north of Chang-chia-lou-tzu. By the evening the Umezawa Brigade reached Fan-chia-tun (E/F 3/2) where it faced the enemy. Part of the Fourth Army had reached Shen-tai-tzu (D 3 N.E.).

14th Mar. The order to the brigades for the 14th March‡ was to stand fast and watch the enemy closely. They were to be ready to attack if the opportunity occurred. Shimamura's guns (eight) opened at 7.15 a.m. The sketch§ shows the positions occupied. The enemy's guns, one battery divided into three portions (from right to left two, two and four guns), replied. Firing died away towards 10 a.m., and there was no advance made by the division during the day. Nor did the Umezawa Brigade on the left advance, but its artillery shelled and was shelled by the enemy's from time to time. All day bodies of Russian infantry could be seen moving to and fro on the plain north of the Umezawa Brigade. This plain stretches for miles to the west, up to the Liao River and beyond. On the line just north of the Fan Ho a long train, probably a Red Cross train, was standing. The Russian infantry could be seen busily entrenching themselves on the flat on the right bank of the Fan Ho, opposite Umezawa. At 5 p.m. columns of Russian infantry and transport were seen retiring from the various villages on the

---

* Not on map. Its position can be inferred from the blocks showing the position of the troops.

† 2 miles south-west of Chen-chien-hu-tun.

‡ *See* squares E 3 and E 2, Map 61.

§ Not reproduced. It showed a Russian line north of the Fan Ho and the Japanese force drawn up on a ridge just north of Chang-chien-hu-tun, the right opposite Ku-kuan-tun, the left outside the high road. One battery in centre and one on right in action.

plain in a northerly direction. It seemed as if the Russians intended to retreat, but at nightfall they were still holding their positions. At 5.30 p.m. Imamura sent forward one and a half battalions to a ridge in front, opposite Ku-kuan-tun. Late in the day the Umezawa Brigade and the 2nd Division came up in line with the 12th Division on the left and right respectively. It was shortly after midday that part of the 2nd Division captured a portion of the Russian position north of Chang-chia-lou-tzu. On asking a staff officer of the 12th Division afterwards why the division did not attack on this day, he said, "It was determined to concentrate the Army for attack at certain places such as Chen-chien-hu-tun and elsewhere. The 2nd Division was unable to concentrate at the place ordered." The 12th Division camped at Ta-yao, two miles south-west of Chen-chien-hu-tun.

Before dawn on the 15th March the Russians had abandoned their position on the Fan Ho, and blowing up the railway bridge, had fallen back on Tieh-ling. There, it was soon known, that they were holding a strong position. At dawn the 12th Division occupied the hills immediately north of the river just evacuated by the enemy. No further advance was made this day. In the afternoon from the new Japanese line the Russian stores and cantonment at Tieh-ling could be seen in flames. At 4 p.m., after crossing the Fan Ho with some difficulty, as the ice was melting rapidly, I watched the Umezawa Brigade on the plain marching in three columns* parallel to the railway towards Tieh-ling. The plain is very flat and devoid of cover, except that afforded by villages. At 4.15 p.m. a Russian battery to the west, covering the retreat of at least a regiment which was making for a bridge of boats over the Liao west of Tieh-ling, opened on the left flank guard. The range was slightly over 2,000 yards. The two battalions with their first line pack-horses took cover at once behind the railway embankment which is about eight to ten feet high, and halted. On this the battery turned its shrapnel on the main body which had just passed the village of Liao-hai-tun. After momentary hesitation, the main body (marching in close order in column) changed its course to the right for about three-quarters of a mile to get cover in some undulating ground at the foot of the hills bordering the plain. There was a certain amount of confusion for a couple of minutes or so, especially among the pack animals, but after that, each company, acting under its commander, rapidly moved to the right in whatever formation he ordered. The battery shelled for twenty minutes, the Japanese losing only 10 men, but some pack animals were also lost. The guns of the brigade did not come into action, nor could I see them anywhere. Apparently bad scouting and lack of cover were the reason why a battery was able to put a stop to the advance

15th Mar.

* Sketch not reproduced. It showed a main body with two battalions left flank guard and one battalion right flank guard.

of a brigade.* At 4.30 p.m. another Russian battery opened from a hill east of Tieh-ling city, but without effect. The III./47th (Shimamura) occupied Liao-hai-tun as soon as the Umezawa Brigade had passed that village. In the meantime the strong north-west wind greatly assisted the conflagration in the Russian cantonment, carrying the smoke over the tower, so that it seemed as if Tieh-ling itself was burning. This burning of stores foretold to a certainty that a further retreat of the Russians was imminent. The Shimamura Brigade camped this night at Ku-kuan-tun and villages south-west of it, the above-mentioned battalions remaining at Liao-hai-tun. Head-Quarters camped at Chen-chien-hu-tun.

The divisional orders issued this evening were as follows:—

"The 2nd Division being on the right, and the Umezawa Brigade being on the left, the 12th Division will take the main road. The Imamura Brigade will be the main body and the Shimamura Brigade the advanced guard."

16th Mar. At 1 am. on the 16th March an officer's patrol of the Ya-lu Army entered Tieh-ling, followed an hour later by a company of the 14th Regiment which had been sent on ahead by Major-General Shimamura. Shortly afterwards the Umezawa Brigade entered by different gates. Divisional Head-Quarters left Chen-chien-hu-tun at 5 a.m. and rode to Hsin-tun (E 2 s.w.), there joining the main road. The Shimamura Brigade in advance joined the main road at Liao-hai-tun, and marched to Tieh-ling. As the ice would not bear, the field guns had to march *vid* Hsin-tun. The Imamura Brigade left its position before dawn, and concentrated at Liao-hai-tun at 8 o'clock. Thence it moved on Tieh-ling. Leaving head-quarters at Hsin-tun, I rode over to the railway bridge. I had seen through my glasses on the afternoon of the 14th a party of Russians collect at the foot of one of the centre piers. It was therefore the more surprising that the piers were still untouched and sound. The bridge is a girder one, with two piers in the river bed. The enemy had blown up the roadway between these piers and nothing more. The ends of the broken girders were lying on the river bed. Repairs seemed to me by no means difficult, nor should they be a lengthy process. The banks of the Fan Ho at the bridge are higher than is usually the case with a Manchurian river flowing through a plain, *i.e.*, about eight feet high. At its deepest part the river was not more than three feet, but of course after rain it must often be double that depth. There were so many bridges to blow up between Mukden and the Sungari, that no doubt the Russians were economical of their dynamite.

I reached Tieh-ling at 10 a.m., and found that the Shimamura Brigade had already arrived, and was halted outside the north-east gate of the town. A hurried look at the Russian entrenchments immediately south of the town was all there

* Again the paucity of cavalry.—J.B.J.


was time for. They were similar to, but not as strong as, those immediately south of Liao-yang, and included one or two small redoubts. Japanese officers told me the frontage of the Tieh-ling position was too small for the Russians to hold against their forces advancing on a wide front. The cantonment was still burning, but by no means had all the houses been set on fire. The general appearance and size of the city was similar to that of Liao-yang. It was untouched, and the only sign of the presence of the Russians was a battery on the hills to the north, which once a minute sent a shell into the cantonment.

As mentioned before, Imamura reached Liao-hai-tun at 8 a.m. As up to now Tieh-ling had been the objective of the 12th and 2nd Divisions, the Umezawa Brigade, and the 10th Division (Fourth Army), a certain amount of confusion was to be expected on their arrival, and it was thought that there would probably be some trouble in each division getting its supplies. This would tend towards delaying the pursuit. The 12th Division, however, had still four days' food, and could therefore proceed at once, avoiding the confusion that might arise in a comparatively speaking small town. Lieut.-General Inouye therefore determined to press on towards Kai-yuan (F 1), and gave orders to that effect on arrival at Liao-hai-tun. Imamura left that place for Tieh-ling at 8.30 a.m. The objective of the division was Chung-ku. On Imamura leaving Liao-hai-tun, the 24th Regiment, one troop, one mountain battery, and one company of engineers were sent to the east as right flank guard. They moved by a road more or less parallel to and east of the main road. The movements of this force are described further on. At 11.30 a.m., Imamura reached the north-east side of Tieh-ling, and was ordered, as soon as the men had their food, to take the 46th Regiment, two batteries of mountain artillery, one company of engineers, and some of the medical corps, to advance along the banks of the Liao as far as Hei-chia-tun (E 1) and to occupy the hills north-west of it, *i.e.*, a ridge running parallel to a line drawn from Chung-ku to Hei-chia-tun. The movements of Imamura's force are described further on.

*The Advanced Guard (Shimamura) at Chung-ku.**—After a halt at Tieh-ling for the men to eat their midday meal, Shimamura, sending out one battalion of the 14th Regiment as left flank guard, advanced along the main road to Kai-yuan. His advanced guard reached San-tao-pu (E 1/2), at 3 p.m. As will be seen further on, that the left flank guard was withdrawn as soon as Imamura came up and relieved it. Following in rear of Shimamura, at a distance of two miles or more, the Divisional Head-Quarters marched with the Awaibara Brigade—in reserve. When Shimamura rode into San-tao-pu, he found the head of the column halted at the north-east end of the

* *See* square E 1, Map 61.

village, and about two companies of Russian infantry could be clearly seen on a gentle slope on the east of the main road close to Chung-ku. The range from the end of the village to the Russians was between 3,000 and 4,000 yards. The greater part of them were not on the sky line, but in full view, slightly down the face of the slope. They were drawn up in two lines, and I imagined that they must be entrenching, but such was not the case, as I discovered on visiting the spot next morning. This extraordinary procedure must have been by way of bluff. There was no sign of the enemy's artillery. The general sent back at once for the guns, one battery of which arriving first came into action and opened fire at 3.15 p.m. in a compound on the east of the road. These guns fired over the compound wall (seven feet high), standing back from it. A slight mirage prevented the range from being quickly ascertained, and the guns fired short. The two Russian companies appeared to take matters very easily at first, but in about ten minutes they began to retire very deliberately by the road. At 3.25 p.m. a Russian half battery replied from a position in rear of Chung-ku, which was never located during the action. The accuracy of the first Japanese battery increasing, and another having arrived and opened on the flat to the left of the road, the movements of the Russian infantry became more hurried, and it quickly disappeared over the rise, leaving, as I saw next morning, only five dead. At 3.40 p.m. the third battery came up, and opened fire from behind a compound wall. At the same time the infantry (47th Regiment) advanced from the east side of the village. The following was their formation :—



The first line was at one pace interval. Meanwhile the artillery duel continued, which must have been more unpleasant

for the Russian infantry in Chung-ku than for the Russian guns, as the Japanese artillery searched the village thoroughly.

At 4 p.m. the Russian guns were shelling occasionally, at one time the Japanese right and centre batteries, at another time the infantry, but with little effect. The advance of the 47th Regiment was very slow, for it was waiting for the 14th to come up on its right, along and among the hills east of the road.

At 4.25 p.m. the second and third lines of the I./47th were hugging the hills close by to avoid the enemy's shells. The squadron, in advance of the 14th, in the meantime had seized an excellent observation post in the hills from which to observe the enemy's movements. It also kept touch with the 24th Regiment. One of its advanced patrols could be seen clearly from San-tao-pu, dismounted and taking cover most carefully.

At 4.30 p.m. the Russian guns shelled the advancing infantry moving slowly with frequent halts.

At 4.50 p.m. the 14th Regiment was moving forward among the hills and somewhat in advance of the 47th. The 14th was never fired on by the Russian guns throughout the action.

At 5.15 p.m. brisk rifle fire broke out on the west front of Chung-ku, when the 6th and 7th Companies of the 47th were in action. On this the Japanese guns commenced to shell this village rapidly, using salvoes by batteries and half batteries This lasted for over two minutes. Up to that time I had never before heard Japanese guns fire so rapidly. As soon as it was over, the enemy's guns which had been silent (perhaps owing to the immense clouds of smoke and dust that rose from the village and obscured the view) opened again on the infantry.

At 6 p.m. the 14th Regiment began to bring up its right shoulder, its right companies coming down the slopes of the hills towards the crest of the rise on which the two Russian companies had originally been seen. About the same time the 47th entered Chung-ku and was firing heavily on the now retreating enemy.

At 6.15 p.m. the III./47th left San-tao-pu and advanced rapidly on Chung-ku.

At 6.50 p.m. (just as it was getting dark) musketry had died away, but the enemy's guns were firing for a few minutes from a new position north of Chung-ku. Major-General Shimamura had already proceeded with two batteries to that village where the position for the night is shown on the sketch.* The 3rd Battery remained at San-tao-po.

During the advance the 47th only lost two or three men from artillery fire. The left flank guard of Shimamura, III. 14th, had halted and faced the enemy in the afternoon. It was relieved by Imamura and rejoined the regiment in the evening.

---

* Not reproduced. It showed 12 companies occupying the edge of Chung-ku and the rest of the force in the village.

The 47th lost half a dozen men, the 14th lost 47. The casualties of the Russians were unknown, but 18 were taken prisoners.

As regards the Russian strength, the cavalry observing from the hills estimated that at the commencement there were about two regiments of infantry in and in rear of Chung-ku. At Shou-shan-kan-pu (F 1) there was about a division. In and about Ssu-chai-tzu (E 1) and Wu-chia-tun (E 1) there was about an army corps. The Chinese said the last body of the enemy left San-tao-pu at dawn. It is doubtful if there was actually more than a battalion opposing the Japanese in Chung-ku. No doubt the two regiments which the Japanese cavalry saw would have been available had their presence in the action been required, but it seems as if Chung-ku was what may be termed a subsidiary rear guard position, the real one being a couple of miles further on. The peculiar conduct of the two Russian companies lends colour to this, especially as taking up a subsidiary rear guard position with a small force in addition to holding a main rear guard position is a favourite manœuvre with the Russians.

When visiting the village of Chung-ku next morning I failed to find the enemy's gun position, but afterwards Japanese officers said that it was in rear of the village about four hundred yards from its south face. Indirect fire must have been used, and probably there was an observation post on one of the roofs of the houses. Several walls on the southern face of the village had been loopholed, but otherwise no measures had been taken for putting it in a state of defence.

Movements of the Right Flank Guard.—As mentioned before, the right flank guard moved from Liao-hai-tun (E 2) east of Tieh-ling. It reached Yu-kou just before 3 p.m. Here it was ascertained that the Russians (one battalion, one squadron, four guns) were at Ma-chia-tzu (F 2) and Chin-chia-tzu (E 2 N.E.). On the Russian half-battery opening on it the force deployed for attack; but little happened except an exchange of fire between the guns of both sides, for the Russians kept steadily retreating. Before sunset the force occupied the hills south-east of Chung-ku. Here it bivouacked for the night. Later, information came in that the enemy in front of it had been the rear guard of a division which was on the point of making for Kai-yuan, *viâ* Meng-chia-kou (F 1), along the valley that runs in a north-westerly direction from that place up to the railway. However, seeing the state of affairs at Chung-ku, the division changed its course to the north-east, and entered a country as mountainous as the roads were bad. After great difficulties it was eventually heard to have reached a point a few miles south-east of Kai-yuan.

Movements of the Left Flank Guard.—The strength and orders of the left flank guard have been already given. Shortly after midday Imamura despatched a battalion to the hills north

of Tieh-ling to protect that flank, while the remainder of the force began to move along the Liao. The colonel of the 46th commanded the advanced guard. At 3.10 p.m. the head of the column reached a point about 3,000 yards south of Yin-shui-tun (E 2 north), and suddenly came under the fire of a battery on the hills. On this the 2nd Battalion changed its direction and went along the foot of the hills close to the river, while the 1st Battalion continued moving over the high ground to the west. Owing to difficulties of the ground the 1st Battalion dropped somewhat behind the 2nd Battalion, which reached the high ground north of Yin-shui-tun first. Hurrying on to conform to the movement of the 2nd Battalion, the 1st came under the fire of the Russian guns, which had taken up another position close to Kao-liu-tun. The 1st Battalion halted at Shou-tao-tzu.* The sketch† shows the position of the 2nd Battalion and of the officer commanding the regiment, who on arrival received information from the cavalry patrols that the main body of the Russian infantry was on the high ground north of Yin-niu-tun with a battery in position just west of them. A section of infantry was sent along the river to threaten the Russian left, and for some reason or other, the troops on the hill immediately north-east of Yin-niu-tun retired on its approach. It was now 6 p.m., and the 1st Battalion had commenced preparing the men's suppers in Shou-tao-tzu,* the commander supposing that as it was late, there was not likely to be further fighting. A few minutes after 6 p.m. the 1st Battalion got orders to move to the ground north-west of Yin-shui-tun, and it arrived there at 6.15 p.m. The sketch† shows the situation at this time. Ever since the arrival of the 5th and 6th Companies (the two deployed) there had been continuous "sniping" going on across the river, and the companies had been heavily shelled, though suffering no loss.

At 6.20 p.m. the enemy's battery retired.

At 6.35 p.m. one of the two mountain batteries opened fire from the position marked on the sketch.† They fired until dusk. On the mountain battery opening, the Russians returned and replied. The valley in front of the two companies of the 2nd Battalion being 2,000 yards wide, and, in consequence, an advance in that direction difficult, the officer commanding the regiment determined to take the bulk of his force across the Liao and attack the enemy *viâ* Hei-chia-tun and Shih-shou-tao, leaving the two companies of the 2nd Battalion where they were. Accordingly, before starting he sent word to the two companies of what he intended to do. On the river bank, just before crossing, the colonel received a message by orderly

* Immediately south of Yin-shui-tun.

† Not reproduced. It showed two companies of II. 46 deployed and two in support north-east of Yin-shui-tun, with No. 2 Company, followed by the remainder of I. 46, behind it. The O.C. Regiment was with No. 2 Company, and two mountain guns were on the left of the supports.

from the two companies asking for orders, so apparently this message had never reached them. It turned out afterwards that the messenger had been killed by a stray bullet on the way, unknown to anybody. The colonel thereupon repeated his order, which was that the 5th and 6th Companies should stand fast while the rest of the force would move in an easterly direction and so avoid the valley. At about this time (between 8 and 9 p.m.) a battalion from the divisional reserve arrived at Hei-chia-tun, and on arrival of the 46th at Shih-shou-tao, it prolonged the latter's right. The crossing began at 9.15 p.m., and by 10 p.m. Shih-shou-tao had been reached. A fire was lighted at this village to acquaint the two companies of the arrival there and the further advance. The two companies at once crossed the valley in front of them and river, but the enemy had gone. After crossing the river the 5th and 6th Companies arrived at Hou Shin-fu-ying,* and the whole battalion concentrated there. At about midnight the colonel ordered a further advance into the hills. At 1 a.m. both battalions met the enemy; in the case of the 2nd Battalion the Russians soon retired, but those in front of the 1st Battalion kept up rifle fire for at least an hour. By 4.30 a.m. the last Russians had retreated.

The following incident occurred with the 1st Battalion while advancing: The first line (one section) of the 3rd Company, on reaching the bottom of a gully, came under wild but heavy fire from the enemy on the far side. The section lay down, and its two supporting sections opened fire over it, the width of the gully being about three hundred yards (darkness prevented the actual distance being known). Heavy musketry went on for nearly an hour, but there was little to show for it next morning, for the enemy only left one dead man behind. The only Japanese casualty all day was the above-mentioned orderly.

According to a divisional order, the force was to occupy the line Wang-kuan-pao-tun†—Yin-shui-tun for the night, so Imamura put the 3rd Battalion, which had been in reserve all day, in position as marked on the sketch.‡ The general with one company, two batteries, and the engineer company, got to Hei-chia-tun at midnight, where he halted. The troops slept where they were in the open, except the regimental reserve, which was in houses. The Russians against Imamura were in all probability the flank guard of a column which was seen moving north on the plain to the north and north-west. The strength of the enemy in contact with Imamura was about a regiment of infantry, but perhaps only a battalion actually opposed him

* Not on map; it is between Shih-shou-tao and Yin-nin-tun.

† Not on map; it is just north of Hei-chia-tun.

‡ Not reproduced. It showed three companies at Yin-shui-tun and one, with the engineer company, at Hei-chia-tun.

The Divisional Head-Quarters and reserve passed the night at San-tao-pu (E 1/2). In the night came orders for the 12th Division to abandon the pursuit and retire next day on Tieh-ling.

The Divisional Head-Quarters got to Tieh-ling with the rear parties of the division at 3.15 p.m. on the 17th. In the course of the day the 10th Division took up the pursuit. The 12th Division halted for the night at Tieh-ling. **17th Mar.**

On the 18th the division marched to Tsui-chen-pu (E 2 south) on the left bank of the Fan Ho, and south-east of Tieh-ling. Quarters were taken up in the neighbouring villages. **18th Mar.**

Casualties.—The total casualties of the 12th Division at the battle of Mukden were 1,300 odd, of which the Awaibara Brigade lost the smallest number, *i.e.*, 74 killed and 308 wounded.

The small arm ammunition expended was as follows:—

The Shimamura Brigade	- -	189,387 rounds.
„ Imamura „	- -	388,560 „
„ Awaibara „	- - -	35,751 „
Total	- -	613,698 „

The Weather during the Battle.—At first the frost was most severe, but when the pursuit began, its severity lessened night by night. The snow storms were not heavy, and when snow fell the wind always dropped. The snow never lay more than three inches deep on the ground, and the sun melted it in a few hours. On account of the wind dropping, one did not feel as cold when it was snowing as at other times. Every other day before the pursuit began the wind blew from the north, but it nearly always abated at night. After leaving the Sha Ho we had sunny weather, and the days were pleasant when there was no north wind. The sand storm on the 9th March was unique, and covered the whole country for miles. The dry and dusty nature of the soil was the cause, but perhaps the movements of troops and transport made it worse than it otherwise would have been. Curiously enough, the ice of the rivers, namely, the Sha Ho, Hun Ho, Fan Ho, and Tieh-ling Ho (branch of the Liao, which flows past Tieh-ling on the north side), melted after we had crossed them, *i.e.*, it was not till then that they ceased to bear. The ice on the Tieh-ling Ho just sufficed to bear the guns when the division returned to Tieh-ling on the 17th March.

(2)—*Supply and Transport.**

(1) First line transport (light) consists of pack animals. It accompanies troops. It carries no food.

* *See* Map 61.

(2) Second line transport consists of pack animals carrying one day's food, in order of regiments and battalions.

These are followed by—

(3) Four supply columns, each consisting of about 500 pack animals.

Although operations began on the 26th February, no forward movement was made until the 7th March, so the troops were supplied between these dates as they were throughout the winter: that is to say, the Right and Centre Columns were supplied from Hsiang-shan-tzu (E 6), and the Left Column from Yin-chiang-pu-tzu (D 6). As the road from these depôts was exposed to the enemy's view and shells, the transport was done by night.

Before the battle the following rations were issued to the troops:—

4 days' rations carried by the man.

(1) 2 days' rations in biscuit and one day in uncooked rice, to which were added 75 *momme* (9⅜ oz.) of *katsuo-boshi* (dried fish), 45 *momme* (5⅝ oz.) of tinned beef, and 15 *momme* (1⅞ oz.) of sugar. No salt issued, as there is salt in the tinned beef.

= 3 days' emergency or reserve rations.

(2) 1 days' ration of biscuit (180 *momme* = 22½ oz.) with 30 *momme* (3¾ oz.) of sugar and 35 *momme* (4⅜ oz.) of sugar candy.

= 1 day's ration.

Second line transport—

(3) 1 day's ration (either rice or biscuit).

= 1 day.

Supply columns—

(4) 4 days' rations (3 ordinary, 1 reserve).

= 4 days.

Total = 9 days.

i.e., 1 day's ration in use, and 8 days' rations in hand.

Cavalry horses:

(1) On each saddle, 1 day's ration -	=	1 day.
(2) 2 days' rations in 2nd line transport	=	2 days.
(3) 4 days' rations in the supply columns	=	4 days.
Total	=	7 days.

In addition to above, bullocks were driven along ahead of the supply columns. The *katsuo-boshi* has been known to the Japanese for centuries as being particularly good for appeasing hunger.

The following is a diary of the movements of the second line transport* during the advance of the division, which began on the 8th March :—

8th Mar. Divisional Head-Quarters were at Kao-shih-tun (D 4 S.E.). The troops camped late in the evening, so the order was given that any troops unable to be supplied by the second line transport should use what was carried on the man, and that next morning (9th) the supply column would be at Shan-cheng-tzu† to fill up the second line transport.

9th Mar. Divisional Head-Quarters reached Ssu-fang-tai (D/E 4). In the evening the troops received rations from the second line transport, which filled up at Ssu-fang-tai the same day.

10th Mar. This evening the Divisional Head-Quarters halted at Ta-kou (E 4 north). The troops were supplied by the second line transport, which, filling up the same day at Ssu-fang-tai, returned to the troops on the 11th.

11th Mar. Divisional Head-Quarters reached Yao-pu (D 3) and the bulk of the troops were at Yi-lu. The troops drew rations from the second line transport, which did not fill up again this day.

12th Mar. Troops halted. As there was a quantity of figs and chickens in the villages, each unit bought sufficient to amount to a half-day's ration, which was added to the ordinary issue. In dealing with the inhabitants "Catch, kill, and pay" was the rule. The second line transport filled up at Wang-chen-tun‡ and Pao-chia-lou-tzu § Making a journey to each place and back again, it got rations for the 12th and 13th.

13th Mar. This afternoon the Divisional Head-Quarters were at Ku-chia-tzu (D 3 N.E.). The second line transport supplied the troops, and filled up from the supply column at Shu-lin-tzu (D 3 S.E.).

14th Mar. The division halted on the left bank of the Fan Ho. The second line transport supplied the troops and filled up from the supply column at Yao-shih-tun (close to Ku-chia-tzu (D 3 N.E.).

15th Mar. The division occupied the right bank of the Fan Ho. The second line transport supplied the troops and filled up at Yao-shih-tun (close to Ku-chia-tzu).


16th Mar. The advanced troops arrived at Chung-ku. It was a long march, so the troops had to use the rations they carried. In the morning the second line transport had been at Chen-chien-hu-tan. From there it went and filled up at Yao-shih-tun. It could not, therefore, reach the division this day.

---

* *See* diagram, p. 340.
† 3½ miles south of Kao-shih-tun.
‡ North of Shih-tai (D 3 S.E.), 5 miles east of Pu-ho.
§ South of Shih-tai, on the Hu-shan-pu road.

17th Mar. The first orders to the division were to return to Tsui-chen-pu (E 2 S.E. of Tieh-ling), but the second line transport was already on the way to Tieh-ling when the order reached it. It then turned back, but later received another order that the division would halt at Tieh-ling. By that time it was too late, so the men again ate the rations they carried.

18th Mar. The division marched to and was quartered in various villages on the left bank of the Fan Ho. Tsui-chen-pu (the Divisional Head-Quarters village) was about 10 miles south-east of Tieh-ling. The regimental (second line) transport supplied the troops.



From the 1st until the 7th March the stations of the columns were as follows :—

1st Column at Hsiang-shan-tzu-tung-kou (E 5 south).

2nd Column at Lao-mu-yen-tzu.*

3rd and 4th Columns at Mien-hua-pu-tzu (D 6 N.E.).

The 1st Column worked between Yin-chiang-pu-tzu (D 6 N.E.) and Hsiang-shan-tzu-tung-kou. The 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Columns between the last line of communication post at Ta-yao (S.E. of Yen-tai Colliery: D 6) and Yin-chiang-pu-tzu, which

* Not on map; it is near Hsi-tao-chieh (D 6).

was the field magazine. Live bullocks and vegetables were sent from Pan-la-shan-tzu (Army Head-Quarters and two miles north of Yen-tai Colliery) to Yin-chiang-pu-tzu, the latter by Chinese carts.

Movements of Supply Columns.—The following is a diary of the movements of the supply columns during the advance of the division which began on the 8th March :—

8th Mar. The columns moved as follow :—1st Column to Lokaa,* 2nd Column to Shang-ping-tai-tzu (D 5 S.E.), 3rd Column to Tien-chia-tzu (half a mile S.W. of Shang Shih-chiao-tzu, E 6 N.W.), 4th Column to Hsi-tao-chieh (D 6 N.E.).

9th Mar. The 1st Column transferred rations to a magazine at Ssu-fang-tai (D/E 4) and camped at Fun-chia-tai—a neighbouring village not marked on map—for the night. It travelled 25 miles, a dust-storm raging most of the time. The 2nd Column went to Li-shih-chai (E 4 west) and halted. The 3rd Column went to Yang-chia-tsai (not marked on map; it is $3\frac{3}{4}$ miles south of Ssu-fang-tai). The 4th Column went to Tung-tai (E 4 west)—a place south of the Mukden–Fushun railway and Ssu-fang-tai. From Hsi-tao-chieh (D 6) to Tung-tai is about 30 miles. Next day the 4th Column was transferred to the Awaibara Brigade (which had become Army reserve) and the division henceforth worked with three supply columns instead of four. The composition of the three columns was not altered.

10th Mar. The 1st Column went to Pai-shen-chai (D 5 east), which village the last line of communication post also reached this day. It filled up and returned to Shang-lou-tzu, a village close to Ta Chang-wang-chai (D 4 S.E.). The 2nd Column supplied the magazine at Ssu-fang-tai and remained at Ta Wa-pu-tzu (south-west of Ssu-fang-tai) for the night. The 3rd Column going to Ssu-fang-tai and handing over its rations there, stayed at Shang-lou-tzu for the night.

11th Mar. The 1st Column handing over its rations to the intermediate despatch magazine at Shang-lou-tzu,† went back to Pai-shen-chai, and filling up there, returned to Shang-lou-tzu for the night. The 2nd Column went to Shang-lou-tzu, and filling up there, returned to Ta Wa-pu-tzu (D 4 east). The 3rd Column went back to Pai-shen-chai, filled up, and returned to Shang-lou-tzu for the night. This day the last line of communication post advanced to Chu-chia-tun (D 4 S.E.).

12th Mar. The 1st Column went back to Chu-chia-tun, filled up, and went to Pao-chia-lou-tzu‡ (north of the Hun Ho). The 2nd Column went to Wang-chen-tun‡ and handed over rations to

---

* I regret I cannot find it on any map.—J. B. J.
† Near Ta Chang-wang-chai (D 4 S.E.). ‡ North of Shih-tai (D. 3 S.E.).

the distributing station there. It stayed at Shih-tai that night. The 3rd Column went to Pai-shen-chai (D 5 east), filled up, and returned to Ta-wa-pu-tzu (D 4 east) for the night.

13th Mar. The 1st Column went to Chu-chia-tun (D 4 S.E.), and filling up there, returned to Shang-lou-tzu* for the night. The 2nd Column going to Ssu-fang-tai, filled up and returned to Shih-tai for the night. The 3rd Column went to Shu-lin-tzu (D 3 east) and handed over rations to the field magazine there, which opened on the same day. There it stayed for the night.

14th Mar. The 1st Column went to Shu-lin-tzu and stayed there—still loaded. The 2nd Column handed over its rations to the magazine at Shu-lin-tzu and returned to Shih-tai. The 3rd Column went to Ta Wa-pu-tzu and stayed there empty. The last line of communication post advanced to Yao-shih-tun (south of Shu-lin-tzu and 22½ miles south-east of Tieh-ling).†

15th Mar. The 1st Column went to Yao-shih-tun and handing over rations there, returned to Shu-lin-tzu. The 2nd Column went to Ssu-fang-tai, filled up, and returned to Shih-tai. The 3rd Column went to Ssu-fang-tai, filled up there, and went to Chu-chan (right bank of Hun Ho) for the night. The last line of communication post advanced to Ssu-fang-tai.

16th Mar. The 1st Column went to Ssu-fang-tai, filled up, and returned to Ta Piao-tun (5 miles west of Ssu-fang-tai). The 2nd Column rested at Shih-tai. The 3rd Column went to Yao-shih-tun, close to Ku-chia-tzu (D 3 N.E). Ku-chia-tzu was the Divisional Head-Quarters on the 13th. Arriving at Yao-shih-tun, the 3rd Column handed over rations there and returned to Chu-chan (D 4 east).

17th Mar. The 1st Column went to Shu-lin-tzu (D 3 east) and stayed there the night. The 2nd Column went to Yao-shih-tun (near (Ku-chia-tzu) and stayed there for the night. The 3rd Column went to Ssu-fang-tai, filled up, and returned to Chu-chan for the night.

(3)—*Remarks by a Medical Officer, 12th Division.*

After the battle, I had a conversation with a medical officer of the 12th Division, who very kindly gave me the following information:—"Two pairs of socks are a necessity in such "weather as we have been experiencing, but they must not "be tight in the boots, *i.e.*, the boots must be made sufficiently "large to admit of two pairs, otherwise frost-bite is caused. "Socks wetted by melting snow cause frost-bite. To obviate

---

* Near Ta Chang-wang-chai (D 4 S.E.).

† It must, however, be between Chu-chia-tun (D 4 S.E.), last line of communication post on the 11th, and Ssu-fang-tai (D, E 4), the last line of communication post, on the 15th.

" this, the men, in addition to the two pairs they wore, carried " a third pair for change. We got great experience at Hei- " kou-tai on the subject, for several doctors from the division " went out to the fighting to study the question. For warmth " for the feet there is nothing like the Chinese shoe with grass " in it. The men wear it sometimes, and at first feel the want " of heels, especially when climbing, but they soon get " accustomed to it and like it very much. The fur goatskin " waistcoat is excellent. During fighting the overcoat is usually " worn, not the waistcoat, which is carried. To wear both " together is inconvenient. The cloth toe-caps are excellent, " for the toe is as a rule the first part to be attacked by the " frost-bite. The boots, of course, must be roomy enough for " them. Mittens are useless and inconvenient. I think a pair " of leather gloves with the fur inside would be best. The " fingers must be separate. Certainly the hood is most useful in " snowy and severe weather. We used it in the Chino-Japanese " war ten years ago. During this last battle not one wounded " soldier of the division suffered from frost-bite. There were " only two cases of frost-bite. It was otherwise at Hei-kou- " tai. Nor had we any case of pneumonia. Dust, so far, has " only very slightly affected the men's eyes, and that only " temporarily.

"In my opinion the stretcher bearers are not numerous " enough. For two hundred wounded in an action I should " like three doctors and fourteen assistants. I do not approve " of the bearer companies not being under the immediate com- " mand of the doctors. I think the British system is the best. " I would mount all doctors. At the battle of Mukden our " field hospitals were established three times, *i.e.*, at Huo-lien " (D/E 6), Shang Shih-chiao-tzu (E 6 N.W.) and Li-shih-chia " (E 4 west). 1,300 men were treated in the hospitals, of which " some were sick and some came from other divisions. Living " underground at the Sha Ho did the men no harm, for they " were given a lot of exercise. In fact, their health was better " than it was during the halt at Feng-huang-cheng."

(4)—*Remarks by Infantry Officers.*

The following is the gist of remarks made by brigadiers, regimental and battalion commanders of infantry, on their own branch of the service during the war, and particularly after the battle of Mukden, in answer to my questions. It was remarkable, when comparing the different answers, how much they agreed :—

The Infantry Attack by Day.—A major-general remarked : " I don't think there is any necessity for altering our infantry attack regulations—they allow sufficient latitude already." This is the answer I have received from all officers I have questioned. Japanese officers were all agreed that in normal circumstances fire should be opened at 1,000 metres (1,100 yards)

from the defences, the reason given being that opening fire earlier is a waste of time, for then it takes longer to establish "fire superiority." The majority agree that when attacking over the flat, or when there is little cover, this fire superiority is obtained as a rule between 600–400 metres (660–440 yards) from the enemy, supposing that the latter is not very strongly entrenched. A colonel commanding a regiment which has seen as much fighting as any in the First Army said, "In attacking over the flat, or over ground where little cover can be obtained, the heaviest casualties occur at about 400 metres (440 yards) as a rule. On the other hand, we inflict at that time great loss on the enemy also." A captain who has been fighting since the landing of the troops in Korea said, "Within 300 yards of the enemy our losses are comparatively small." He was not referring, of course, to cases in which the enemy was strongly entrenched. It seems to be generally agreed that, under the above circumstances, more men are lost during the advance when lying down and firing than when making rushes.* In a hilly country they say the contrary is the case, *i.e.*, more casualties occur when moving from point to point than when lying down and firing. According to the regulations, when a regiment is deployed for attack, the battalion commanders give orders for rushes. When a battalion is deployed for attack, company commanders may give orders, but if practicable the battalion commanders give orders.†

Night Attacks.—Of the general advisability of night attacks all approve, and most agree that before making one the enemy's position should be well reconnoitred. One colonel said he did not think that they were advisable with large forces: a large force in this war being a division at least. As a means of getting in close touch with the enemy's line they were most useful. Frequent night attacks are inadvisable, but often there are positions that cannot be taken by day, but can be taken by night. As in a night attack there is no danger from the enemy's artillery, some officers think that losses are less than in one by day, and all agree that, if successful, greater loss is inflicted on the enemy than by day, for he loses heavily when falling back after being driven from his line.

Night Attack Formations.—These vary according to the enemy's position and the ground. In the battle of Liao-yang, I gave a short account‡ of the night fighting at Ta Ta-lien-kou, and the formations employed. This was an example of close formations which seem to be generally used in the attack on

* An ordinary rush is 50 paces. It may be mentioned here that commonly the rushes are made by at least a company at a time, supposing that the attack is being made by a regiment or more.—J. B. J.

† No better example of an attack across the open, up to date in this war, can be found than that of the Okasaki Brigade (2nd Division) at the battle of the Sha Ho.—J. B. J.

‡ *See* Vol. I., pages 425–7.

Pien-niu-lu-pu and the Russian trenches north of it—the formations were line. The battalion moving against the village had three companies in the first line and one company in reserve. A colonel said, "Don't fire too soon is our motto, and it has invariably succeeded. If we fire prematurely, the enemy marks our position and further advance is delayed. After all, the bayonet is best. Although bayonets are always fixed, the rifles of all troops in a night attack (including the reserves) are loaded. Ordinary foot-gear is used by the men. They tread lightly (to this they are trained) and do not crawl or stoop.

Various Remarks on Night Attacks.—A captain who has been in the field since the war began said, "Hand-to-hand fighting, as far as my experience goes, lasts generally a few minutes, but at Ta Ta-lien-kou (mentioned above) we fought hand-to-hand for ten minutes—a regular *mêlée* in which we were very much crowded together. The Russian bayonet, as you must have remarked, has no edge, so in the case of the two men killed with my sword, I managed to catch hold of the bayonet in my left hand; this has often been a disadvantage to the Russian infantry." In answer to a further question he said, "We do not think much of the revolver—you have no time to reload. The Russian officers use it much more than we do." A colonel said, "The reason we are always successful in night attacks or in defence by night is that the enemy always fires too soon or too high. However, lately (he was speaking after the battle of Mukden) the enemy has learned to do better and reserve his fire more.

Defence at Night.—When attacked at night the Japanese often allow the enemy to get within from one hundred to fifty paces before individual fire is opened and hand-grenades are thrown. One colonel (and there are many that hold the same opinion) was strongly of the opinion that, when attacked, the best plan was to "fire as soon as you know the whereabouts of your enemy." As far as a regiment is concerned, the rule is to put the reserve in one place and not to distribute it. At night all bayonets are fixed and rifles loaded. The posting of sentries at night depends on many considerations. When the Japanese line is on a ridge, a section is often put one hundred yards down the slope with sentries one hundred yards in front of it again. In answer to a question *re* the employment of a wire to prevent the elevation of the rifle at night, a colonel who was in the severe night fighting when the Japanese defended Pen-hsi-hu during the battle of the Sha Ho, said, "The wire dodge is, like many other things, excellent in theory but useless in real war. Perhaps it might be useful in defending a fort. In peace time, by way of impressing upon the men the necessity of firing low, it is perhaps a good thing to practice."

Remarks on the holding of Ground close to the Enemy's Trenches, after seizing it in a Night Attack.—A colonel said,

"When close to the enemy at night and halted—that is to say, when occupying such a position as Imamura did during the three days before the pursuit began—we do not put sentries out in front, but keep them in the firing line, at night. Usually one or two per company." This is not the invariable rule, for considerations of ground and proximity to the enemy must be regarded; the colonel commanding the other regiment of the Imamura Brigade said, "We had patrols of three men each out fifty paces in front of the line. On the approach of the enemy they fired and came back into the line." On such occasions, the food is cooked under cover in rear and sent forward when it is dark. Halted in such positions the emergency rations are often a necessity. In the position mentioned above the nights were extremely cold, but the men had only greatcoats (not very thick) and fur goatskin waistcoats. In a very few places charcoal could be used.

Grenades.—I have already given a description of their use. All officers agree as to their utility and destructive power.

Ammunition.—A regimental commander told me that as the war went on, the Japanese had discovered that the men were capable of carrying a good deal more than was supposed at first. At the commencement of the battle of Mukden each man of his regiment carried 500 rounds, and when the pursuit began perhaps some as much as 600 rounds, owing to casualties in the interval. This, of course, was not the case with every regiment, *e.g.*, in another regiment of the 12th Division each man carried 250 rounds at the commencement of the battle. The men like carrying as much as possible. Each man is told that when wounded, he is, if possible, to hand over his ammunition to an unwounded comrade. The rule about the ammunition of a dead soldier is that if it is found by the stretcher-bearers, it is handed over to the division. It is afterwards reissued to his regiment.

Machine Guns.—All officers are enthusiastic about them. All agree that their chief *rôle* is defence, even at night, and that they are extremely useful in attack. During the battle of Mukden machine guns were used very much in the attack by the Japanese, but it seems that the casualties of the machine gun detachments were very heavy indeed; one commander thought them especially useful in pursuit.

The Blue Sack.—This is a sort of long cylindrical cotton bag, open at both ends.* It is carried over the shoulder across the back, and its ends knotted in front on the chest. In fact, it is worn more or less *en bandoulière*. When the knapsack is temporarily abandoned on going into action, the most necessary

* It is elsewhere described as:—6 feet 6 inches long with both ends open; it is 8½ inches across when laid flat. It is made of blue drill, doubled, and is sewn down the centre so as to form two long compartments.

articles, such as food, ammunition, shirt, &c., are transferred to this blue sack. It is worn for lightness sake in lieu of the knapsack. In the fighting at Hei-kou-tai, some regiments kept their knapsacks and found them a great impediment.

Obstacles.—The majority of officers consider barbed wire the best. They have a poor opinion of military pits with an entanglement above them, for they say that a certain amount of cover can be obtained in them, and if a soldier has an iron hook, he can reach up and tear down the wire fairly easily.

Officers with a Company.—Most commanders would like the numbers increased. They think there are not enough to control the men when deployed.

Boots.—The men of the 12th Division who landed in Korea are now wearing their fifth pair of boots or shoes. The latter were not a success, and as regards the former, improvement is very necessary.

Other Equipment.—The putties are considered excellent in lieu of the gaiters originally worn. The uniform was too tight at first. The haversack is most useful. The men do very well with the ordinary cap, covered with khaki in the summer, although it is not suitable as a summer covering for the head.

Rifle Barrels.—Up to the end of the battle of Mukden there has been no sign of deterioration in the rifle barrels. The oil gets frozen sometimes and interferes with the action of the lock.

Emergency Ration.—The ration is used by order of regimental commanders, but the fact must be reported to Divisional Staff. On urgent occasions, surbordinates may order its use, and report having done so.

The Shooting of the Russian Infantry.—The majority of the officers consider that it is not good, and varies a great deal according to the regiment. One colonel said, "I think they shoot well enough at extreme ranges, but in my opinion this opening of fire too early is a bad sign."

(14) Port Arthur.—Operations in the Kuan-tung Peninsula from 26th May to 31st July 1904.

Report by Capt. C. A. L. Yate, King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.

Plate.

Sketch Map of the Kuan-tung Peninsula - - Map 68.

Forces Engaged.—The Japanese troops which actually took part in the battle of Nan Shan consisted of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Divisions with the 1st Independent Field Artillery Brigade. The 3rd Division had detached the 34th Regiment towards Pu-lan-tien (Port Adams) before the battle. This regiment, together with a battalion of infantry and some artillery belonging to the 4th Division, were placed under the commander of the 5th Division and faced north during the battle, being opposed by a Russian force of about a regiment of infantry with some cavalry. Portions of the 6th Japanese Division were landing about this time—some 18 miles away—and their 11th Division was close at hand. This last had disembarked at Yen-tai Wan, where the 6th Division was also landing, on the 24th May, and rested near there until the 26th. On the 27th it reached Chin-chou (Kinchau).*

The 4th Division faced north after Nan Shan, with the 5th Division on its right (east). The 1st and 3rd Divisions advanced south after the battle, the latter on the left. It was a detachment of Nakamura's Brigade of the 1st Division, however, which occupied Liu-shu-tun on the 27th, and Dalny on the 29th May. The remainder of the force began entrenching itself on the heights east of Lake Pei-pu-tzu-ya.

On the 29th a redistribution of units took place. The 3rd Division was relieved by the 11th and marched northwards as the right wing of the Second (General Oku's) Army. The newly formed Third Army Head-Quarters had meanwhile arrived at Chin-chou and assumed direction of the operations in the Kuan-tung Peninsula.

The boldness of the Japanese in attacking the strong Nan Shan position without (as it was then supposed) leaving any reserves to provide against a reverse, was at the time much commented upon; in reality, however, their strategy here

* *See* Map 68.

displayed the caution that characterized it throughout the campaign.

Early in June the Third Army Head-Quarters moved from Chin-chou to Lake Pei-pu-tzu-ya; the divisions had occupied the line An-tzu Shan—Ta-tzu Shan on the 30th May. The 11th Division on the left advanced along the most southerly of the three metalled roads which the Russians had built across the Kuan-tung Peninsula to some three miles west of Dalny, where it took up a defensive position on a line of low foot-hills. The 22nd Brigade of this division had one regiment on each side of the road, the 43rd to the north of it; this regiment had one battalion in the front line and two in support; the left regiment —the 12th—had all three battalions in the front line. The two mountain batteries with this brigade were placed—one on the western of two knolls to the north-west of Ta-tzu Shan (point 183), the other on a knoll immediately north of the main road (south-east of point 272). The rest of the divisional artillery was further to the rear. The two knolls just referred to were provided with shelter pits and splinterproof cover. Along the hills immediately in front ran shelter trenches, traced so as to cover the approaches from the valleys. On a spur of the 272-Metre Height was a closed work, and the position was further strengthened by wire entanglements.

The trenches were well placed with reference to the ground, but appeared hardly deep enough to give protection against plunging fire.

The 10th Brigade (of the 11th Division) was directed to march on Li-chia-tun, and occupied the heights south-east of that place. The ground on the northern slope of this range was so steep that the supply of water to the troops on the top became a source of great difficulty; it had to be carried by hand, and much of it was spilt on the way.

The positions occupied by the 1st Division were not visited by the foreign attachés.

At this period the Russian garrison of Port Arthur was known to equal, if not to surpass, the forces advancing to the investment. The Japanese, therefore observed every precaution against counter-attacks and made great efforts to obtain intelligence regarding the enemy. From some captured artillerymen they ascertained the following particulars:—

The enemy's line extended from Hou Mu-kang-tzu (on the north) through Han-chia-tun to Ling-shui-ho-tzu. The section Hou Mu-kang-tzu—Han-chia-tun was held by the 4th Division (General Fock). That on the south being occupied by the 7th Division (General Kondratenko). The 4th Division comprised the 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th East Siberian Rifle Regiments, the 7th Division, the 25th, 26th, 27th and 28th. Each of the above regiments consisted of three four-company battalions.

The 5th East Siberian Sharpshooters—not included in a divisional cadre—also formed part of the force. After Nan

Shan one company of this regiment had only 26 men out of 250 left, and the whole regiment had lost 700 killed and 300 wounded. The high proportion of killed is accounted for by the fact that the wounded could not be got out of the bottom tiers of trenches and were left to die, being hit again and again in some cases.

According to statements by officers of the Third Army Head-Quarter Staff, the 3rd East Siberian Rifles (1st Division I. East Siberian Army Corps) and the 9th and 12th East Siberian Rifles—both belonging to the 3rd Division III. East Siberian Army Corps were also in the fortress; the last-named division was General Stessel's proper command.

There remained in Port Arthur, besides, two battalions of fortress infantry, about two cavalry squadrons and three depôt battalions. The Japanese did not know of the presence of these fortress battalions until the prisoners told them of it. The depôt battalions were formed in Siberia just before the war from men between thirty and forty years of age; these were absorbed into line battalions to make good losses as the operations progressed, their places being taken by all the able-bodied men in Port Arthur. In addition the garrison comprised the regular complement of fortress and divisional artillery and some five hundred volunteers; these last—so it was reported by Russian refugees at Chifu—were allowed to enlist, regardless of nationality. In spite of these reinforcements the companies in the fighting units did not usually exceed 150 to 180 men.

Operations of the 25th and 26th June 1904.—Towards the end of June the 1st Reserve Brigade arrived from Japan and was placed under the orders of the commander of the 1st Division; a Naval Brigade was also added to General Nogi's forces. It was therefore determined to attack Hsiao-ping-tao (on the south coast) and the heights to the north and north-west of it, and also to dislodge the Russians from Chien Shan and Wai-tou Shan. From the peculiarly shaped rocky summit of the latter eminence, their observation parties could see everything that was passing in and around Dalny. Hsiao-ping-tao anchorage formed a convenient torpedo depôt, and not only was it desired to deprive the enemy of its use, but also to provide for the Japanese flotilla a base as near as possible to Port Arthur.

For some three miles west of Dalny, up to the point where the central and southern main roads bifurcate, the country is low-lying and partially cultivated. Then comes a series of low ridges which increase in height and steepness as one moves westward, until finally one finds oneself amongst a sea of towering heights ranging from 800 to 1,200 feet—with salients running out from them. Between these, run narrow sandy valleys in which nestle groves of trees and Chinese villages. In July and August (the rainy season) numerous streams make their way through these valleys to the sea.

The steepness of the slopes usually enabled the heights to be captured without much loss, but for the same reason the enemy suffered comparatively little in retreating, and it was difficult to bring artillery fire to bear upon them. Moreover, the endless succession of positions available, greatly retarded the progress of offensive operations.

The bulk of the fighting described below naturally fell upon the Japanese left, the 1st Division on the right merely moving forward. This division was divided into two columns, of which the left column only fought a few insignificant skirmishes with the enemy round Pan-tao.

On the night of the 25th June three columns were formed from the 11th Division.

The right column was directed on Lan-ni-chao.

The centre column was directed on Ling-shui-ho-tzu and Chu-chuang-tzu-kou.

The left column moved along the most southerly of the three main roads.

The bulk of the division and its head-quarters were with the centre column.

The advanced guards of each column struck the Russian outposts before sunrise on the 26th. Marching on in the darkness they drove the retreating enemy before them towards Chikuan Shan in the south, while the right column captured the heights last of Lan-ni-chao after a slight resistance. **26th June.**

The Russians evacuated Wai-tou Shan, and between 9 and 10 a.m. the commander of the 11th Division was on this height. This division was at the time occupying the line Han-chia-tun—Shuang-ting Shan, and the left of the 1st Division moved up to join hands with it. The main hostile forces had not been encountered so far. By reconnaisances it was ascertained that the enemy occupied the following positions, in front of the 11th Division:—

From Lan-ni-chao in the north to the cross-roads 1,500 yards north of Chien Shan (marked × on map), thence it formed a salient round Chien Shan peak, and continued along the ridge south-south-west of it, but not quite to Ta-shih-tung. Here it formed a deep re-entering angle, the extreme right being bent forward so as to occupy the summit of Lao-tso Shan.

For the actual attack on Chien Shan the main bodies of the different columns assembled at Chu-chuang-tzu-kou, where three attacking columns were again formed. A portion of the 22nd Brigade, with part of the divisional artillery, formed the right column, which was to advance viâ Lan-ni-chao, the 43rd Regiment and one battery formed the centre, and the 12th Regiment with the rest of the artillery was on the left. The central column was to advance on the peak, and the left one on to the spur of Chien Shan.

The Russian fleet appeared on the scene at this juncture, as it had done on several previous occasions, and bombarded the Japanese left. The rocky sides of the hills about here are

abundantly pitted with shell marks, testifying to the severity of the bombardment. The arrival of some Japanese warships, however, quickly caused the Russian ships to withdraw. The Russian field guns continued firing from positions west of the Chien Shan ridge; on the mountain itself they had placed machine guns.

About 12.30 p.m. the 43rd Regiment advanced, with nearly all its men in the first line. Two companies struck a fougasse, but no one was injured. The Russians now dragged field pieces on to Chien Shan, but only about four rounds per gun had been fired from these when they were silenced. The commander of the mountain battery which had accompanied the advanced guard of the centre column, had by a clever manœuvre got his battery on to a knoll some 3,000 yards south-east of Chien Shan by 12.30 p.m., and thence bombarded the enemy on the heights.* Between 3 and 4 p.m. two batteries belonging to the right column came into action on the Lan-ni-chao heights against Chien Shan. At 5.30 p.m. the peak was occupied. In addition to the Russian infantry, two hostile batteries and four 6-cm. quick-firers defended the crest. The two last were captured, together with about 200 shells. Some 40 Russian dead were found on Chien Shan. The Japanese 11th Division lost in this day's fighting about 150 men.

Noticeable features about these operations were :—

(1) The weakness of the apparently formidable Chien Shan position. When the peak had been captured, an enterprise rendered comparatively easy by the steep zig-zag approach on the east, the strongly fortified spur running south-west, was rendered untenable. The trenches along it were seen into from the top and were so traced that the occupants could only fire to their immediate front (south-east).

(2) The effective way in which both fleets were able to intervene in the land operations, as they had done at Nan Shan.

The left of the Russians only retreated a very short distance after this fighting, but on their right they had receded a good deal; the new position on this wing ran along the heights of An-tzu Ling, and the ridge south of these as far as the valley west of Ta-shih-tung—thenceforward it almost coincided with that occupied before the 26th June, the extreme right on Lao-tso Shan being now practically an advanced position.

After the capture of Chien Shan the Japanese 11th Division occupied Lan-ni-chao with one regiment of its right brigade, the other regiment occupying Chien Shan itself. Of the left brigade, one battalion, increased later on to one regiment, held the entrance to the valley at Ta-shih-tung, the rest of the

* The position of these guns is marked Y on the map.—C. Y.

brigade occupying Shuang-ting Shan which had been captured by the 12th Regiment on the 26th after a slight skirmish.

Russian Counter-attacks from 3rd to 5th July 1904.— Realizing too late the supreme importance of Chien Shan the Russian commander made determined efforts to retake it. Between 1 and 2 p.m. on the 3rd July a force of infantry, at least two hundred strong, supported by about eight guns, attacked the Japanese positions about Chien Shan; it was reinforced about 4.30 p.m. and made a determined assault, which the Japanese repulsed with difficulty. **3rd July.**

At 5.20 p.m. four hostile guns took up a position in the neighbourhood of the heights west of Ta-shih-tung, and shelled the Japanese. The hostile infantry along the whole line retired about 7 p.m., but the guns remained in position. At 8.30 p.m. a force of about a battalion advanced with bands playing from the direction of Ta-po Shan, but was repulsed by a Japanese counter-attack. On the same day, at 5.30 a.m., the Japanese outposts on Lao-tso Shan noticed signs of the enemy advancing, and after a fire-fight which continued throughout the morning, the Russians, being reinforced, drove in the Japanese outposts. At 3.50 p.m. two Russian columns advanced in close order down the valley north of Lao-tso Shan. They were heavily fired on by Japanese artillery on Shuang-ting Shan (312-Metre Height) and retired in confusion. At 6.30 p.m. Russian infantry appeared on the south of Lao-tso Shan, and at 6.45 p.m. four guns in the valley north of the above height poured a galling fire on to the Japanese left. Although silenced by artillery fire, they retained their positions throughout the night.

At 5 a.m. on the 4th July a Russian company on the hills 1,100 yards north of Cha-kou fired on the Japanese reconnoitring patrols. From adjoining heights, bodies of Russians kept up a heavy fire on the Japanese position on the hills north-east of Pan-tao. The right batteries of the 11th Divisional Artillery, compelled the enemy in this part of the field to take shelter. **4th July.**

Skirmishing took place on the same day between the Japanese and weak Russian detachments, supported by artillery, which had advanced to the heights east of Nan Cha-kou.

From 1 a.m. until 7 a.m. on the 4th, the Russians made a series of assaults upon Chien Shan and the spur to the south of it, with bodies of ever-increasing strength. The Japanese called up their reserves to oppose these forces, which by noon were estimated at seven and a half battalions with a regiment in reserve.

The hostile guns fired heavily on Chien Shan, and the enemy's riflemen forced two Japanese batteries to take up positions further to the rear. The enemy again attacked at 3.50 p.m., and his warships, appearing in the offing, caused considerable annoyance to the Japanese left. On this flank, too, the Japanese infantry reserves were brought up, and the

newly-arrived heavy artillery took up positions (*a*) near ———* three batteries, and (*b*) east of Huang-ni-shan-tun—two batteries, Japanese naval guns, also participated in the engagement.

Another attack was made on Chien Shan about 11 p.m. and repulsed.

5th July. Early on the 5th, the enemy opposite the Japanese right advanced from the positions where he had sheltered himself on the previous night—the heights north of Cha-kou. After advancing to within fifty yards of the Japanese line, he began gradually to retreat in this part of the field, and finally disappeared about 1 p.m.

That same morning at 2.30, the fiercest of all the attacks on Chien Shan took place, the fighting being hand-to-hand. At 6.30 a.m. the enemy began to retreat.

On the left of the Japanese an unsuccessful attempt was made by their outposts to recover the positions from which they had retreated on the previous day.

The Russian warships again shelled for a time the Japanese positions in this region, but no serious fighting took place.

Generally speaking, as the result of the above operations, the relative positions of the opposing forces remained unchanged.

The Japanese warmly praise the manner in which the Russians advanced at night. The men were in shirt-sleeves, and despite the rugged nature of the hill slopes, they advanced so stealthily on several occasions as to surprise the Japanese outposts.

The battle of the 26th to the 28th July 1904.—Some of the reinforcements which reached General Nogi during July have already been referred to. They comprised altogether—

(*a*) The 4th Reserve Brigade which was used as "Army Troops."

(*b*) The 2nd Field Artillery Brigade of 72 guns.

(*c*) 3·9-inch mortars, 4·7-inch howitzers (some of the last took part in the battle of the Ya-lu), 4·7-inch bronze guns, and more naval guns—a few of these were 4·7-inch, but these were mostly 12-pounders.

(*d*) The 9th Division. The rearmost components of this force did not reach the front until the 28th and 29th July.

Between the 5th and 26th, only minor skirmishing took place. The Japanese placed twelve† 3·42-inch field guns taken at Nan Shan in position east of Lan-ni-chao and six naval guns at a point some 1,650 yards west of Chu-chuang-tzu-kou.

On the 12th and 17th, small counter-attacks were made by the Russians and repulsed.

26th July. On the 26th July, the operations designed to push the Russians back behind the permanent defences of Port Arthur

* Place not stated.

† This is according to the official reports. The Third Army Staff informed the Attachés that they were ten.—C. Y.

were begun. At this time the Japanese forces were disposed as follows :—

Right Wing.—The 1st Division with the 2nd Field Artillery Brigade.

Centre.—The greater part of the 9th Division reinforced by the 4th Reserve Brigade, three heavy batteries and the captured Russian pieces.

Left Wing.—The 11th Division and two heavy batteries.

As a general reserve behind the right was the 1st Reserve Brigade at Wang-chia-tun. The ground on this flank was open and a counter-attack on a large scale was therefore to be apprehended.

Below are given the different subdivisions of the Army for the attack and the objectives assigned to them :—

The right of the two columns into which the 1st Division was divided was to advance along the northern main road, Shih-shan-kou (Height 178) being its first objective.

The left column was to move against the same line of heights from a more southerly direction.

The divisional artillery was to come into action at daybreak on the 26th July to the east of Ying-cheng-tzu to support the above attacks.

After the fighting of the 3rd–5th July the Russian left wing extended from Height 352 (Hsi Shan*) viâ Shuang-tai-kou to the sea at Ying-cheng-tzu Bay. Before that they had held the heights 1,100 yards north of Cha-kou and the 244- and 178-Metre Heights. The two last-named were still occupied by them, 244 and the ridges west of it as regular advanced positions, 178 merely as a weak outpost.

On the extreme left of the Russian position close to the northern road (2,000 yards north of Chang-ling-tzu) the enemy had dug gun pits for one battery (eight pieces). Round Shuang-tai-kou was a very well constructed infantry trench. On the high hills were tiers of trenches, the top one very conspicuous on the crest line. The 195-Metre Height had a blinded trench along the crest line.

The ground in front of the positions in the hills was everywhere steep except to the north-east of the 195-Metre Height, where a long gently-sloping spur ends in a col over which a path passes.

The 9th Division, in the centre, which was to be hurled against the loftiest heights, formed three attacking columns, the right one (18th Brigade) was directed on a salient west of An-tzu Ling, the centre one, consisting of the 4th Reserve Brigade, on to a hill with an earthwork termed "the Height 2,000 metres north-east of An-tzu Ling," the left (6th Brigade) on to a low hill east of An-tzu Ling. The 9th Division was bivouacked round Lan-ni-chao and Pan-tao.

* The Japanese appear to have called this hill Ojikei.

The 11th Division, which had been moved southward since the 9th had begun to arrive, was formed in two columns; the right one was to move from the southern spurs of Chien Shan across the valley on to the long ridge south of An-tzu Ling. It consisted of six battalions (the whole 10th Brigade):—the 44th Regiment being on the right, 22nd on the left. With it were five out of the six divisional mountain batteries, six 4·7-inch bronze guns, twelve 3·9-inch mortars and ten naval guns. The mountain batteries fired from a narrow ridge 4,000 yards east of Ta-shih-tung. The left column (four battalions and one mountain battery) moved on to an under-feature east-north-east of the 195-Metre Height. Two battalions remained in reserve and to observe the enemy's extreme right.

It is worthy of note that the 11th Division attacked without packs, leaving them at the bottom of the hills under the charge of a few men. One such fatigue man carried four packs on a pole over his shoulder. The 9th Division, which had just arrived, made no such arrangements and the men fought with their valises on. At the outset of this fighting each soldier carried between 200 and 300 rounds of ammunition, his pockets and haversack being filled.

At 7.30 a.m. on the 26th July the attack began, but the movements of the force were greatly impeded by a thick fog which later in the day turned to heavy rain. In the afternoon the left column of the 1st Division captured the weakly held 178-Metre Height. It then advanced on to the 244-Metre Height and subsequently on to "K," reaching the foot of this rocky hill in the evening. To support this attack four howitzers and six mortars were placed on the track leading north from the main road and leaving it just west of Pan-tao. A mountain battery of the 9th Division was placed on the south-east slopes of the 244-Metre Height. Throughout the cold rainy night the men of the 1st Division, intermingled with parties of the 9th, were crowded together at the foot of the precipitous slopes. The 1st Division Head-Quarters were at Chien Mu-kang-tzu.

The right column of the 9th Division halted on the ridge halfway between Lan-ni-chao and Hsi Shan; it suffered heavily from the enemy's artillery fire, and I was informed that a single shrapnel disabled fifty men. The other column on the right likewise halted, rain and fog stopping its advance. The left column of the 9th Division was almost up to the hostile works when a heavy fusillade caused it to retreat.

Throughout the 26th, the Army Commander watched the operations on the right and centre from Height 300—north of Pan-tao. The mountain batteries of the 11th Division from the ridge east of Ta-shi-tung, and the heavier pieces further back, poured a tremendous fire on to the Russian trenches along the crest of Height 195. The guns evidently fired both shrapnel

and high-explosive shell as all the grass on the slopes was burnt. Guns using indirect fire also aided the attacking column on the extreme left. No decisive infantry movements, however, took place on this flank on the 26th.

Throughout the night of the 26th–27th July, the 9th Division made attacks on the An-tzu Ling Heights, but the ground was too bad and the enemy too vigilant for it to succeed.

27th July. The 27th broke fine, and early in the morning the western salient of An-tzu Ling and all the heights north of it were heavily shelled. The rocks—loosened by the projectiles—fell on to the soldiers of the 1st and 9th Divisions cowering at the foot of the heights and obliged them to retire a little. At 3 p.m, the infantry in this part of the field gained a partial footing on the west salient and summit of An-tzu Ling, but a heavy flanking fire prevented the whole position from being captured. The column of the 9th Division directed on to the heights north-east of An-tzu Ling participated in the capture. Four tiers of trenches on this height were so disposed that the capture of one tier rendered no portion of the others untenable; but the summit was so narrow that the enemy could only put two companies of Sharpshooters, one infantry battalion, two Q.F. mountain guns, and six machine guns on the top of it. Two of these pieces were put out of action on the 26th and two more on the 27th. At the end of the assault just described, the enemy was hurling boulders on to the Japanese and many casualties were caused by these.

An attack on the 195-Metre Height made by the 11th Division on the afternoon of the 27th was unsuccessful owing to the stubborn resistance of the enemy, and the assistance rendered by the Russian war-ships which appeared off Lung-wang-tun. A night attack was therefore decided upon for the night of the 27th/28th July. During its course a battalion commander of the 12th Regiment with two companies, got right round the enemy's extreme right; and, owing to the retreat of adjoining portions of the enemy's line, a large party of Russians on this wing was completely cut off. But taking advantage of the darkness it sailed away in junks, and the Japanese when they entered the positions at 5 a.m. were greatly disappointed to find that the "bird had flown."

On the evening of the 27th July, General Nogi ordered the 1st Division, supported by the general reserve, to make a general assault the next day. A description has already been given how the portions of the 1st and 9th Divisions had captured, respectively, the height south-west of Yin-liao-tzu, and the spur west of An-tzu Ling. Early on the morning of **28th July.** the 28th, the 1st Division moved up the valley towards the north of Hsi Shan. The 9th Division and part of the 1st captured this height by a frontal attack, while another portion

of the 1st entered Shuang-tai-kou, meeting with slight resistance.

The Russians on Hsi Shan, called also "the triple-peaked hill," finding it impossible to fire on to the slopes immediately below the crest, drove galleries through the ground just below, and placed men inside who bayonetted the assailants through loopholes as the latter clambered up. Japanese engineers were then sent up to throw grenades charged with dynamite through these loopholes. Besides this the enemy "lassooed" the Japanese as they climbed up and pulled them off their legs. Several Japanese officers relate how one Russian overbalancing himself whilst attempting this, fell over and broke his arm.

The final assault on Hsi Shan was aided by the enfilade fire of several guns which had taken up a position in the plain to the right. At 9 a.m. the Japanese had captured the entire crest line of the central heights, and by noon the enemy was in full retreat. At 3 p.m. the Japanese position was:—Chang-ling-tzu—Lung-wang-tun. Thence it was seen that the enemy had taken up a position on the Feng-huang Shan line of heights some 8,000 yards further back, which had been hastily entrenched beforehand.

The chief points to be noted about the three days' fighting just described appear to be:—

(1) The verification of the oft-repeated dictum that commanding positions are not necessarily strong positions, but rather the contrary. The sheer heights of An-tzu Ling and Hsi Shan were taken by infantry assaults, but the 195-Metre Height, approachable by a gently sloping spur, was never stormed, although turned and rendered untenable by artillery fire, yet so confident were the Russians as to the impregnability of the two first-named heights that they had held them with only a few companies, whilst concentrating a considerable force in the low ground near the sea.

(2) The Japanese artillery and infantry gave a splendid example of mutual support.

(3) The somewhat crippled Port Arthur squadron by intervening in the land fighting was still capable of producing some effect, even if it were only temporary.

(4) The mistake that the Russians made in placing their guns in positions whence they could not easily be withdrawn, which resulted in their loss.

29th July. *The fighting on the 30th July.*—On the 29th July the Russians held the line Feng-huang Shan—Chu-chia-tun—Ta Ku Shan—Hsiao Ku Shan.

On the hill immediately west of the northern road where this cuts the hill-range between Tu-cheng-tzu and Shui-shih-ying were two tiers of trenches, one on the crest, another

two-thirds of the way down. On the northern foot hills of the Feng-huang Shan group was a line of gun epaulments, and several of the hills to the south had ordinary shelter trenches running round them. Close to Tu-cheng-tzu and about a mile in front of the hill range had been dug rows of shelter pits. The level extent of ground which the Japanese had to cross was thickly cultivated with millet, intersected by the beds of several streams and dotted with villages. At that time the crops were partly cut, the streams were full and the soil heavy.

When they retreated on the 28th the Russians took most of their dead and wounded with them.

The 29th July was a day of rest for the Japanese forces. Ammunition and supplies were replenished, field hospitals cleared and the whole of the 9th Division took its place in the centre of the line.

The heavy artillery started at 11 p.m. that night and reached Hsia-chia-tun, a village on the Tu-cheng-tzu—Ta Ku Shan road, at 2 a.m. It had been kept under the direct orders of General Nogi. The 1st Reserve Brigade was again under the officer commanding the 1st Division. The right of this division moved on Ni-chia-tzu, the left on Tu-cheng-tzu; both columns starting at 3 a.m. The rest of the Army left its bivouacs at 4 a.m.

The enemy, possibly convinced that after such heavy fighting another period of inaction would follow, was completely surprised. The Japanese found the arms of some Russian units piled and captured quantities of supplies and cooking utensils.

At 9 a.m. the 1st Division had taken the positions opposite to it, but the 9th Division which had to pass over open ground after crossing the railway, advanced more slowly and suffered some loss.

30th July. The enemy retiring from Feng-huang Shan on to Yu-ta Shan was enfiladed by the Japanese artillery, and suffered heavily. By midday the whole range was in the hands of the Japanese, and they were now in a position to bombard the town and harbour. The first round from their siege batteries was fired on the 7th August, and marked the beginning of the siege proper.

It only remained to capture Ta Ku Shan and Hsiao Ku Shan, which was done from the 7th to 9th August.*

The principal medical officer at the Dalny base hospital gave the casualties in the fighting from the 26th July to the 30th July at 2,500. The 19th Regiment belonging to the right brigade of the 9th Division suffered most severely.

---

* *See* Report 17.—C. Y.

(15) Port Arthur.—Epitome of Operations of the Third Japanese Army from the Battle of Nan Shan on 26th May 1904 to the end of the Siege.

By Colonel W. Apsley Smith, C.B., Royal Field Artillery,
Tokio, 14th February 1905.

Maps.

Sketch map of Kuan-tung Peninsula - - Map 68.
Environs of Port Arthur - - - „ 69.

26th May to 25th June.

1. After the battle of Nan Shan* the 1st and 3rd Divisions of the Second Army advanced south-west, and the remaining division—the 4th—was sent north. A week later the 6th and 11th Divisions came into line from Yen-tai Wan—their landing place†; the 3rd and 6th Divisions moved north to complete the Second Army, and the Third Army—composed of the 1st and 11th Divisions—took up a defensive position some four miles west of the Dalny branch railway. Both the 1st Division on the north and the 11th Division on the south rested their outer flanks on the sea.

2. The Russians, who were now in superior numbers, established themselves five to six miles further west The Japanese line extended from north to south for over nine miles as the crow flies, and had the Russians made a serious attack on the Third Army during June they would probably have broken its front.

3. All the country between Port Arthur and the Japanese line, south of the main Manchurian railway, is extremely broken and mountainous, precipitous peaks rising to heights of 1,000 to 1,200 feet, with rocky ridges, steep underfeatures, and deep valleys. The main watershed runs east and west, the spurs generally trend north and south.

4. Towards the end of June Dalny had been sufficiently cleared of some thousand mines, and reinforcements for the Third Army, including an infantry reserve brigade, began to arrive there.

25th June to 5th July.

On the night of the 25th–26th June the Third Army advanced in echelon, the left (11th Division) leading, and by the 27th–28th June the line of Russian field works had been

* *See* Map 68.
† A bay 30 miles east of Chin-chou.—W. A. S.

captured after two or three somewhat severe engagements. This both rendered Dalny secure and gave to the Third Army an excellent position.

5. On the 3rd, 4th, and 5th July the Russians repeatedly attacked the captured works, both by day and night; the fighting was desperate, and in many cases hand-to-hand; the losses on both sides were heavy. The Japanese, however, maintained their position.

6th to 26th July.

6. Eventually the Russians took up a second previously prepared line of works, four to six miles further west, with their right somewhat refused, and their left on the sea. About the 23rd July the 9th Division, landing at Dalny, occupied the centre of the Japanese line.

26th to 28th July.

7. The next general attack took place on the 26th, 27th, and 28th July. The fighting was very severe—much of it at night, and hand-to-hand; some of the positions were almost inaccessible, and at points there were as many as four tiers of trenches. As a result, the Russians retired to the line of heights immediately opposite to and some 4,500 yards from the Port Arthur enceinte.

8. On the night of the 30th–31st July these heights were carried by surprise, and the investment was completed, with the exception of two detached hills—Ta Ku Shan and Hsiao Ku Shan—a mile in front of the forts on the extreme Russian right. These hills were only lightly entrenched, but seriously interfered with any siege operations. They were captured by the 11th Division on the 7th–8th August, and the siege proper of Port Arthur commenced.

9. Up to the 9th August the approximate losses of the Third Army were between 8,000 and 10,000 casualties, and at least 7,000 sick. The Russians lost quite as many.

10. The besieging army in August consisted of—

(*a*) Three complete divisions, two of which—the 9th and 11th—had six mountain batteries apiece and the remaining one—the 1st—six field batteries. The 1st Division alone had its cavalry.

(*b*) The 1st Reserve Brigade and an independent reserve brigade, each of three regiments of two battalions.

(*c*) The 2nd Artillery Brigade of 72 field guns.

(*d*) Twenty-eight 12-cm. (4·7-inch) heavy field howitzers.

(*e*) Six 3·4-inch captured Russian field guns.

(*f*) Eight 4·7-inch and sixteen 12-pr. naval guns

(*g*) Seven battalions of siege artillery with twenty-four 9-cm. (3·5-inch) mortars, seventy-two 15-cm. (5·9-inch) mortars, sixteen 15-cm. howitzers, thirty 12-cm. (4·7-inch) bronze guns, and four 10·5-cm. (4·1-inch) guns of latest construction.

Very few of these guns could have much effect upon permanent works or against really heavy guns.

The garrison of Port Arthur, exclusive of the Navy, was estimated to be 32 battalions at the commencement of operations (25th May 1904), and the heavy armament at some 300 guns.

11. The land defences of Port Arthur* are divided into two distinct sections, separated by a valley a mile or more in width, through which runs a road and river and the railway. The eastern section has an almost continuous enceinte, with forts on hills behind, and with a line of advanced works closely connected with the enceinte. The western section consists of isolated forts, affording mutual support, and covering lines of entrenchments and semi-permanent works on every spur and knoll. Both flanks rest on the sea. The valley is covered by several detached works, connected by shelter trenches and forming a salient between the two sections. The low ground to the north is much broken, and affords in many places excellent cover from view and even from plunging fire. At a distance varying from two to three miles to the north of the defences runs a chain of heights with many underfeatures towards the south, giving an admirable choice of positions for siege artillery. Close in rear of the north-east portion of these heights is the railhead, three hours journey from Dalny, a place which forms an unsurpassable base of operations for an army.

8th to 19th Aug.

12. From the 8th to the 19th August there was desultory cannonading, chiefly Russian, whilst the Japanese infantry entrenched themselves in the low ground, and the batteries built their emplacements on the southern spurs of the heights.

19th to 21st Aug.

13. On the 19th August the 1st Division took an isolated spur near Hsiao Tung-kou on the extreme Russian left, and on the night of the 19th/20th the 9th Division captured part of the most northerly detached redoubt, Fort Kuropatkin, in the Shui-shih-ying valley, but only to be driven out of it next day: this work covered one of the main sources of the Port Arthur water supply. On the 21st August there was heavy firing, both artillery and musketry, especially about the right centre of the eastern section of the defences, and the Japanese infantry pushed in closer at this point. This was evidently to be the point of attack, and it was now certain that General Baron Nogi intended to try and take this eastern section by a *coup de main*. Both he and his chief of the staff had been present at the successful assault on Port Arthur in November 1894, and this may have biassed them. Probably, also, the Third Army was urgently wanted elsewhere.

22nd to 25th Aug.

14. On the 22nd August the artillery fire was heavy and universal; but on neither side could much system be detected, or much attempt, except here and there for short intervals, at

* *See* Plate 69.

concentration. The Japanese artillery preparation was, in fact, conspicuous by its absence. The 9th Division captured during the day, two adjoining advanced works, East and West Pan-lung Shan, in the right centre of the eastern section, and close to the enceinte. But its losses were very severe, some battalions losing 70 to 80 per cent. of their strength. One of the above works was assaulted three times.

15. On the night of the 23rd/24th the Russians made a very determined counter-attack against the two captured works, East and West Pan-lung Shan, and to the east and west of them. They were repulsed after heavy fighting, and the Japanese, following up, at one time penetrated the enceinte, and even reached half-way up the glacis of one of the supporting forts (Wang-tai Forts) behind.

16. The net results of the above fighting were, (i) the retention of the advanced works, East and West Pan-lung Shan; (ii) a Japanese casualty roll of 14,000; (iii) the resolve of General Baron Nogi to have recourse to regular siege operations, obtaining from Japan every siege gun available and reinforcements to complete his cadres.

17. During this period, except for a heavy but unsuccessful counter-attack on the night of the 28th/29th August against the two captured works, East and West Pan-lung Shan, nothing of primary importance took place. A desultory cannonade continued on both sides, mainly, perhaps, Russian; at times intense —(*e.g.*, if naval batteries fired on the ships or buildings, the Russian batteries would shell them heavily)—at other times dying away to nothing. Also outbursts of rifle fire against saps and trenches, and volleys in response. A few very minor sorties. The Russians dug various entrenchments, and the Japanese pushed on their saps and parallels, working almost entirely at night, and suffering considerable damage to works and some loss in men from shell fire during the day. The two captured works, East and West Pan-lung Shan, were each held by a company, and the casualties in the two companies, from as many as 100 in twenty-four hours, dwindled down to 6 or 10, as they gradually dug themselves in. **25th Aug. to 19th Sept.**

The following additional siege guns were mounted:—Six 28-cm. (11-inch) howitzers, two 15-cm. (6-inch) naval guns, and two 12-cm. (4·7-inch) naval guns. A few siege guns were shifted in order to obtain cross or enfilade fire.

18. On the 19th September, after a carefully prearranged bombardment of some five hours by one-third of the siege guns, assisted during the last half of the time by field and mountain batteries, the 9th Division partially captured the redoubt in the valley, Fort Kuropatkin, taken and lost on 19th 20th August, and the 1st Division attacked two semi-permanent works (Namako-yama), together with the fort south-west of and supporting them (203-Metre Hill) on the extreme Russian left. **19th Sept.**

20th to 22nd Sept.

19. By noon next day the 9th Division and part of the 1st Division had occupied all four redoubts (17, 18, 19 and 19A on map), in the low ground of the Shui-shih-ying valley with their supporting trenches, and had cut the source of water supply which these works covered. On the same day, and during the night of the 20th/21st September, they captured the two semi-permanent works (Namako-yama) and penetrated one corner of the permanent fort on 203-Metre Hill, only, however, to be driven out of this corner on the 22nd. Very approximate Japanese losses in above attacks, 3,000; to which the 1st Division contributed over 2,300!

The result was appreciable progress; the line of attack across the low ground in the Shui-shih-ying valley was straightened out; the close attack on the western portion of the eastern section could be pushed, and from the Japanese right oblique fire could be brought to bear upon the eastern section, while indirect fire upon ships in harbour and upon the town could be more accurately observed and corrected.

23rd Sept. to 15th Oct.

20. Desultory firing on ships in harbour, forts and towns, mainly on ships. Saps against the centre and left of the eastern section vigorously pushed; more heavy guns being mounted. On the night of the 11th/12th October the 1st Division effected a lodgment on the north face of the more westerly advanced work (Sung-shu Shan) of the eastern section at the foot of the glacis. The Russians made two or three sorties on saps and parallels, but did not press them; they were thought to be mounting some naval guns, and to be bringing to bear on the land fronts more of their coast guns. Their artillery fire was heavy at times, but very intermittent—they used more smoky powder than ever, and a great number of their shell were blind.

16th Oct.

21. After one and a half hours preparation by fifty siege guns, carefully selected so as to bring an oblique and cross fire on the point of attack and supporting works, and assisted by the shrapnel of eight or nine field batteries, a semi-permanent advanced work (Work "G") just west of the works taken in August, was captured with ease and with hardly any loss. One or two Russian trenches at the foot of the glacis of the advanced fort (Erh-lung Shan), next to Work "G," attacked on the west, were also occupied.

17th to 25th Oct.

22. Very little firing except occasionally against the ships, which have suffered considerably (*e.g.* "Peresviet" has been hit 27 times). Since the 19th September, two more 6-inch naval guns, four more 15-cm. (5·9-inch) mortars, and twelve more 28-cm. (11-inch) howitzers have been mounted. Some guns have suffered so much from erosion that it is intended to use smoky powder in certain batteries. Saps are being continued.

23. Approximate Japanese losses:—In August 16,500 casualties and 10,000 sick. In September 5,000 casualties and

5,000 sick. During July, August, and September, out of some 20,000 sick, 16,000 were beri-beri cases, and the remainder chiefly typhoid and dysentery.

24. On the 25th October a general attack was ordered against the centre and west of the eastern section, after a bombardment that was to commence next day, and to last three or four days. The troops to attack to be the 9th Division and one brigade each of the 1st and 11th Divisions. Remaining troops to demonstrate and repel counter-attacks. All saps to be vigorously pushed. **25th Oct.**

25. On the 26th October, after a cannonade of six hours, gradually increasing in intensity, the advanced trenches immediately in front of and close to the two forts (Sung-shu Shan and Erh-lung Shan) on the west of the eastern section were rushed and held in spite of four counter-attacks on the night of the 26th/27th October. The small advanced work, "G," just east of the two forts, and already partly seized, was wholly occupied; Japanese losses, 500. On the 27th, 28th, and 29th October the very intermittent but occasional heavy bombardment was continued, mainly by the heavier siege and naval guns; it almost ceased at night. On the 29th October, at dawn, the Russians re-took one of the trenches captured on the 26th, but only to be driven out four hours later. **26th to 29th Oct.**

26. On the 30th October, for some four hours a very concentrated fire from every siege and naval gun was maintained. It had evidently been well thought out, and showed both method and skill. Not a fort or work on the front attacked escaped continuous attention; cross and oblique fire was used as much as possible. The Russians replied slackly. **30th Oct.**

At 1 p.m., after half-an-hour's shrapnel fire from field and mountain batteries pushed in to 1,000 to 1,500 yards range, accompanied by the fire of wooden grenade-mortars from the advanced parallels, the infantry attacked seven different works (Sung-shu Shan and Erh-lung Shan, "P," the North Fort of East Chi-kuan Shan, Kobu-yama, East Chi-kuan Shan, and "Q") simultaneously. But the Russian fire—rifle, machine gun, and shrapnel—swept the storming parties both in front and on either flank; the ditches proved to be unexpectedly wide and deep, and in at least two works (Sung-shu Shan and Erh-lung Shan) caponiers rendered the ditches impassable.

Realizing the difficulties, the Japanese did not vigorously support the attacks. By nightfall, however, one work ("P") had been partially occupied, and the crests of the glacis of four others (Sung-shu Shan, Erh-lung Shan, the North Fort of East Chi-kuan Shan, and Kobu-yama), were held by what was left of the storming parties.

On the night of the 30th/31st October, the Russians made two determined counter-attacks on the partially-captured work "P",

but were repulsed, and on the rebound the entire work was seized and held.

27. The result of the above fighting was that, in the eastern section of the Port Arthur defences, in addition to the two works (East and West Pan-lung Shan) captured on the 19th/20th August, the Japanese captured three other smaller advanced works, "G." "P," and Kobu-yama. But their general attack had to be postponed until caponiers and counterscarps could be mined and ditches filled in.

The losses from 26th to 31st October, inclusive, were 2,020.

28. Between the 1st and 25th November there was no serious infantry fighting. In the eastern section sapping from the captured works against the Chinese enceinte progressed steadily; the ditches of the uncaptured works were attacked by mines or saps, and in most cases the flanking defences of the ditches, counterscarp galleries, caponiers, &c., were blown in and more or less destroyed.

1st to 25th Nov.

29. On two occasions the Russians, anticipating a general attack, opened a very heavy gun and rifle fire; but, as a rule they have confined themselves to small though incessant sorties, almost invariably at night, against sap-heads and mines.

The Russian artillery has not, on most days, fired much, and a great number of their shells have been blind.

30. In the Shui-shih-ying valley, and in the eastern section, the Japanese field and mountain batteries, together with three field howitzer batteries, six naval 12-prs. and four 4·7-inch naval guns, have been pushed in to within 1,500 to 2,000 yards of the forts attacked; one mountain battery is within 450 yards, and single guns or pairs of guns are within 800 yards of particular works, the object being to gain direct destructive effect and to ensure accuracy.

The heaviest Japanese guns, especially the 11-inch (28-cm.) howitzers and the 6-inch naval guns, have pretty constantly bombarded forts, ships, and town; five steamers have been sunk, and battleships hit; there have been six to eight heavy explosions and large fires in Port Arthur.

31. About the 16th November the 7th Division began to reach Dalny from Japan, and by the 25th November it had taken up its position in second line. It brought no cavalry, and its artillery consists of two field and two mountain batteries. Considerable reinforcements have also reached the 1st, 9th and 11th Divisions, *e.g.*, the 9th has received 3,000 men; three companies of engineers from the Manchurian armies, and two reserve companies of engineers from Japan have joined. There has been little sickness, and comparatively few casualties. One regiment of the 2nd Artillery Brigade and the 1st Division Cavalry Regiment—less one squadron—have been sent to the north.

32. On the 25th November an attack was ordered to take place at 1 p.m. next day, using the same troops and with the same objectives as on the 30th October (*vide* para. 26, *et seq.*) — attack to be preceded by some four hours' "fairly vigorous" bombardment. **26th Nov.**

The bombardment, however, seemed as severe as any we have yet seen, and the Russians replied freely.

At 1 p.m. a large mine was exploded in the ditch of a (the North) Fort of East Chi-kuan Shan in the centre of the eastern section, and was evidently the signal for assault on the five remaining advanced works (Sung-shu Shan, Erh-lung Shan, the North Fort of East Chi-kuan Shan, "Q," and East Chi-kuan Shan) in this section.

The storming parties appeared to enter the works without excessive difficulty, but to be unable to make good their foothold. Grenade throwing was incessant, there was some rifle and machine gun fire, and the bayonet was used in places. Some men ran back: a few held on; but owing, it is supposed, to the strenuous defence from successive lines of parapets, no work was occupied for any length of time. At 4 p.m. a fresh attempt to carry Erh-lung Shan failed, and during the night a determined attack on an auxiliary work flanking Sung-shu Shan was repulsed with heavy loss.

A few of the newly-arrived troops assisted on the Japanese left, otherwise the fresh troops were not used.

33. Foiled in the eastern section, the Japanese determined to take the fort on their extreme right, *i.e.*, 203-Metre Hill—one corner of which they had taken and lost on the 20th 22nd September. This fort completely dominated both harbours and the new town, and afforded a good view of the interior of many of the forts in the second line of defences.

On the 28th November both the work itself and a knoll to the north-east of it were fiercely attacked by a brigade of the 1st Division and three reserve companies. Though at first partially successful, the troops could not maintain the ground won, and at nightfall a vigorous counter-attack drove them back to their trenches.

On the night of the 28th 29th November, the Japanese again nearly got both the work and the knoll, but could not hold them.

On the 30th November the Russians attempted, without success, to turn the Japanese out of the sandbag enclosure close to the knoll; that afternoon another fierce attack was made upon the work by a brigade of the 7th Division, lately arrived from Japan, and quite fresh. The formation adopted was four lines of half-battalions in close order and in two ranks; one battalion being held in reserve. The loss was very heavy, and the only result was that a lodgment was effected below the south-west angle of the work. During the night of the 30th

November/1st December, the Japanese occupied the knoll—but only to lose it again.

Between the 1st and 5th December the approaches against both the south-west and north-east corners were extended and parallels made. By the 5th December the Japanese had established themselves in the south-west corner.

On the afternoon of the 5th December a final and successful effort was made; the troops of the 7th Division employed being trickled up as required in extended order, while six field batteries swept the reverse slopes and stopped the Russian attempts to reinforce. By evening the Japanese held the entire work, and during the night both the knoll and the long lines of trenches between the Japanese position and the second line of the main Russian defences on the west and south-west were evacuated by the Russians.

34. Between the 26th November and the 6th December the Japanese casualties were over 14,000, and the Russians were stated to have lost 6,000. The latter figure is said to have been verified; how it could have been verified it is hard to say. The remaining Russian effectives were also estimated at 7,000 or 8,000.

6th to 25th Dec.

35. After the capture of 203-Metre Hill, two 4·7-inch guns, three naval 12-prs., two 6-inch naval guns and four 15-c.m. (5·9-inch) howitzers, were mounted in its immediate vicinity; and as a direct result of the capture, what remained of the Russian fleet, with the exception of the "Sevastopol" and of a few torpedo-boats, was put absolutely *hors de combat*. No ships, except hospital ships, remained afloat in either harbour. On the 16th December the "Sevastopol," which had taken refuge just outside the Tiger's Tail, was torpedoed, and a few days later she was sunk by her commander.

On the night of the 16th/17th December the Japanese occupied a low ridge south of 203-Metre Hill. On the 18th December the mines against the North Fort of East Chi-kuan Shan, in the centre of the eastern section were blown up, and by 11 p.m., after some difficulty, owing to the disinclination of the troops to face the machine gun fire from the interior of the fort, the entire work was occupied. Japanese losses 400; Russian losses 250, out of a garrison of 300. The Russians made no attempt to retake the fort.

Elsewhere mines and saps were vigorously pushed, and a breach was made in the Chinese enceinte north of Wang-tai.

28th Dec. to end of the siege.

36. On the 28th December the mines against Fort Erh-lung Shan, on the west of the eastern section, were exploded at 10 a.m., and by nightfall the fort was occupied with a loss of 960 men. The close and admirably timed support of the attack by the field and mountain artillery was very noticeable on this occasion. Two new 6-inch naval guns were mounted near 174-Metre Hill.

On the 31st December three mines in Fort Sung-shu Shan immediately west of the fort last taken were fired; the explosions caused the Russian magazines in the fort to blow up, and the fort was occupied with little difficulty.

On the 1st January the supporting works, the Wang-tai forts, south-east of the two works just captured, together with some minor batteries in their vicinity, were seized; and on that night the Russians blew up one of the remaining works in the eastern section.

On the evening of the 1st January General Stessel offered to surrender, and on the evening of the 2nd January the capitulation of Port Arthur was signed. 25,040 men of all ranks laid down their arms, exclusive of about 15,000 sick and wounded, and of about 2,000 volunteers and civilians. There was plenty of food left, and ammunition for at least another month.

37. The defence, until almost the end, was most gallant, and most obstinate; but, in my opinion, the surrender was premature, and, more or less, discreditable.

(16) Port Arthur.—Diary of the Officers attached to the Third Japanese Army from 29th July 1904 to the Fall of the Fortress.

Compiled by Major C. M. CRAWFORD, 5th Gurkhas.
Port Arthur, 11th July 1904 to 24th January 1905.

Map.

Environs of Port Arthur, 2 inches to 1 mile* - Map 69.

29th July. The third group of foreign military attachés embarked at Shimonoseki at 2.30 p.m. on the Nippon Yusen Kaisha s.s. "Suminoye Maru," *en route* for Dalny to join the Head-Quarters of the Third Japanese Army before Port Arthur.

(2) The following British officers accompanied the party:—

Colonel W. Apsley Smith, C.B., Royal Field Artillery.
Major C. M. Crawford, 5th Gurkhas (Indian Army).
Captain C. A. L. Yate, King's Own (Yorkshire Light Infantry).
Captain Sir A. Bannerman, Bart., Royal Engineers.

* The following table gives the signification of some of the place names. The Japanese names are given in brackets:—

Akasaka-yama = Akasaka (proper name) Hill.
An-tzu Shan (Anshi-san) = Saddle Hill.
Chi-kuan Shan (Keikwan-san) = Cockscomb Hill.
The Japanese called—
East Chi-kuan Shan,† Higashi Keikwan-san.
North Fort, Kitahodai.
South-east Chi-kuan Shan, Tonan.
Erh-lung Shan (Niriu-san) = Double Dragon Hill.
Hsiao Ku Shan (Shoko-san) = Little Lone Hill.
Huang-shin Shan (Hakugin-san) = Yellow Metal Hill.
Pan-lung Shan (Banriu-san) = Crouching Dragon Hill.
I-tzu Shan (Isu-san) = Chair Hill.
Sung-shu Shan (Shoju-san) = Pine Tree Hill.
Ta Ku Shan (Taiko-san) = Great Lone Hill.
Yu Ta Shan (Udai-san) = Beautiful Mountain.
Hsiao-tung-kou (Shotoko) = Little East Ravine.
Kao-chia-tun (Hokaton) = High House Village.
Liu-chia-tun (Riukaton) = Willow House Village (or Liu Family Village).
Kabu-yama = Carbuncle Hill.
Namako-yama = Sea-slug Hill.
Pa-li-chuang (Hachirisho) = Eight Mile Farm.
Shui-shih-ying (Suisei) = Sailor's Camp.
Ssu-chia-tun (Yokaton) = Four House Village.
Tuan-shan-tzu (Danjanshi) = Round Top Village.
Wang-tai (Bodai) = Salvation.
Wu-chia-fang (Gokabo) = Five House Hamlet.

† Called East Chi-kuan Shan to distinguish it from another hill of the same name on the Tiger's Tail.

(3) The following foreign military attachés were included in the group :—

Colonel Solar, Chilian Army.
Captain Don J. Herrera, Spanish Army.
Lieut. Fortescue, United States Cavalry.
Lieut. Graf Wolffskeel von Reichenberg, German Army.

(4) The under-mentioned officers and interpreters of the Imperial Japanese Army accompanied the party :—

Colonel C. Ikeda, Japanese Imperial Infantry.
Captain K. Shimaoutsi, Japanese Imperial Artillery.
2nd-Lieut. I. Ishikata, Japanese Imperial Infantry.
Interpreter M. Hayashi.
Interpreter K. Kumagai.

* * *

3rd Aug. Disembarked at Dalny at 8.30 a.m. Dalny was in the hands of the Chinese population for forty-eight hours, between the Russian evacuation and the Japanese occupation, and all the European houses were systematically stripped of furniture and other valuables, which were taken away in junks. Now perfect order prevails. The town is a large and promising one, excellently planned, and laid out with very good roads, wharves, and docks; deep water right up to the wharf for ocean steamers.

The Russians before leaving burnt the Government buildings and sank a steamer directly in front of the dock gates (which were destroyed). They also destroyed the railway line and the bridges as much as they could, and laid large mines along the wharf at intervals of about one hundred and fifty yards. Their evacuation of the town was so hurried, however, that they either forgot or were unable to fire more than one of these mines, which did considerable damage.

The Japanese have altered the gauge of the railway line to suit their own rolling stock.

* * *

4th Aug. Heavy firing from Port Arthur heard all day. By permission of the Commandant, we visited the base supply depôt of the Third Army. * * * days supply are always kept in hand for each of the divisions. Excellent arrangements for the supply of fresh fish to the front. The fish are kept alive in tanks or junks until required, when they are killed, slightly salted, and sent up, periodically, fresh. We saw large quantities of rice, wheat, *miso* (a kind of Japanese pickle), compressed forage, and eggs preserved in lime.

As a base for the Third Army, Dalny could not be improved on.

5th Aug. All the military attachés left by rail at 5.20 a.m. for the head-quarters of the Third Army, and were presented to General Count Nogi, the Commander of the Third Army. Count Nogi

* Deleted by the Japanese censor.

informed us that he had given orders for us to see everything, and that a staff officer would be placed at our disposal, who would take us over all the battlefields, commencing with that of Nan Shan, and explain all the operations as they occurred.

* * *

6th Aug. We all left at 2 p.m. in a steam launch for Liu-shu-tun,* *en route* for Chin-chou. In the evening we inspected the site of the old Chinese batteries overlooking Ta-lien Bay. These are now in ruins. Liu-shu-tun is the base of the Second Army.

7th Aug. Visited the field of Nan Shan. Unfortunately, there was no Japanese officer present to explain the actual details of the battle, so we had to content ourselves with examining the ground carefully. The position was undoubtedly a very strong one, and it is wonderful how the Japanese managed to take it with so little loss.

* * *

8th Aug. Left Chin-chou and returned to Dalny.

9th Aug. An officer of the Intelligence Branch Third Army Staff, delivered a most interesting lecture to us for six hours on the operations of the Third Army.

* * *

11th Aug. Visited Japanese entrenched position near Pei-pu-tzu-ya Lake, held by the 22nd Brigade and two batteries of the 11th Division from the 30th May to the 26th June 1904, but never attacked by the Russians. Trace of trenches good, but profile bad, being much too wide. No attempt at concealment. Good facilities for counter-attack and for flank defence. Three advanced works (lunettes) were well placed. Good field of fire. Flanks secured by sea on left and inaccessible heights on right.

12th Aug. Left Dalny at 8.20 a.m. and proceeded to the summit of Chien Shan, about twelve miles distant. Chien Shan was the key of the Russian position, and was stormed on 26th June with trifling loss. On the 3rd, 4th, and 5th July the Russians made desperate efforts to retake it, but without success. The position appears at first sight to be a very formidable one, but is not so in reality, by reason of its steepness, and the consequent large amount of dead ground up to the very foot of the position. We obtained a very fine view of the Japanese and Russian positions from the 26th June to 7th August, and a bird's-eye view of Port Arthur.

* *See* Map 68.

† Held by them between the 26th May and 26th June.—C.M.C.

Rode along the second Russian line of defence,* carried on 27th and 28th July, from their right flank as far as the southern salient, An-tzu Ling. The ground over which the Japanese attacked is exceedingly rugged, but there is plenty of cover and dead ground, while the guns could support the infantry up to nearly the last moment. **13th Aug.**

The Russian batteries and shelter trenches were all very badly placed, and offered an ideal target for guns. From the Russian position south-west of An-tzu Ling we could plainly see some of the forts of Port Arthur, and also the Japanese shelters on the western and northern slopes of Ta Ku Shan, carried on the night of the 7th and 8th August.

The officer who was deputed to accompany us over the battlefields, informed us that during the operations in this mountainous country the Japanese infantry always carried 200, and often 300 rounds per man on their persons, as it was impossible to distribute reserve ammunition during an action. He also stated that many regiments discarded their knapsacks, &c., before attacking An-tzu Ling and other hill positions.

Visited the left flank of the second Russian line of defence. Here again the positions were difficult of access but favourable for attack, and the Russian trenches were placed on the actual crest. In all these operations the Japanese guns seem to have supported the infantry most admirably. **15th Aug.**

Marched to camp, 6 miles distant, visiting Army Head-Quarters *en route*. Ascended high hill to west of camp and about 8,000 yards from the Russian works. A desultory cannonade was being carried on. **18th Aug.**

Ascended heights called Feng-huang Shan, about 2½ miles off, overlooking the line of Russian works. A Japanese battery of four 12-cm. (4·7-inch) field howitzers was firing indirect immediately below us; twelve field guns were in action about 2,500 yards to our right. About 10.30 a.m. heavy artillery fire was heard on the extreme right of the Japanese line, and we were able through our glasses to see an attack by what appeared to be three battalions of the 1st Division against an isolated spur (called Height south-east of Hsiao-tung-kou (A 3 on map†) jutting out from the Russian left. The ground was quite open, but there were depressions and hollows in which the infantry could take cover and re-form. The advances were made by rushes, in fairly wide and extended formation, and were well covered by a battery of field guns immediately in rear. **19th Aug.**

When we left the hill, about 6.30 p.m., the infantry were lying down under cover behind the north-east slope of the hill, about five hundred yards from the Russian trenches, apparently

* Held by the Russians from 27th June to 27th July.—C.M.C.

† *See* Map 69.

unable to advance any nearer. During the attack the Russians fired on the Japanese infantry from three heavy Krupp guns on I-tzu Shan, south-east of attack, also from a battery of Q.F. guns in the valley to the east, about 3,500 yards distant.

Proceeded to the Naval Observatory (D 1) on a hill some one thousand yards in advance of Feng-huang Shan (where we had been on the previous day). We were allowed to remain by the courtesy of the naval officer in charge, provided we did not show ourselves. From this position the fire of twenty naval guns is directed by telephone, viz. :—

(*a*) Four 4·7-inch guns on the right, about 150 feet below and 500 yards distant.

(*b*) Fourteen naval 12-pounders on the right of and 600 yards from the four 4·7-inch guns.

(*c*) Two 4·7-inch guns about 600 yards in rear of the 12-prs., protected by large shellproof casemates formed of large sandbags and earth.

There is also a separate observation station on this hill, which is in direct telephonic communication with the general commanding the artillery, and from which the fire of various batteries is directed by means of a special apparatus, consisting of a plane table with map marked in squares and a powerful double hyposcopic telescope, enabling the observer to direct the fire without exposing himself.

During the night of the 19th and 20th August the Japanese had captured part of Fort Kuropatkin (D 3), a small detached infantry redoubt in front of the centre of the Russian line, and about 2,500 yards from where we stood. At 3 p.m. the garrison of this redoubt (about 200 strong) was heavily attacked by a strong party of Russian infantry supported by Q.F. guns, and were forced to retire some four hundred yards to their advanced trenches. Their retreat was excellently covered by most accurate shrapnel fire from the Japanese field batteries.

21st Aug. We ascended the hill at 4.30 a.m., as it was half expected that an attack would be made. The Russians were searching the valley in front of them incessantly and carefully with two electric searchlights and frequent star shells. Heavy firing, artillery and musketry, going on along the eastern portion of the Russian line of works.

22nd Aug. Changed our camp to the bed of the stream just below the observation station.

At 10.30 a.m. very heavy rifle and Maxim fire was heard in the direction of an advanced Russian redoubt (East Pan-lung Shan (D 3)) about 4,000 yards to our left front. Through our glasses we clearly saw the head of a Japanese assaulting column about 300 strong start out from the head of a ravine some one hundred and fifty yards from the thick belt of wire entanglement that surrounded the redoubt. The advance of this column

was supported by a furious and concentrated fire from fifty or sixty Japanese siege and field guns which poured an incessant hail of high-explosive shells and shrapnel on the redoubt itself, the forts on its immediate right and left, and the connecting line of infantry entrenchments. The Russian artillery and rifle fire was also continuous and heavy.

The assaulting column, preceded by a small party of engineers, advanced with the utmost gallantry to the wire entanglement, cut its way through it, and rushed up, losing heavily, to some dead ground below the glacis, where it stopped.

Reinforcements reached it in batches from the ravine, and about noon a party headed by an officer with a flag rushed for the parapet and planted the flag thereon. It was struck down, and the men also. Shortly afterwards the Russians made a counter-attack, but were driven back fighting hand-to-hand. Eventually the Japanese established themselves in the ditch of the work and along the exterior slope of the parapet.

At 4 p.m. it was noticed that a fairly large body of Japanese infantry had collected on the north-east slope of the redoubt known as West Pan-lung Shan (D 3). At 5 p.m. the assaulting column advanced (some 500 strong) in a broad deep mass. There were apparently no wire entanglements to cut through. This attack, like that on East Pan-lung Shan (D 3), was admirably supported by artillery fire. The Japanese reached the dead ground just below the crest of the hill, and, when reinforced, rushed across, banners flying, to the parapet, where they formed up.

We have since been informed by a staff officer of the 11th Division that the attacks on East and West Pan-lung Shan (D 3) were delivered by the three battalions of the 7th Regiment, which lost between 80 and 90 per cent. of their strength: only 4 officers in the regiment were unwounded.

24th Aug. The Russians tried to recapture East and West Pan-lung Shan (D 3) during the night of 23rd/24th August, but were repulsed with loss. The Japanese have now placed four machine guns in each of these forts.

About 5.30 p.m. we observed two Russian destroyers outside the harbour, east of Golden Hill (C/D 5), apparently searching for mines. One of them presently struck a mine and threw out a great cloud of steam, showing that she had burst her boilers. She had a very decided list, and appeared to be sinking, but continued to drift about in a helpless manner. The other destroyer then went to her assistance, took off most of, if not all, her crew, and turned to go back to harbour. When she had proceeded about three hundred yards she likewise encountered a mine, and (from the dense brown smoke thrown out) evidently exploded her magazine. Be that as it may, she went down, stern foremost, in three minutes. Her decks were black with men, very few of whom are likely to have been rescued by the steam launch that appeared on the scene some ten minutes later.

The 24th August marks the termination of what may be described as the first phase of the siege of Port Arthur. The desperate resistance encountered and the heavy losses incurred at the assaults on Forts East and West Pan-lung Shan made it abundantly clear to General Nogi and the Head-Quarters Staff that the Port Arthur of 1904 was a very different problem to the Port Arthur of 1894, and that it was not in the least likely to yield to a *coup de main*, even if pushed with all the fiery dash and dogged determination that characterizes the Japanese soldier. From this time forward slower but surer methods were adopted: heavy siege guns were brought over from Japan, reinforcements arrived to bring the depleted ranks up to war strength, and preparations were made to conduct the siege according to the rules and principles of scientific warfare.

25th to 31st Aug. On the night of the 28th/29th August the Russians made a second counter-attack against East and West Pan-lung Shan, but were again repulsed. With this exception, nothing of importance occurred during the period other than a desultory cannonade at long ranges.

5th Sept. Visited head-quarters of the 1st Division, and were most cordially received by Lieut.-General Matsumara and his staff. From the top of the hill immediately above the camp we obtained an excellent view of the advanced Russian works. A staff officer gave us an interesting lecture on the battle of Nan Shan, and also on the operations on the Japanese right, from the 13th August to the present date.

The Japanese losses from the 19th August to the 24th August are officially stated to have been 14,000 officers and men killed and wounded.

7th Sept. We were taken over some of the naval batteries by the naval officer in charge. We saw six 4·7-inch guns and eight 12-prs. The 4·7 guns are made in Japan, and are exactly the same as the Elswick pattern. They were in very fair condition, and do not appear to be excessively eroded, considering they have all fired 900, and some of them 2,000 rounds since this siege commenced. The ammunition is of three kinds:—

(*a*) High-explosive armour-piercing; bursting charge 1·942 kilogrammes (about 4 lbs.).

(*b*) Semi-armour-piercing high-explosive; bursting charge ·860 kilogrammes (about 2 lbs.).

(*c*) Common shell with ordinary powder.

We were informed that the ordinary range at which these 4·7-inch guns have been firing has been from 9,000 yards to 10,000 yards, but that the two guns in casemates have occasionally fired up to 13,000 yards.

The losses in this one battery of four guns up to date have been one officer, one warrant officer and 14 men killed and wounded, out of a total of 80—just 20 per cent.

From the four-gun 4·7-inch battery we visited the naval 12-prs. some 400 yards to the west. There was nothing much to note here beyond that they seem to be in a very exposed situation, and this made us realize how plucky it was of them to stand up—as they did a few days ago—against the heavy Russian naval guns. These 12-prs. are also of Elswick pattern, made in Japan.

From the 12-prs. we went to the two 4·7-inch guns in shell-proof covered emplacements, some 600 yards in rear. These guns are absolutely protected against anything but a shell entering the mouth of the embrasure. Overhead there is firstly a row of steel rails, a layer of timber baulks six inches thick, five layers of bags about fifteen inches thick, packed with earth, and, lastly, some three feet of loose earth on the top of all.

The walls of the emplacement are very solidly constructed of four or five thicknesses of bags filled with earth, and loose earth outside these again. The mouth of the embrasure is wide enough to allow of the gun being slewed round to an angle of 20 degrees right or left of the central line.

8th Sept. Visited the head-quarters of the 11th Division on the extreme left of the Japanese line, and heard a lecture by a staff captain on the capture of the two hills, Ta Ku Shan and Hsiao Ku Shan on the 6th and 8th August 1904.*

10th Sept. A staff officer, of the Army Head-Quarters Staff, gave us a lecture on the operations of the Third Army subsequent to the capture of Ta Ku Shan and Hsiao Ku Shan. He informed us that the Japanese Head-Quarters Staff have obtained possession of some Garrison Orders by General Stessel, from which it would appear that the Russian strength in Port Arthur, on or about the 18th August 1904, was only about 17,000.

He gave the following details of Japanese guns now in front of Port Arthur:—

108	7-cm. (2·75-inch) field guns belonging to the three divisions.
72	7-cm. field guns belonging to the Artillery Brigade.
2	6-inch naval guns.
10	4·7-inch naval guns.
20	12-pr. naval guns.
28	12-cm. (4·7-inch) field howitzers (horsed).
124	siege guns and mortars.
Total - 364	

* *See* page 416.

The following is an official résumé of events subsequent to the capture of Ta Ku Shan and Hsiao Ku Shan, and up to 10th September:—

"After the capture of Ta Ku Shan (E/F 4) and Hsiao Ku Shan (E/F 4), the Japanese line was pushed forward to the general line Ssu-chia-tun (D 3)–Pa-li-chuang (C/D 3), following the valley. The railhead was now advanced to Chang-ling-tzu (some 2 miles north of Army Head-Quarters (F 1)); this has been impossible before, as it would have been under fire from Ta Ku Shan.

"Our right flank not being sufficiently advanced to protect our siege operations it became necessary to capture Yu Ta Shan (B/C 2), which was accordingly done on the 15th August by the 1st Division, plus 2nd Field Artillery Brigade (72 guns), three batteries (12 guns) of field howitzers, and one reserve infantry brigade, the whole under the orders of the general commanding the 1st Division.

"About this period trench tramways were laid down by men of the fortress artillery from the railhead in various directions to the different siege batteries.

"On the 18th August our preparations for the assault were completed, and on this date the Height south-east of Hsiao-tung-kou (A 3) was carried by the 1st Division after a stubborn resistance.

"On the 19th August the siege batteries opened fire, and in the evening our infantry attacked Fort Kuropatkin (D 3) and took a portion of it, but owing to the stubborn Russian defence and the concentrated artillery fire, it was forced to retire on the 20th August, after losing heavily.

"On the evening of the 20th August the 9th Division occupied the line Pa-li-chuang (C/D 3)–Wu-chia-fang (D/E 3), and the 11th Division the line Wu-chia-fang (D/E 3) to the sea.

"At 4 a.m. on the 21st August a force from the 9th Division moved against East Pan-lung Shan (D 3).

"About 8.30 a.m. troops of the 11th Division seized a small entrenchment, Kobu-yama (D/E 4), but at 9.30 a.m. were obliged to abandon it.

"The 11th Division troops succeeded in reaching the foot of the Russian works at East Pan-lung Shan, but could not advance further.

"During the night of the 22nd/23rd August, the 11th Division, reinforced by the 4th Reserve Infantry Brigade, made repeated but unsuccessful attacks on East Pan-lung Shan. By noon on the 22nd August the greater part of the fort was in our hands, and considerable loss was experienced by a flanking fire from West Pan-lung Shan. Seeing this, two reserve companies that had been sent up as reinforcements to East Pan-lung Shan attacked West Pan-lung Shan on the initiative of a captain, and carried it.

"During the night of the 23rd/24th August one brigade of the 11th Division attacked Wang-tai (D 4), and succeeded in reaching a point half-way up to the summit, but was obliged to retire under the heavy fire it encountered.


"On the 24th August General Nogi clearly saw that it was not feasible to carry Port Arthur by a *coup de main*, and that it would be necessary to stand fast, holding the two works we had already taken. Sapping operations were at once commenced against Sung-shu Shan (D 3) and East Chi-kuan Shan (E 4), also against Fort Kuropatkin (D 3) and the forts (17, 18, and 19 on map) north of Shui-shih-ying (C 3). The enemy fires on these incessantly by day and attacks them frequently at night."

Reinforcements are now fast arriving, and active developments may shortly be expected.

Visited the head-quarters of the 11th Division in the centre of the line. This division has borne the brunt of nearly all the fighting since the siege began, and its losses have been very heavy indeed. The division is now, however, up to its full strength. Its commander, Lieut.-General H. Oshima, informed us that the Russians offered a most desperate resistance to the assault on East and West Pan-lung Shan, and were mostly all killed at their posts.

Visited the general commanding, the artillery, who gave us details regarding the artillery dispositions. **16th Sept.**

Visited the engineer park in the morning. The Japanese have devised a portable head-cover for infantry in the trenches. It consists of two slabs of wood $1\frac{1}{4}$ inches thick, fastened together at an angle of about 45° and covered with three thicknesses of steel $\frac{1}{8}$-inch thick. An aperture for firing, 8 inches by 4 inches, is made near the right-hand top corner; the weight is about 30 lbs. **18th Sept.**



This head-cover is not sufficiently high to afford efficient protection, and it is a clumsy thing to carry about. We were also shown some iron shields $\frac{1}{4}$-inch thick to protect men working at the head of the sap. The weight of these is at least 60 lbs., and they do not strike one as being really practical.

* * *

We were informed that it was proposed on the following day to assault the advanced Russian works in the valley (the redoubts south of Shui-shih-ying (C 3) and Fort Kuropatkin (D 3)), and also to attempt the fort Namako-yama (B 3), on the extreme right opposite the 1st Division. The naval guns would open fire at 9 a.m., and the remainder at 1 p.m.; the works would probably be assaulted at 4 p.m. With the 1st Division there would be ninety field and twenty-six siege guns, twenty-four machine guns, and eight 4·7-inch Q.F. guns. Against the redoubts in the valley there would be forty siege, thirty-six mountain guns, twenty-four machine guns, and four Q.F. guns of 4·7 inches. The 9th Division would attack these forts, and the 11th Division on the left would make a demonstration only.

19th Sept. Colonel Apsley Smith took up his position with the general commanding, the artillery, Captain Yate with the 1st Division, Captain Sir. A. Bannerman and I at the Naval Observatory. Up to noon the usual duel went on between the naval guns and Fort Sung-shu Shan (D 3), evidently in order to let the Russians think that no attack was intended. Between noon and 1 p.m. firing ceased altogether, but about 4 p.m. it greatly increased in intensity, and was entirely concentrated on the two advanced redoubts in the valley (Fort Kuropatkin, and 17 on map), the practice being excellent. The Russians replied with their heavy guns, and also made some very pretty shooting with shrapnel against the Japanese advanced parallels. Shortly after 4 30 p.m. the Japanese reserves moved up into the parallels, and at 5.20 p.m. two Japanese soldiers carrying shields issued from the trenches and proceeded up the slope towards Fort Kuropatkin, the nearest and largest of the Russian redoubts, evidently to look for wires of mines. One of these was shot almost at once, the other a few minutes afterwards.

At 5.40 p.m. an assaulting column about one hundred strong leapt out of the trenches and rushed for the redoubt, headed by officers with flags. They reached the ditch with little or no loss, but there they stopped, and we saw the flags waving on the exterior slope of the parapet while the men were down in the ditch.

About 5.55 p.m. a reinforcement some three hundred strong rushed up and a few minutes afterwards a third party about one hundred strong. All of these men disappeared into the ditch, and we could see them trying to run round in rear of the work. Frequent explosions took place in the ditch, seemingly of dynamite bombs or hand-grenades, which we had been told were being prepared for the destruction of caponiers and counterscarp galleries.

Matters continued like this until 6.20 p.m., when a party of about two hundred men emerged from the ditch and doubled back to their trenches, followed in five or ten minutes by a second party about one hundred strong. They retired quite steadily, and there was no sign of panic or disorder. A small

party of men still held on in the ditch—to judge at least from the Japanese flag, which still continued to wave, just showing over the ditch. This is how affairs were when we left the Naval Observatory at 7 p.m. A detailed report of this attack follows.*

As far as we could see, the other redoubt north of Shui-shih-ying (17 on map) was never assaulted at all up to the time we left.

With regard to the operations of the 1st Division, Captain Yate reports as follows :—

"The heavy artillery was directed to open fire at 1.30 p.m., the field artillery at 2 p.m. Fire directed principally on Namako-yama (advanced Russian position, B 3 on map) and 203-Metre Hill (A/B 4), the high fort in rear of Namako-yama.

"The field artillery actually opened at 2.40 p.m. There appeared to be ten field batteries in action, three howitzer batteries, some Hotchkiss and machine guns, and all the naval guns with the 1st Division, *i.e.*, five 12-pr. and two 4·7-inch.

"The 4·7-inch naval guns directed their fire partly on the redoubts in the low ground near Shui-shih-ying. The remainder shelled Namako-yama and 203-Metre Hill (A/B 4) only. The Russians replied intermittently with artillery fire from these hills. About 6 p.m. infantry advanced against the south and south-west slopes of the two last-named heights.

"No decisive results had been obtained by the time darkness set in. The movements of the infantry were almost entirely concealed from the hill where the head-quarters of the 1st Division were posted."

It seems in the assault yesterday on Fort Kuropatkin (D 3) that by 6 p.m. the Japanese held the north and east sides of the work, while the Russians still clung to the south and west sides. The fort was completely captured at 2 a.m. to-day. A number of naval mines were found inside the work. **20th Sept.**

Redoubt 17 was attacked at 7 p.m. yesterday, but was not captured until 9 a.m. to-day. Between 9 a.m. and noon to-day the Japanese also captured works 18, 19, and the old Chinese Fort (C 3).

The loss of the above chain of works is a very serious matter for the Russians, as it protected the springs and reservoir which provided the main water supply of Port Arthur; the Japanese have now cut the pipes and diverted the water for their own use.

At 5.30 p.m. we witnessed the attack and capture of Namako-yama (B 3) from the position of the general commanding the artillery.

All the Japanese field batteries with the 1st Division (sixty guns) concentrated their fire on the Russian position and

---

* *See* page 426.

smothered it with shrapnel. The two 4·7-inch guns attached to the division played on the crest with high-explosive shell.


The Russian fire on the attacking force from artillery and machine guns was very heavy, both from 203-Metre Hill (A/B 4) and also from a horse-shoe shaped fort (B 3) below Namako-yama, on the east.

At 6.10 p.m. the Japanese flag waved on the summit of the hill, and the Japanese batteries swept the reverse slope of the position with shrapnel. By 6.30 p.m. the firing on both sides had practically ceased.

21st to 23rd Sept. The Japanese have made real and substantial progress to-day. During the night of the 20th/21st the Japanese captured a portion of the Russian position at 203-Metre Hill (A/B 4), but on the 22nd September they were forced to retire.

24th Sept. An officer of the Naval Brigade showed us two 6-inch naval guns to-day. They are of Elswick pattern, manufactured in Japan, and are on central-pivot naval mountings secured to specially prepared platforms of timber and cement, 7 metres (22·9 feet) long by 6 metres (19·6 feet) broad.

Section of 6-inch Gun Platform.



The guns were in open emplacements with fairly good cover for the gun crews and ammunition, but this is not absolutely shell-proof from a heavy naval gun.

Little or no firing took place to-day.

25th and 26th Sept. There has practically been a cessation of hostilities during the last three days.

On the 26th we inspected two of the 28-cm. (11-inch) fortress howitzers. These guns are of Japanese manufacture, and weigh something over 10 tons (10,370 kilos.) each. The carriage weighs 5·2 tons (5,310 kilos.) and the platform 8·2 tons (8,444 kilos.). The breech mechanism is of the ordinary English pattern. The gun is mounted on an iron carriage, garrison standing pattern, this latter being on a dwarf traversing

platform. It is central pivoted, on a cast-iron plate let into a bed of cement. The rear trucks are on an all-round circular racer. This is by far the heaviest piece of artillery that the Japanese have placed in the field up to the present time. The shell weighs 485 lbs. (220 kilos.) and has a bursting charge of 16·75 lbs. (7·6 kilos.). 200 rounds per gun are kept with the battery. The magazines are very well protected.

We also inspected a 4-gun battery of 10·5-cm. (4·1-inch) siege guns, Krupp 1901, firing fixed ammunition, and a 6-gun battery of 12-cm. bronze guns made in Japan.

Desultory firing by the naval 4·7-inch and 6-inch guns at the warships in harbour. One of them is claimed to have been set on fire on the 28th. **27th to 30th Sept.**

There were local and unimportant attacks against the sap-head in front of Erh-lung Shan (D 3), on the 29th September at 2 a.m., and on the night of 29th/30th September. Both of the above were without any result.

On the 27th September we inspected the Japanese war balloon. On the morning of the 29th we inspected a reserve battalion encamped close by. We were shown one company practising the attack and another manœuvring in close order. In the former the men were extended to one place interval only; the Japanese do not favour widely-extended formations when it is intended to push the attack home.

The company drill called for no special comment; the men were very steady, and manœuvred smartly and with precision.

I noticed that no use was made of signals or of the whistle, either in the attack or in the company drill.

We afterwards saw some men's field service order kits; these weigh just over 42 lbs., including ammunition, but exclusive of rifle and bayonet, which weigh 9 lbs. 8½ ozs.

We received intelligence from an officer of the Head-Quarters Staff that 28-cm. (11-inch) howitzers would open fire on some of the forts. We witnessed the practice, which was accurate; apparently, however, ordinary shell, and not high-explosive, was used. The fire went on during the day in a desultory manner. **1st Oct.**

A party of us visited the camps about 1½ miles beyond the naval batteries. There were three 4-gun field howitzer batteries down in the hollow, and further on an engineer company of the reserve brigade of the 1st Division. Here we were shown a torpedo that was found inside Fort 203-Metre Hill and also a number of Russian hand-grenades. The employment of these somewhat antiquated instruments of war has been a marked feature in the assault and defence of the various works round Port Arthur. Both Russians and Japanese have made up large numbers of them, and their moral effect is said to be very great. **2nd Oct.**

I have not as yet had an opportunity of seeing any of the Japanese bombs, but the Russians are of two kinds—one weighing about 10 lbs. (globular), the other weighing about 7 lbs.,

in the form of a small shell. Both of them have a length of ordinary Bickford fuze (about 8 inches) attached through an aperture in the shell. We met here a German-speaking soldier of the engineer company, who told us that the men of the company were on duty at the sap-head every other night, and that every night four or five men were hit.

After the engineer park, we visited a mountain battery about 400 yards north-east of Fort Kuropatkin, very cunningly concealed behind artificially-planted millet stalks.

This gun is the same calibre as the Arisaka field gun (2·95 inches), but is considerably shorter (the length is as nearly as possible 4 feet 4 inches). It can either be carried or drawn by ponies. In the former case the gun (228 lbs.) goes on one pony, the carriage divides in two and each half goes on a pony (weight of each load about 200 lbs.), while the wheels are carried by a fourth pony (weight of load about 200 lbs.). The breech action is the single interrupted screw. For wheel transport a pair of shafts are attached to the point of the trail.

Two kinds of ammunition are carried—shrapnel and high-explosive percussion shell. The former can be used up to 3,700 yards, the latter up to 4,300 yards.

3rd Oct. Inspected the bivouac of the 8th Reserve Regiment, encamped in the vicinity. Shelters have been constructed to accommodate a section of 18 to 20 men each, by digging a circular pit about 3 feet 6 inches in depth and 21 feet in diameter. A pole 9 feet high is erected in the centre, and the men's sections of tents are fastened over in the shape of a roof.

We also inspected the men's rations and field kitchens. The field oven is a sheet iron cylinder about 2 feet 6 inches high and the same in diameter, an opening in front and a vent hole on each side. It cooks enough food for 40 to 50 men at a time.

The colonel of the regiment informed us that the men's daily ration was 6 *go* (about three-fifths of a quart, or 1·06 lbs.) of uncooked rice and 40 *momme* (one third of a lb.) of either fish or meat, half ounce of salt, vegetables as procurable (abundant here), and compressed Japanese tea; each man gets three meals a day. There was no firing to-day on either side.

4th Oct. Ascended hill occupied by the general commanding the artillery. An officer of his staff showed us the positions of the saps to the six different points of attack. He stated that every night from 15 to 20 yards of sap—4 feet deep in the clear—were dug, or about 100 yards of parallel. An officer of the Head-Quarters Staff called at our camp in the afternoon and gave us an account of an interview he had recently had with an American correspondent and a French painter who succeeded in entering Port Arthur from Chifu on the 28th September in a Chinese junk, but were ordered to leave by the Russians on the following day, and were picked up by a Japanese destroyer and taken to Dalny.

According to a statement made by the American, the garrison of Port Arthur is living on horseflesh at the present time, and has no vegetables, while the ammunition is running short.

General Stessel had apparently not heard of the battle of Liao-yang, and was under the impression that the Baltic squadron had started some time ago; he was undeceived on both these points. With regard to the military situation generally, the officer had not much to tell us beyond the fact that the Russian warships have anchored under cover of the Tiger's Tail (C 5), and will shortly be bombarded.

No firing of any sort to-day—high wind blowing.

5th Oct. The 28-cm. (11-inch) guns, about two miles east of this camp, opened fire this morning on the warships. The Russians replied vigorously, and made very good practice.

6th to 8th Oct. The Japanese 28-cm. guns bombarded the town and shipping intermittently—not without effect apparently, to judge from the dense clouds of smoke that arose from time to time.

On the night of the 7th/8th the Russians attacked and captured the Japanese sap-head in front of a small infantry work "G" (D 3), 200 or 300 yards east of Fort Erh-lung Shan.

9th to 14th Oct. During the afternoon the Japanese recaptured the portion of sap lost by them on the night of the 7th/8th October. The Russians shelled the naval 4·7-inch guns with mortars and some of the heavy guns on Golden Hill and Tiger's Tail forts (C 5).

Went with Colonel Apsley Smith to Dalny. We noticed a very marked improvement in the sanitary conditions, and general cleanliness of the place since we visited it in August last. The commandant and his staff officer were most courteous to us, placed an interpreter at our disposal, and allowed us to do anything we asked. Dalny is now being converted into an enormous base supply depôt, not only for the Third Army, but also for the First, Second, and Fourth Armies in the north. Large supply sheds—each with a storage capacity of 70,000 cubic feet—have been already built, and several others are in process of construction. Large quantities of building material are also being sent over from Japan, and the roofless houses are being repaired and made capable of accommodating troops. The Japanese are now employing in Dalny for various purposes no fewer than 500 Chinese carts (each capable of carrying half a ton), 6,000 Chinese coolies, 2,000 Japanese artisans (carpenters, masons, mechanics, &c.), and 3,000 men of the Military Train Reserve (specially called out for this war, some of whom have received a month or six weeks' elementary training). The Chinese carters receive 3 *yen* (6*s*.) per diem; the Chinese coolies 50 *sen* (1*s*.). The Japanese artisans receive 50 *sen* per diem, plus free rations and lodgings.

The Japanese arrangements for private canteens in the field seem worthy of note. The proprietors are private individuals of

known probity and good antecedents. The Japanese Government gives these men, their assistants, and their goods free passage by sea and rail, but not any cart or pack transport.

In Dalny at the present moment there are five or six canteens, with small branches along the line of rail, and in the villages close behind the line of batteries. They are not, however, allowed to wax fat by placing exorbitant prices on the articles they sell. These are all fixed by the Chief Commissariat Officer, and allow for a profit of 10 per cent. on the original cost of the article in Japan. All kinds of things are sold—beer, cigarettes, *saké*, note paper, tinned fruit, &c. The daily sale of each article is limited; for instance, only one cask of *saké* may be expended in one day at any one canteen. A non-commissioned officer is specially detailed to each canteen to see that the regulations are adhered to. We paid interesting visits to the hospital ships—the "Rohilla Maru" and the "Hakuai Maru." On the former were three wounded Russian officers, one of whom informed me that they were very well treated, and had nothing to complain of.

The water supply of Dalny is now working well, as is also the electric light. The Chinese population is well controlled, while the orderly and sober behaviour of the Japanese troops is beyond praise; the streets at night were perfectly quiet, and such a thing as a drunken man is hardly ever seen, which compares favourably with what was frequently seen on the Taku road at Tientsin, in 1900–1901.

On the 14th October we returned to our camp in front of Port Arthur, when Captain Yate placed the following notes at my disposal regarding events that had occurred during our absence at Dalny.

10th Oct. The Japanese 28-cm. (11-inch) howitzers bombarded one of the Russian forts, and made very accurate practice. The Russians fired heavily on the road leading from the 9th Division headquarters past Tuan-shan-tzu (E 3) Hill, and also at the 12-cm. guns and howitzers situated immediately west of this.

12th Oct. Very heavy firing all night. Heard following day that troops from 1st Division had crossed the railway and attacked Fort Sung-shu Shan (D 3) from the west, capturing an earthwork just above the railway, and penetrating some one hundred yards beyond it. In the afternoon visited Fort Kuropatkin (D 3). Ditch of fort some 8 to 10 feet deep. Flank defence of ditch, in the shape of escarp caponiers, so damaged as to be unrecognizable. Inside is a mass of ruins, and even after three weeks is still smouldering. Fort admirably traced from Russian point of view; long side enfiladed, and others partly so, from Fort Erh-lung Shan.

13th Oct. Went to Hsiao Ku Shan (E/F 4) (hill on extreme left of Japanese line). The colonel of the 43rd Regiment had been

present at the attack on this hill from the 7th August to the 9th. His regiment advanced with two battalions in the front line and one in reserve, over 1,200 yards of open ground, now dry, except for stream some fifty yards broad, but at that time a swamp, which greatly delayed the attackers, whose left flank, moreover, was harassed by the fire of the Russian gunboats. The 43rd Regiment lost 540 killed and wounded in taking this hill (as nearly as possible 20 per cent.). In the two leading battalions every officer was *hors de combat.*

15th Oct. An officer of a Reserve Regiment dined with us to-day, and informed us that at the assault on the Pan-lung Shan Forts on the 22nd August the losses of his regiment were 13 officers killed, 24 officers wounded, and 50 per cent of the rank and file killed and wounded. We received an intimation at 9 p.m. from the Army Head-Quarters Staff that the infantry work east of Erh-lung Shan (D 3) would be assaulted to-morrow afternoon.

16th Oct. At noon ascended hill close to the position of the general commanding the artillery. The 28-cm. (11-inch) howitzers were shelling "G" work (D 3) in a leisurely manner, evidently ranging.

The Russians replied at intervals from mortars (firing smoky powder) beyond West Pan-lung-shan (D 3) and also from a large fort, Ta Shan (D 4 S.E.), between Erh-lung Shan and the Tiger's Tail. Nearly all the shells from the former were blind.

Precisely at 3 p.m. a very heavy concentrated fire was opened on the "G" work (D 3), Fort Erh-lung Shan and Fort Sung-shu Shan, from the thirty-six mountain guns of the 9th Division, two or three field batteries of the Artillery Brigade, and the following siege pieces :—

Six 28-cm. (11-inch) fortress howitzers.
Thirty-four 12-cm. (4·7-inch) guns.
Four 12-cm. (4·7-inch) howitzers.
Four 10·5 cm. (4·1-inch) Krupp guns.
Two 12-pr. naval guns.

The total number of guns in action must have been between 98 and 104.

The practice was decidedly good. Many of the large shells burst actually in the trenches of "G" work, while the field and mountain guns fired most accurate shrapnel, not only at "G" work, but also at the flanking trenches of Erh-lung Shan. This terrific bombardment continued for one hour and a half, and at 4.30 p.m. a company of infantry (200 men) leapt out of the advanced parallel, dashed over the one hundred yards of open ground and into "G" work. They suffered very little loss (only six casualties according to some statements), and met with hardly any opposition. The defenders had evidently vacated the trenches or had been nearly all killed by the bombardment.

Ten minutes or so afterwards an advanced Russian trench below Erh-lung Shan was also easily rushed and captured.

At 5 p.m. the Japanese were lying down under cover immediately north of "G" work, and they also held the Russian advanced trench and the north-west crest of an underfeature north of the glacis of Erh-lung Shan.

The total Japanese losses in this affair were only 150, and no damage was caused to the material of their batteries. It was an admirable example of an attack conducted according to scientific principles, an overpoweringly heavy oblique artillery fire, with definite objective for each group of guns, and the infantry pushed close up to the point of assault. The Russian shrapnel practice was fair, but their heavy guns did not take any great part in the proceedings. The Russians made a half-hearted attempt to recapture "G" work during the night, but without result.

17th Oct. The Japanese are now strongly entrenched in "G" work, the advanced trench below Erh-lung Shan, and also occupy the whole of the underfeature below it.

A staff officer to the general commanding the artillery informed us to-day that since the 19th September the following additional siege pieces have been brought up:—

Twelve 28-cm. (11-inch) fortress howitzers.
Two 15-cm. (5·9-inch naval guns (of 50 calibres).
Four 15-cm. (5·9-inch) mortars.

The 28-cm. howitzers have not yet been mounted.

There are consequently now before Port Arthur 254 siege pieces and 180 field and mountain guns. The six 87-mm. (3·4-inch) captured Russian guns have been withdrawn, as ammunition ran short.

The officer also imparted the following items of information:—

(*a*) The Japanese propose to try smoky powder for some of the less exposed siege guns, on account of the erosion caused by smokeless powder.

(*b*) The following hits during the past week or ten days have been obtained by the 28-cm. howitzers on the Russian warships in harbour:—

"Bayan" five hits, "Poltava" four hits, "Retvisan" six hits, "Peresviet" 17 hits.

The above were observed from an observation post at Namako-yama (B 3) on the extreme right.

(*c*) The 28-cm. howitzers have not as yet fired high-explosive shells; these are on their way up.

18th Oct. We received news to-day of an important Japanese victory on the Sha Ho.

Hardly any firing at all to-day.

Visited the artillery siege park at advanced railhead Ta-fang-tzu (F 1), where all siege pieces and their ammunition are sent. **19th Oct.**

Paid a visit to the 1st Division head-quarters. From the observation station we could clearly see the Japanese parallels running up to about three hundred yards from Erh-lung Shan, and 400 yards from Sung-shu Shan, also working parties constructing gun emplacements on slope of hills some one thousand two hundred or one thousand five hundred yards west of where we stood. **20th Oct.**

The chief of the staff of the 1st Division gave us the following details regarding the attack on 203-Metre Hill (A/B 4) on the 19th and 20th September. 203-Metre Hill (A/B 4) is double-headed with a connecting col. The whole is surrounded by a casemated trench. The head-cover is exceedingly strong, consisting of steel plates, timber baulks, and four or five feet of earth on the top of all. The fort is traversed longitudinally and transversely by underground passages.* On the 19th September one company of the 1st Brigade effected an entrance at one corner of the ditch, but any further advance was absolutely impossible, as the passages were swept by fire of machine guns. The company held its ground with the greatest obstinacy for two days, when the Russians brought up field guns to shell them from the south-west, and the few survivors were compelled to retire.

No firing to-day from either side.

Ascended high hill about 1½ miles to the east. From there we noticed two saps within 30 yards of the ditch of the North Fort (D 3/4). **22nd Oct.**

Practically no firing to-day.

Hardly any firing. One of the 28-cm. howitzers was dragged past our camp to-day. It was lashed to four large drugs, and was hauled by a party of at least 150 men on two stout hawsers. The rate of progress (over an indifferent road) was about 1½ miles an hour. **23rd and 24th Oct.**

The four 6-inch naval guns north-north-west of Shui-shih-ying (C 3) carried on a sharp duel during the afternoon with Fort Sung-shu Shan. Visited the general commanding the Field Artillery Brigade. His batteries are at present in line east and west of Yu Ta Shan (B/C 2), but will be pushed forward to-night, the right wing to 1,300 yards from Sung-shu Shan, the centre and left up to 2,000 yards from Sung-shu Shan and Erh-lung Shan. **25th Oct.**

An officer of the Head-Quarters Staff visited the camp to-day. He came to announce an attack for the 26th instant,

* This statement has since been ascertained to be incorrect.—C.M.C., 21.12.1904.

and communicated to us the following substance of orders issued to-day from Head-Quarters :—

After a heavy bombardment along the whole line, the enemy's defences from Sung-shu Shan to East Chi-kuan (E 4) will be attacked, and after their capture a circular position will be taken up on the high ground within the line East Chi-kuan Shan (E 4), the height occupied by the old Chinese camp (D 4) and a hill (C/D 4) south-west of Sung-shu Shan on the Japanese right flank.

The objectives for each division will be as follows :—

1st Division : The brigade on the left to attack Sung-shu Shan and the heights in rear. The right brigade to be in reserve to meet a possible counter-attack.

11th Division : The right brigade to attack the North Fort (D 3/4), "Q" work, and East Chi-kuan Shan (E 4), afterwards the heights in rear. The left brigade to make a demonstration against the enemy's right, and if necessary repel counter-attacks.

At 5 p.m. to-morrow (the 26th October) the 1st and 9th Divisions will attack the infantry trenches in front of Erh-lung Shan and Sung-shu Shan. This attack will be supported by the Field Artillery Brigade and every available siege piece.

Under cover of the general bombardment all the saps will be pushed forward as much as possible.

Firing will be continued during the night by the 28-cm. howitzers.

The officer also informed us that, according to statements by Russian bluejackets who have lately deserted, the fire of the 28-cm. howitzers has been very effective against the Russian squadron in the harbour. The "Bayan" is reported to be quite *hors de combat*, and the "Peresviet" to have been struck 27 times.

From information received, it would appear that the forts of Sung-shu Shan, Erh-lung Shan, and East Chi-kuan Shan, are to all intents and purposes permanent works. The ditches are reported to be 20 feet deep and from 18 to 21 feet wide, flanked by caponiers with two tiers of fire ; the works themselves are covered in with cement head-cover.

25th Oct. A desultory fire commenced about 11 a.m., chiefly from the naval guns. The Russians hardly replied at all.

At 1 p.m. the 28-cm. howitzers on the Japanese left began to shell the North Fort (D 3/4) and South East Chi-kuan Shan (E 4).

About 3.30 p.m. the firing on the Japanese right increased considerably in intensity. The fort of Erh-lung Shan was heavily pounded by all the naval guns and the 28-cm. howitzers on the right flank, in addition to several batteries of field howitzers.

At 4.30 p.m. the fire on Erh-lung Shan was terrific, shrapnel as well as high-explosive shell.

At 5 p.m. to the minute an assaulting column about two hundred strong left the advanced parallel and rushed up in a deep mass against the infantry trenches in front of Erh-lung Shan, followed almost immediately by a second column of equal strength a little further away to the right.

Both columns reached the trench with trifling loss, and at once entered it. Two or three Japanese shells fell among them, notwithstanding that there were two flags being vigorously waved.

Three more columns of about two hundred men each left the parallel during the next twenty minutes and established themselves under cover beneath the crest of the trench.

At 5.20 p.m. the Russians fired a large mine at the western angle of the trench; the explosion was tremendous.

Meanwhile the men beneath the crest of the parapet had commenced to construct three covered approaches from the parallel to the trench; they worked admirably, and when we left the hill at 6 p.m. had nearly completed their task.

A noteworthy feature of this attack was the large use made by the Japanese of bombs fired from the advanced parallels out of specially constructed wooden grenade mortars. The projectile is simply a tin cylinder 6 inches in length and 5 inches in diameter filled with some sort of explosive. There is a piece of fuze ($4\frac{1}{2}$ inches long) attached to the cylinder, one inch of which is exposed, and is lighted when the gun is fired. A few shrapnel bullets are packed into the cylinder to fill up interstices and give the requisite weight. The whole projectile weighs $4\frac{1}{5}$ lbs. The propelling charge is ordinary black powder made up in five different charges, according to range. The extreme range is 400 yards; the most favourable one 300 yards. The practice made with these bombs seemed somewhat erratic, but they exploded with very great violence, and their moral effect must be considerable, while their manufacture is cheap and easy.

The Russian advanced trench in front of Sung-shu Shan was rushed a few minutes before that of Erh-lung Shan: fighting was still going on at nightfall.

27th Oct. Paid a second visit to the general commanding the Field Artillery Brigade. He was good enough to give us the following notes: During the night of the 26th/27th October the Russians made four attempts to recapture the advanced trench of Sung-shu Shan; all of these were unsuccessful.

The Japanese losses at Sung-shu Shan, including these counter-attacks, were 140 killed and wounded: at Erh-lung Shan they amounted to 300, most of which were caused by Russian indirect artillery fire after the trenches had been occupied.

The Japanese profited by the bombardment on the 26th to seize the whole of "G" work (D 3)) they were only in possession of the northern portion of it previously), and also to drive the Russians away from the railway bridge. They met with great resistance at this point, and it would appear that there is something important at the head of the valley which the Russians wish to defend—a water supply in all probability.

The mine that exploded in the advanced trench at Erh-lung Shan during the attack on the 26th was probably fired in order to blow in a subterranean passage connecting the trench with the fort itself.

Visited a field howitzer battery in action. It was admirably placed, and had not so far received a single shell, as the Russians fired entirely on the emplacements vacated on the night of the 25th/26th October, when the field guns were pushed forward.

28th Oct. Intermittent fire from the naval guns and the 28-cm. howitzers; the Russians hardly replied.

29th Oct. Very little firing during the morning, but in the afternoon it grew a little brisker. At 6 a.m. to-day the Russians attacked the Japanese advanced parallels in front of Sung-shu Shan, and by 9 a.m. had driven the defenders back to where they were on the 26th October. Between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m., however, the Japanese attacked and recaptured the advanced trenches. The Head-Quarters Staff have announced that a general attack will take place to-morrow along the line Sung-shu Shan–East Chi-kuan Shan.

30th Oct. Our party divided as follows to witness the attack: Captain Yate to the 11th Division on the left, Captain Sir A. Bannerman near Tuan-shan-tzu (E 3) in centre, Colonel Apsley Smith and I to an observatory on the right, about half-way between the naval guns and Shui-shih-ying village, and about 2,300 yards from Sung-shu Shan. Firing from the naval guns and the 28-c.m. howitzers commenced about 9 a.m.

About 11 a.m. a heavy concentrated fire from every siege and naval gun was opened on Sung-shu Shan, Erh-lung Shan, "P" (D 3 S.E.), North Fort (D 3/4), "Q" (D 4 N.E.), and East Chi-kuan Shan, also on all the works immediately in rear of this line. The fire was very accurate and rapid, and objectives had evidently been carefully assigned to the different groups of guns.

At 12.30 p.m. the field and mountain guns commenced shrapnel fire, exceedingly heavy on the section of the line "P" to "Q," moderately heavy on Erh-lung Shan and Sung-shu Shan.

The Russian reply to all this artillery fire was feeble in the extreme.

A few minutes after 1 p.m. all the different points of attack were assaulted simultaneously by infantry columns.

Coming from the right, a column about two hundred strong left the advanced parallel about two hundred yards in front of Sung-shu Shan and dashed up against the work through a somewhat narrow passage in the wire entanglement. Directly the men left the cover of the trenches they came under a heavy fire, and they sustained some 30 casualties before reaching the ditch, into which they descended. The party had three scaling ladders with it, but none of these were used as far as we could see. This first column was quickly followed by a second one of about equal strength, which lost some 25 men *en route;* half-an-hour later a third small column, eighty to one hundred strong, followed, and had 15 or 20 casualties. Both the second and third columns followed the first column into the ditch of the work. Altogether there must have been 70 to 80 bodies lying on the slope between the advanced parallel and the ditch work. This loss was not excessive, as a heavy fire was brought to bear on the attacking column from Sung-shu Shan itself, from a small auxiliary infantry work (D 4 N.W.) flanking the western face of the work, and also from a long line of entrenchment connecting Sung-shu Shan and Erh-lung Shan and enfilading the Japanese left flank.

At 3.30 p.m. a large mine exploded at the salient angle of Sung-shu Shan, and at 4 p.m. a tremendous explosion took place inside the work, followed by dense volumes of smoke, which continued to pour out in undiminished quantity for more than an hour. During the whole of this time a sharp musketry combat was carried on between the Japanese in their advanced parallel and the Russians in the trenches between Sung-shu Shan and Erh-lung Shan. Some of the latter were distinctly observed to be firing on the dead and wounded lying about in front of Sung-shu Shan. Nothing more was seen of the columns in the ditch; occasionally a man was sent back to the parallel, but nearly all of these were shot down. A few men tried to mount the parapet of the work, but were at once killed.

Erh-lung Shan was not assaulted at all from the direct front —a few men attacked the western face, but it was impossible to estimate the actual strength of the column or columns. All that is certain is that a party of men succeeded in reaching the ditch.

With regard to occurrences on the centre and left, Captains Yate and Sir A. Bannerman report in substance as follows:—

At 1.15 p.m. East Chi-kuan Shan (E 4), a small knoll to the west, since called Kobu-yama by the Japanese (D/E 4), "Q" (D 4 N.E.) North Fort (D 3/4), and "P" (D 3, S.E.), were simultaneously attacked. At East Chi-kuan Shan and at "Q" the Japanese were definitely repulsed, with considerable loss. They succeeded eventually in establishing themselves close to Kobu-yama, "Q," and "P." The Russian shrapnel and machine gun fire were murderously effective.

During the night of the 30th/31st October the Russians made two determined counter-attacks on the Japanese just **31st Oct.**

outside "P." The first of these was repulsed, the second drove the Japanese back to their advanced parallel. The latter then brought up reinforcements, and not only recaptured their former position, but seized the work itself, where they are now finally established.

North Fort (D 3/4) was again attacked to-day at 5 p.m. by a small party under cover of 28-cm. (11-inch) howitzer and shrapnel fire, but was unsuccessful.

The military situation is now as follows: The Japanese hold Kobu-yama, "P," East and West Pan-lung Shan, and "G"; mining operations are in progress against Erh-lung Shan and Sung-shu Shan; saps are being pushed against 203-Metre Hill (A/B 4), and also against the enceinte from East and West Pan-lung Shan and "G."

The Japanese losses are stated officially to be as follows:—

(*a*) On the 3rd October:—

Officers	33
Rank and file	1,441
Total	1,474

(*b*) From 26th to 31st October, both days inclusive:—

Officers	51
Rank and file	1,970
Total	2,021

2nd Nov. Two enormous explosions occurred in Port Arthur this morning in the vicinity of the old town; the first appears to have been accidental, the second was caused by the fire of the Japanese naval guns; both are supposed to be old Chinese powder magazines.

3rd Nov. To-day being the birthday of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Japan, the naval batteries fired a salute of 101 shells at Forts Erh-lung Shan and Sung-shu Shan. With this exception there was no firing.

4th Nov. The Japanese officer in charge of the third group of military attachés left this morning to take up an appointment in Korea.

The military situation is now as follows:—

The 1st Division is pushing saps against 203-Metre Hill (A/B 4) from the south-west.

At Sung-shu Shan and Erh-lung Shan mines are being driven to blow in the caponiers of the counterscarp and fill up the ditches.

A trench has been made between "G" (D 3) and Erh-lung Shan, behind which troops can assemble to carry by assault the portion of the Chinese wall connecting these two works.

From East and West Pan-lung Shan saps are being pushed against the portion of the Chinese wall immediately opposite to them. A mine is being driven against the parapet of the North Fort (D 3/4). On the extreme right the Japanese have advanced their right flank and have expelled the Russians from the village of Kao-chia-tun (A 4/5). Their outposts extend from the village to Pigeon Bay.*

The following artillery dispositions were made yesterday :—

Two 9-cm. (3·5-inch) mortars have been placed west of Shui-shih-ying (C 3), to fire on the road in rear of Erh-lung Shan.

Eight batteries of the Field Artillery Brigade, plus six naval 12-pr. guns, have been pushed up in line with two astride of Shui-shih-ying. On the east of this village are four field batteries and two 12-pr. naval guns; west of it are four field batteries and four 12-pr. naval guns. From the field batteries west of Shui-shih-ying, three sections have been still further advanced to some rising ground only 1,300 yards from Sung-shu Shan, in order, so I am informed, to get a really accurate fire on the loopholes and demolish head-cover.

5th to 8th Nov. Very little firing. Steady progress made with mining and sapping operations described in diary for 4th November.

9th Nov. To-day being the birthday of His Majesty the King, Field-Marshal Count Nogi sent a most cordial letter of congratulation to the British attachés with this group, together with a case of champagne. The Chief of the Staff and three other officers of Head-Quarters Staff lunched at the attachés' mess, and His Majesty's health was drunk with full honours.

Very little firing to-day.

10th Nov. Heavy gun and rifle fire about 4 a.m., continued for about twenty minutes. The Russians apparently mistook the relieving trench guards for an assaulting column, and opened fire on them. The following further artillery dispositions are in progress.

Two batteries (eight guns) of 12-cm. (4·7-inch) howitzers are to be pushed forward between Shui-shih-ying and Pa-li-chuang (C/D 3); a third battery of three guns will be advanced to a position east of Ssu-chia-tun (D 3).

Four 12-cm. naval guns will be brought up to a position some 500 yards west of the Field Artillery Observatory (C 2).

Emplacements for all the above were commenced on the 7th instant.

The Russian warships in the harbour are regularly shelled by the 28-cm. howitzers.

The Russian guns in Sung-shu Shan have now been practically silenced.

---

* For Pigeon Bay *see* south-west corner of Map 68.

Sapping and mining operations continue to make progress in 1st and 9th Divisions.

In the 11th Division the struggle in the counterscarp galleries of the North Fort (D 3/4) continues. Captains Yate and Sir A. Bannerman visited East Pan-lung Shan to-day.

12th Nov. Started at 10 a.m. with Colonel Apsley Smith for the headquarters of the 9th Division, whence we were taken by an orderly officer to East Pan-lung Shan, where we were shown into the advanced trenches, about one hundred and fifty yards from the fortified Chinese wall now held by the Russians. We had with us a pair of hyposcopic glasses, so were able to obtain a good view without exposing ourselves. The Chinese wall is a fairly strong line of defence about twelve feet in height without ditch, a loophole to every yard, good cover in trench, and traverses at frequent intervals.

From East Pan-lung Shan we went to "P" work (D 3 S.E.), from the east face of which we obtained a most excellent view of the North Fort (D 3/4), and its masonry, counterscarp galleries, and loopholed gorge. This fort seems to have been considerably damaged by the Japanese artillery fire.

"P" work and East Pan-lung Shan were held by the 35th Regiment, the garrison of each being two companies.

From "P," we visited West Pan-lung Shan, held by a detachment (two companies of the 7th Regiment); got a good view of ditch of Erh-lung Shan. All the siege trenches that we saw were most admirably constructed; the depth varies from 4 feet to 6 feet, with about 6 feet of earth or large sandbags on the top.

Great care has been taken to provide cover from view at exposed places by placing three or four planks across the top of the trench, and piling up sandbags or earth thereon. Considering the large number of corpses that must have been buried in the vicinity, there was very little smell, while the cleanliness of the trenches and the excellence of the sanitary arrangements came as an agreeable surprise. We particularly noticed the well-fed, cheerful look of the men, who seem very comfortable. The chief source of discomfort is the scarcity of water, which has to be brought up from a ravine by hand for nearly two miles. The garrisons of the fort are relieved every ten or twelve days.

13th Nov. We were informed to-day that the 7th Division is on its way from Japan to join the Third Army.

The losses in the engineer battalions of the various divisions of this Army have been so great that three companies of engineers have been sent down from the northern Armies, and one company will be attached to each of the three divisions now here.

14th to 16th Nov. Nothing of any importance occurred; sapping and mining operations continue; small local counter-attacks made nightly by Russians at different places.

Most of the 1st Cavalry Regiment and the 17th Artillery Regiment of the Field Artillery Brigade have left for the north.

17th Nov. A staff captain from Head-Quarters informed us that at 2 p.m. to-day the mines at Sung-shu Shan (D 3 s.w.) would be exploded. Witnessed the explosion from the Field Artillery Observatory (C 2). There was one very large explosion and four minor ones. We have since been informed that the former was caused by four mines at the salient angle exploding simultaneously, thereby blowing in part of the Japanese trench.

18th Nov. A party of us visited the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division on the right flank. This brigade consists of the 1st and 15th Regiments, in all six battalions, and is holding Namako-yama (B 3), and attacking 203-Metre Hill (A/B 4). From the former place we had an excellent view of the harbour of Port Arthur, and saw several sunk merchant steamers, also the masts of a battleship. From Namako-yama we were taken to the sap-heads before 203-Metre Hill (A/B 4). There are three altogether, two on south-west and one on the north-east. An officer of the 1st Regiment, informed me that the Russians attacked them regularly every night, but never in strength. The capture of 203-Metre Hill appears to be a difficult problem.

20th Nov. A most regrettable incident occurred to-day. Two British attachés, Captains Yate and Sir A. Bannerman, and the German attaché, 2nd-Lieutenant Graf Wolffskeel von Reichenberg, visited the Japanese advanced trenches in front of Erh-lung Shan. They were accompanied by 2nd-Lieutenant Ishihata, one of the Japanese officers attached to the group of attachés, and were conducted by one of the adjutants of the 9th Division, and an engineer officer. After visiting the sap-head and mine shafts they were sitting in the trenches preparatory to returning when a large Russian shell—probably 12 or 15-cm.—fell in their midst and exploded with great violence, killing Lieutenant Ishihata on the spot and slightly wounding the adjutant; the remaining members of the party were covered with dust and stones, but were not otherwise damaged, which under the circumstances seems almost miraculous.

Three mines were fired at Erh-lung Shan this morning, two of which were very successful. Captain Yate reports that the depth of the ditch of this work is from 14 to 18 feet; it is now half filled up with *débris* caused by the explosion of the mines. As the caponiers at the end of the main fort (west) have been previously destroyed, the ditch is practically safe; engineers found and cut enemy's mine wires a few days ago.

The engineer reinforcements from the north for the Third Army are as follows:—

1 Guard Division engineer company attached to 1st Division.
1 6th Division engineer company attached to 9th Division.
1 8th „ „ „ „ 11th „

As an engineer battalion consists of three companies the arrangement only leaves two companies of sappers with the Guard, 6th and 8th Divisions.

In addition to the above, the 1st and 12th Reserve Engineer Companies have joined the Port Arthur investing force.

The 7th Division* landed at Dalny on the 18th instant, and is marching up; its position in the investing line is not yet fixed. This division has its head-quarters at Asahikawa in Hokkaido, but draws its recruits from various parts of Japan, as the population of Hokkaido is insufficient.

A very heavy fire of siege and field guns, Maxims and rifles, commenced at 4 p.m., and lasted for more than an hour.

Apropos of the 7th Division, we are informed that six mounted men are attached to each infantry company; this is the only instance of mounted infantry in the Japanese army.

The divisional artillery of the 7th Division is half field and half mountain; this was formerly the organization for all the divisions, but is now only retained by the 7th. There is no cavalry with this division.

An officer informed Captain Yate that of the twelve battalion commanders with the 9th Division only one has remained unwounded up to date. The four regimental commanders and the lieutenant-colonel commanding the divisional engineer battalion have all been killed or wounded—mostly killed. In one particular company there are only two soldiers who have been through the campaign from the commencement.

Another officer informed us at the beginning of this month that in the engineer battalion of the 1st Division only 60 men remained out of the original effective of 600 rank and file. These figures speak volumes for the severity of the fighting.

21st Nov. Sapping and mining operations progress. The following is the official account of the heavy firing at 4 p.m. yesterday:—The Japanese commander in the trenches in front of Erh-lung Shan (D 3) sent a reconnoitring patrol of one non-commissioned officer and two men over the parapet to gather information. They found the outer line vacated by the enemy, the majority of whom were in the inner fort (it seems that there are two parapets behind the outer one, the innermost of all for artillery, the next one for infantry). A larger patrol of one officer and twenty men followed the reconnoitring patrol; the Russians took this patrol to be the prelude to an assault, so hastily sent up reinforcements. The Japanese guns opened fire on these, the heavy artillery on both sides joined in, also the machine guns and infantry.

22nd and 23rd Nov. Saps and mining at the various forts continued—also against the Chinese wall. The ditch of the North Fort (D 3/4) is being traversed and a trench dug at sap-head for assembly of a storming party.

* *Vide* diary of 13th November.—C.M.C.

Visited Hsiao Ku Shan (E/F 5) on extreme Japanese left, and was able to form a very good idea of the great difficulties attending the attack on this position on the 8th August 1904. (Detailed report follows.)* **23rd Nov.**

Hsiao Ku Shan (E/F 5) was held by one Russian battalion, two field guns, and one machine gun. The Japanese attacking force consisted of three battalions (43rd Regiment) strongly supported by mountain guns, 12-cm. (4·7-inch) field howitzers, and 3·6-inch light mortars (twenty-four guns, mortars, &c., in all). The ground for 1,500 yards to the east and north-east of the position is absolutely flat, and quite devoid of all cover. There was also a stream (forty to fifty yards in width) running at the foot of the mountain. The Russians had dammed this stream so as to make a deep inundation, which proved a very serious obstacle, and cost the lives of several men.

Nevertheless, owing to the concentrated and accurate fire of the artillery, which bore down all opposition, the Japanese infantry were eventually able to carry the position with a loss of 30 to 35 per cent., which under the circumstances cannot be regarded as excessive.

The capture of Hsiao Ku Shan (E/F 5) exemplifies the truth of Zieten's saying: "Nothing is impossible; only some things are more difficult than others."

An officer of the Head-Quarters Staff called in the afternoon and announced that a general attack would be made to-morrow at 1 p.m. on Forts Sung-shu Shan, Erh-lung Shan, the North Fort, Work "Q," and East Chi-kuan Shan inclusive. Work "P" has been handed over from the 9th to the 11th Division. **25th Nov.**

The 26th Regiment of the 7th Division is being pushed up to the front—also a field hospital.

Went with Colonel Apsley Smith to the Field Artillery Observatory (C 2). Captain Yate and Sir A. Bannerman to position in vicinity of Tuan-shan-tzu (E 3). **26th Nov.**

From noon a heavy concentrated artillery fire commenced against all the forts selected for attack, particularly Sung-shu Shan, Erh-lung Shan, and the North Fort, also, to a somewhat less extent, on Work "Q," Work "H" (D 3 S.E.), Wang-tai (D 4 N.E.), and the Chinese wall. At 12.50 p.m. there was a very large explosion in the ditch of the North Fort. This was evidently the preconcerted signal for attack, as all the assaulting columns left the advanced parallels simultaneously.

At Sung-shu Shan and Erh-lung Shan the storming parties reached the works under heavy gun and rifle fire, but apparently without very heavy loss. At 1.30 p.m. the Japanese from Sung-shu Shan were seen running back in considerable panic, and were severely punished by the Russian guns while doing so. At Erh-lung Shan the storming party remained in the work. At 2 p.m. the Japanese and Russian artillery fire had

* *See* page 416.

almost entirely ceased, but re-opened at 4 p.m., when a large column entered Fort Erh-lung Shan. The Japanese also captured portion of the Chinese wall between "G" and West Pan-lung Shan; their reserves were plainly visible on the slope north of the latter fort.

With regard to events in the more eastern section of the line, Captain Yate reports as follows:—

The assault on the North Fort, Work "Q," and East Chi-kuan Shan was preceded by heavy artillery fire, mainly from the 28-cm. howitzers. On a large mine exploding at the North Fort the infantry attacked all three places simultaneously. At the North Fort the total attacking force was probably a battalion, the leading assaulting column being about one company. The enfilading fire from South East Chi-kuan Shan was extremely accurate, and caused many casualties. The Russian grenades also seemed to be very effective.

At Work "Q" the Japanese losses were heavy, but the crest of the parapet was reached and some men climbed over. Grenade throwing then commenced, and the bayonet was also used on those who entered the work; none returned.

At the North Fort a few men reached the parapet, but the majority of the assaulting column took cover in the crater formed by the mine explosion. A small party climbed up from the western side, but were stopped by wire entanglements, and had to retire with some loss.

Forts An-tzu Shan and I-tzu Shan were heavily shelled to-day by the naval 6-inch and 4·7-inch guns.

Heavy gun and rifle fire was heard at intervals during the night, principally in the direction of Sung-shu Shan (D 3 s.w.).

27th Nov. Visited the Naval Observatory (D 1) in the afternoon and met an officer who appeared somewhat depressed about yesterday's attack. He informed me that an attack was made during the night on the auxiliary work (D 4) of Sung-shu Shan, and was repulsed with considerable slaughter. He also stated that 203-Metre Hill (A/B 4) would be attacked to-night or to-morrow morning.

The 26th Regiment of the 7th Division passed our village to-day about 5 p.m. on its way to reinforce the right flank previous to the attack on 203-Metre Hill (A/B 4). The men looked, I thought, depressed and fagged, and not in good fighting fettle, but the fact of their having been kept standing about most of the day in a piercing north wind may possibly account for this.

A tolerable amount of firing went on during the night.

28th Nov. Fighting began in the direction of 203-Metre Hill (A/B 4) at 8.30 a.m. All along the eastern section everything is perfectly quiet.


The Japanese dead lie very thick just outside the auxiliary fort of Sung-shu Shan—at least 400 of them.

The Japanese evidently intend now to make a determined attempt to capture 203-Metre Hill (A/B 4), having failed in their attacks on the works in the eastern section of the Russian line.

203-Metre Hill (A/B 4) is a point of great importance for the Japanese, as it entirely commands the east and west harbours, and also the Russian shell factory and the new town. From this spot the fire of the 6-inch naval guns and 28-cm. howitzers can be accurately directed against the Russian battleships and cruisers.

A rough eye sketch of the operations at 203-Metre Hill is given below:—

Rough Eye Sketch of Operations at 203-*Metre Hill*, 28*th November to* 5*th December* 1904 (*from hill* 174–1500 *yards to north-west*).*



A. Sandbag breastwork to cover head of approach made during night of 30th November to 1st December 1904.
B. Approaches made 30th November to 1st December.
C. Japanese sandbag enclosure.
D. Russian trenches.
E. Japanese advanced parallel (from which attack was made on 5th December 1904).
F. Japanese trenches.
G. and H. Russian trenches.
K. Quarry.
L. First Japanese parallel.

203-Metre Hill was attacked at 8.30 a.m. as follows:—

Two battalions attacked the left of the enemy's positions at Height 210; one battalion attacked Height 203 from L. At the same time the knoll known as Akasaka-yama (*vide* sketch) was fiercely assailed by three companies of the 38th Reserve Regiment. At 10.30 a.m. the Japanese troops were holding on

* 174-Metre Hill (A 3)

to the top trenches (HH); the lower trenches (F1, F3) were also full of their reserves. The troops attacking Height 210 suffered considerably from artillery fire.

About 11.30 a.m. the majority of the troops close to Heights 203 and 210 broke and fled down to the valley in a compact mass, pursued by shrapnel.

They rallied, however, at the lower trenches, and returned to their former positions.

At Akasaka-yama the attack made by the Japanese was entirely unsuccessful, and their losses very heavy. They succeeded in constructing a sandbag entrenchment within fifty yards or so of the Russian trenches.

At 7 p.m. the Russians made a vigorous counter-attack, and drove all the Japanese down from Heights 203 and 210 to the lower trenches at F1.

29th Nov. During the night of the 29th/30th November the Japanese again occupied Heights 203 and 210 and also the Russian trenches at Akasaka-yama, but were unable to hold them: the fighting is reported to have been hand-to-hand and the losses on both sides severe.

30th Nov. Proceeded to Hill 174 (A 3). At noon some fifty Russians attempted to evict the Japanese from their sandbag enclosure at Akasaka-yama (A/B 4). Fierce hand-to-hand fighting took place, and the Russians were driven back with the loss of at least three-fourths of their number. At 1.30 p.m. Japanese infantry began to assemble in the lower trenches (FF) and by 2.15 p.m. three battalions had collected, of which one battalion was in reserve slightly to the rear.

At 2.30 p.m. the attack was commenced by two battalions from F1 towards F2 and A.

After considerable delay at the line of wire entanglements (through which passages had apparently not been cut), the two battalions eventually formed up at the foot of the hill, and under cover, in four lines of half battalions, the distance between the lines being about six paces. The companies in each line were in close order in two ranks.

This unwieldy mass advanced for fifty yards or so, when it was smitten on the left flank by rifle fire from the trenches at H. The whole column halted, turned to its left, and began a furious fusillade at the face of the hill.

After five minutes or so of this a further advance was made as far as the line AH, whence the leading half battalion pushed on up the slope towards Height 210. In ten minutes it was driven back, and carried with it nearly the whole of the remainder of the column, which went headlong down the hill until stopped by the reserve battalion in the trench at F1.

In a few minutes the men rallied and re-ascended the hill, lying down in a dense crowd in the angle between A and the

wire entanglement below H trench. This latter had evidently been partially evacuated by the Russians.

At 4 p.m a half-hearted demonstration was made against Height 203 from L; this made no progress whatever. Such was the situation at nightfall.

The attack on this occasion was delivered by troops belonging to the 7th Division, which had quite recently joined the army.

The Russian guns took no great part in this fight owing to the configuration of the ground; the rifle fire was very heavy.

1st Dec. During the night of the 30th November/1st December the Japanese again occupied the Russian trenches at Akasaka-yama, but for the second time were turned out.

An approach was made up to the south-west corner of 203-Metre Hill (A in sketch), and the head of it covered by a strong breastwork of sandbags. Two approaches have also been made up the left side of the hill towards Height 203 (marked B in sketch). The Russians have evidently evacuated trench H.

2nd Dec. Situation at 203-Metre Hill the same in every respect as yesterday.

3rd Dec. Lieut.-General Sir W. G. Nicholson arrived from Dalny to pay a visit on his way up to the north.

4th Dec. It has been decided to attack the Russian position at 203-Metre Hill to-morrow, and to carry it at all costs.

5th Dec. To Hill 174 (A 3). At 11 a.m. the situation was as follows: The Japanese were in possession of Height 210 (*see* sketch)* but had been driven off Height 203. The position of "H" trench immediately below Height 203 was held by a small party of Russians.

The Japanese guns were playing on Height 203 and on the ground between 203 and 210.

At Akasaka-yama there was no change in the situation.

An excellent advanced parallel (E) had been constructed to enable troops to assemble for the attack.

By 1.30 p.m. this parallel and the approach to it were quite full of infantry with fixed bayonets. At 1.45 p.m. one company trickled out by twos and threes, re-formed under cover at the foot of the hill, and lay down at "G" trench, just to the right of "K." In a few minutes this company advanced in extended order and worked its way up to Height 203, seemingly with little or no loss—the Russians in "H" trench had withdrawn.

Reinforcements in the parallel at "E" were now trickled up, company by company. Each re-formed under cover and then advanced to the summit. By 2.30 p.m. the whole crest line from Height 203 to 210 was occupied by two battalions; the

* On page 401.

men could be seen throwing stones and grenades at the Russians on the other side of the hill.

During this time the reverse slopes of the hill were continuously swept by the fire of thirty-six Japanese field guns, eighteen of which fired shrapnel at 3,300 yards range and the remainder fired high-explosive common shell at 6,000 yards.

Owing to the very effective fire of these guns, the Russians were unable to send up reinforcements, though they twice attempted to do so. By 4.30 p.m. firing had practically ceased, and the whole position was in Japanese possession.

The estimated losses during the day are :—

Japanese	-	700 killed and wounded.
Russians -	-	1,000 to 1,100 killed and wounded (chiefly from artillery fire).

This attack was a marked contrast to that of the 30th November.

6th to 12th Dec. Having captured 203-Metre Hill, the Japanese lost no time in establishing thereon several observation stations in telephonic communication with the various naval and siege batteries. From the summit of 203-Metre Hill the whole of the harbour, docks, arsenals, and the old and new towns are clearly visible, and the fire of the heavy guns can be accurately directed. The result of having obtained this important position has been the destruction of the entire Russian naval squadron in Port Arthur, with the exception of the battleships "Sevastopol," the gunboat "Otvajni," and some six destroyers, which have taken refuge outside the harbour at the foot of Man-tou Shan—a high hill on the Tiger's Tail Peninsula.

The following are the warships that are known to have been placed *hors de combat* :—

"Pobieda," "Retvizan," "Poltava," and "Peresviet."
Cruisers "Pallada" and "Bayan."

The Japanese are now considerably strengthening their artillery force on the extreme right. On the 10th December two 4·7-inch naval guns were placed on the col between 203-Metre Hill and Akasaka-yama, and on the following day three naval 12-prs. on the crest of Akasaka-yama itself. Two naval 6-inch guns will also be shortly moved up to the vicinity of Namako-yama (B 3), and four 6-inch howitzers near 203-Metre Hill.

The Russians are now actively engaged in constructing defences in the valley between An-tzu Shan (C 4) and I-tzu Shan (B/C 4); they evacuated Akasaka-yama and Horse Shoe Knoll (B 3) on the 5th December.

The Japanese mining operations at Sung-shu Shan, Erh-lung Shan, and North Fort (D 3/4) continue to make good progress; the mines at North Fort (D 3/4) will be ready in the course of a few days.

On the 11th December I had an interesting conversation with a staff officer; he stated that the actual garrison of 203-Metre Hill at the time of the attack on the 5th December was at most 400 men. The Russians twice tried to send up reinforcements—estimated at 1,500 in all—but were unable to do so owing to the severe losses caused by the Japanese artillery fire (*vide* Diary, 5th December 1904).

The Russians left 400 dead on 203-Metre Hill and in the neighbourhood, and their total casualties at this spot on the 5th December may be safely put down at from 1,100 to 1,200 killed and wounded.

The officer further stated that operations would shortly commence in the region south of 203-Metre Hill, with the view of cutting off the enemy's communications between Port Arthur and the high promontory of Lao-tieh Shan.* He was confident that General Stessel would resist to the last.

One 6-inch howitzer has been placed in Work P (D 3 S.E.) to breach the gorge of North Fort (D 3/4), about 350 yards distant.

The Russians have made no attempt to recapture 203-Metre Hill, which is significant.

16th Dec. Visited 203-Metre Hill, which is now held by troops of the 7th Division. The former Russian trenches were so damaged by the fire of the 28-cm. howitzers as to be almost unrecognizable; the Japanese have now constructed sandbag defences, which, however, afford no cover worth mentioning. The whole position was remarkably clean, and all the corpses had been buried.

An excellent view was obtained of the harbour, town, and shipping. All the men-of-war have a most battered and helpless appearance, and the majority of them have evidently sunk in shallow water, and have their keels resting on the harbour bottom. The new town does not appear to have suffered much from the bombardment.

I had an interview with a staff officer of the 7th Division, who confirmed the estimate of the Russian losses in the Diary for the 5th December, and also volunteered the statement that the total Russian casualties from the 26th November to the 6th December were between 5,000 and 6,000; he stated that he had excellent authority for his figures.

The "Sevastopol" was attacked last night by torpedo boats and severely damaged.

17th Dec. Visited a new field artillery observatory on a hill about 1,500 yards south-east of Yu Ta Shan (B/C 2)—in company with an officer of the corps artillery. He stated that the Russian losses from 26th November to 6th December had been "verified" as 6,000, also that the Japanese losses during the same period exceeded 20,000. The head of the Intelligence Department at Third Army Head-Quarters, puts the numbers at "over 10,000."

* For Lao-tieh Shan, *see* south-west corner of Map 68.

From the hospital returns, and from what I have been told by other officers, I calculate that 15,000 will be nearer the correct figures than either 20,000 or 10,000.

One officer stated that he did not think that the Russians could have more than 6,000 men now fit for duty, and that many of the guns in the various forts cannot be used owing to the lack of trained gunners.

The Russians sent in a flag of truce on the 16th instant, bearing a letter from General Stessel in which he complained that the Japanese were firing on Red Cross buildings; this was emphatically denied by General Nogi. General Stessel, in a second letter, asked to have certain areas excluded from bombardment. General Nogi replied that this was impossible, but desired the Russian commander to send a map with the positions of hospitals marked on it.

On the night of the 16th–17th December the Japanese occupied—with little or no resistance—a low ridge (called "Hill 1,000 Metres" east of Liu-chia-tun on map) south of 203-Metre Hill. They have now commenced two saps against I-tzu Shan (B/C 4).

A Russian torpedo boat was sunk in the harbour to-day by a 4·7-inch shell.

The mines at the North Fort (D 3/4) will be exploded to-morrow, and the work carried by assault if practicable.

18th Dec. I went to the Naval Observatory (D 1) to witness the attack on the North Fort. At 2.30 p.m. the mines were exploded, and a few minutes afterwards the infantry (about one battalion) attacked, and succeeded in obtaining a foothold on the parapet, but was unable to advance further, owing to the fire of two Russian machine guns. Both sides made copious use of hand-grenades. The shrapnel fire of the Japanese on the gorge of the work and the ground immediately in rear was heavy and accurate; their heavy guns engaged Forts East Chi-kuan Shan, "Q" (D 4 N.E.), "H" (D 3 south), and Wang-tai. The Russian shrapnel was moderate only—both as regards quality and quantity—while their heavy guns were conspicuous by their silence.

Repeated efforts were made to induce the Japanese infantry in the front line to charge the Russian machine guns and clear the redoubt with the bayonet, but without avail. Eventually, at 7 p.m., the general commanding the division personally brought up half a battalion and flung them into the work. It succeeded in capturing the machine guns, and by 11 p.m. the whole fort was in Japanese hands.

This is the only occasion during this siege—that I know of—that the commander of a division has personally assumed command of an assaulting column. The Japanese losses in this affair were only 400; those of the Russians were 250, out of a garrison of 300. The Russians left in the fort five 8·7-cm. (3·4-inch) Q.F. guns, two 3·7-cm. (1·5-inch) Hotchkiss guns, and six machine guns, also large quantities of ammunition.

Nothing of any great importance occurred during this period. Four 28-cm. howitzers have been moved from the left flank up to the neighbourhood of Namako-yama (B 3). The "Sevastopol" has again been torpedoed, and is now quite unfit for any active operations. **19th to 25th Dec.**

A staff officer informed Colonel Apsley Smith on the 24th instant that Forts Sung-shu Shan and Erh-lung Shan would probably be blown up and assaulted about the 28th or 29th of this month, and that in the beginning of January an attempt would be made to push the enemy in the centre; meanwhile the operations on the Japanese right are merely in the nature of a demonstration to deceive the Russians. This hardly accounts for the recent increase in siege artillery on the right.

On the 23rd December a height 1,200 yards south-east of 203-Metre Hill was occupied by troops of the 7th Division and is now entrenched.

Colonel Apsley Smith left for Tokio. **26th Dec.**

A very large fire commenced in Port Arthur to-day about 2 p.m., and continued till nightfall; it appeared to be near the dockyard.

The 6-inch howitzer in position at Work "P" made a twenty-yard breach in the Chinese wall in front of Wang-tai.

It is a significant fact that the Russians have not only made no attack on the North Fort (D 3/4) since its capture on the 18th instant, but have refrained from shelling it from Forts East Chi-kuan Shan, "H" and Wang-tai. This would appear to confirm the statement made by the officer of the corps artillery regarding the lack of trained gunners with the Russians (*vide* diary for 17th December 1904). **27th Dec.**

Orders have been issued for the attack on Fort Erh-lung Shan (D 3) to-morrow.

The mines at Fort Erh-lung Shan (D 3) were exploded at 10 a.m., and the infantry assaulted immediately afterwards. The Japanese field and mountain artillery were pushed right forward and were very active. One battery of the latter was on the western slope of West Pan-lung Shan—evidently in order to fire point-blank at the Russian loopholes at Erh-lung Shan (D 3). The Japanese had no 6-inch naval guns in action, and very few 28-cm. howitzers. Fire from other guns was well distributed against An-tzu Shan (C 4), I-tzu Shan (B, C 4), Sung-shu Shan (D 3 s.w.), "H" (D 3 south) and Wang-tai (D 4 north), and an old Chinese fort south-east of I-tzu Shan, which contains a few Russian Q.F. guns. **28th Dec.**

The infantry eventually succeeded in carrying the work about 6 p.m. The fire from the inner line of defence was so severe that the Japanese had to bring up two mountain guns to fire point-blank from the outer parapet.

The Japanese losses at the capture of Fort Erh-lung Shan were 960, the Russian losses about 300.


29th Dec. Two new 50-calibre 6-inch naval guns have been placed in the valley between 174-Metre Hill (A 3) and a ridge about 1,000 yards north-west of 203-Metre Hill (A/B 4).

30th Dec. An officer of the corps artillery, informed me to-day that the estimated Russian losses from the 18th instant (when the North Fort was captured) to the present date are 1,000. He went on to say that Fort Sung-shu Shan would be attacked to-morrow, and that the next objectives would be "D," East Chi-kuan Shan, "H" and Wang-tai.

The saps in front of I-tzu Shan (B/C 4) are progressing.

31st Dec. Witnessed attack on Fort Sung-shu Shan. At 10 a.m. all three mines were exploded, and the infantry at once attacked. Three or four minutes afterwards a second terrific explosion took place well in the interior of the fort, after which the Japanese infantry entered the work apparently unopposed. Shortly afterwards a large white flag was hoisted near the gorge. I have since been informed that what actually occurred was as follows:—

Rough Plan of Fort Sung-shu Shan.



XXX. Japanese mines in parapet.
A. Ditch of work.
B. Subterranean passage leading through work.
C.C. Russian magazines.
D.D. Russian bombproof casemates.
E. Gorge of work.
F.F. Route of Japanese infantry.

The explosion of the three mines in the parapet caused the Russian magazines to blow up, and blocked the subterranean passage. In the meantime parties of Japanese infantry had made their way round to the gorge of the work, thus cutting off the retreat of the garrison, which was consequently forced to surrender. It numbered 3 officers and 156 rank and file. From 200 to 250 more were entombed in the *débris* of the two explosions.

The Japanese losses only amounted to 120 killed and wounded.

Heavy firing was heard during the night.

1st Jan. 1905. New Year's day dawned in a propitious manner for the Japanese arms. Early in the morning the general commanding the 6th Brigade of the 9th Division pushed forward and occupied

Wang-tai (D 4 north), and also a small infantry work south of and between East and West Pan-lung Shan. He then advanced a portion of the 35th Regiment of his brigade to attack Work "H." This work was also attacked from the east by two companies from a regiment of the 11th Division.

During the forenoon the attack made steady progress, and at 3 p.m. the battery was captured. Directly after the Japanese had entered the work a very large mine exploded—evidently fired by the Russians when evacuating. Battery "Q" and another smaller one south-east of Fort Erh-lung Shan are likewise in Japanese hands.

The artillery fire of the Russians, and, in fact, their defence generally, was exceedingly weak, and it appears as if the end were near.

The chief Japanese artillery fire came from twelve 4·7-inch bronze siege guns in emplacements north of Fort Kuropatkin (D 3).

There was a tremendous explosion in the Russian lines during the night.

2nd Jan. The explosion during the night was caused by the Russians blowing up Fort East Chi-kuan Shan. This was occupied by the Japanese troops at 7 a.m.

An officer of the Head-Quarters Staff wrote this morning to inform us that General Stessel had sent in a flag of truce, with a letter, proposing a conference to-day, to discuss terms of surrender, and that the meeting would take place this afternoon in Shui-shih-ying.

Four torpedo boats and one small transport succeeded in leaving the harbour during the night, and evading the blockading squadron. They have proceeded to Chih-fu, and have on board four Russian, French, and German war correspondents.

The capitulation of Port Arthur was signed to-day.

3rd Jan. Visited Forts Erh-lung Shan and Sung-shu Shan. Both have been so much damaged by mine explosions and artillery fire as to be unrecognizable. In Erh-lung Shan there were heaps of mangled bodies and human limbs, and there are still some 200 Russian dead buried under the *débris*. I talked with several Russian soldiers. They had a well-fed appearance, and were fraternizing freely with the Japanese.

4th Jan. Visited the North Fort, Forts "D" and East and South-East Chi-kuan Shan. The North Fort is a permanent work with a deep ditch, flanked by concrete counterscarp galleries. It was, however, only intended for defence by infantry, the only guns in it being a few Hotchkiss and field pieces.

An officer of the Head-Quarters Staff was sent to-day to Port Arthur to communicate to General Stessel the message from the Emperor of Japan, that the garrison would be treated with the greatest consideration, and to inform him that General

Nogi proposed a meeting on the following day. General Stessel expressed himself very happy to meet General Nogi, and the following conversation then took place:—

General Stessel inquired as to Kuropatkin's whereabouts, and when informed that he was in the vicinity of Mukden declined to believe it. The officer thereupon produced the map, and showed him the positions of the two armies near the Sha Ho. Stessel then said that he last heard from Kuropatkin on the 6th October, stating that he was advancing to his relief. His Chinese spies, moreover, had reported that Kuropatkin was at Chin-chou, 20 miles north of Dalny. General Stessel inquired where the Baltic Fleet was, and on being informed, remarked that its coming was now useless.

All Russian horses and arms were handed over to-day to the Japanese; the prisoners will begin to arrive to-morrow. The officers will be allowed to retain their swords, and those who wish to do so will be allowed to proceed to Russia on parole; everyone else will be sent to Japan.

6th Jan. Lieutenant-Colonel Hume and two Swiss military attachés arrived to-day from the First and Second Armies *en route* for Dalny.

Large numbers of Russian prisoners—officers and men—marched by to-day on their way to the railhead. They all looked extremely healthy.

7th to 11th Jan. Re-visited Forts Sung-shu Shan and Erh-lung Shan, also "H," Wang-tai, and a battery of four 10-inch howitzers just below Wang-tai. The howitzers are in a very exposed position almost on the crest of the hill, and had consequently suffered severely. Two of them were quite destroyed, and a third had its carriage damaged. One gun had evidently been hit just as it was being loaded, and practically the whole of the gun detachment were killed.

A foreign military attaché gave me the following information that he obtained to-day from a Russian officer.

After the battle of Nan Shan the Russian forces in the Kuan-tung Peninsula numbered 35,000 (exclusive of the Navy—about 10,000 men). There are now in Port Arthur hospitals 15,000 sick and wounded; about 10,000 men have surrendered. The Russian losses during the siege were about 16,000 killed and wounded.

Fifty per cent. of the officers of the garrison have been actually killed—including two generals; only twenty-eight officers passed through the siege unhurt.

Food had latterly run short, also ammunition—especially for the heavy guns. Nevertheless, it would have been possible to have resisted for some time longer had it not been for the fire of the Japanese 28-cm. (11-inch) howitzers, which wrecked all the provision depôts and workshops, and blew up some ammunition magazines.

A cordial meeting took place on the 5th instant between Generals Stessel and Nogi. The two generals with their respective staffs lunched together and parted on excellent terms.

The following information regarding the garrison of Port Arthur was officially given out to-day by the Head-Quarters Staff of the Third Army:— **12th Jan.**

The following are the correct numbers of Russian officers and men who have surrendered These figures do not include about 18,000 sick and wounded in the hospitals at Port Arthur:—

(*a*) Going to Japan as prisoners—

Officers - - - -	878
Rank and file - - - -	23,491
Total - -	24,369

Among the above are the following generals and admirals:—

Lieut.-General Smirnov (Chief of the Fortifications).
Lieut.-General Fock (commanding 4th Division).
Major-General Nikitin.
„ Byeli.
„ Gorbatovski.
„ Illmann.
Admiral Wiren.

(*b*) Officers proceeding to Russia, 441.

They will be accompanied by some 230 soldier servants.

The following generals and admirals have accepted parole:—

General Stessel.
Major-General Reiss (Chief of the Staff).
„ Nadin.
„ Kostenko.
Admiral Prince Ukhtomski.
„ Grigorovich.
„ Roshchenski.
Chief Naval Engineer Lindberg (ranking as Admiral).

Total number of those who have surrendered—

Officers - - - -	1,319
Rank and file - - - -	23,721
Total - -	25,040

There are also some 2,000 volunteers, civil, postal, and telegraph officials and labourers, which brings the total numbers in Port Arthur up to about 55,000*—exclusive of the Chinese population.

* It is not clear how this figure is arrived at.

13th Jan. The official entry into Port Arthur took place to-day, and was of the most unostentatious nature. In addition to the Head-Quarters Staff the parade was attended by the commanders of divisions and brigades with their respective staffs, a detachment of two hundred rank and file from each infantry regiment, a proportionate number from the cavalry, artillery, engineers, naval brigade, and departments, and by every officer not employed on duty elsewhere.

The Head-Quarters Staff—preceded by a band—moved off at 10.30 a.m., the foreign military attachés followed immediately in rear.

The route selected was from the vicinity of Fort Sung-shu Shan through the old town, along the quay to the commencement of the new town, where there is a small parade ground. Here General Nogi and his staff took up their positions, and the defile past in column of route commenced; some seven thousand men passed the saluting post. The troops presented a very fine appearance, and their marching was excellent.

The spectacle was witnessed by large numbers of Russians, both soldiers and civilians.

After the parade we were entertained at luncheon in a large house lately occupied by General Smirnov, and the health of his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Japan was enthusiastically drunk.

General Nogi's health was afterwards proposed in a most suitable speech by the senior foreign military attaché, Colonel Pertev Bey, of the Ottoman Army.

Both the old and the new towns of Port Arthur are very little damaged, and I was particularly struck by the well-fed, well-dressed, and generally prosperous condition of the men, women, and children whom I met in the streets; there was no sign anywhere of famine or distress.

One of the committee appointed to take over the Russian munitions of war, &c., informs me that there are ample supplies of ammunition of all kinds—gun and rifle.

14th Jan. All the attachés attended a memorial service for the officers and men killed during the siege.

The ceremony, which was a simple but most impressive one, took place on some rising ground north of Shui-shih-ying, and was attended by some ten thousand troops, representing the various corps and departments.

16th Jan. A steam launch was kindly placed at our disposal to visit the Russian warships. We went on board the "Retvisan" and "Poltava," both of which are riddled with shell holes. The Japanese naval officers are confident, however, that they will be able to repair all the men-of-war in two or three years.

The "Sevastopol" and the gunboat "Otvajni" lie at the foot of Man-tao Shan (on Tiger's Tail Peninsula) in 25 fathoms of water.

I am informed that medicines were very scarce in the Port Arthur hospitals when the Japanese entered.

Scurvy appears to have been prevalent, owing to the lack of vegetables.

All the foreign military attachés with the First and Second Armies arrived to-day to pay a short visit to Port Arthur. **19th Jan.**

The following is the official statement of the principal Russian war material taken over by the Japanese in Port Arthur:— **23rd Jan.**

Guns:—

Heavy (12-inch, 10-inch, and 6-inch)	54
Medium (4·7-inch to 3-inch) - -	149
Light (Maxim and Hotchkiss) -	343
Total -	546

Shell (of different sizes) - -	82,670	
Gunpowder - - -	30,000	lbs.
Rifles - - - -	35,252	
Rifle ammunition - -	2,266,800	rounds.
Horses - - -	1,920	

General Nogi and the Head-Quarters Staff of the Third Army left to-day for Liao-yang. Orders have been issued for the concentration of the Army in the north. The 2nd Field Artillery Brigade has already marched, the siege artillery follows between the 20th and end of January, organized in one brigade as under:— **24th Jan.**

(*a*) 12-centimetre field howitzers—6 batteries (24 guns).
(*b*) 15-centimetre field howitzers—4 batteries (24 guns).
(*c*) 10·5-centimetre Krupp guns—1 battery (4 guns).
(*d*) 12-centimetre bronze guns—5 batteries (30 guns).

As regards the infantry, the 1st Division marched to-day, the 7th Division on the 29th instant, and the 9th Division on or about the 12th of February.

The 11th Division will shortly embark at Dalny and proceed to the Ya-lu river to join the newly formed Fifth Army, operating in Korea.

Concluding Remarks.

The siege of Port Arthur lasted 148 days, *i.e.*, from the 7th August 1904, when the first siege gun opened fire, to the 2nd January 1905, when the capitulation was signed.

Japanese Estimate of Port Arthur.—There is no doubt that the Japanese Head-Quarters Staff entered upon this siege with a light heart, and that they altogether under-estimated the difficulties that lay before them. In support of this statement it may be noted that at the beginning of August 1904 the only

siege guns with the Third Army were six 4·7-inch naval guns, thirty obsolete Japanese bronze guns of 12-cm. (4·7-inch), and four new Krupp guns of 10·5-cm. (4·1-inch).

Before the attacks of the East and West Pan-lung Shan Forts, the Japanese were evidently under the impression that their superb infantry would be able to carry the line of works with a rush—as they did in 1894 against the Chinese.

When it had been forcibly brought home to them that regular siege operations would be necessary, they set to work with characteristic energy to make up for lost time, and by the middle of September had established a formidable siege train of 152 pieces of ordnance—including eighteen 28-cm. (11-inch) fortress howitzers, sixteen 15-cm. (5·9 inch) siege howitzers, and four 6-inch naval guns. It is undoubtedly to these—especially to the 28-cm. howitzers—that their ultimate success is largely due.

Features of Country round Port Arthur.—With regard to the general features of the country near Port Arthur, it may be said that the line fortified by the Russians was by nature well suited for defence, affording as it did a clear field of fire, good command, and excellent mutual support between the different salients on which the various batteries and forts were placed. There were several points suitable for observation stations, while the reverse slopes of the hills offered many ideal positions for batteries of howitzers and mortars.

The weak point of the position lay in the fact that the Japanese line was even more suitable for attack than was the Russian for defence. A line of high hills parallel to and some 4,000 yards from the outer Russian forts gave excellent facilities for observation and at the same time good cover for ammunition and supply depôts, while the reverse slopes of these hills and the numerous underfeatures and folds of ground in front offered suitable artillery positions. Moreover, the numerous ravines running at right angles to the Russian line allowed of troops being brought up under cover with comparatively little labour, close to the points selected for attack, while the steep banks of the river bed at the bottom of the valley separating the hostile forces permitted of the reserves being massed within easy supporting distance of their comrades in the advanced trenches.

Russian Artillery Dispositions.—The Russian artillery positions were in general badly chosen. No attempt was made to utilize the reverse slopes or small valleys for batteries of howitzers and mortars, but these were placed almost on the crest line. Heavy guns were in many cases posted in most exposed positions in forts or on the summits of hills, without a vestige of cover of any sort, and no trouble was taken to prepare alternative positions for the wheeled artillery.

The large number of corpses, damaged guns, and artillery material of all kinds that littered the ground between Forts

Sung-shu Shan and South East Chi-kuan Shan, bore eloquent testimony to the faultiness of the Russian arrangements and the accuracy of their opponents' fire.

Japanese Artillery Dispositions.—The Japanese, on the other hand, made admirable use of accidents of ground, millet crops, dummy guns, and emplacements to conceal their batteries and deceive the enemy. Their losses in men and material were consequently small.

Japanese Engineers and Infantry.—Of the Japanese engineers and infantry it is impossible to speak too highly; their indomitable courage, their endurance, and their devotion to duty are beyond all praise.

The capture of Port Arthur had become—like that of Badajoz a century previous—a point of personal honour to officers and men alike, and they were prepared to face any bloodshed and to endure any hardships rather than fail in the task entrusted to them by their Emperor.

Japanese Losses in the Campaign.—With regard to the losses in this campaign, it is impossible to speak with absolute accuracy, but from information which I have collected from various sources it would seem that the casualties from 1st June 1904 to 8th August 1904 were from 8,000 to 10,000, and from the latter date to the 2nd January 1905 about 52,000. From 60,000 to 62,000 men killed and wounded may, therefore, be taken as the price that the Japanese nation has paid—and ungrudgingly paid—for the capture of Port Arthur.

Addendum.

Official statement of the exact quantities of foodstuffs and clothing taken over by the Japanese military authorities in Port Arthur.

Flour	1,360,250 lbs.
Barley	3,300 „
Crushed wheat	132,000 „
Indian corn	23,100 „
Rice	2,230 „
Army biscuit	99,000 „
Corned beef	58,000 „
Salt	580,000 „
Sugar	33,000 „
Beans	1,031,250 „
Trousers	3,200 pairs.
Overcoats	2,700
Cloth for overcoats	40,000 yards.
Black cloth	8,666 „

(17) Port Arthur.—The Attack and Capture of Ta Ku Shan and Hsiao Ku Shan by the 11th Japanese Divison; the 7th and the 8th August 1904.

REPORT by Major C. M. CRAWFORD, 5th Gurkhas. Port Arthur, 20th February 1905.

Plate.

The operations of the 11th Japanese Division against Ta Ku Shan and Hsiao Ku Shan - Map 70.

Ta Ku Shan and Hsiao Ku Shan* are two isolated and precipitous hills, between 600 and 700 feet in height, forming advanced posts in front of the right flank of the Russian main line of defence. Their capture was absolutely necessary, as they commanded the Japanese siege works and interfered greatly with the lines of communication and the establishment of the railhead at Chang-ling-tzu.

6th Aug. On the 6th August 1904 the 11th Division occupied the line Tuan-shan-tzu—Kao-chia-tun, the point of division of its two brigades (the 10th and 22nd) being the height (marked A on the map) north of Ta Ku Shan.

The ground opposite the Japanese right was undulating, and afforded cover for an attacking force. There were good artillery positions at A, B, and Wang-chia-tun.

On the left, low ranges of hills—varying from 6,000 to 2,000 yards from the points to be attacked—offered excellent positions for guns. Between the nearest of these ranges, however, and Hsiao Ku Shan (a distance of some 1,500 yards), the ground was absolutely flat and open, with no cover of any sort or kind. The Russians had, moreover, dammed the stream at the foot of the hill, and had thus made a wide and deep inundation that proved a most formidable obstacle to the attackers.

In addition to the six divisional mountain batteries, two four-gun batteries of 4·6-inch field howitzers and twenty-four light 3·6-inch mortars (intended for use in the mountains) were placed at the disposal of the commander of the 11th Division.

---

* *See* Map 70. The meaning of Ta Ku Shan is Great Lone Hill, and of Hsiao Ku Shan Little Lone Hill.

Of these, the field howitzers were on the reverse slopes of the hills at C, twelve of the light mortars were at San-chien-lung, and the remainder at B and Wang-chia-tun.

The divisional artillery was between A and San-chien-lung.

The Russian force on Ta Ku Shan and Hsiao Ku Shan consisted of about three battalions of infantry and twelve field guns, of which one battalion and two guns were posted on Hsiao Ku Shan, the remainder on Ta Ku Shan and the ground between this hill and East Pa-li-chuang.

For the attack on the 7th August, the 10th Brigade (22nd and 44th Regiments, each of three battalions) was detailed to attack the line East Pa-li-chuang—Ta Ku Shan; to the 22nd Brigade (12th and 43rd Regiments) was allotted the section Ta Ku Shan–Hsiao Ku Shan inclusive. The 12th Regiment attacked the former and the 43rd Regiment the latter hill.

7th Aug. To prepare the way for these two attacks the whole of the Japanese artillery opened fire at 4.30 p.m. on the 7th August. The Russian guns—not only from Ta Ku Shan and Hsiao Ku Shan, but also from the neighbouring works in the main line of defence—responded vigorously, concentrating their fire principally on the mountain guns, which consequently suffered considerable loss.

About 7.30 p.m., the artillery preparation being considered sufficient, the infantry was ordered to advance. The 10th Brigade, on the right, drove back the enemy opposed to it, and does not appear to have met with any determined resistance.

On the left, however, matters were different; owing to the darkness and heavy rain the Japanese guns were unable to effectively support the infantry, nor could the commander of the division see how events were progressing at Ta Ku Shan and Hsiao Ku Shan. However, the infantry at both places succeeded (in spite of a heavy fire and heavy losses) in establishing themselves at the foot of the hills, where they passed the night.

8th Aug. The attack was renewed on the 8th August, after a thorough and effective preparation from every available gun.

About noon some Russian gun-boats and destroyers issued from Port Arthur and opened a reverse fire from the bay west of Yen-chang on the 12th and 43rd Regiments, which nevertheless clung tenaciously to their ground and gradually worked their way up the slopes. By 8 p.m. the Russians had been compelled by the Japanese artillery fire to retire behind the crests of Ta Ku Shan and Hsiao Ku Shan: the Japanese infantry advanced, and after a stubborn contest captured both hills.

The Japanese losses during these operations amounted to 1,460 killed and wounded, the majority of which occurred in the 22nd Brigade. The 43rd Regiment alone had 540 casualties, and in its two leading battalions every single officer was *hors de combat*. The Russian losses are not accurately known but they were certainly severe, and all their guns were captured.

The capture of Ta Ku Shan and Hsiao Ku Shan was a brilliant feat of arms, and was undoubtedly due in a great measure to the loyal and efficient co-operation of the Japanese artillery, which proved itself (here as elsewhere) to be the backbone and marrow of the battle. It seems remarkable that the Russians did not set a higher value on the retention of these two hills, which formed, as it were, a powerful bastion on the right flank of their line, and were efficiently flanked by the fire of the works in rear.

Had Ta Ku Shan and Hsiao Ku Shan been really scientifically fortified and strongly held, their capture would have been well nigh impossible, and, until they were taken, the Japanese could not have commenced serious siege operations.

(18) Port Arthur.—Operations of the 1st Japanese Division from the 13th to the 22nd August 1904.

REPORT by Captain C. A. L. YATE, King's Own (Yorkshire Light Infantry), before Port Arthur, 11th September 1904.

Plate.

General Map of Port Arthur and neighbourhood - Map 71.

On the 13th August the 1st Division occupied the line Tsing-chia-tun—Hua-shih-lung (the latter on main road to Port Arthur). The Reserve Brigade (1st, 15th, and 16th Reserve Regiments) on the right. The 1st Brigade (1st and 15th Regiments) in the centre. The 2nd Brigade (2nd and 3rd Regiments) on the left.

At 9 p.m. on that day a general advance was made. The Reserve Brigade occupied a height east of Chin-chia-kou on its right and the height north-east of Hsiao-tao-kou on its left. The 1st Brigade sent one regiment (the 15th) to seize the height "1,200 metres south-west of Tien-pan-kou," south of 1st Division Head-Quarters Hill. The 1st Regiment was to seize the height of Yu Ta Shan. The 2nd (left) Brigade was to retain its position.

The men of the 15th Regiment captured the height south-west of Tien-pan-kou at midnight 13th/14th August in pouring rain. Having captured it, they found only a hostile advanced post, the main defensive line being on the present 1st Division Head-Quarters Hill. The thick weather prevented their discovering this beforehand; when the sky cleared at midnight, they saw this hill to the south of them. They established themselves at its foot and cut the wires of the entanglements during the darkness.

The six divisional batteries 1st Division, plus eight Army batteries (fourteen in all),* all 7·5-centimetre field guns, were ordered to take up positions on the line Han-chia-tun—Tsing-chia-tun, and open fire at daylight on the 14th August. The heavy rain on that day prevented an effective artillery bombardment, and the attack was therefore postponed till the 15th August.

* The 2nd Artillery Brigade having two four-battery regiments instead of two six-battery regiments.—C. Y.

At 10 a.m. on that day the "Height 131" north-east of Hsiao-tao-kou was captured. The troops remained on these heights till the 19th August.

On the 18th August the left brigade advanced to Yu Ta Shan facing Shui-shih-ying. The eight batteries of the 2nd Artillery Brigade moved to the east of Yu Ta Shan.

On the 19th the centre brigade remained stationary. The divisional artillery (Han-chia-tun—Tsing-chia-tun heights) were ordered to concentrate their fire on the heights north-east of Tai-ping-kou (Height 174, on the Japanese staff map). The 1st and 15th Reserve Regiments reached the bottom of this height and cut the wires during the night 19th/20th August. On the 20th they reached and took the first of three defensive lines at 10.30 a.m., the second at 12.30 p.m. The third could not be taken from in front. A few soldiers passed round and entered it from the rear. This height having fallen, the Russian trenches running north and south between Tai-ping-kou and 203-Metre Hill were rendered untenable by enfilade fire.

The Height 101, 1,200 yards west of Shui-shih-ying, was captured on the 19th August. The spurs running towards the south-west of Shui-shih-ying were captured on the evening of the 20th August.

On the 21st the north-east spur of Namako-yama was taken. The losses during all the above operations were about 2,000.

(19) Port Arthur. Operations of the 9th Japanese Division, the 19th to the 31st August 1904.

REPORT by Captain C. A. L. YATE, King's Own (Yorkshire Light Infantry), 23rd September 1904, and partially re-written 7th February 1905.

Plate.

Operations during November and December 1904 - Map 72.

Introduction.

The plan of operations for the first general assault on Port Arthur, which lasted from the 13th to the 24th August, was as follows:—The 1st Division was to capture the hostile positions on the range of hills lying north-west of the town and in front of the permanent forts forming the western defences. The 9th and 11th Divisions were to attack the line of forts and batteries forming the eastern sector of the land defences.

The operations of the 1st Division have been described in a separate report.* The 11th Division attacked East Chi-kuan Shan fort and the batteries lying south-east of it. These operations, which were attended by great loss and were completely unsuccessful, were not witnessed by any foreign attachés. This report will therefore be confined to those of the 9th Division.

The 6th Brigade of this division (7th and 35th Regiments) were to attack the two Pan-lung Shan batteries, the 18th Brigade (19th and 36th Regiments) were to move against the outlying fort, termed Fort Kuropatkin, or the fort north of Lung-yen.

The Attack on Fort Kuropatkin.

On the 19th August, the Japanese artillery opened fire all along the front, the Russians barely responding. The naval guns fired principally on Fort Kuropatkin. The six mountain batteries of the 9th Division (thirty-six pieces) and a four-gun 12-cm. howitzer battery in the valley north of the Naval Observatory directed their fire on the same objective. The 15-cm. howitzers and 12-cm. siege guns further east fired on the Pan-lung Shan works. **19th Aug.**

* Page 419.

At about 5 p.m. a party of about the strength of a weak battalion advanced against Fort Kuropatkin. The men moved over the open ground north of the fort in successively extended lines, about a section (80 men) abreast, and at about three paces interval.

A halt was made in a trench some three hundred yards from the work. Thence independent fire was delivered. On advancing once more they were met by a heavy rifle fire, but nevertheless reached the ditch of the work, where they were checked.

The front company during this advance is reported to have sustained 150 casualties out of a strength of 180.

20th Aug. On the 20th August the Russians entirely recaptured the work after some hand-to-hand fighting. Unseen by the Japanese in the fort, they brought up infantry and machine guns to the railway bridge, where a party of the attackers had effected a lodgment over night. Aided by a rapid and well-directed shrapnel fire, they overwhelmed the Japanese, the latter evacuating the fort at about 3 p.m. The Japanese artillery effectively supported the infantry, the shrapnel fire being very accurate.

The retreat was a flight, some of the men leaving their rifles behind. It was brought to a standstill in the trenches whence the final attack had started overnight.

Fort Kuropatkin protects the main road from Chin-chou to Port Arthur, and also the waterworks at Lung-yen. It was therefore a point of prime importance for the Russians. A network of trenches flanks the approach to it, and a deep trench leads to the southern Lung-yen fort. The parapet is almost entirely blinded along the face and has loopholes through steel plates. A very steep ditch surrounds it.

The Attack on the two Pan-lung Shan Works.

On the 20th August the bombardment was continued. In the evening the 9th Division occupied a line from Pa-li-chuang on the right to Wu-chia-fang on the left. Owing to the proximity of the hostile position, the Japanese were able to reconnoitre the defensive arrangements minutely. During the night of the 21st/22nd August the Russians fitted up electric alarm wires in the entanglements in front of their works. The Japanese, discovering this, thought they would require special non-conducting wire cutters, and an engineer colonel who was subsequently killed, utilized bicycle tyres for this purpose.

It is strange that the Japanese should have thought that the current would be powerful enough to be injurious, considering the well-known difficulty of inducing such a current.

21st Aug. At 4 a.m. on the 21st August the 9th Division began to move against East Pan-lung Shan work.

During the morning of that day portions of this division advanced over the open glacis-like slopes leading from the railway to the east section of the Russian defences. They advanced by small parties extended to from three to five paces. Great skill was shown in avoiding places where shells burst, in doubling over open ground, and in utilizing cover. Strong reserves were visible in the railway cutting and in the watercourses close by.

A reserve brigade was placed under the commander of the 9th Division during the night of the 21st/22nd August. On this night Fort East Pan-lung Shan was hotly attacked, one portion being assaulted five times. On the morning of the 22nd the Russians still retained possession.

At about 10 a.m. that day a battalion had crept up to the head of a watercourse some one hundred and fifty yards from the glacis of the work. **22nd Aug.**

Some men dashed up to the entanglement and cut the wire entanglements, which consisted of plain wires.

The Japanese artillery, especially its field guns, swept the crest and rear of the work with shrapnel and high-explosive shells, the former being very accurate, though they appeared to hit a few of the Japanese infantry. The latter carried flags, which the men raised to indicate their position to their own artillery. Russian guns and riflemen from the forts on the flanks and in rear played upon the Japanese, as did also two Maxims whose positions could not be located.

At about 12 noon a portion of the force which had congregated at the entrance of the work, probably finding some cover in shell craters, was seized with a momentary panic and fled to the head of the watercourse, where it was rallied and led forward again. The Japanese advanced along the ditch of the outer parapet, but the Russians held most of the interior of the work. At about 1 p.m. they made a counter-attack, but did not succeed in driving the Japanese back beyond the salient of the glacis. A hand-to-hand fight ensued, hand-grenades of a special pattern were thrown by the Japanese and similar ones by the Russians. One of the Russian guns inside the fort continued firing even at this moment.

The attack on this work was carried out by small bodies of men rushing forward in succession from the watercourse.

Two battalions of the 7th Regiment attacked this fort, one being in reserve. Out of the 1,800 men composing these two battalions, only 200 could be collected at the conclusion of the fighting.

The 9th Reserve Regiment of the 4th Reserve Brigade, which was detailed to support the above troops, showed great hesitation, and was in consequence relegated to line of communication duty, being afterwards sent to the forces in the

* Properly speaking the Pan-lung Shan work are batteries.—C. Y.

north. Considerable feeling was manifested towards it by the remainder of the Third Army.

From about 2.30 p.m. on the 22nd a pause set in, only desultory firing continuing.

At 5 p.m. West Pan-lung Shan battery was stormed by a mass of infantry which attacked it from the eastern spur. This party was formed on the initiative of a captain who, seeing from his position in front of East Pan-lung Shan work that some reinforcements intended for his party were halting in a watercourse leading to the western work, collected some of his own company and joined the reinforcements. With the group thus formed he attacked the western work. At about 5.30 p.m. heavy shell fire was directed by the Japanese on to its northern and western slopes. At 6 p.m. three Japanese flags were waving on the crest.

Attack on Wang-tai and "H" Work.

On the night of the 23rd/24th August a furious night assault was made by the 6th Brigade on the Chinese wall and the heights immediately south of it. The Japanese succeeded in advancing some distance up the Wang-tai hill and nearly to the top of that on which "H" Battery stands, but the Russian searchlights enabled the defenders to fire on them with accuracy. The attack was repulsed with very heavy loss, heaps of bodies marking its path.

Russian Counter-attack.

On the same night (23rd/24th August) heavy counter-attacks were made all along the line from Shui-shih-ying eastward to the coast. The two Pan-lung Shan works were held by the Japanese, although two Russian companies actually penetrated beyond them. The Japanese never vacated these works, in spite of the losses caused by the continuous Russian shell fire from all the adjoining works, as well as from the forts in rear. During the earlier period of the occupation the losses in these two posts averaged 100 daily.

Observations.

Generally speaking, there was a want of method in the Japanese artillery preparation. It was too short and not continued long enough when the infantry attacks took place.

The insufficiency of the artillery, both as regards calibre and number of guns shows how little the Japanese then realized the serious nature of the task before them; 4·7-inch naval guns and 15-cm. (5·9-inch) howitzers constituted their most powerful ordnance.

Infantry supports were too far back. General Nogi tried to pierce the defences by a *coup de main*, and received a distinct

repulse. The tenacity with which the Japanese maintained their hold of the Pan-lung Shan works merits the greatest admiration, and proved of great service subsequently.

The Russian searchlights and star shells proved of some value ; the Japanese, on the other hand, found their two searchlights of little use and sent them northward not long afterwards.

The total Japanese losses from the 19th to the 24th August, were 14,000, amongst which were 3,500 dead. After the latter date the Japanese tactics changed considerably, and a more or less regular siege commenced.

The garrison of each of the Pan-lung Shan works amounts to about one company with four machine guns.

(20) Port Arthur.—Attack and Capture of Fort Kuropatkin, or North Lung-yen Redoubt, the 19th August to the 19th September 1904; with description of the Fort.

REPORT by Captain Sir A. BANNERMAN, Bart., R.E., before Port Arthur, 19th December 1904.

Plates.

General Map of the Attack on Fort Kuropatkin - - - -	Map 73, fig.	1.
Plan of Fort - - - -	„ „	2.
Sections of Fort - - - -	„ „	3 and 4.
Plan of Approaches to Fort - -	„ „	5.

Description of Fort Kuropatkin.

On the 19th September 1904, during the attack on Fort Kuropatkin, the work was very severely "hammered." After its capture the Japanese, having nothing to gain by its occupation, destroyed what remained of its bombproofs, and as a consequence it was difficult to get exact dimensions.

The plan could still be easily recognized, but for sections it was necessary to rely on the kindness of the Japanese Staff. These sections had to be modified considerably after two visits to the redoubt.

The work was constructed round a coffin-shaped hummock, caused by the protrusion of a vein of rock from the surrounding red soil. The ditch apparently followed the line where the rock began to rise steeply, thus accounting for the peculiar trace. This brings the terreplein some 5 feet above the crest of the glacis, and looking from the glacis, produces the appearance of an enormous parapet.

The ditch must have entailed immense labour, being cut out of rock, part of which must have needed blasting. It was flanked, at the gorge and at angle "6,"* by breastworks of barrels filled with stones, with sandbags on the top. Machine gun fire could be heard whilst the stormers were in the ditch probably it came from behind the breastworks. The trenche

* *See* Map 73, Fig. 2.

at angles "3" and "6" were well placed for flank fire over the glacis; they were deep, with sandbag loopholes.

The parapet was provided with sandbag loopholes all round, except for a few feet at the entrance, where it was too high. It was traversed at short intervals, 15 or 20 feet. Both traverses and loopholes were much "knocked about." The breach through which the stormers entered the work was made in the face 1–2. Here overhead cover had been provided for the infantry, a doubtful advantage, as this face invited attack and received a concentrated artillery fire. After the assault there were 4 feet of *débris* in the ditch near the breach, and it was easy to walk up into the work.

The bombproofs were much wrecked by artillery fire; 4·7-inch howitzers and 4·7-inch naval guns were the heaviest ordnance used. Possibly the Russian 15- and 22-centimetre (say 6- and 8·5-inch) howitzers, turned on to the work after its capture, may have contributed to the damage.

The timber was entirely destroyed or removed, but appears to have been heavy, 10 to 12 inches square for posts and joists, and 10 or 11 inches overhead. In another Russian redoubt, forming part of the same line of works, the overhead timber was formed of 10-inch by 2-inch planks, set on edge, touching one another.

Those bombproofs furnished with an iron plate between earth and timber escaped without serious damage. So far as can be ascertained, except for this ⅜-inch iron, the others were equally well protected. On the evidence of Japanese officers who entered the work when it was taken, the difference was most marked between those casemates with an iron plate and those without. There would appear to be some virtue in the presence of the iron plate apart from its strength, which cannot be great. Only the smaller bombproofs were provided with plates, and possibly their small size may account for their immunity.

A deep trench led up to the entrance, where no great provision against attack was made. Some barbed wire was left about the entrance, but it is not apparent that any great fire could be concentrated there—rather the reverse. Reliance seems to have been placed on the breastworks flanking the ditch. Cover for supports was provided in the ditch just beside the entrance.

A mine was pushed a short distance to the front, for the purpose of intercepting any underground work on the part of the Japanese.

Except for a small Hotchkiss gun mounted at the eastern salient, the work relied for its defence entirely on infantry, machine guns and hand-grenades. A few land mines were laid in the ditch but none seem to have exploded.

*Attack and Capture of the Fort.**

When the Japanese, on the 30th July 1904, drove the Russians from the heights some 6,000 yards to the north of Port Arthur, they found a line of trenches and redoubts, passing just in rear of Shui-shih-ying, still interposed between themselves and the central position of the main defences.

The flanks of this line were thrown back to rest on the main line of forts, and Fort Kuropatkin stood out, a prominent salient, on the highest points within one thousand yards, some 250 feet above sea level. There was nothing unusual in its appearance. Owing to its irregular shape, the nature of the work was difficult to determine. The majority inclined to the belief that it was a lunette, and even after the Japanese had entered it and been driven out again, it appeared on a map as a rectangular redoubt.

Accustomed to victory, the Japanese had great hopes that they could take Port Arthur by assault. Accordingly, whilst preparations were being made to storm the two Pan-lung Shan forts, and after a desultory bombardment from four 4·7-inch howitzers, two or three 4·7-inch naval guns, half a dozen naval 12-prs., and a few field guns firing an occasional shrapnel, the Japanese
19th Aug. infantry, on the evening of the 19th August, effected a lodgment in the north salient of the work, with a loss of 350 men. It is not clear whether the advanced Russian trench was evacuated
20th Aug. or taken by assault. On the morning of the 20th August, the Japanese were firmly entrenched at the point "X,"* the entanglement on the glacis of the redoubt was destroyed, and a party of, at most, 200 men was holding on to the north salient, with three hundred yards of absolutely open ground between them and the nearest support. When, at 2 p.m., a determined counter-attack was made by the Russians upon the troops in the salient, these came back to their trenches with heavy loss. The bodies of those that fell in the retirement remained unburied until the redoubt was finally captured in September.

21st Aug. The morning of the 21st August found the Russians in full possession of the redoubt, the damage to the parapet repaired, and only the wire entanglement not replaced. The Japanese held some two hundred yards of trench at the point "X," with secure communication to their rear.

Before any further attempt could be made on Fort Kuropatkin, the very heavy loss incurred in the barren capture of the two Pan-lung Shan forts, and the repulse of the assault on Wang-tai Battery, during the night of the 23rd/24th August, had warned the Japanese that Port Arthur was not to be taken except by a regular siege.

---

* *See* Map 73, Fig. 1. † *See* Map 73, Figs. 1 and 5.

Accordingly, approaches were begun at six different points on the line of defence, Fort Kuropatkin being one of the works selected for attack. The approaches here are noteworthy as being the first from which an assault was delivered. They also progressed faster than any others, and consequently represent the first attempt at siege work under modern conditions. Their design was never imitated.

The trench at "X"* was extended right and left, loopholed for musketry, and formed the first parallel. It was broadened and deepened later, and served as a thoroughfare across the Russian front.

The sap was broken out during the night of the 31st August/1st September. The ground falls away slightly to the right, and to take advantage of this fall, which concealed the workers from the Russian trenches on the left, the sap was started right-handed. After proceeding 65 yards, an angle was made, and the next 200 yards of trench were directed just clear of the left of the redoubt. Instead of zig-zagging, a traverse was made at every 30 yards of approach. The soil was red earth and stone. **31st Aug. 1st Sept.**

At 100 yards' distance from the redoubt, a short second parallel was formed, from which three zig-zags were driven to distances varying from 70 to 90 yards from the crest of the glacis. At this distance the third parallel was made. A small relief approach to the second parallel was dug on the right of the main approach.

Sandbags ran short during the work, and Dalny was ransacked for materials from which to make them. The latter portion of the trenches was revetted with bags made of flowered calico. At such short distances, however, invisibility became of minor importance.

The approaches were finished on the 15th September, and "snipers" were pushed out to the right, along the nullah, from the third parallel. The Russians occasionally made counter-attacks at night, but were always easily repulsed. **15th Sept.**

Concurrently with the approaches to Fort Kuropatkin, others had been pushed against a cluster of redoubts south of Shui-shih-ying,† and these approaches were ready on the 18th September. Though the redoubts were assaulted simultaneously with Fort Kuropatkin, the operations against them did not appreciably affect the fate of the latter, except that the attack was delayed pending the completion of the saps against the redoubts. The wildest reports had been circulated about the strength of Fort Kuropatkin; the work was credited with an enormous ditch, iron-plated caponiers, underground galleries, and other terrors. **18th Sept.**

---

* *See* Map 73, Fig. 5.

† *See* Map 73, Fig. 1.

19th Sept. At 1 p.m. on the 19th September, fire was opened from practically the same pieces as were used in the previous attack, but in this instance the bombardment was carefully regulated. Beginning with an occasional shot to find the range, it grew gradually in intensity till a steady stream of shells was falling into the work. The howitzers appeared to be directed against the bombproofs inside the redoubt, whilst the naval guns concentrated their fire on the north salient. By 3 p.m. timber was sticking up from the parapet near this salient, large quantities of *débris* were sliding into the ditch, and the sandbag loopholes showed signs of damage all along the crest. The Japanese field artillery on the right enfiladed with shrapnel the northern faces of the redoubt, and the Russian trenches to the south-east. About 4 p.m. the Russians began firing very large shrapnel at the advanced parallels, from the neighbourhood of Wang-tai, taking the trenches at rather a dangerous angle, and making excellent practice. Although the parallels had no traverses or flank protection, casualties were few. This immunity was probably due to the fact that the assaulting party and supports were not sent into the advanced parallels until the moment had almost arrived for the attack.

At 5 p.m. two ground-scouts, their heads and bodies protected by steel shields, left the third parallel and started towards the north salient. The fire directed on them was not heavy, but both fell.

At 5.15 p.m. the assaulting party could be seen making its way up to the advanced trenches.

At 5.40 p.m. the stormers left the trenches and advanced at a steady run towards the north salient. They got into the ditch without loss, and were followed by the supports, about 400 men in all. Intermittent rifle fire and occasional short bursts from a machine gun could be heard as the last men crossed the open, but casualties were few. A demonstration against the trenches to the south-east, had drawn off the attention of the defenders of those trenches, and fire was only directed on the attacking force at the redoubt from the northern face and the short trench to the west. Parties worked their way along the nullah from the third parallel and engaged the defenders of the south-western trenches. Japanese shrapnel also kept down the fire. From the ditch, however, the attackers were unable to make their way into the redoubt. From the general map,* it will be seen that the ditch is flanked, round the point attacked, by one or other of the main forts, except for the northern face, where a little cover can be found. Artillery fire of every description swept the ditch.

Although a practicable breach had been made by the artillery, only a few small parties made their way up to it. Men could only enter the work two or three at a time, and they seem to

* *See* Map 73, Fig. 1.

have been shot down as fast as they went in. The caponiers proved to be non-existent, but two flanking walls of sandbags checked attempts to work round to the gorge.

Huddled together in the cramped space, with hand-grenades falling continuously amongst them, and only partial cover from the defenders' artillery, the attackers held on till 6.30 p.m., when some 250 men left the ditch and ran back into the advanced trenches, losing many on the way. There were, however, no signs of panic.

A certain number remained in the ditch waving a Japanese flag above the crest of the glacis to call attention to their presence.

The situation was unchanged when darkness fell.

During the night the assault was renewed, and at 2 a.m. a party of Japanese succeeded in driving the defenders from the work. The morning of the 20th September saw Fort Kuropatkin empty and burning fiercely, and the trenches both to south-east and south-west in Japanese possession. **20th Sept.**

The casualties incurred in their capture are unknown, the returns including those at other places, but they are approximately 500 to 600.

South Lung-yen Redoubt fell without fighting.

Though in itself useless to the Japanese, Fort Kuropatkin protected one of the main water supplies of Port Arthur, the source of which was immediately destroyed. Its fall further enabled the Japanese to commence siege operations against Forts Erh-iung Shan and Sung-shu Shan, and to push mountain artillery into the low ground south of Fort Kuropatkin with a view to enfilading many of the defences.

(21) Port Arthur.—Japanese Operations on their right wing and in centre, the 19th to the 22nd September 1904.

REPORT by Captain C. A. L. YATE, King's Own (Yorkshire Light Infantry), before Port Arthur, 28th October 1904, and partly re-written in Tokio, 8th February 1905.

Plates.

Operations, 19th to 22nd September 1904 -	Map 74.
Plan of works to the south of Shui-shih-ying -	Map 75.
Profile sketch of Namako-yama - -	Panorama 9.
„ „ (203-Metre Hill) - - -	

After the fighting at the end of August, the Japanese began sapping against Fort Kuropatkin.* The approaches were completed about the middle of September. On the 19th of that month the 9th Division was to make a renewed attack on it, whilst the 1st Division was to advance against the fortified hills in front of the positions it then occupied. As I was specially detailed to watch† these operations, and was the only foreign attaché present, this report will be almost entirely confined to the operations on that side.

The 1st (Right) Division Operations.—The operations of the 1st Division comprised three distinct attacks on the following points‡:—

(*a*) Namako-yama Hill.
(*b*) Four small works lying south of Shui-shih-ying.
(*c*) The 203-Metre Hill, termed Royasan by the Japanese and High Hill by the Russians.

A brigade was detailed for each of these three attacks, which will be separately described in the order given above.

Positions of its Troops.—Since the fighting of the 13th to the 21st August the Reserve Brigade of the 1st Division had been camped at Tai-ping-kou and on the lower slopes of ridge "Y." Its outposts extended over the low ground westward and

* The report on the details of Fort Kuropatkin with plan and profiles should be read in connection with this report.—C. Y. (Page 426.)
† From 1st Division Head-Quarters Hill.—C. Y.
‡ *See* Map 74.

thence over the line of hills running north and south from Louisa Bay to Pigeon Bay.

The 1st Brigade in the centre had some of its troops camped on the northern slopes of 1st Division Head-Quarters Hill, others on the sheltered sides of the 131-Metre and 174-Metre Heights (a battalion on the latter), and finally one battalion of the 1st Regiment on the north-east spur of Namako-yama, this position having been captured on the 21st August.*

The 2nd (left) Brigade occupied the ridge running out from Head-Quarters Hill to the west and south-west of Shui-shih-ying. The 3rd Regiment of this brigade held Shui-shih-ying itself.

Dispositions of the Infantry for the Fighting.—The dispositions of the troops at the commencement of the fighting are shown, as far as possible, on the accompanying plate.† They were briefly as follows :—

Infantry, 1st Regiment of 1st Brigade to attack Namako-yama. One battalion 15th Regiment formed a reserve to the 1st, its sister regiment ; its other two battalions were detached as a divisional reserve, to the col east of Tai-ping-kou. The 2nd Brigade (less one battalion of the 2nd Regiment retained at divisional head-quarters) was drawn up in the hollows between the heights and Shui-shih-ying village. The Reserve Brigade, comprising the 1st, 15th and 16th Regiments (each of the two battalions) was concentrated round Tai-ping-kou, a portion, however, forming a right flank guard to meet any hostile movements from the direction of Pigeon Bay.

The divisional commander and his staff were on the south-east corner of Head-Quarters Hill, as was also the senior of the two Intelligence officers on the Third Army Head-Quarters Staff.

Disposition of the Artillery.—The number of guns employed was as under :—

(1) Sixty field guns, thirty-six of the 1st Divisional Artillery and twenty-four of the 17th Regiment, which was a four-battery one belonging to the 2nd Artillery Brigade, and temporarily placed at the disposal of the commander of the 1st Division.
(2) Twenty-six heavy guns.
(3) Twenty-four machine guns.
(4) Eight 47-mm. Hotchkiss guns.

The disposition of the above guns was as follows :—

(i) At Hsiao Han-chia-tun, five naval 12-prs. (not included in above).

---

* *See* report on these operations, page 419. † *See* Map 74.

	Field.	Heavy.
(ii.) At the west of Hsiao Han-chia-tun, two field batteries 17th Regiment - -	12	—
(iii.) At the west of Tsui-chia-tun, three field batteries 1st Regiment - - -	18	—
Each of the batteries at (iii.) advanced a section; they were placed at the following three places:—(*a*) Wang-chia-tien-tzu; (*b*) the col east of Tai-ping-kou; (*c*) the third peak west of Height 174.		
(iv.) Four field batteries (three 1st Regiment and one 17th Regiment) at the west of 1st Division Head-Quarters Hill -	24	—
(v.) At point 101 (height west of Shui-shih-ying) for reverse fire on 203-Metre Hill, one battery 17th Regiment -	6	—
(vi.) South of Hsiao-tung-kou, twelve 9-cm. mortars - - - - - -	—	12
(vii.) North of Tien-pan-kou, twelve 12-cm. howitzers, or 3 batteries - - -	—	12
(viii.) At Tien-pan-kou, two naval 4·7-inch guns under orders of the G.O.C. Siege Artillery - - - - - -	—	2
Total field guns - -	60	—
„ heavy guns - -	—	26

The above list was furnished to the foreign attachés by the Staff of the Third Army.

Machine Guns.—The machine guns were attached to infantry units.

Hotchkiss Guns.—Of the eight Hotchkiss guns employed, two were in Shui-shih-ying, two with the Namako-yama column, and two with the troops attacking the 203-Metre Hill. The position of the others is not known, but some guns of this class appeared to be firing from the 174-Metre Height.

Positions of Guns not under G.O.C. 1st Division.—The 16th and 18th Field Artillery Regiments of the 2nd Artillery Brigade, each detached a few guns to the height north-west of Yu Ta Shan to fire on the hills to be attacked. The rest of the 2nd Artillery Brigade, and the naval guns near the Tu-cheng-tzu–Port Arthur road, fired mostly on the works south of Shui-shih-ying.

Capture of Namako-yama.

Description of the Position.—Namako-yama is a long, sharply indented hill with two peaks at either end of the ridge

forming its summit. A road leads along the valley which skirts its western slope. The spur which the Japanese captured in August is separated from the main hill by a low col. The sides of the hill are precipitous and very rocky towards the top. A short distance below the summit the Russians had constructed a long trench, with blindages,* and a shorter one a little lower down.

Its Garrison.—The following Russian troops defended it on the 19th September :—

Detachments of the 5th Siberian Sharpshooters.
„ „ 27th East Siberian Rifles.
„ „ Sailors.

The whole amounting to the strength of about five companies.

The Preliminary Bombardment.—All the artillery under the commander of the 1st Division directed their fire on this hill and on 203-Metre Hill, the heavy guns opening at 2 p.m., and the rest at about 2.40 p.m. The ground round Shui-shih-ying had been shelled during the forenoon by the naval guns. The Russians replied with moderate energy from their main forts. A gun in a very exposed position on Namako-yama† was very pluckily served.

The Infantry Attack.—The infantry attack on Namako-yama began about 6 p.m. on the 19th September. The two battalions of the 1st Regiment at "*a*"–"*a*"† advanced round the shoulder of the spur on which they had been stationed to a position on the main hill below the Russian trench, where the steep ground and rocks afforded some shelter. They were supported by machine guns which were immediately brought up the spur and fired thence at the Russian trenches on the main hill. The infantry remained on this slope during the night. **19th Sept.**

The afternoon of the 19th September and the following night were piercingly cold and a high wind was blowing. At 11 p.m. the Japanese captured the lower trench. During the night the troops entrenched themselves in their positions, and the space being insufficient, a portion of the force came down the hill again. The rest remained in position until 4 p.m. on the following day. They suffered somewhat from their own artillery's shrapnel during the forenoon of the 20th September, the usual waving of flags being resorted to in order to warn the gunners. The 15th Regiment, from the lower portion of the ridge east of Tai-ping-kou,‡ attempted an attack on the south-west corner of Namako-yama§ during the forenoon. They suffered heavy losses owing to the fire from the 203-Metre Hill and from the under-feature north-east of it. Between 3 and 4 p.m. a battalion of the 1st Regiment in very close formation rushed up the hill, and after a hand-to-hand fight, in which **20th Sept.**

* This trench was never visited by me, but the clouds of smoke which arose after its capture denoted the presence of woodwork.—C. Y.
† *See* Panorama 9 (*a*). ‡ *See* Map 74. § *See* Panorama 9 (*b*).

hand-grenades were freely used, captured the north-east portion of the hill, the enemy's trench being set fire to. Almost at the same time another battalion of the 1st Regiment moved round the north-east spur and thence up the valley, climbing the hill at its south-western end and successfully gaining the summit. The two assaults were made within twenty minutes of one another (*see* lines and arrowheads on Plate).* The guns in the work had been dismounted before capture.

The casualties sustained by the Japanese during these attacks were not large.

Capture of the Works south of Shui-shih-ying.†

One of the four small open works lying south of Shui-shih-ying† ; the north-western one, termed "B," was the strongest. The enemy had been strengthening this during the preceding fortnight. "D," the north-eastern work, was considerably smaller than the others.

After four hours' bombardment by the naval guns and 2nd Artillery Brigade, a part of the 3rd Regiment advanced to the attack at 6 p.m. Two men with metal shields, reaching as far down as the legs, strapped in front of their bodies, moved forward a few minutes before the assaulting party to cut the wires. Both fell after a few minutes. The Russians defended the work so stoutly that, although the assailants reached the ditch, they could not get up the escarp.

After darkness had set in the Japanese made several attacks, but could not succeed, owing to the effective fire of machine guns inside the work.

During the night, about 2 a.m., the troops in the ditch were recalled to the sheltered ground, whence the attack had been launched.

21st Sept. At daybreak the artillery bombarded the works afresh, and at 9 a.m. the troops moved forward again. At 9.40 a.m. the work was captured. Without halting, the Japanese attacked "A" (the south-western) and "C" (the south eastern) work. "D" (the north-eastern) work had been captured during the night by portions of the 9th Division, which had advanced from Fort Kuropatkin. The defenders of "D" work had fled to "C." The defenders of "B" and "A" likewise fled to "C," a watercourse connecting the last three works.

The casualties in these attacks amounted to about 300 men. The enemy's strength and casualties are not known.

The gorges of these works are defended by a network of trenches, very narrow and with frequent traverses. The depth averages 5 feet, and the shaly soil enables the sides to be almost perpendicular. Emplacements for machine guns were made at intervals. The parapets of the works are very low and blinded by sandbags and timber, with earth over the top. The ditches

* *See* Panorama 9 (*a*). † *See* Map 75.

are about 8 feet and double that width. The inside is a labyrinth of bombproof shelters, partly below the ground level. These were used as barracks and magazines. Machine guns from the interior swept the parapets. Three of these were captured in "B" work, and several in the others.

The attack on Fort Kuropatkin will here be briefly referred to, in order to maintain the sequence of the narrative.* It was carried out by the 36th Regiment and one battalion of the 19th Regiment, all belonging to the 18th Brigade. The fort was bombarded during the 19th September by the naval guns south and south-east of the Naval Observatory, and by those near the main road. The infantry were massed in the approaches. These were the first sapping works undertaken by the Japanese. Artillery fire had forced the defenders to evacuate it, but they remained in the flanking trenches. After fighting from 5 p.m. on the 19th to 4 a.m. on the 20th September, the Japanese captured it. It was subsequently abandoned, being too much exposed to artillery fire.

The Attack on 203-*Metre Hill.*†

20th Sept. 203-Metre Hill was attacked on the evening of the 20th September by a portion of the 1st Reserve Brigade (under the commander of the 1st Division); two companies of the 1st Reserve Regiment, and the larger proportion of the 15th and 16th Reserve Regiments took part in it. The attackers advanced over the 180-Metre ridge), termed ridge "Y" on the Panorama,‡ and moving along a "nek" attacked the south-west corner of the hill. They reached the wire entanglement surrounding it, and a small party even penetrated beyond. Rocks and grenades thrown by the defenders, even more than rifle fire, brought the attack to a standstill. But the great obstacle was the flank fire of machine guns in casemates made of stout circular beams, some twelve inches in diameter, supporting a roof of rails, sleepers, and earth, and having steel plates with loopholes for flanking fire. These dark casemates no doubt gave rise to the idea—which was generally credited for a long time, even by the Japanese General Staff—that the Russians had constructed tunnels from one side of the hill to the other.

22nd Sept. The troops could progress no further, and after remaining for two days in the south-western portion of the lower trench, they were withdrawn—about 2 p.m. on the 22nd September. The party which originally penetrated beyond the wire entanglements was annihilated. The position was principally rendered untenable by the fire of field guns from near Pigeon Bay† and of heavy guns from the permanent forts lying south. Shell fire caused about 50 per cent. of the casualties, which amounted to between 2,000 and 3,000 men.

---

* For further account, *see* page 426.

† *See* Map 74.

‡ Panorama 9(*b*).

Since the above operations the Russians have been still further strengthening their positions. The Japanese have entrenched themselves along the whole ridge 180 ("Y" on the Panorama*), and are constructing three saps against the 203-Metre Hill.

2nd Oct. On the 2nd October the Russians were again driven off an eminence situated south-west of the 180-Metre ridge, and which they had re-occupied after the 22nd September. For present positions (October), *see* the Map.†

The strength of the defenders of 203-Metre Hill during the above fighting was estimated at two battalions—portions of the 5th Siberian Sharpshooters and some sailors being amongst them.

Considerable annoyance was caused to the troops on Namako-yama by Russian sharpshooters. A few days after the above fighting, Major-General Yamamoto, commanding 1st Brigade, was shot whilst reconnoitring—the first casualty among the general officers of the Third Army.

Authorities for Statements.

The operations round Namako-yama and also the attack on "B" work were witnessed by me on the 19th, and the attacks on the works south of Shui-shih-ying on the 20th. The positions of troops were taken off a map belonging to a Japanese officer. The gun positions were subsequently corroborated by an officer on the staff of the 1st Division, who also gave a general account of the whole fighting. The sketch of Namako-yama was made on 1st Division Head-Quarters Hill ("A" on the Map),† that of 203-Metre Hill on the second peak west of Height 174 ("B" on the Map). The works south of Shui-shih-ying were personally visited.

* *See* Panorama 9 (*b*).

† *See* Map 74.

(22) Port Arthur.—The Employment of the Artillery in the Centre Attack on 19th September 1904.

REPORT by Colonel W. APSLEY SMITH, C.B., Royal Field Artillery. Before Port Arthur, 18th November 1904.

Plate.

Environs of Port Arthur - - - Map 69.

1. This was the first serious attack made, after the failure of the attempted assault of 19th/24th August.

2. The objective was two-fold:—

(i) The Japanese right to gain ground on the extreme west, seizing Namako-yama (B 3) and, if possible, carrying by assault 203-Metre Hill (A/B 4). As to this *see* report by Captain Yate.*

(ii) The Japanese centre to straighten out the line of attack across the Shui-shih-ying valley (C 3), between the eastern and western sections of the Russian defences. The defences (Fort Kuropatkin (D 3) and Redoubts 17, 18, 19, 19a) across this valley formed a strongly marked salient jutting out into the Japanese lines. They covered one of the main sources of the Port Arthur water supply, and, until they were captured, no close attack by trenches and saps on the centre of the main Russian line was possible.

The Japanese left was ordered to demonstrate only.

3. The Russian works in the above salient consisted of Fort Kuropatkin at the apex (already half taken and lost on 19th/20th August), and four smaller redoubts (Nos. 17, 18, 19, and 19a) to the south and south-west, with numerous supporting trenches. The Japanese trenches were from seventy to one hundred yards from Fort Kuropatkin.

4. For the main attack on Fort Kuropatkin (D 3), the commander of the 9th Division used his right brigade, the 18th, supported by all, or nearly all, his thirty-six mountain guns firing at 1,500 to 1,800 yards ranges. He also had twenty-four machine guns and four 1·8-inch Q.F. Hotchkiss. To prepare and support the attack, the general commanding the siege

* *See* page 432.

artillery used forty siege and naval pieces of ordnance, and forty-eight field guns belonging to the 2nd Independent Artillery Brigade.

The attack on the subsidiary redoubts (Nos. 17, 18, 19, and 19a) to the south-west was left to the commander of the 1st Division, for which *see* Captain Yate's report.*

5. I was with the general commanding the siege artillery, from 9 a.m. until dark, in his observation trench some 2,000 yards from Fort Kuropatkin. A colonel of artillery was there, and occasionally an adjutant or an orderly crept up to receive or deliver messages. Ten yards from us were the blindages for the telephones and hyposcopic telescope; half a mile behind, on another hill, was the Head-Quarters Staff of the Third Army.

6. From 9 a.m. till noon the usual desultory cannonade went on, the idea being to prevent the Russians from guessing that anything was brewing. The Russians replied at intervals from here, there, and everywhere. Practice on both sides indifferent. From noon till 1 p.m. the Japanese ceased fire "by order," and the Russians conformed—presumably both sides ate their luncheons.

7. At 1 p.m., slow fire began from the Japanese left, and was gradually taken up by the centre and naval guns. The fire was mainly perhaps against Fort Kuropatkin and its auxiliaries (Nos. 17, 18, 19, and 19a), but the main Russian forts in rear were not ignored. At 1.30 p.m. the Russians began to reply, and at 1.50 p.m. the general commanding the siege artillery ordered "Fire rather quicker."

8. The divisional mountain batteries had been ordered to open at 2 p.m. They did not do so and towards 2.30 p.m., the general commanding the artillery telephoned to the commander of the 9th Division to ask the reason. I could not discover the reason, but at 2.50 p.m. they began to shoot.

9. From 2 to 5 p.m., the Japanese artillery fire gradually increased in intensity, and was more visibly concentrated on the actual point to be attacked. The Russians replied with vigour, and must, I think, have latterly realized what was intended. At 5 p.m. the general commanding the artillery asked the commander of the 9th Division if he was ready to assault. Then occurred the one temporary break in the telephone; however, at 5.30 p.m., the reply came back that "All was ready," and this was telephoned round to batteries.

10. At 5.40 p.m., the infantry assaulted Fort Kuropatkin, and disappeared into the ditch, after sustaining some loss from the gun and rifle fire with which the Russians swept the glacis. The Japanese artillery maintained an incessant and accurate fire of shrapnel upon the supporting redoubts and trenches, and their heavier ordnance shelled the main forts in rear.

11. Infantry fire went on, and grenades continued to burst n and round the fort, and at 6.20 p.m. two successive lots of

* *See* page 436.

Japanese left the work. The general commanding the artillery then telephoned to ask the commander of the 9th Division if he should re-open fire upon it, and was told "No."

12. Just after 7 p.m. the general commanding the artillery told me that they had taken most of Fort Kuropatkin and that he thought the 1st Division had taken a redoubt (No. 17) to the south-west. He proved to be right as to the fort, and wrong as to the redoubt, the attack on which had been repulsed. However, during that night the whole of the fort was captured, and during the next forenoon the four redoubts (Nos. 17, 18, 19, and 19a) and practically all the supporting trenches in the valley salient were carried.

13. In the above attack, the general commanding the siege artillery told me that he only used seven of his twenty-eight companies of siege artillery and less than one-third of the siege ordnance. Some guns, no doubt, could not be brought to bear; others, I think, he did not wish to unmask.

14. The artillery command seemed to work smoothly and well; there was no fuss; very few orders were given; everything appeared to be carefully prearranged, except the actual time for the assault, the psychological moment for this being left to the joint discretion of the commander of the 9th Division and the general commanding the artillery. So far as I could see, the Head-Quarters Staff did not, in any way, interfere.

15. The direction and communication were entirely by telephone. In spite of a gale of wind, and of the din of the guns, only one temporary breakdown, as already mentioned, occurred.

16. The artillery preparation was systematic, and the fire from 2 to 5 p.m. was accurate, and sufficiently, though not unduly concentrated. I thought that the fire, however, might have been more crossed, as the batteries were on a wide front. The shrapnel burst well, but the cover was too good for it to have had much effect, and this the general commanding the artillery fully realized. Everything was a marked contrast to what I saw of the artillery work in the attacks of the 19th 24th August.

There was no naval co-operation; in fact, since the siege commenced I have not seen or heard of the Japanese fleet firing a shot against the land forts.

17. The Russian artillery fire struck me as intermittent and without system. Some of the Japanese batteries were ignored; others, and especially the naval guns, were heavily and accurately shelled at intervals. A good many Russian shell were blind; some of the few shrapnel they fired burst very short and high. A number of their guns fired smoky powder. The casualties in the Japanese batteries were very few, and there was said to be no material damaged.

(23) Port Arthur.—The Operations in October 1904: the Attack on the Chi-kuan Shan Works.

REPORT by Captain C. A. L. YATE, King's Own (Yorkshire Light Infantry). Before Port Arthur, 11th January 1905.

Maps and Sketches.

Sketch Map to illustrate Operations - -	Map 72.
Rough Plan of Russian and Japanese Trenches and Approaches - - -	Map 76.
Plan of East Chi-kuan Shan (Higashi Keik-wanzan) Battery Defences - - -	Map 77.
Profile Sketch to illustrate Fighting of the 9th and 16th October - - -	Panorama 10.
Profile Sketch showing View of East Chi-kuan Shan from the North-East - - -	„

Appendices.

Objectives allotted to Japanese Artillery during the fighting, 26th to 31st October, 1904 -	Appendix 1.
Order of battle, Third Japanese Army, during October 1904 - - - -	Appendix 2.

Fighting on the 9th October.

After the capture of Fort Kuropatkin on the night of the 19th 20th September, the Japanese occupied the connecting trench which had been built by the Russians between the above work and the South Lung-yen work, the enemy having evacuated both work and trench after being driven out of Fort Kuropatkin. From the railway the Japanese pushed saps towards Fort Erh-lung Shan under cover of the steep slopes and deep watercourses south of the railway.

7th/8th Oct. On the night of the 7th/8th October the enemy seized the Japanese parallel situated some one hundred and fifty yards below the Russian advanced trench on Erh-lung Shan.

The eastern end of this parallel, led into the watercourse separating the two heights on which Fort Erh-lung Shan and "G" work respectively stand.*

* *See* Map 72 and Panorama 10 (*a*).

The Japanese determined to retake this parallel on the 9th October. At 3 p.m. on that day all the guns that could be brought to bear bombarded the following objectives:— 9th Oct.

(1) Fort Erh-lung Shan.
(2) The northern slopes of Erh-lung Shan.
(3) The valley between Erh-lung Shan and "G" hill.

The fire was very accurate, especially the shrapnel of a mountain battery which had been advanced to the west of Lung-yen village.

As the guns opened, two parties of Japanese infantry, each about fifty to eighty strong, charged in swarm formation.* One party rushed at the centre, the other at the left of the parallel. The left party were exposed to the fire of Maxim guns situated behind the Chinese Wall and trained to fire down the watercourse. None of the enemy were observed leaving the parallel, but they probably ran out on the west side, which leads into a deep watercourse.

This attack was smartly carried out, and afforded a good example of co-operation on the part of the Japanese artillery and infantry.

The Japanese losses were insignificant.

Fighting on the 16*th October* 1904.

On this day the Japanese proposed to occupy—

(1) "G" work.†
(2) The Russian advanced trench on Erh-lung Shan glacis, some fifty yards south of the parallel which the Japanese had recaptured on the 9th October.‡
(3) An underfeature some three hundred yards north-west of the glacis of Fort Erh-lung Shan.*

Description of Positions attacked.—(1) "G" work and the zigzag connecting it with the Chinese Wall had been constructed within the preceding six weeks. A blinded trench, of which the zigzag is a continuation, runs round the hill some fifteen or twenty yards below the crest. This is connected with another blinded trench running round the top. The bare, gradually rising hill slopes present an excellent field of fire to the defenders. A strong entanglement of ordinary steel wire runs along the front. The railway cutting to the north-east is perfectly enfiladed from it.

Sapping had been carried on against this work from West Pan-lung Shan Fort for a month past.

(2) The Russian advanced trench* is some 5 feet deep, with frequent earth and sandbag traverses and sandbag loopholes.

---

* *See* Panorama 10 (*a*).
† This attack is marked "No. I. Attack" on Panorama 10 (*a*)
‡ The attack on this is marked "No. II." on Panorama 10 (*a*).

Description of Fighting. — At 1.40 p.m. the Japanese artillery opened, firing slowly at first. The following pieces were used (for positions, *see* the Map*):—

(1) Thirty-six mountain gun.
(2) Two or three batteries 2nd Artillery Brigade.
(3) Two 12-cm. (4·7-inch) naval guns (marked "B" on the Map).
(4) Two 12-cm. (4·7-inch) naval guns (marked "I" on the Map).
(5) Four 12-cm. (4·7-inch) howitzers (marked "L" on the Map).
(6) Four 28-cm. (11-inch) howitzers (marked "P" on the Map).
(7) Four 10·5-cm. Krupp guns (marked "Q" on the Map.
(8) Two 28-cm. (11-inch) howitzers (marked "R" on the Map).
(9) Six 12-cm. bronze guns (marked "S" on the Map).
(10) Twenty-four 12-cm. bronze guns. Two naval 12-pr. guns (marked "N" on the Map)

The guns at "N" fired very little. The 28-cm. howitzers and medium siege guns were the only ones that fired until 3 p.m. The 28-cm. shells did great damage to the blindages.

At 3 p.m. the fire became more intense, all the batteries noted above joining in. A mountain battery fired from the low ground near the railway, one or two of its guns being placed south of the embankment.

It was the best effort at methodical bombardment with oblique fire and a definite object for each group yet witnessed. The Russians replied feebly, firing at intervals with howitzers from "I" Battery (using smoky powder) and from Pai-yu Shan Fort (just east of railway, about one mile south of the top of margin of the map*).

At 4.30 p.m. one company of the 35th Regiment dashed out of the parallel on to the Russian trench at "G," a distance of barely 100 yards. They reached it without loss, and captured the first zigzag beyond. The enemy appeared to have evacuated the trench. The Japanese, after entering, suffered somewhat from artillery and infantry fire—the latter from the Chinese Wall. Three separate parties followed the original assaulting column at short intervals.

Five minutes later the attack against the Russian trench took place (marked "No. II." on the Panorama†). The Japanese advanced parallel was some fifty yards below this. The force attacking here appeared to number about one hundred men. The fifty or sixty Russians holding the trench fled without awaiting the Japanese onset. They attempted to retire direct on the fort in a south-westerly direction (*see* chain dotted line and arrowhead†). Finding themselves exposed to the fire of their

* Map 72. † Panorama 10 (*a*).

comrades in the fort as well as to that of the enemy, they rushed down to the dip and thence across the ridge to the western face of the hill. They were fired on by Japanese shrapnel, and left several dead. The Japanese artillery during this attack continued to fire on the enemy's trench until their own infantry were almost into it. Two men of the assaulting party were knocked over by shells from their own guns, these being the only casualties observed during this advance.

A few minutes after the second attack the north-western ridge of Erh-lung Shan was occupied, the troops advancing from the railway (*see* "No. III." on the Panorama*) The enemy was not holding this ridge. The attackers went up in three separate parties, each party running up in extended files and spreading out along the top. No sooner arrived there, they came under rifle fire from several directions, and under artillery fire from Fort Sung-shu Shan. The troops here appeared somewhat unsteady. A considerable number came down again, probably to fetch entrenching tools. A trench (*see* the Panorama*) had been begun before darkness fell, and four casemates for mountain guns (built of iron rails, baulks, earth, and sleepers) were subsequently constructed along the top of the ridge to fire on Sung-shu Shan Fort and Battery.

The Japanese remained in possession of all the points occupied, their total loss amounting to some 150 men (all arms). Some 400 men of the 7th Regiment are estimated to have taken part in these attacks. The Russian shrapnel fire from Sung-shu Shan was good, but their heavy batteries fired many blind shells.

Operations from the 26*th to the* 31*st October.*

On the 26th October a series of concerted attacks began against the main line of the Russian defences on the eastern section.

The plan of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief was briefly as follows:—

To occupy the line East Chi-kuan Shan—Chinese Wall—Sung-shu Shan.† To effect this he intended, after a heavy bombardment, to assault the following points:—

1. Fort Sung-shu Shan.
2. Fort Erh-lung Shan.
3. "P" work.
4. The North Fort of East Chi-kuan Shan (a permanent fort).
5. "Q" work.
6. Small work on a knob immediately east of the last, called by the Japanese Kobu-yama.
7. The East Chi-kuan Shan Battery.

The two Pan-lung Shan Forts, taken in August, and the recently captured "G"‡ work formed a wedge, so to speak, driven

* Panorama 10 (*a*). † *See* Map 72. ‡ *See* pages 442–4.

into the enemy's line. From this line of works subsequent operations were to be carried on against the Chinese Wall and the line of heights to the south of it.

By the 26th the Japanese had advanced their saps* to within thirty to fifty yards from the Russian advanced trenches on the East Chi-kuan Shan and Sung-shu Shan heights, and from the glacis trench of Fort Erh-lung Shan.

The objectives allotted to the several divisions for the forthcoming fighting were as follows :—

1*st Division.*—Sung-shu Shan and the heights south and south-east of it.

9*th Division.*—Fort Erh-lung Shan and " P " work.

11*th Division.*—The East Chi-kuan Shan works.

The distribution of units for the different attacks (*see* Appendix 2, Order of Battle), was as follows :—

1*st Division* :—		No. of Battalions.
(1) Against the Sung-shu Shan Fort—2nd Regiment		3
(2) To advance over the low ground south-west of Shui-shih-ying against the fortified heights south of the fort—3rd Regiment		3
9*th Division* :—		
(1) Against the right (west) of Fort Erh-lung Shan—36th Regiment		3
(2) Against the left (east) of the same fort—a battalion of 7th Regiment		1
(3) To hold West Pan-lung Shan Fort—3 companies 7th Regiment	6 cos.	
To hold East Pan-lung Shan Fort—3 companies 7th Regiment		
In the saps against Chinese Wall and Erh-lung Shan Fort of the 7th Regiment	2 cos.	
Total	8 cos., or	2
(4) To attack " P " work—1 battalion 35th Regiment		1
Carried forward		13

* *See* Map 76, giving rough plan of the saps against the works of the east sector.

	No. of Battalions.
Brought forward - - - -	13
11*th Division* :—	
(1) Against East Chi-kuan Shan North Fort —22nd Regiment - - - -	3
(2) Partly against the above fort and partly to attack "Q" work and Kobu-yama— 44th Regiment - - - -	3
(3) Against East Chi-kuan Shan Battery— 12th Regiment - - - -	3
Total number of battalions employed in the attacks - - -	22

Remaining over on the extreme Japanese right :—

	No. of Battalions.
1*st Division* :—	
The 1st Reserve Brigade - - -	6
The 1st Brigade - - - -	6
9*th Division* :—	
Two battalions of the 35th Regiment at Divisional Head-Quarters - - -	2
The 8th and 38th Regiments, 4th Reserve Brigade (less a battalion 8th Regiment at Dalny) - - - - -	3
11*th Division* :—	
The 43rd Regiment - - - -	3
Total - - - - -	20

Distribution of the Artillery.—For positions of the batteries, *see* the Plate.* The 2nd Artillery Brigade placed two of its twelve batteries at the disposal of the commander of the 11th Division, whose artillery consisted entirely of mountain batteries. Two batteries of the brigade remained under the commander of the 1st Division. The remaining eight took up more advanced positions* on the night 25th/26th October. In this new distribution, a complete mixing up of tactical units took place.

The Fighting on the 26th October.—On the afternoon of the 26th October the 1st Division attacked the advanced trench on the slope of Sung-shu Shan, and the 19th Division the glacis trench of Fort Erh-lung Shan. These trenches were not blinded, but had earth or sandbag traverses at short intervals and sandbag loopholes. The Japanese advanced parallels were in each case some thirty or forty yards below the objective. **26th Oct.**

* *See* Map 72.

The Japanese infantry on this day wore khaki coats over their cloth uniforms, no doubt to enable their artillery to distinguish them more easily.

During the morning and until 3 p.m., the naval guns only fired against the forts. The Russians scarcely replied.

At about 3 o'clock the Japanese fire became more intense.* The guns mentioned in Appendix 1 opened fire, and also a 12-cm. howitzer battery just below the east slope of Yu Ta Shan, concentrated their fire on the two forts, principally on Erh-lung Shan.

The field batteries of the artillery brigade fired shrapnel on the Russian trenches situated on the slopes in front of the forts. The 2nd Regiment had two battalions in the front parallels of Sung-shu Shan Fort, and one battalion in reserve.

At 5 p.m. a company rushed at the Sung-shu Shan trench, and entered it at the north-east salient, losing hardly any men during the advance. The Russians held on to the trench to the right south-west of them, and had not been dislodged by 6 p.m.

A few instants later a company belonging to the 18th Brigade, 9th Division, moved on that portion of the Erh-lung Shan glacis trench which is opposite to the centre of the face. (The 18th Brigade had three battalions detailed to attack the fort.) It was followed almost immediately by another column of similar strength moving a little further to the right. Here too very few men fell whilst advancing against the trench. They appeared to meet with some resistance after entering, and three more parties, each about a company strong, followed close on their heels. Two or three Japanese shells fell amongst them despite the fact that they vigorously waved the white flags with red circle in the centre, which are supplied for this purpose. The reinforcements did not enter the trench, but entrenched themselves below it. A few skirmishers only crossed the glacis trench and threw up breastworks on the artificial glacis between it and the ditch.

The two flanks of the trench could not be occupied owing to enfilade fire from the rear, apparently from a machine gun. One Maxim was found after the surrender behind the Chinese Wall, which enfiladed the glacis, glacis trench and eastern slope.

At 5.15 p.m. two small explosions occurred in the centre of the trench, and a big one at 5.20 p.m. in the portion opposite the west of the face. No great losses seem to have been caused by them. When the skirmishers had completed the breastworks, and were enabled to keep the enemy's fire down, some more Japanese infantry—probably two or three companies—went up and began digging two approaches between the advanced parallel and the glacis trench. These were completed in a very short time, the enemy's fire being only desultory.

* *See* Appendix 1, page 454, giving details as to artillery targets.

At the commencement of the fighting the Russians still held the west side of "G" work and the valley to the south of the railway bridge between Erh-lung Shan and Sung-shu Shan hills. The enemy defended this bridge obstinately. It is supposed that there was a source of water up the valley. At this point the Japanese gained some one hundred and fifty yards of ground. The Russians made four counter-attacks on the Sung-shu Shan trench during the night, but did not succeed in dislodging the Japanese.

The 1st Division in this fighting lost 140, including 38 killed.

The 9th Division at Erh-lung Shan lost some 300—chiefly caused by Russian indirect artillery fire after the trenches had been occupied.

The Fighting on the 30th and 31st October.—On the 28th October the two 28-cm. howitzers north of Tuan-shan-tzu hill kept up a persistent and accurate fire on the East Chi-kuan Shan group of works. It was proposed to assault these on the 30th. 28th Oct.

Description of the East Chi-kuan Shan Works.—On the left (south-east) of this section of works is the South East Chi-kuan Shan Battery, some 40 feet higher than the remainder of the group.* Its armament consisted of—

Two 6-inch field howitzers.
Seven heavy 3·42-inch field guns.
One light 2·95-inch field gun.
Four 2·95-inch naval Q.F. guns.
One 4·7-inch naval gun.

The front slope of East Chi-kuan Shan Battery is perfectly enfiladed by three of these pieces.†

Some two hundred yards below the crest of the East Chi-kuan Shan Battery a deep trench runs round the hill. It is blinded by strong beams with sandbags or earth on the top, and cut into short lengths, partly by sharp bends in the contour of the hill, and partly by traverses of sandbags or natural soil.

It had, therefore, to be captured step by step, its small width—barely three feet behind the banquette—rendering this a very difficult matter. Under the banquette are bombproofs some two feet high and six feet wide. In these the garrison could dwell in comparative security, whilst able to take up its post at a moment's notice. The trench is well flanked by South East Chi-kuan Shan Battery, the Chinese Wall, and the "Sangar."† The last evidently contained a Maxim or small calibre gun. Dips in the ground and communicating trenches afforded covered lines of retreat. Above the trench, the ground rises at a slope of some 30 degrees, and is covered with loose stones. Some twenty yards below the top is another blinded trench. Inside the work were mounted four 7·5-cm. (2·95-inch) and four 12-cm. (4·7-inch) guns, besides a few smaller pieces.

---

* *See* Maps 72 and 77 and Panorama 10 (*b*). † *See* Map 77.

This work was a most formidable one, the lower trench forming its chief defence.

Kobu-yama* is a small pimple-shaped knob (as its Japanese name indicates) with a trench running round just below the top and another trench with blindages on the summit.

"Q," a recently constructed work, consists of a blinded circular trench with a very steep slope in front formed partly by excavated earth. A straight line of trench runs some fifty yards in rear. The gorge is open but shot into from the Chinese Wall in rear, as well as from "N" and "R" works. A few field guns were placed in it, including a muzzle loader.

East Chi-kuan Shan North Fort is a permanent fort of irregular hexagonal trace. It is provided with concrete counterscarp and gorge galleries.

"R" work is a battery with two 6-inch naval guns on pivot mountings behind shields, besides a few smaller pieces in rear.

"N" work has one 10·5-cm. gun on the road in rear of its crest, one similar piece on the top, and one heavy 3·42-inch field gun.

"M" work has one 6-inch naval gun on pivot mounting, one 10·5-cm. gun on an overbank carriage, and two 6·5-cm. field guns.

"P" work* was formed by two tiers of trenches, with others at right angles running back along the contour of the spur on which it stood. It contained at least one 3·42-inch field piece and one or more machine guns.

Distribution of Troops on the 30th October.—For the attacks on the East Chi-kuan Shan works, the infantry of the 11th Division was disposed as follows:—

Three companies each of the 43rd and 44th Regiments remained at Head-Quarters (Ta Ku Shan)‡ as a divisional reserve. The remainder of the 44th Regiment were in the saps in front of "Q" and Kobu-yama. The 12th Regiment were to attack East Chi-kuan Shan Battery, the 22nd Regiment the North Fort.

The remainder of the 43rd Regiment were placed behind breastworks some 1,500 yards north of the line East Chi-kuan Shan—South East Chi-kuan Shan. From there they fired volleys at intervals.

The divisional mountain batteries were placed east and north-east of Ta Ku Shan. One battery of II./18 Field Artillery Regiment (Army Artillery Brigade) was on the north-west spur of Ta Ku Shan.

The 9th Division detailed III./35th Regiment to attack "P" work.

30th Oct. *The Fighting on the 30th October.*—On the 30th October the line of works between Sung-shu Shan and South East Chi-kuan

---

* *See* Panorama 10 (*b*). † *See* Map 72.

‡ South-east corner of Map 72.

Shan was subjected to a heavy artillery fire, every piece that could be brought to bear being employed.

The fire on Forts Erh-lung Shan and Sung-shu Shan was somewhat less heavy than on the works further east. The siege guns opened about 9 a.m., fire became general and much heavier at 11 a.m. Between 12.30 p.m. and 1 p.m. a perfect tornado of shells was poured upon the forts. The recently constructed Japanese bomb mortars, made of bamboo, fired vigorously from the advanced parallels into the enemy's trenches.

Attack on "Q" Work.—At 1.5 p.m. there was an outbreak of infantry fire, and directly afterwards a force of about a battalion attacked "Q." The remaining works of the East Chi-kuan Shan group were simultaneously attacked a few minutes later.

About one battalion took part in the first rush against East Chi-kuan Shan Battery; the parties against Kobu-yama and the North Fort were slightly smaller. The men on the slopes of "Q" were in thick swarms, and fell fast. When almost at the top they swerved to the right, and came under a heavy rifle fire from the Chinese Wall. The attack came to a complete standstill. Men formed bunches or lay scattered about in the shell craters. For the rest of the day they threw hand-grenades, squirted oil, &c. The enemy's rifle fire and hand-grenades caused many casualties. Men attempting to retire to the sap-head were almost invariably shot. The slopes were evacuated by the Japanese after nightfall.

Attack on the North Fort.—At the North Fort a small party got up the parapet at 1.30 p.m. It could not get over, however, although the supports lined the crest of the glacis and fired. All the men on the parapet were hit in a short time.

Attack on Kobu-yama.—On Kobu-yama the Japanese captured the trench running round the hill near the summit, but the Russians remained on the top.

The heaviest loss was incurred in front of East Chi-kuan Shan Battery. A large party of Japanese rushed straight at the trench, and attempted to work along it to the flanks. At 1.15 p.m. a considerable portion of these left the trench and made for the top of the work. They were met by a terrific enfilade fire of shrapnel and by fire from the Russian trenches and parapet. One single shrapnel brought down the officer carrying the regimental colour and some dozen men besides. The hillside between the lower trench and the top was strewn with corpses. Nevertheless a small party, perhaps twenty strong, got right among the guns on the parapet. Some thirty minutes later they ran down singly, only one man reaching the sap-head. The men in the lower trench threw grenades and tried to retain possession, but at 3.15 p.m. the Russians had regained the whole trench. This day's fighting cost the 11th Division 15 officers and 633 men. By far the greater part fell in front of East Chi-kuan Shan Battery.

Attack on "P" Work.—The 9th Division seized the trench just below the crest of "P" after a short fight. At about 3.30 p.m. a panic occurred, and the troops in the trench rushed back. They were turned back by reserves which came on, met the fugitives at the wire entanglement, and retook the trench.

Attack on Sung-shu Shan Ditch.—Simultaneously with the above attacks, a column about two hundred strong left the advanced parallel some two hundred yards north of Sung-shu Shan, and dashed against the fort through a narrow opening in the wire entanglement on the glacis. They at once came under a heavy fire, and sustained some thirty casualties before reaching the ditch. This column was followed by a second one of about equal strength, and by a third one some eighty to one hundred strong. These all reached the ditch with about the same proportion of casualties. A large mine exploded at 3.30 p.m. near the face, and another explosion occurred at 4 p.m. inside the fort. The Japanese in the advanced parallel, and the Russians on the parapet, kept up a sharp musketry fire. A few Japanese who tried to mount the parapet were instantly killed.

31st Oct. *Recapture of "P" by Russians and subsequent Recapture by Japanese.*—On the night 30th/31st October the Russians made two determined counter-attacks on the Japanese in the lower trench of "P." The second one was successful, the Japanese being driven back to their advanced parallel. Major-General Ichinoye, commanding the 6th Brigade (9th Division), who had played a distinguished part in the capture of the Pan-lung Shan Forts in August, led forward his reserves, and not only recaptured the trench, but took the entire work, which was thenceforward called after him.

Capture of Kobu-yama.—Kobu-yama was also completely captured by the 11th Division troops after nightfall.

Fighting on the 31st October.—On the afternoon of the 31st October, about two companies of the 11th Division again attacked East Chi-kuan Shan North Fort. This attack was preceded by a vigorous bombardment, the shrapnel fire from the battery on the north-west slope of Ta Ku Shan being especially accurate.

Attack on East Chi-kuan Shan North Fort.—At 3.25 all the Japanese troops left the saphead and a terrific explosion occurred, another taking place at 4.20 p.m. Directly after this the Japanese infantry advanced. A small party reached the parapet, but could not get over, although it was under flanking fire, probably from "P" work. The Russians poured a heavy machine gun fire on the assailants, which caused great loss. The Japanese, however, established a firm footing on the glacis.

Losses.—The total losses from the 26th to the 31st October, both days inclusive, were 51 officers and 1,970 men.

Remarks on the Operations.

The net result was that the Japanese had captured two small works, which are little more than a network of trenches, and had obtained a footing on the edges of the counterscarps of the three permanent forts of the eastern section. From these positions they were enabled to undertake mining operations against the defences of the ditches. These results were in no way commensurate with the losses incurred, and no doubt fell far short of the expectations of the Japanese Head-Quarters. The operations may, in fact, be said to have ended in a repulse.

Several faults were noticeable in the execution of the attacks described above.

(1) There was evidently a want of previous reconnaissance.*

This was especially the case at East Chi-kuan Shan Battery and the North Fort. In the former instance the strength of the Russian advanced trench was evidently unsuspected by the Japanese, although they had suffered heavily when attacking the same work in August. It was hardly shelled at all, the artillery firing principally at the parapet and the batteries in rear ("R," "M," "N").

The difficulty of a frontal attack up the slope was obvious, owing to its exposure to cross and enfilade fire. It would have been better to have worked up to it from the direction of "Q." It was thus attacked when it finally fell.

(2) The Japanese artillery, whilst shelling the points of attack so long that they caused casualties amongst their own infantry in nearly every case, quite neglected to turn their fire on to hostile guns which played on the storming columns. The enormous losses caused by shrapnel fire on the 30th October bore striking testimony to the efficacy of this projectile under favourable circumstances.

(3) The Japanese infantry did not display the same dash as during the earlier operations, the 12th Regiment, opposite East Chi-kuan Shan Battery, forming an honourable exception. The wear and tear of siege warfare was beginning to tell.

The efficacy of bombs,† whether shot out of a gun or thrown by hand, was amply demonstrated.

On the other hand, the advanced and glacis trenches of the works, with the exception of East Chi-kuan Shan Battery, a special case, proved, if anything, a source of weakness to the defenders. Their troops were easily driven out and the trenches afforded valuable *points d'appui* to the enemy. The difficulty of getting men to fight well in advanced and semi-isolated positions was very apparent. Flanking fire from other works would seem, generally speaking, to be a more efficacious way of defending the slopes in front of works.

---

* I endorse this; but reconnaissance was most difficult.—Apsley Smith, Colonel, 14.2.05.

† The moral effect; I am not so sure of the physical effect.—Apsley Smith, Colonel, 14.2.05.

APPENDIX 1.

*Objectives of Japanese Artillery as allotted during the Fighting of the 26th to the 31st October 1904.**

On the 26th October :—†

The four 28-cm. howitzers at "P" fired on Erh-lung Shan Fort.

The howitzers and mortars in Tung-ho-kou valley, "K" and "L," fired on Erh-lung Shan and Sung-shu Shan forts.

The guns at "N" and howitzers at "M" divided their fire between the two above forts.

All the naval guns fired on Sung-shu Shan Fort.

On the 30th October :—

The guns at "N" and howitzers at "M" fired on "H" Battery, Wang-tai, and Pan-lung Shan new Battery.

The pieces at "Q," "S," "V," and "W" distributed their fire over the ground between Wang-tai and East Chi-kuan Shan North Fort.

The 15-cm. mortars at "X" fired on "Q" work and East Chi-kuan Shan Battery.

The indirect fire pieces in the Tung-ho-kou valley ("K" and "L"), the four 28-cm. howitzers near Tien-pan-kou ("A"), naval guns, and Field Artillery Brigade, fired on Erh-lung Shan and Sung-shu Shan Forts.

On 31st October :—

The following fired on East Chi-kuan Shan North Fort :— Mortars from "K," howitzers and mortars from "W," "V," and "P."

---

* This was the distribution at the beginning of the day's operations. Targets were, of course, changed as the situation demanded.—C. Y.

† *See* Map 72.

APPENDIX 2.

ORDER of BATTLE of the THIRD JAPANESE ARMY during October 1904 (excluding Ammunition Supply and Medical Details).

1ST DIVISION.	9TH DIVISION.	11TH DIVISION.
1st Infantry Brigade. 1st Regiment. 15th Regiment. 2nd Infantry Brigade. 2nd Regiment. 3rd Regiment.	6th Infantry Brigade. 7th Regiment. 35th Regiment. 18th Brigade. 19th Regiment. 36th Regiment.	10th Infantry Brigade. 22nd Regiment. 44th Regiment. 22nd Infantry Brigade. 12th Regiment. 43rd Regiment.
Attached: 1st Reserve Infantry Brigade. 1st Reserve Regiment. 15th Reserve Regiment. 16th Reserve Regiment.		
1st Divisional Artillery Regiment (Field). 1st Battalion. 3 batteries. 2nd Battalion. 3 batteries.	9th Divisional Artillery Regiment (Mountain). 1st Battalion. 3 batteries. 2nd Battalion. 3 batteries.	11th Divisional Artillery Regiment (Mountain). 1st Battalion. 3 batteries. 2nd Battalion. 3 batteries.
1st Cavalry Regiment. (3 squadrons.)	9th Cavalry Regiment.(1) (1 squadron.)	11th Cavalry Regiment.(1) (1 squadron.)
1st Engineer Battalion. (3 companies.) One section 1st Reserve Engineer Company. 1st Train Battalion.	9th Engineer Battalion. (3 companies). Two sections 1st Reserve Engineer Company. 9th Train Battalion.	11th Engineer Battalion. (3 companies.) 11th Train Battalion.

[*Continued on p.* 456.

(1) The remainder of these regiments had been sent north at the beginning of the siege.

APPENDIX 2—*continued.*

ARMY TROOPS.

Infantry.

4th Reserve Infantry Brigade.

8th Reserve Regiment.	9th Reserve Regiment.(1)	38th Reserve Regiment.

Field Artillery.

2nd Field Artillery Brigade.

16th Regiment.		17th Regiment.		18th Regiment.	
1st Battalion.	2nd Battalion.	1st Battalion.	2nd Battalion.	1st Battalion.	2nd Battalion.
2 batteries.	2 batteries.	2 batteries.	2 batteries.	2 batteries.	2 batteries.

Siege Artillery.

1st Regiment.		2nd Regiment.		3rd Regiment.				
1st Battalion.	2nd Battalion.	3rd Battalion.	4th Battalion.	5th Battalion.		6th Battalion.	7th Battalion.	Independent.
4 batteries. All 12-cm. bronze guns.	4 batteries. All 15-cm. howitzers.	24 15-cm. mortars.	28 15-cm. mortars.	4 10·5 cm. Krupp guns.	6 12-cm. bronze guns.	24 15-cm. mortars.	24 9-cm. mortars.	18 28-cm. howitzers.

Heavy Field Artillery Regiment.

8 batteries of 4 12-cm. howitzers each.(2)

Naval Guns.

4 6-inch guns.	10 4·7-inch guns.	17 12-pounders.(3)

(1) This regiment was sent north during October.
(2) Batter es temporarily under G.O.C. 9th Division.
(3) This includes only the guns firing at the fortress. Other pieces were employed to guard the railway and eastern coast.

(24) Port Arthur.—The Siege Operations from the end of October to the Fall of the Fortress.

REPORT by Captain C. A. L. YATE, King's Own (Yorkshire Light Infantry). Tokio, 26th February, 1905.*

Plates.

(1) General map of Port Arthur and neighbourhood - - - - Map 71
(2) Sketch map to illustrate operations - „ 72
(3) Rough plan of East Chi-kuan North Fort - „ 78
(4) Rough plan of Erh-lung Shan Fort - „ 79
(5) „ sketches of Sung-shu Shan Fort - „ 80
(6) „ „ „ 203-Metre Hill - Panorama 13

Changes in the Disposition of the Artillery during November and December.

The moves of guns are shown in detail on the map,† the dates being written alongside the dotted lines drawn between the former—and the new positions of the pieces.

The following particulars are given in explanation and addition :—Early in November some of the naval guns ("F" and "G" on map), and some direct fire siege pieces ("N" and "S" on map), were pushed forward from 1,000 to 2,000 yards, to shell the works more effectively. The 2nd Artillery Brigade had been advanced late in October.‡ The departure for the north, between the 14th and the 18th November,§ of the 17th Field Artillery Regiment, had reduced its strength by four 6 gun batteries. As a result, some of the eminences east and west of Shui-shih-ying were occupied by two or four guns instead of by complete batteries. Continual changes took place in the dispositions of these guns which it is impossible to follow. The positions occupied are marked "Field" on the map, the dates of taking them up being given where possible.

All the mountain artillery of the 9th Division, and some of the 11th Division were advanced to the south of the railway

* This report should be read with the Diary for the corresponding period (Report 16).—C. Y.
† *See* Map 72.
‡ *See* report on October operations, page 447.—C. Y.
§ Compare Diary, page 397.—C. Y.

embankment, in many cases to the glacis of the forts and even into the ditches.* These guns were more usually employed singly, or in pairs, than by batteries.

After the capture of 203-Metre Hill, two 28-cm. howitzers (from "T" on map), and six 15-cm. howitzers (from "M" on map), were sent thither to shell the harbour and new town, as were also two 15-cm. naval guns ("E" on map), three naval 12-pounders ("D" on map), and two naval 12-cm. guns "B" and "C" on map), were sent respectively to Akasaka-yama, and the col between it and the 203-Metre Hill.

During December the 15-cm. mortars were advanced as follows:—

(*a*) One, and later two, pieces, to "P" Work, to batter the North Fort gorge defences.
(*b*) One in each of the two Pan-lung Shan Works to batter the Chinese Wall.
(*c*) One to "G" Work, and one to the slopes of Sung-shu Shan, to batter Fort Erh-lung Shan.

The rest of the 11th Divisional Mountain Artillery was placed on Hsiao Ku Shan, on the slopes of Ta Ku Shan, and on the low ground south-east of these two heights.

Changes in the Composition and Distribution of the Besieging Army during the same Period.

The following changes took place after the 1st November in the Order of Battle, already submitted (Appendix 2, October operations†):—

1. The seven 12-cm. field howitzer batteries (twenty-eight pieces) were reconstituted into six of four pieces each. This owing to some of the howitzers having become unserviceable.

2. The Field Artillery Brigade was reduced by one regiment.‡

3. Two out of the three squadrons of the 1st Divisional Cavalry Regiment left for the north, entraining on the 8th November.

4. Three companies of engineers reinforced the Army, one going to each division. The first (Guard) company arrived on the 8th November.

5. The 4th Reserve Brigade, head-quarters Hsiao Ku Shan,§ sent one battalion 38th Reserve Regiment to the 174-Metre Height, where it came under the command of the general commanding the 1st Division.

---

* Compare account of operations against East Chi-kuan Shan, North Fort, page 452.—C. Y.

† *See* page 455.

‡ *See* page 397.

§ Marked on Map 71, but not on Map 72.

6. One battalion 8th Reserve Regiment was detached to Dalny.* The brigade commander was therefore left with only two battalions at his disposal.†

7. The 7th Division was added to the Port Arthur besieging army, its last troops disembarking at Dalny on the 20th November and moving forward by route march on the following day. This division consists of the 13th Brigade (25th and 26th Regiments) and the 14th Brigade (27th and 28th Regiments). It has a composite artillery regiment of four 6-gun batteries, two field and two mountain. The divisional cavalry regiment did not accompany it, but the six mounted infantry men per company, which form another unique feature of its organization, did.‡

8. During the fighting for the 203-Metre Hill, the 17th Regiment of the 8th Division was temporarily attached to the Third Army and quartered one mile west of Tien-pan-kou village. One of its three battalions was placed in immediate reserve to the troops attacking 203-Metre Hill during a part of the time. It was not engaged, however, and the regiment returned northward at the conclusion of the fighting.

The Operations against the Permanent Forts, Eastern Sector.

The mining, sapping, and other operations undertaken with the object of destroying the ditch defences and parapets of the three permament forts on the eastern section :—

(1) East Chi-kuan Shan North Fort,
(2) Erh-lung Shan Fort,
(3) Sung-shu Shan Fort,

were begun during the latter part of October.

The forts were respectively taken on the 18th, 28th, and 31st December, in the order given above.

For the sake of clearness the entire narrative of these operations is embodied in this section.

East Chi-kuan Shan North Fort.§—Towards the end of October the Japanese, having brought their saps up to the 6th parallel, 43 yards from the glacis crest, began tunnelling into the precipitously steep slope of the glacis.

The Russians drove out a countermine from "A" hoping to get under the Japanese gallery. They misjudged the direction, however.

On the 23rd October they fired their mine and created a breach in their own gallery by which the Japanese entered. **23rd Oct.**

The face counterscarp gallery is divided into several rooms with concrete partitions,‖ a passage running in rear. The **24th Oct.**

* This, or a portion of it, went earlier in the siege.—C. Y.
† The 9th Reserve Regiment having gone north in October.—C. Y.
‡ Compare Diary for November 20th, page 398.
§ *See* Map 78. ‖ *See* section Map 78.

Japanese brought up a machine gun to fire along this. Under cover of its fire, single men, carrying sandbags, entered the gallery and, throwing themselves flat down, pushed the sandbags with their heads, thus gradually forming a breastwork. Some were shot whilst doing this, but by this process the Japanese gradually advanced along the passage and gained possession of the rooms. Their progress is shown by chain-dotted lines, with dates opposite to them on the sketch.

6th Nov. On the 6th November a sharp fight took place in the counter-scarp gallery. Steel plates as well as sandbags protected the Japanese working parties. A mountain gun was brought up by the attackers to smash down the obstacles in the gallery.

On this day the Russians, by throwing explosives, set fire to a covered passage across the ditch which the Japanese had begun on the 1st November and nearly completed; the fire was put out with a hose.

17th Nov. The Russians, imagining that the Japanese were sapping up to the east corner, drove a mine towards "B," exploded it, and created another breach. By this time the Japanese had penetrated sufficiently towards the east of the face gallery to enable them to fire down the eastern flank ditch and gallery. They brought up three machine guns to fire down this ditch. The Russians had constructed a temporary caponier of earth and barrels at the south end. The gallery was unfinished and stopped some twenty yards short of the southern end of the flank. This gallery formed one continuous passage inside, but the Russians had built sandbag partitions (as at "X" in the sketch).

The Japanese, advancing a mountain gun to the north end of the gallery, battered these down also.

One night about this period two parties of engineers (five men each) moved along the ditch and gallery (dotted lines in sketch). The ditch party blew a breach in the gallery wall at "Y." Sandbags had previously been dropped from the top by the Japanese to protect the working party. This cleared the enemy out of the northern half.

22nd Nov. The two galleries in the parapet which had been begun after the completion of the covered way across the ditch had advanced 4 to 9 feet. By this date the whole eastern gallery was in Japanese hands. The Russians blew in the end at "D" when evacuating it.

December. Early in December, one, and later two, 15 cm. mortars were put into "P" Work to batter the concrete gorge galleries at a distance of 400 yards.

16th Dec. The two mine galleries with several branches had been completed and six powder chambers prepared.

On this date General Kondratenko, a colonel of engineers, and seven other officers were killed by a 28-cm. shell whilst holding a consultation in the gorge gallery.

At 2.20 p.m. the mines under the parapet were fired. **18th Dec.**
Three big explosions practically divided the parapet into two.

The Russian machine guns, firing on the gaps, kept the attacking infantry at bay, and when these tried to extend along the parapet, flank fire from the same guns obliged them to retire. The Japanese captured the fort at 11.50 p.m.* The spoils were :—

Two 47-mm. Hotchkiss (one undamaged) ;
Two 2·4-cm. guns (Nordenfeldts ?) ;
Four Maxims ;
11,500 rounds machine gun ammunition ;
80 hand-grenades.

The attacking force consisted of :—
The 22nd Regiment ;
Two or three companies 43rd Regiment ;
A battalion 38th Reserve Regiment. This last effected the entrance into the fort.

For action of the artillery, *see* Appendix.†

Erh-lung Shan Fort.‡—Three shafts were sunk at Erh-lung Shan to blow in the counterscarp wall—one opposite the centre of the face and one near each corner. On the 3rd November **3rd Nov.** the central shaft had reached 13 feet and each of the flank ones half that distance below the ground level. The following day, **4th Nov.** the desired depth had been attained in the centre, but the work on the outer shafts was seriously delayed by rock, the sites having to be changed. By the 8th, four shafts had reached **8th Nov.** a depth of 12 to 13 feet. After this they were only deepened **13th Nov.** 8 to 12 inches daily, owing to the presence of rock.

At 3.30 a.m., sixty Russians attacked the Japanese advanced **16th Nov.** trenches from two directions, but fell back after fifteen minutes' fighting, leaving ten dead.

On the night of the 16th/17th two Japanese soldiers **16th/17th Nov.** descended from the upper storey of the eastern caponier ("1" in sketch), which had been captured and smashed, into the ditch, cut the telephone wires, and tested the stability of the escarp soil. The entire western caponier ("2" in sketch) had previously been destroyed.

About 9 a.m. on the 20th the mines against the counterscarp **20th Nov.** were fired and brought down the wall in three places (the left one is shown in the sketch). The biggest explosion was the left one; here the *débris* reduced the depth of the ditch from about 30 feet to some 14 to 18 feet.§ The Japanese subsequently made an approach across the ditch to the parapet through the *débris*.

---

* Compare Diary, page 406 (December 18th).—C. Y.
† *See* page 473. ‡ *See* Map 79.
§ Compare Diary, page 397. I looked down on the *débris* through a loophole, and did not realize its height above ditch level.—C. Y.

On the previous night 19th/20th November the enemy tried hard to hinder the works by rifle fire and by throwing explosives. The Japanese employed rectangular wooden frames about 7 feet by 4 feet with stout wire netting to protect themselves against the grenades. Bundles of hay had also been piled up near the sap-heads with a view to crossing the ditch. These were never used. A reconnaissance of the parapet, made on the evening of the 20th, caused a great outburst of artillery fire, the Russians imagining it to be the prelude to an assault.

20th/21st Nov. On the following night a covered way was made across the ditch with sandbags and a roof of steel plates, and ramps were made in the escarp and counterscarp. The enemy opposed these works energetically, especially during the night 22nd/23rd November. They were, however, completed before the general attack on the 26th November.

26th Nov. On that day the parapet was partially occupied by 5 p.m. but the assailants were ejected again by midnight.

11th Dec. Five galleries were constructed in the parapet, one opposite the eastern caponier corner, then two together further west, then one close to the communicating gallery (*see* sketch),* and lastly, one still further west.

15th Dec. These galleries had been driven from 17 to 36 feet under the parapet, and powder chambers were being prepared. By the 28th December some galleries had attained a length of over 40 feet.

22nd Dec. On this day the enemy burnt 33 feet of one gallery by throwing combustible materials into the entrance. On the **23rd Dec.** following day he began countermining between the central and eastern galleries.

25th Dec. On the 25th this work ceased, and a similar attempt was made against the right gallery.

28th Dec. At 10 a.m. on the 28th the mines were fired with very good effect. Three storming parties immediately crossed the ditch. Fire from machine, mountain and light field guns, as well as a shower of grenades thrown by the enemy on the cavalier, kept the attackers at bay for hours. They lay in crowds on the slopes at "3" and "4" (*see* sketch),* exposed to enfilade artillery fire from An-tzu Shan and I-tzu Shan Forts† which, however, fired little. In the course of the afternoon the Japanese dug two emplacements (*see* sketch*) and placed mountain guns in them to combat the enemy's pieces inside the work.

At 4.30 p.m. the infantry, of whom some one thousand to one thousand two hundred were lying on the exterior slopes, rushed across the parapet.

By 7.30 p.m. they had captured the work, although some fifty Russians in the gorge resisted till 3 a.m. on the 29th.

* *See* Map 79. † *See* Map 71.

Some of the defenders hid in the casemate in rear of the face parapet. The Japanese trained a machine gun on to the entrance and prevented their escape.

The garrison consisted of I./26th East Siberian Rifles—500 strong—and some sailors. Nearly 250 of them were buried in the *débris*.

The Japanese had 1,000 casualties.

They captured:—

Four 15-cm. guns on siege carriages.
Eight "small calibre" (3·42-inch) field guns.
Thirty 37-mm. Hotchkiss guns.
One 2·9-inch mountain gun.
One muzzle-loading gun.
Several Maxim guns.

The 18th Brigade (19th and 36th Regiments) attacked the fort, each regiment having two battalions in reserve. The 19th Regiment bore the brunt of the fighting.

*Sung-shu Shan Fort.**—On the glacis crest of Sung-shu Shan Fort* three shafts were dug directly after the fighting of the 30th October, when the Japanese penetrated as far as the ditch (*see* "a," "b," "c," "d" on sketch); "a" and "c" shafts, which were constructed first, hit upon the concrete roof of a counterscarp gallery of whose existence the Japanese appear to have been unaware. This necessitated the shaft being driven backwards (*see* dotted line, section 1–2 on sketch). The right shaft was further delayed by rock. The left shaft was completed on the 4th November. **30th Oct.**

On the 6th November another shaft ("d" on sketch) was sunk at the left centre and completed on the 13th November. **6th Nov.**

On the 14th November I descended the last-named shaft. It was some 25 feet deep and 8 feet in diameter. The underground gallery connecting the shafts had recesses for powder charges every 12 to 20 feet. **14th Nov.**

The mines were all fired at 2.30 p.m. on the 17th.† The eastern portion of the counterscarp gallery (shaded in sketch) was reduced to ruins, but in the centre two mines failed to explode, and the solid brick revetment withstood the force of the explosion, which destroyed some of the Japanese advanced trenches, but only made a hole in the roof of this portion of the gallery. **17th Nov.**

The Japanese had worked along the undestroyed portion of the gallery (towards "e" in sketch) and completed their preparations for blowing in the inside wall—that looking into the ditch. **21st Nov.**

The enemy brought up small calibre guns to fire into the ditch, but the Japanese kept down this fire by throwing explosives. On the night of the 21st/22nd November the **21st/22nd Nov.**

---

* *See* Map 80. † Compare Diary for that date, page 397.—C. Y.

charges against the inner gallery wall at "e" were exploded two exits being made into the ditch. The enemy began countermining, but his works were stopped by the Japanese working against them.

22nd Nov. to 10th Dec. After this the Japanese made a series of attempts to gain access to the parapet. They made a rough bridge of planks resting on wooden trestles reaching half-way up to the top of the ditch. Russian guns from Ying-tung-tzu and An-tzu Shan* destroyed this, and the attempt was abandoned as impracticable.

The communicating gallery to the interior of the work was neutralized by blocking up the loopholes and working into it from the counterscarp gallery. The Russians finally evacuated it, blocking it up under the parapet by an explosion. A covered way across the ditch was made of two rows of sandbags roofed with steel plates. These were continually being destroyed by the Russian artillery fire, causing many casualties and necessitating repairs nearly every night. Nevertheless the assailants reached the parapet by this means and began constructing mine galleries under it.

17th Dec. The Russians at once made attempts to hinder the work, and at 3.30 a.m. on the 17th an explosion took place above the right-hand gallery, probably caused by the firing of a countermine. The Russians immediately attacked, some twelve of them advancing along the ditch. They were, however, repulsed. The mines were fired at 10.10 a.m. on the 31st December.

31st Dec. The Japanese artillery immediately opened a heavy fire, and five minutes later the infantry ascended the parapet. A second explosion occurred a few minutes later—probably caused by the accidental firing of a magazine—and blocked the gallery leading from the counterscarp to the gorge. Some 150 of the defenders were thus entombed. At midday the remainder hoisted the white flag, 2 officers and 160 men were thus taken prisoners.

The Japanese losses were 150, principally caused by artillery fire. A prisoner gave the strength of the garrison at 300, but some accounts put it at 500.† Earlier it was reported to consist of three companies.

The 2nd Japanese Regiment carried out the attack.

The Assaults on the Eastern Defences during November.

23rd/24th Nov. On the night of the 23rd/24th November the III./12th Regiment made an attack on the advanced trench of East Chi-kuan Shan Battery and actually held part of it for some hours; they were finally ejected with heavy loss.‡

26th Nov. On the 26th November another general assault was made on the whole eastern sector; the plan was the same as for that of

---

* *See* Map 71. † Compare Diary, page 408.
‡ *See* Map 72.

the 26th to the 31st October, as was also, with slight exceptions, the distribution of the attacking troops. This fighting will be dealt with in three parts :—

(*a*) The attacks on the East Chi-kuan Shan Works.
(*b*) The advance against the Chinese Wall.
(*c*) The attacks on Forts Erh-lung Shan, Sung-shu Shan and the Sung-shu Shan New Battery.

The infantry assaults were preceded by a general bombardment, similar to that on the 30th October, the objectives allotted to the guns being the same.

The explosion of a large mine at East Chi-kuan Shan North Fort was the signal for the assault, and immediately afterwards the infantry swarmed out of the sap-heads (12.45 p.m.).

The Attack on the East Chi-kuan Shan Works.—At this portion of the line attacks were made on :—

(i) East Chi-kuan Shan ;
(ii) "Q" Work ;
(iii) the North Fort.

(i) About a battalion moved against the advanced trench of (i), advancing by rushes of companies, at intervals of a few minutes to a quarter of an hour. The attackers were greeted by a terrible outburst of rifle and Maxim fire, as well as by enfilading shrapnel from South East Chi-kuan Shan Battery, which fired even more effectively than it did on the 30th October. About half the assaulting party fell between the sap-head and the advanced hostile trench, a distance of barely fifty yards. They were twice driven out of the trench, but returned in diminishing numbers. This attack was most gallantly carried out. At 9 p.m. only dead and wounded were left on the slope.

At 9 p.m. the Japanese retook part of the trench, being finally repulsed at 2 a.m. on the 27th November.

(ii) About a company attacked (ii), some of the men getting over the parapet. They never returned. Grenade throwing and bayonet fighting took place on the crest. Both here and at (i) the enemy threw grenades charged with petroleum. These burnt very brightly for a few seconds, and then exploded violently, scattering burning fragments all around.

(iii) At (iii) a small party, perhaps fifty men, advanced from the left (eastern) sap made against the North Fort, which ends in a deep quarry-like hollow. They tried to get into the ditch, but got caught in a wire entanglement on the glacis and were mostly hit.

Some four hundred men attacked the face parapet of the fort, some of them getting over it. Hand-to-hand fighting took place on the top. Most of the attackers here spent the rest of the day in a crater on the exterior slope.* These attacks, which were very half-hearted compared to those on (i), likewise ended in complete failure.

* Compare Diary for this date.—C. Y.

According to statistics issued the following afternoon, the attacks on these three points cost 52 officers and 1,119 men, a figure which was subsequently found to be below the mark.

The Advance against the Chinese Wall.—From West Pan-lung Shan a party whose strength could not be estimated advanced against the Chinese Wall and got as far as this.* Here they were checked by machine gun fire and by reinforcements from Wang-tai, most of them being killed or wounded.

The Attacks on Forts Erh-lung Shan and Sung-shu Shan and on Sung-shu Shan New Battery.—A small portion of Sung-shu Shan Fort was held for a short time, as was also part of the parapet at Erh-lung-Shan,† but by midnight the assailants had been dislodged.

In addition to the troops of the 1st Division (attacking Sung-shu Shan) and of the 9th Division (attacking Erh-lung Shan) two battalions of the 25th Regiment (7th Division) were engaged at the former fort and a third battalion of the same division against Erh-lung Shan. These were the only troops of this newly arrived division which took any part in the day's fighting.

The attack on Sung-shu Shan Fort had been greatly hindered by flanking fire from Sung-shu Shan New Battery. This battery formed part of a crescent shaped group of trenches, running from Ying-tung-tzu, past the gorge of Sung-shu Shan Fort to the railway, about one mile south of the fort. Wire entanglements ran in front all the way.

Along the Ying-tung-tzu—Sung-shu Shan gorge portion were mounted—

Four 15-cm. howitzers.
One 10·5-cm. gun.
One 47-mm. Hotchkiss.
In the battery itself there were—
Two 10·5-cm. guns on field carriages,
One 3·42-inch field gun inside a blindage,
One 75-mm. quick-firing gun,
Two more 3·42-inch field guns,
Six Hotchkiss Q.F. guns.
And, some 1,000 yards southward, two more field guns.

The strength of the work, however, lay in the cross-fire from rifles that could be brought to bear on its exposed slopes from trenches close by.

On the evening of the 26th November volunteers were called for from each division to make a night attack on this battery; two thousand of these, under Major-General Nakamura commanding 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, started to attack the work from the railway embankment immediately below, at 10 p.m.

---

* Compare Diary, which states that the Japanese captured a portion. —C. Y.

† Compare Diary, end of November, page 399.—C. Y.

They reached a wire entanglement which runs about twenty yards below the summit. Further progress was impossible, and at 2 a.m. on the 27th November they were withdrawn, after losing over 50 per cent., including General Nakamura, severely wounded. The negotiations for an armistice to bury the dead failed, and the bodies lay in heaps on the slopes of the hill until some days after the surrender, emitting a sickening stench. The night 26th/27th November was very frosty, the cold weather continuing throughout all the succeeding week's fighting, so that numerous wounded must have perished.

The total losses during this eighteen hours' fighting reached 4,000.

*The Capture of 203-Metre Hill.**

Description of the Defences.—The defences of 203-Metre Hill† consisted of—

(i) Two main lines of wire entanglements running right round the hill, with shorter lengths running up and down the slopes in places.
(ii) Two trenches running right round the hill.
(iii) Two stone and sandbag breastworks on the summits.

(i) The wire entanglements were of plain steel wire with fragile wooden stakes about 3 feet high. They had been largely demolished by the fire of 28-cm. howitzers before the attacks took place.

(ii) The lower trench was wide and shallow and unprovided with traverses of any kind; it was evidently unfinished. Between the lower trench and the base of the hill, the Russians had placed a number of fougasses consisting of boxes filled with black pebble powder and fired by electricity.

The slope between the two trenches is very steep, especially on the north-east side (left in sketch), where it attains 35° to 45°. On this side the ground juts out in front of the trenches at some points, obliging the defenders to construct small "sangars" for individual riflemen. Even these could not search all the ground, the dead portions of which proved of great service to the attacking troops.


The natural soil is hard and stony, but round the trenches the excavated soil makes movement somewhat difficult.

The upper trench had been so battered by howitzer shells that its original shape was difficult to recognize. It had been traversed at intervals of about twenty feet by natural earth banks. The trench here was key-shaped, and ceased immediately in rear of the traverses.

---

* *See* Panorama 11.

† Compare report on September operations, pages 437 and 438, and Panorama 9.—C. Y.



Rough Plan of 203-*Metre Height Defences* (*excluding Entanglements*).

The remains of three stout casemates were observable along the west front of the hill; they consisted of vertical round beams some twelve inches in diameter, on which were placed rails and sleepers surmounted by sandbags and, in some cases, steel plates resembling locomotive footplates (perhaps taken from the engine-rooms of ships). The floor was sunk well below the level of the trench, the loopholes being very little above its ground level. At the sides and ends were loop-holed steel plates specially intended for the flanking fire of machine guns. A short passage led up a ramp from the case-mate to a shelter in rear, where the garrison evidently lived.

(iii) The two breastworks on the summit—one on each peak—commanded the approaches from each end. At the south-west end the ground between the position and Ridge 180* is swept throughout by fire from casemate a^3 (*see* plan above). The north-east side and Akasaka-yama knoll afford each other reciprocal flanking defence.

Akasaka-yama has a breastwork on the top similar to that on the main height. Some fifty yards down the slope is a trench of the usual key-shaped pattern, with natural earth traverses.† The perpendicular sides were reveted with sand-bags in places, but the shaly soil mostly stood without support.

From twenty-five to thirty-five yards below this trench (the intervening ground sloping gently) the Japanese had constructed a stone breastwork forming three sides of a rectangle.‡ Their

* *See* Map 72.

† The trace of the trenches and wire entanglements, both here and on the main hill, is faithfully represented in the profile sketch (Panorama 11) attached.—C. Y.

‡ Mistaken for sandbags by all the attachés when watching the fighting. Compare Diary, 28th November.—C. Y.

troops lay behind this for nearly a week, suffering greatly from grenades which the Russians threw amongst them. From our observation post, bodies could occasionally be seen hurled several feet into the air when these exploded.

Plan of Attack.—It was intended to capture the knoll Akasaka-yama before attacking the height, to save the troops opposite the latter from being enfiladed; the task proved too difficult, however. The Japanese actually suffered much loss from this enfilading fire.

The Fighting.—The attack on both hills began early on the 28th November.* On this day the following Japanese guns fired :— **28th Nov.**

Four 28-cm. howitzers from Tien-pan-kou ("A" on the map).†

Three 12-cm. howitzer batteries, situated respectively at Hsiao-tung-kou, Tai-ping-kou, and east of Namako-yama.

Two 9-cm. mortar batteries (not shown on map) from near Tai-ping-kou.

At 2 p.m. some thirty men dragged a field-piece to the right of the peak immediately west of Height 174, whence it continued to shower shrapnel on 203-Metre Hill till the end of the fighting.

For infantry attacking units, *see* Diary for this date,‡ and sketches attached thereto. Two battalions 26th Regiment remained in reserve in the saps from 10.30 a.m. till the afternoon.

On this day the remaining battalion 26th Regiment and the entire 28th Regiment were sent from in rear of the Japanese centre towards 203-Metre Hill. **29th Nov.**

Part of the 15th Regiment relieved the 38th Reserve detachment at Akasaka-yama. These troops were in their turn relieved at 3 a.m. on the 30th November by one battalion 26th Regiment, the 28th Regiment relieving the troops opposite 203-Metre Hill.

The Japanese on the 29th November held the upper trench on the south-west side. In the centre and on the north-east the Russians remained in possession. From 4 p.m. till 7 p.m. the summits were occupied.

For the course of the fighting, *see* Diary for this date.§ The Russian trenches were heavily shelled by the 7th Division batteries on Ridge 180. The howitzers likewise fired a great deal. The 1st Division gunners were largely used as stretcher-bearers, their pieces being for the most part inactive. On this day I noticed our system of crawling and of advancing by twos and threes tried by the infantry moving against the north-east **30th Nov.**

* For details of the fighting, *see* Diary for that date, page 400.
† *See* Map 72. ‡ Page 401. § Page 402.

peak. Large bodies of men carrying bundles of empty sand-bags came up during the afternoon to construct approaches.

1st Dec. On the 1st December the Russians heavily shelled the slopes of 203-Metre Hill and Ridge 180. The Japanese during the previous night had placed a field battery in deep gun-pits dug in a ploughed field some six hundred yards west of Tai-ping-kou, and pointing towards Pigeon Bay. These guns did not fire, and their position was almost indistinguishable a few hundred yards off.

For progress of approaches, *see* the sketch attached.*

On each side of the newly constructed sandbag parapet on the south-west slope, heads were seen appearing and disappearing and pieces of rock flying over the top. The Japanese again held part of the summit till 3 p.m., when they retreated. The Japanese in their official accounts gave the 1st December as the date of the final capture of the hill, this version being generally accepted in Europe. The Russians were not ousted till the 5th December, so that their version (6th December) is the more accurate.

2nd Dec. For progress of approaches, *see* the panorama attached.* The 28-cm. howitzers from Tien-pan-kou vigorously shelled the north-east peak.

3rd Dec. Two battalions 27th Regiment moved from the centre to the vicinity of 203-Metre Hill.

4th Dec. The 17th Regiment reached the vicinity of the fighting.†

5th Dec. For the attack this day the dispositions of the troops were as follows:—

26th Regiment of 13th Brigade opposite Akasaka-yama.
25th Regiment of 13th Brigade in reserve near 1st Division Head-Quarters Hill.
14th Brigade against 203-Metre Hill with one regiment in reserve.
One battalion 17th Regiment in reserve west of Namako-yama.
For details of fighting, *see* Diary for this date.‡
Two Russian attempts to recapture the hill failed.

Remarks on the Fighting.—Noticeable points about the fighting were—

1. The value of fresh troops for a difficult enterprise. The 1st Division troops were decidedly "jumpy," and evidently "played out."
2. Even the flimsy, half-destroyed, plain wire entanglements greatly impeded the attackers. This feature has been observable throughout the siege warfare.

* Panorama 11. † *See* Map 72. ‡ *See* page 403.

3. The defences—so formidable in September—could not withstand the 28-cm. howitzer fire. The shells had lifted the stout supporting timbers of the improvised casemates bodily out of the ground, and had largely obliterated the excavations. Here, of all places, a permanent fort would seem to have been necessary.
4. As usual, the Japanese most carefully concealed their artillery, and the guns used indirect fire in most cases.

It may further be noted that the scabbards of the Japanese officers, though covered with brown cloth or leather, were easily distinguishable at a distance of 1,500 to 2,000 yards, against their yellow cloaks, as they ran.

*The Concluding Operations.**

After the capture of 203-Metre Hill, the Japanese made various changes—

(*a*) in the disposition of their guns.
(*b*) in that of their infantry.

For (*a*), *see* Diary, the 6th December to the 24th January, also the first section of this Report.†

Regarding (*b*). The 7th Division, which during the fighting had been moved by driblets until the whole of it was on the extreme right, occupied: (1) Akasaka-yama knoll; (2) 203-Metre Hill; (3) the hill 700 yards south of 203-Metre Hill; (4) Ridge 180; (5) a portion of the low ground west of the above heights. Its head-quarters were at Pan-chia-tun, one mile north-west of 174-Metre Height.

Heights 174, 131, Namako-yama, and the heights north and north-west of it, continued to be held by 1st Division troops. This division, however, moved its main strength eastward, *i.e.*, to the line of heights west of Shui-shih-ying, to the Shui-shih-ying valley, and around Sung-shu Shan Fort.

From the Shui-shih-ying heights, sapping was begun against I-tzu Shan. The outpost line running west from 180-Metre ridge to Pigeon Bay, which had formerly been held by the 1st Reserve Brigade (1st Division) only, was considerably strengthened by the inclusion of 7th Division troops, and henceforward assumed the offensive. The Russians after the loss of 203-Metre Hill evacuated all the surrounding heights and retired to the line‡ An-tzu Shan, I-tzu Shan, West Ta-yang-kou, Kou-chang-tzu, Ta Liu-chia-tun, Pigeon Bay.

On the 6th December the 7th Division patrols occupied a height 550 yards south of Chia-chia-tun, which had been held by a Russian piquet since August. **6th Dec.**

At 9 a.m. on the 17th December the same division captured Chiu-hsieh Shan almost without resistance. **17th Dec**

* *See* Map 72. † *See* page 457. ‡ *See* Map 71.

18th Dec. On the 18th, at 8 p.m., two companies of the 27th East Siberian Rifles made a counter-attack, but were repulsed at 1 a.m. on the 19th December.

During the next few days all the low hills round Pigeon Bay fell into Japanese hands.

For the captures of Fort East Chi-kuan Shan, Erh-lung Shan, and Sung-shu Shan, *see* Diary of the 18th, 28th and 31st December, also the section "Operations against the Permanent Forts," of this report.

31st Dec./ 1st Jan. During the night 31st December 1904/1st January 1905, scouts reported to Major-General Ichinohe, commanding 6th Brigade (9th Division), that the Chinese Wall opposite the line Pang-lung Shan—Erh-lung Shan, as well as the heights south of it, were weakly held.* He accordingly advanced of his own initiative and captured "H," and Pan-lung Shan New Battery, during the early morning.

On the afternoon of the 1st January two battalions of his brigade attacked Wang-tai, a battalion of the 44th Regiment (11th Division) co-operating from the east; two companies of this actually attacked.

At 3 p.m. the Japanese artillery opened a heavy fire on Wang-tai;† flag-waving by the infantry on the slopes caused this fire to cease about fifteen minutes later, when an isolated infantry scout crept up to the crest. He returned, and next an officer with some twenty-five men advanced. The officer was mortally hit, but most of the party entered the entrenchment at the summit. Almost immediately a large mine explosion took place, which, however, caused practically no damage. The Japanese remained in possession.

Late that evening the 11th Division took "Q" Work. At 2 a.m. the enemy blew up East Chi-kuan Shan Battery, a block of concrete weighing some one hundred and fifty tons being hurled two hundred yards down the slope. The Japanese occupied the work directly afterwards.

"M," "N," and "R" Works likewise fell into their hands before morning.

On the following day hostilities ended with the capitulation of the fortress.

The Japanese casualties during the last day's fighting were quite insignificant, the 11th Division only losing 40 men, including 10 killed.

---

* Compare Diary for the 1st and 2nd January.—C. Y.

† *See* Map 72.

APPENDIX.

List of Objectives assigned to the Artillery during the several Attacks of this Period.*

A. On the 26th November: same as on the 30th October (*see* Appendix 1 to October operation report).†

B. Attacks on 203-Metre Hill:

(*a*) Four 28-cm. howitzers from Tien-pan-kou (*b*) Three 12-cm. howitzer batteries (*c*) Two 9-cm. mortar batteries exclusive of divisional artillery	Fired on the hill.

C. Attack on East Chi-kuan Shan North Fort:

(*a*) Four 28-cm. howitzers at "P" (*b*) Two 28-cm. howitzers at "R"	On the fort itself.
(*a*) 12-cm. bronze guns at "N" (*b*) 15-cm. howitzers at "M"	On "H" Work, Pan-lung Shan New Battery, and Wang-tai.
(*a*) 12·5-cm. Krupp guns at "Q" (*b*) Six 12-cm. bronze guns at "S" (*c*) Four batteries 15-cm. mortars at "V" and "W"	Over the ground between Wang-tai and the fort.
Mortars at "K" and "X"	On "Q" and East Battery Chi-kuan Shan.

D. Attack on Erh-lung Shan Fort:

(*a*) 28-cm. howitzers from "O" and "P"	On the fort.
(*b*) 28-cm. howitzers from "A"	On Forts An-tzu Shan and I-tzu Shan.

E. Attack on Wang-tai, January 1st:

(*a*) 28-cm. howitzers from "R" and "T" (*b*) Indirect fire-pieces "K" and "L." All naval guns	On Wang-tai and adjoining ground.

The above particulars furnished by the Head-Quarters Staff Third Army.

* *See* Map 72.

† Page 454.

(25) Russian Cavalry Reconnaissance on the Japanese left flank, May 1905.

REPORT by Colonel W. H. BIRKBECK, C.B., 24th May, 1905.

Plate.

Russian Cavalry Reconnaissance, May, 1905 - Map 81.

1st to 15th May. The Japanese outpost line runs eastwards from the Mongolian boundary line a few miles north of Kang-ping.* From the beginning of May the Russian cavalry in front of this line had displayed considerable activity, and by the 15th it became evident that there was a large mounted force with guns upon the right bank of the Liao River on the Ta-min-tun†–Kang-ping road.*

17th May. On the 17th May about 50 Russian squadrons were observed advancing southwards at a point some 15 miles north of Kang-ping.* Coming in contact with the outpost line, these squadrons sheered off to their right with the evident intention of passing round the Japanese left, and on the 18th May **18th May.** appeared in its rear. On that day two Japanese field hospitals south of Kang-ping* were captured. San-tai-tzu, occupied by Japanese infantry, was unsuccessfully attacked, and the Russian force bivouacked around Fang-chia-tun.

19th May. On the 19th May the Russian cavalry moved southwards in three columns, of which the left came in contact at 11 a.m. with a Japanese battalion occupying Ku-chia-tzu. South-east of Ku-chia-tzu were posted two batteries of the corps artillery, and to cover their left two more Japanese battalions took position outside the Fa-ku-men—Hsin-min-tun road. The Russian cavalry which had been visible in front of this position all day drew off at evening, and the Japanese decided to make a night attack upon their bivouacs, which they expected to find near Man-chu-tun. Concentrating at Ku-chia-tzu, the attacking force advanced at nightfall on Man-chu-tun, but failed to find the enemy. In the absence of any Japanese cavalry, the infantry were compelled to carry out their own reconnaissances, and infantry officers' patrols and mounted Chinese "farmers" were sent out to locate the Russian positions.

* 16½ miles north of Fa-ku-men.
† 100 miles south of Fa-ku-men.

It was not, however, till 3 a.m. on the morning of the 20th May that the Russians were ascertained to be situated as follows:—The main body at Ta-shan-tzu; 500 men at Ta Fang-shen; covering party at Hsiao Fang-shen. 20th May.

The distance from Man-chu-tun and the intervening nullahs made an attack under cover of darkness no longer possible; still, darkness or not, the Japanese determined to assume the offensive. It was 5 a.m. before the head of the column entered Hsiao Fang-shen, which the Russians had vacated in the night. Ta Fang-shen was also untenanted, but Russian scouts were watching it from the surrounding hills. As the Japanese entered Ta Fang-shen the Russians were observed advancing from Ta-shan-tzu, where their main body had spent the night. Doubtless the weakness of the Japanese as they entered Ta Fang-shen—they had only five companies and no guns—was plainly evident to the Russian scouts, and emboldened the Russians to attack. Advancing, in an estimated strength of 2,000 sabres, they formed a line enveloping the village in a semicircle to the south and west, and dismounting at 2,000 yards attacked on foot. Their advance was disorderly, in a straggling line with supports in rear, and they opened fire at 1,200 yards. Good cover was available to within some 700 yards of the village, sheltered behind the walls of which the Japanese suffered little or no loss. At 700 yards the cover ceased, and the Russians commenced to advance across the open; the Japanese let them come within 600 yards before they stopped them with a heavy fire, which drove them back to shelter with severe loss. Those Russians who could get back to their horses by sheltered ways, while those who could not retire further without exposure remained behind the cover they had taken.

The Japanese then divided their fire, some continuing to engage the men who were behind cover, while a portion fired section volleys at the led horses, some of which had approached to 1,500 yards. These volleys threw the led horses into confusion, but with the help of mounted men they were withdrawn out of range, where their riders joined them with difficulty. The action ended at 11 a.m., and by noon there were no Russians in sight. The latter lost 300 killed and wounded, the Japanese loss was insignificant. No artillery was employed against the village.

The Russians appear to have split up in the early morning into three parties, the first column going south towards Hsin-miu-tun, the second south-east towards San-mien-chuan, while the third remained in observation about Ta-shan-tzu and fought the action above described. Of the Japanese line of communication troops one regiment stationed at Ta-ku-chia-tzu had meanwhile taken up a position along the hills west of that place, and a brigade from San-mien-chuan had occupied thereby an extensive line from Kung-chu-tun along the hills towards

Ta-ku-chia-tzu. The second Russian column attacked the Ta-ku-chia-tzu regiment, and two squadrons succeeded in passing through a gap in the line, and cut up a convoy on the road between Ta-ku-chia-tzu and San-mien-chuan, burning some twenty or thirty Chinese carts with stores. The first Russian column was repulsed by the line of the San-mien-chuan brigade in spite of the artillery fire which they brought to bear upon it. On the night of the 20th May the three columns assembled and bivouacked around Hsiao-tai-tzu.

At 1 p.m. a Japanese divisional cavalry regiment (3 squadrons) joined the infantry at Ta Fang-shen, and the same afternoon the Cavalry Brigade (8 squadrons) reached Ta-tun after a march of over 30 miles, and communication was established between the two forces.

21st May. It was, of course, impossible for the Japanese to gauge the Russian intentions for the 21st, but they determined in any case to attack them with both the Cavalry Brigade and the Mixed Brigade. The former therefore advanced along the Man-nen Ho,* while the latter followed the Hsin-min-tun road. On reaching Ting-chia-fang-shen the cavalry of the Mixed Brigade met three Russian squadrons, before whom they retired, drawing them on to the infantry at Ta-shan-tzu. The infantry fire delivered at short range drove the Russian cavalry back on Ting-chia-fang-shen, whence it turned north-west to the Kung-chu-tun—Ta-tun road, where it was charged and completely routed by the Cavalry Brigade.

At 3 p.m. the Cavalry Brigade effected a junction with the Mixed Brigade at Ting-chia-fang-shen. With only 11 squadrons against 50, the Japanese were obviously unable to ascertain what the Russian main body was doing on this day, and fearing that if they went on south the Russians might slip past them and get away north, they decided to remain in a position of readiness at Ting-chia-fang-shen, pushing patrols forward right and left of the Hsin-min-tun road. At midnight, 21st/22nd May, it was ascertained that after feinting all along the line of the San-mien-chuan brigade the Russians had withdrawn north-westwards across the Mei-lin River to Ta-hsiu-shui-ho-tzu.

The losses inflicted on this and the previous day by the line of communication troops are estimated at 300 killed and wounded.

22nd May. On the 22nd May the Japanese Cavalry Brigade moved all along the left bank of the Mei-lin River to Fang-chia-tun keeping touch with the Russians throughout the day and interposing between them and Fa-ku-men. They bivouacked at Fang-chia-tun, while the Russians remained about eight miles further west. The Mixed Brigade stayed at Ting-chia-fang-shen.

On the 23rd May the Russians made a wide detour into

* Not shown on the Map.

Mongolia, passing 8 miles west of the left flank of the Japanese main outpost line which had been extended to intercept them.

So ended the Russian cavalry reconnaissance.

That, with a loss of 600 men killed and wounded, the reconnaissance effected its object of locating the left of the Japanese line there can be no doubt; but that 50 squadrons, with guns, unopposed by any mounted troops (for the 11 Japanese squadrons only came in touch with them on the 21st May, did not accomplish a great deal more, is but another proof of the indifferent quality of the Russian cavalry, trained, as they are, to rely primarily upon the rifle. From Kang-ping to Kung-chu-tun is not more than 45 miles, and, with the exception of a patrol which went to Hsin-min-tun (12 miles south), Kung-chu-tun was the furthest point reached in four days, *i.e.*, 18th to 21st May inclusive. The Russians were unhampered by any baggage train, they lived on the country, and there was nothing whatever to prevent their riding round or even through the Japanese infantry, and doing all the damage they pleased to the convoys on the roads and the flotillas of junks on the Liao River.

The cavalry soldier's first weapon, his mobility, was sacrificed in useless attacks against infantry in position, apparently for the sake of information which could have been easily got by a few officers' patrols.

(26) Third Japanese Army.—Operations from the 11th March 1905 to the conclusion of hostilities.

REPORT by Colonel W. H. BIRKBECK, C.B., Liao-yang, 3rd October, 1905.

Plate.

Operations 4th March 1905 to end of war - - Map 82.

10th Mar. 1. On the night of the 10th March the Third Army lay exhausted along the lines Wei-chu-hsi*—Wang-chen-chung—Liu-tiao-tun, facing the railway line, while the pursuit of the retreating Russians was taken up by the fresher divisions of the Fourth and First Armies.

11th Mar. On the 11th March the divisions again faced northwards and occupied the line Mo-chia-tzu (D 7)†—Ta-ku-chia-tzu (D 7)—Hsin-cheng-pu (C 7), in order from right to left, 9th Division, 1st Division, 7th Division, thus resuming the original positions in which they had deployed on the 27th February in the battle of Mukden.

14th Mar. On the 14th March the Army occupied cantonments along the left bank of the Liao Ho (D 6), as shown in the map, having first driven a Russian rear guard from the Chu-chu Shan (D 6).

The force engaged in the latter operation consisted of five battalions of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, four batteries of artillery, one company of engineers, and half a medical company, all of the 9th Division now reinforced by the 14th Reserve Brigade; the Russians retired across the Liao Ho (D 6) without offering any serious opposition.

The line of resistance covering the cantonments ran along the left bank of the Liao Ho (D 6) with patrols beyond the river. The passage at Shih-fo-ssu (C 7) was covered by a bridge-head.

3. The main supply depôt of the Army was at Tsai-lu-pu (C/D 7), and the line of communication continued to run *viâ* Ma-shan-chia-tzu‡ to Liao-yang. During this halt the drafts already despatched to replace the losses at the battle of Mukden joined the Army, and the damaged equipment requiring extensive repair, as well as the special winter clothing, was collected

* *See* Map 60, squares E 1 and E 2. † *See* Map 82.
‡ Map 60, square A 5, 35 miles south-west of Mukden.

at Tsai-lu-pu (C/D 7) for despatch to the rear. Experimental water-carts and boiler-carts were also issued.

4. The system of reinforcement appears to be as follows :— When a battle is imminent, estimates of the probable losses are telegraphed to the head-quarters of the territorial divisions in Japan, and drafts are despatched from the depôts so as to reach the Army immediately after the battle. In this case some of the drafts actually arrived and joined the fighting line during the progress of the battle ; but the losses so far exceeded the estimate that it was not till after the next advance that the ranks were filled up to their full establishment.

5. It is the custom of the Japanese to push out what they call an "advanced guard" in front of their general line of outposts, and on the 18th March such an advanced detachment (one regiment of infantry, one squadron of cavalry, two batteries of artillery, and a company of engineers) was sent forward to Ho-kua-tzu-yen (E 5). **18th Mar.**

The two independent cavalry brigades had reached the line Chin-chia-tun (D 3)—Chang-tu Fu (F 3) by the 21st March, and subsequently came into collision with Russian cavalry some twenty miles north of that line ; to support them the Ho-kua-tzu-yen (E 5) detachment sent forward on the 2nd April, one battalion to Chin-chia-tun (D 3) and one battalion with a troop of cavalry to Chang-tu Fu. **21st Mar.** **2nd Apr.**

6. In the meantime cavalry patrols and staff officers from the Third Army had carefully reconnoitred the country up to the line of Fa-ku-men (C 4) and, on the 9th April, the Army began to move by successive divisions from right to left into the cantonment areas shown in the map on the right bank of the Liao Ho (D 6). **9th Apr.**

The movement was completed by the arrival of Army head-quarters at A-chi-niu-lu-pu-tzu (D 6) on the 19th April. **19th Apr.**

The new cantonments were on higher and drier soil, and the water was much purer than in the villages of the Liao plain.

7. The main supply depôt of the Army was now established at Hung-shan-tzu (D 6) on the Liao Ho, and provisions came up in junks from Ying-kou ; this was the commencement of the use of the river line, which has since played such a great part in the supply of the left wing of the Manchurian Armies.

The Tsai-lu-pu (C/D 7) line was abandoned, and, in addition to the river, a line was established from San-tai-tzu (D 7) on the railway to Hung-shan-tzu (D 6).

8. Turning one moment to the operations of the two independent cavalry brigades, it would appear that the Russians, who had retreated in all haste after their defeat at Mukden, realized at the end of March that the pursuit was not being pressed, and began to send their mounted troops southwards again.

21st Mar. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade which had reached Chin-chia-tun (D 3) on the 21st March was proceeding along the Ta-hua (E 1) road, when at Pao-li-tun (E 2) it came in contact with some ten Russians squadrons with a battery, moving south.

4th Apr. After a short resistance at the northern end of the village, the Japanese brigade retired on Chin-chia-tun (D 3), where on the 4th April it successfully repulsed, with the support of a battalion of the Third Army from Ho-kua-tzu-yen (E 5) the attack of a large Russian force estimated at twenty squadrons with artillery and machine guns. The Russian main force withdrew to Pa-pao-tun (D/E 2). Similarly the 1st Cavalry Brigade had advanced from Chang-tu Fu (F 3) on the Feng-hua (F 1) road, and on the 3rd April had occupied Tzu-liu-shu (F 2), driving out a troop of Russian cavalry.

5th Apr. 9. On the 5th April, some five or six Russian squadrons supported by a battalion of infantry passed the cavalry brigade outposts, but were repulsed.

8th Apr. On the 8th April the Russians came on in force with some ten squadrons, one brigade of infantry, and guns, and forced the Japanese to retreat hastily on Chang-tu Fu (F 3) where the Ho-kua-tzu-yen (E 5) battalion had established itself.

9th Apr. 10. On the 9th April the Russians passed on to Chang-tu Fu (F 3), where there was some fighting, and on the 10th April, sent a detachment as far as Ma-cheng-tai (F 4), but on the **11th Apr.** 11th April the main body withdrew northwards, leaving a few squadrons in touch with the Japanese cavalry about Chang-tu Fu.

11. Meanwhile the 2nd Cavalry Brigade had withdrawn from Chin-chia-tun (D 3) across the Liao Ho (D 2) to Liu-chia-tun (D 3), leaving a detachment with two companies of infantry **15th Apr.** at San-chia-tzu (D 3). On the night of 15th April these two companies attacked the Russian cavalry at San-yen-ching (D 3) **16th Apr.** and drove them back with considerable loss. On the 16th April a large Russian force (estimated at twenty squadrons with guns) attacked San-chia-tzu (D 3), but without success, and in the evening, withdrew northwards.

The 2nd Cavalry Brigade, which had re-crossed the river co-operated from the direction of Liang-chia-tzu (D 3), and subsequently re-occupied Chin-chia-tun (D 3), where it established its head-quarters, reconnoitring the Ta-hua (E 1) road, while a detachment at Liu-chia-tzu (D 2/3) searched the left bank of the Liao Ho (D 2).

12. Accepting the above Japanese estimates of the Russian numbers, two points come prominently forward, firstly, the inadequacy in numbers of the Japanese cavalry, and, secondly, the want of enterprise of the Russian mounted troops; an occupied village appears to have drawn these so-called cavalry, like a magnet, into an unsuccessful dismounted attack, after which they appear to have "withdrawn northwards."

13. At the end of April the Third Army moved up to the line Kang-ping-hsien (C 3)—Chin-chia-tun (D 3) and the divisions occupied the areas shown on the map, in which they remained till the conclusion of hostilities. The movement was completed on the 5th May, when Army head-quarters reached Fa-ku-men (C 4). The 7th Division pushed an advanced guard to Ssu-tzu-yueh (C 2), while the 9th Division maintained a detachment of three battalions and a company of engineers with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade at Pa-pao-tun (D/E 2). **5th May.**

The Army was supplied in its new cantonments from the river at Tung-chiang-kou (D 4) and Hsiao-ta-tzu (D 4), while the San-tai-tzu (D 7)—Hung-shan-tzu (D 6)–Fa-ku-men (C 4) line was replaced by a line from Tieh-ling (E 6) to Fa-ku-men.

14. From the beginning of May the Russian cavalry were active along the whole front of the Army, and infantry were reported at Ta-hua (E 1) and also north of Liao-yang-wo-peng (C 1), towards which point the mass of cavalry seemed to be collecting.

This movement culminated in Mishchenko's raid of the 15th to the 24th May, already reported,* and from the latter date the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, which had been hurriedly brought across from Pa-pao-tun (D/E 2) to oppose him, remained upon the left flank of the Army.

15. On the 15th June the 15th Reserve Brigade occupied a position on the Hsin-min-tun (A 7)—Fa-ku-men (C 4) road, 17 miles south-west of Fa-ku-men. **15th June.**

Bridges connecting the 7th and 9th Divisions were completed at Lien-hsia-kou (D 3) on the 20th May, and on the 1st June, the 1st Cavalry Brigade joined the Third Army and took up a position between the 7th and 9th Divisions, covering a small front of more than four miles, with head-quarters at Kai-wo-chi (C 3).

16. On the 8th June a conference of generals commanding divisions assembled at Fa-ku-men (C 4), at which I have no doubt the decision of the Manchurian Head-Quarters was made known, that the Armies would remain in their present positions till after the rainy season. **8th June.**

A very strong line of almost continuous trenches and redoubts was now made along the whole front of the Army, from Ma-yuan-tun (C 3) by Hsiao-pu-wo-peng (C 3), San-ho-pu (C 2), Lu-chia-tzu (D 2), to half-a-mile east of Chin-chia-tun (D 3). The elaboration of this line afforded instruction to the young soldiers, as well as forming a line of resistance.

The troops were further occupied in improving the communications, in anticipation of the rainy season, and in making their quarters sanitary, a point to which the utmost importance was attached. The small percentage of sick, which never

* *See* preceding report, page 474.

exceeded 8 per cent. at the most unhealthy season, shows the success which attended their efforts.

The instruction of the young soldiers was continued with energy throughout the summer.

17. To us observers it seemed probable that the middle of May would see the Army advancing to the Chung-chun—Kirin line, which would be reached before the rains, and before the Russians had time to reorganize their army and replace the losses of the Mukden disaster.

Such a course, had it been possible, possessed obvious advantages, but doubtless the Manchurian Head-Quarters were guided by more weighty considerations, among which possibly were the following:—

(*a*) The command of the sea was not yet assured.

(*b*) No adequate reserve of supplies had or could be accumulated in the advanced depôt in time for an advance in May, for the river line was undeveloped, and the railway alone was totally inadequate, while the means of pushing it on were insufficient.

(*c*) The ranks were full of raw recruits, and the heavy loss of trained officers had materially reduced the efficiency of the army as a fighting machine.

(*d*) The original plan of campaign ended with the occupation of Tieh-ling (E 6) and Mukden, and information regarding the country was not as full as the Japanese strategists considered essential.

18. The army then settled down to a long period of instruction and waiting.

16th June. Constant insignificant collisions occurred between the outposts, the only affairs worthy of mention being the Liao-yang-wo-peng (C 1) surprise of the 16th June, which no doubt prevented another Mishchenko raid, and the affair of Ssu-tzu-yueh (C 2), which was as follows:—

1st July. At 9 a.m. on the 1st July the advanced guard of the 7th Division (one battalion) was attacked and surrounded at Ssu-tzu-yueh (C 2) by some one thousand five hundred of the enemy's mounted troops with eighteen guns. Fighting continued all day, and in the evening the Japanese withdrew under cover of a heavy thunderstorm upon their main line of resistance at San-ho-pu (C 2), with the loss of 90 killed and wounded.

Next day, in co-operation with the 1st Cavalry Brigade, a brigade of the 7th Division with guns re-took Ssu-tzu-yueh, and the Russians retired to their former positions.

This was Mishchenko's reply to the Liao-yang-wo-peng surprise.

19. During the latter half of July the 1st Cavalry Brigade moved across to Liu-chia-wo-peng (B 3), on the left flank of

the Army, where the whole Cavalry Division as well as the cavalry regiment of the 7th Division came under Major-General Akiyama's command. This mounted force was subsequently strengthened in August by the new 17th Cavalry Regiment as well as by the cavalry regiment of the new 14th Division. A detachment of the 1st Division replaced the 1st Cavalry Brigade at Kai-wo-chi (C 3). The safety of the left flank was thus assured against any further raids, for Major-General Akiyama covered the whole of the cultivated strip of Mongolia, which marks the Chinese encroachments on the so-called deserts, and thus necessitated a wide turning movement by any Russian raid, through country incapable of supporting more than five hundred men and horses without a supply train.

20. The Third Army was strengthened in August by the arrival of the newly-raised 14th Division, which arrived by march-route from Mukden on the 16th and following days, the movement being completed on the 22nd. **16th Aug.**

The new division occupied quarters in the villages west of Fa-ku-men (C 4), with head-quarters at Kung-chu-ling (C 4).

21. I have shown on the plate the lines of supply of the Third Army. Briefly the river posts supplied the Army with food, while Tieh-ling (E 6) supplied ammunition, clothing, and ordnance stores, and personnel marched up from Mukden.

22. In conclusion, I have no doubt that the Third Army was in a position to advance as soon as the rainy season ended, *i.e.*, by the middle of August: the ranks were full to overflowing, and the recruits were trained and many of them blooded on the outpost line; the horses were in excellent condition and the material in first-rate order.

23. I am informed that fifty days' supplies were in hand at the Hsiao-ta-tzu (D 4) depôt, and material for a light tramway line was ready there, the line being already laid as far as Chin-chia-tun (D 3), and the embankment prepared to Pa-pao-tun (D/E 2)

Preparations had also been made for joining Hsin-min-tun (A 7) with Fa-ku-men (C 4) and Hsiao-ta-tzu (D 4) by light railway, and a portion of the latter section was already laid.

That supply would have been very costly after leaving this river, I have no doubt, but it was quite possible.

Finally, the health of the troops was excellent, and their spirits had never been higher.

(27) The Expedition to Saghalien.

REPORT by Captain C. A. L. YATE, King's Own (Yorkshire Light Infantry), Nagoya, 11th November 1905.

Plate.

Sketch map of Island of Saghalien, in text.

Covering Minute.

The accompanying is a fairly accurate translation of the original lecture, shorn of superfluous phraseology.


LECTURE by an Officer, on the Expedition to Saghalien,* in which he served as Company Commander.

On the 21st July we started from our port of embarkation Otaru, escorted by the Kataoka Squadron. At that time, although the Baltic Fleet had been disposed of, there was still a risk of being attacked by the Vladivostok Squadron. The escorting squadron therefore took every precaution, the order of advance being as follows :—First two torpedo boats advancing at full speed in search of the enemy's ships. Some distance behind these followed two destroyers and two gunboats ; then the main fleet of transports. The remainder of the escorting squadron brought up the rear. Each transport had a naval officer on board ; communication between the ships was perfect.

During the three days' voyage we had very fine weather, and the sea was like a mirror ; quite the contrary to what we expected. At 7.30 a.m. on the 24th July, we approached the coast near Alkova. The transports were temporarily anchored at a distance of about 4,000 yards off the coast. Shortly before, a naval detached squadron had reconnoitred the enemy's dispositions and selected a suitable spot for landing. Whilst preparations were made for disembarking, the town of Alkova and several neighbouring points were heavily bombarded. There was no sign of the enemy.

The spot chosen was well adapted for landing, the beach being very shelving and of sand or shingle, no mud. The bay was wide enough for a large number of transports to anchor side by side.

* Now called Karafuto by the Japanese.


ARAKOVA
(Alkova)
ALEXANDROVSKI
RUIKOVSKI
(Liukov)
KORSAKOV
KORSAKOV
BAY
SOYA STRAIT
HONKAIDO
Rough sketch map of
SAGHALIEN
(KARAFUTO)
50 25 0 50 Miles

When satisfied on these points the advanced reconnoitring detachment signalled back to the Commander of the Expeditionary Force, and disembarked a detachment of marines to cover the landing. Alkova was seized with panic, and conflagrations were seen here and there, the result of our bombardment.

The transports now approached to within 1,000 yards from the beach and the disembarkation began (9 a.m.). Each infantry transport took about two hours to discharge its load, all the ships working simultaneously. The infantry all landed first and the foremost parties pushed forward a strong screen of scouts. At 11.30 a.m. the last party had left the ships.

The 3rd Battalion 51st Regiment now relieved the naval covering parties, and the 1st Battalion 51st Regiment pushed inland. The scouts seized the telegraph office at Alkova; news came that a hostile force was advancing from Alexandrovski. One brigade of the expeditionary force (which consisted of the 13th Division) now pushed forward towards Alexandrovski; the other, with which I was, to Ruikovski. The city of Ruikovski was occupied without the slightest resistance on the 27th July. It is hard to understand why the enemy left it. Some few works had been put up, but the garrison fled when we approached.

Why did the enemy surrender so early?

It is difficult to say, but the following reasons are probably correct:—

(1) General Lipanov as commander-in-chief was not beloved by those under him, and was an inefficient commander.
(2) The army was composed of imperfectly trained soldiers.
(3) Our appearance was altogether unexpected.
(4) The officers were too negligent. General Lipanov was once a lawyer, and was very imperfectly acquainted with military matters. The officers did not obey him, and all harmony was lost.

The enemy's force numbered altogether some 8,000, of whom about half were convicts, and had been induced to serve by a reduction of their sentences. They wore khaki clothing and caps with a silver cross as a badge. They used bayonets like our (Japanese) model, 1885 (18 *Meiji*), carried single loading rifles and 100 rounds per man in belts (bandoliers?). It is quite certain that they were not determined to fight, but merely wished to gain their freedom; besides, their training was practically *nil*.

We marched very hard the next few days (some 20 miles being covered each march), but met with no resistance—in fact, we wondered what we had come for. Ruikovski was taken on the 27th, and one cavalry regiment pursued the enemy. The southern (*sic*) army retired after the taking of the place. Many

temporarily fortified points had been constructed along the coast from Ruikovski southward, but none were held.

The natives were very much alarmed at the coming of our army, but had no intention of resisting us. According to the accounts of some sentries, a few natives attacked an outpost one night because we held some of them as hostages. The population north of Ruikovski is scanty. The sea round the coasts is stormy, especially in September. From November until the spring it is frozen. The island is well wooded, mostly pine woods. It is very hilly, but the peaks are generally not more than 1,800 to 2,400 feet high. The water supply is good. There are two main roads leading to the capital, about 18 feet wide. Troops cannot, as a rule, move off the roads, since the wet ground impedes movement. There is much reclaiming of ground going on, and cultivation is abundant. Trout and salmon abound. Coal is found in the river beds; we found it wherever we went. Cattle and horses are in good condition. The soil is fertile. In July the thermometer averaged about 85° Fahr. by day; the mornings and evenings were cool. We wore winter clothing. Flies plagued us greatly. There were no mosquitoes in the houses, but many in the woods; they tormented us on the march. According to the natives, snow begins to fall in October and melts in April. The natives, called Giliaks, are yellow skinned, and resemble the Chinese. They are of a kindly disposition, but hate the Russians. They reside in very rough dwellings by the coast, and live by fishing. In summer they store up quanties of sun-dried fish for their winter food supply.

I (lecturer) was on board the Nippon Yusen Kwaisha's "Awa Maru" and can only describe what took place on her. She carried one battalion (gross tonnage 6,329). Each transport had two or three lighters with their owners, and a number of coolies, good rowers. These had all been brought from Japan. When the disembarkation began, the boats from the men-of-war were sent round to the transports, and helped to disembark the troops. The lighters were about 9 feet broad and 36 feet long, and carried 100 men;* only the coolies rowed; the soldiers being ordered to remain concealed in the boats without moving. Ten launches towed the lighters as far as they could. The tide being spring tide, there was no necessity for wading.

Note by Captain Yate.

Regarding the tonnage of the "Awa Maru," she must have carried large supplies of horses or stores in addition. The Japanese allowed 1½ tons per man for the voyage from Japan to Manchuria, and transports of some 1,800 tons took a battalion.

The lecturer mentioned that the cavalry pursued the enemy to Ruikovski, and had some fighting. He did not mention the main body as having encountered the enemy.

* The boats carried 20 each.—C. Y.

(28) Russian Notes on Japanese Tactics.

COMPILED from a captured Russian document, by Major C. M. CRAWFORD, 5th Gurkhas, and dated Manchuria, 6th July 1905.

NOTES on JAPANESE TACTICS by Major-General KARTSEV, Commanding the Mixed Caucasian Cossack Division.*

The principal characteristics of the Japanese troops are as follows :—

1. Careful and strict performance of outpost duties.
2. A quiet and noiseless advance when assuming the offensive.
3. Precautions, when in action, to guard against surprise.
4. Quick decision at the critical moment.

The points to which we should pay particular attention are as follows :—

1. *Reconnoitring Duty*—

It should be borne in mind that other things should be reconnoitred besides merely the enemy's position—the general features of the country should, in particular, be carefully observed. Reconnaissances should be pushed home as far as possible against the front and round the flanks of the enemy's line, care being taken to avoid being cut off. When the enemy's patrols are encountered it is unnecessary to pursue them; more importance should be attached to fulfilling the particular mission on which one has been sent. It is preferable to try and decoy the enemy into an ambush, and every opportunity should be embraced of getting to close quarters with cold steel, as hand-to-hand fighting is the weak point of Japanese cavalry.

The outpost line must always be ready to fight at a moment's notice—as laid down in Field Service Regulations—and under no circumstances is retreat permissible. All outpost duties must be strictly performed, especially at night. Reports should not be sent by a single orderly; not only is there a chance of his being intercepted by the enemy, but he may also be set upon by Chinese, who are hostilely disposed towards us.

The line of piquets should be thrown out as far from the main body as possible.

2. *The following points should be remembered with regard to Tactics*—

(*a*) *Against the Enemy's Cavalry*—The Japanese cavalry has hitherto tried to avoid shock tactics against our Cossack cavalry; the only occasions on which it has charged have been when dealing with very small detachments. In future, therefore, when encountering the enemy's cavalry it will be advisable

* The original was captured by the Japanese at Liao-yang-wo-peng.

to conceal your strength, and to entice them to approach to close quarters, when shock tactics can be employed.

An advance in deep columns against Japanese cavalry is not recommended; it will be better in most cases to keep the main body under cover until the enemy advances sufficiently near to render a charge possible. As many prisoners as possible should be taken.

(*b*) *Against the Enemy's Infantry.*—If the enemy's infantry is taken by surprise, a sudden cavalry charge will undoubtedly be successful. In order to effect a surprise the following points should be borne in mind:—

(1) The real strength of the force should be concealed from the enemy as long as possible.
(2) Care should be taken to keep out of effective range of the enemy's infantry.
(3) Endeavour should be made to entice the enemy's infantry away from the point which it is intended to attack.
(4) Foggy weather or darkness should be taken advantage of.
(5) Retirements in front of the enemy's infantry should be carried out in extended order, so as to minimize losses.

3. *Dismounted Service*—

During this war our cavalry has very frequently fought dismounted; this has often been rendered necessary because the ground was not sufficiently open for mounted action. Dismounted service should be employed rationally, as circumstances demand. Should the enemy's cavalry adopt dismounted action, or should his infantry be encountered, our cavalry must not hesitate to fight on foot also.

According to the experience gained by our troops, there is nothing much to fear from Japanese infantry fire as regards quality; having plenty of ammunition, they are able to fire a great deal. On the defence, therefore, it is advisable to allow the enemy to advance to within 600 yards, and then to overwhelm him with a hail of bullets; the moral effect of this will be very great.

When firing at long ranges the target must be a large one, such as an encampment, barracks, or reserves in close order. Even against such an objective it is useless to fire unless the range is accurately known; otherwise the only result will be a waste of ammunition, and the exposure of our position to the enemy, which will call down a heavy hostile fire, more particularly from the enemy's artillery. During this war the terrific and powerful effect of artillery fire has been most marked. Consequently, troops should not be exposed unless a favourable opportunity presents itself.

(29) A Russian Study of Japanese Tactics.

TRANSLATION of Instructions issued by General KUROPATKIN to the Russian troops, forwarded by Major C. M. CRAWFORD, 5th Gurkhas, Manchuria, 5th July 1905.

A.—*Hill-fighting and Attacks.**

The attack of the Japanese is a continuous succession of waves, and they never relax their efforts by day or night. If the enemy's front is narrow, they seek to outflank it; if extended, to pierce it. Their movements are usually carried out under cover of night, and are followed by an assault on the particular portion of the position selected for attack.

When attacking a flank they invariably make a simultaneous attack against the front of the position: it is very necessary, therefore, to make bold and careful reconnaissances in order to be able to distinguish between the real and the feigned attack.

A characteristic of tactics of the Japanese in the hills is that they advance along the sides of the hills on a very narrow front and carefully avoid valleys. They generally attack our positions from a flank.

These would seem the best tactics to pursue in the mountains of Manchuria.

If the Japanese find it absolutely necessary to march along a valley they wait until night to do so.

The Japanese mountain artillery moves in considerable numbers and with great rapidity in the mountains. The mountain guns always keep pace with the infantry, and are often boldly pushed forward to positions on our flanks or even within our line of defence. Compared with the Russian field guns the Japanese mountain guns are greatly inferior—both in rapidity of fire and in mobility over flat country. They have, however, achieved considerable successes at times over our batteries by rapidly changing their positions and taking up new and better ones. The Japanese show considerable skill in these movements, and they appear to have some special equipment that enables them to move so rapidly. Moreover, their guns very soon come into action on positions captured from us, and thus afford invaluable support to their infantry, enabling them to retain what they have won.

B.—*Tactics in Flat Country.*

The Japanese are in the habit of making separate and independent attacks on each of the various portions of our positions: the operations are carried on chiefly by night. For

* The document from which this translation was made was, amongst others, captured after the battle of Mukden.

example: On the night of the 27th and 28th September 1904 they attacked the heights near Ku-shu-tzu village.*

On the night of the 29th and 30th they attacked and occupied the heights of Dowgolbaya† and a temple to the east.

At daybreak on the 1st October 1904 they captured Han-to-hai hill,‡ and on the 3rd October they seized some heights and a wood in the vicinity of the above hill.

On each of these occasions, directly the positions had been captured, the Japanese opened a heavy artillery fire on the Russian trenches in the neighbourhood, thus clearing the ground for further action.

In making attacks the Japanese usually deliver the assault just before dawn, so as to be in possession of the place by sunrise. During the day they strengthen the position to the utmost.

In order to deceive the enemy as much as possible the Japanese make one or more false attacks before delivering the real one. These feints are supported by heavy artillery fire. Sometimes the real assault is delivered under cover of a general attack along the whole line. The main object of these false attacks appears to be to entice the enemy's reserves away from the real point to be assailed. For example: On the 11th and 18th August 1904 they made false attacks on the 3rd Siberian Army Corps and on the same day delivered a vigorous attack in force on the 10th Army Corps at San-ping. On the 27th and 28th September 1904 they made a demonstration against the 10th Army Corps, and on the following day they attacked the 17th Army Corps. Again, on the 30th September they threatened the 1st and 17th Army Corps and at daybreak on the following day they delivered a severe attack on the 10th Army Corps. In the attack the Japanese advance by successive fractions of an extended line: their supports follow similarly extended, 100 to 150 yards in rear.

When in close order formations under artillery fire the Japanese deploy at once.

For example, during the fighting near Shan-lan-tzu on the 3rd October 1904 some of our shells burst over a column composed of two or three battalions. To our surprise they extended so smoothly and so rapidly that in one minute the whole column had deployed. An hour afterwards a number of scattered groups of infantry appeared from some trees close by. They doubled forward to some bundles of *kaoliang* stalks piled along their front, and there lay down. Very soon they stood up and ran forward again, each man carrying a bundle of the millet, and lay down again some distance further on. In this manner, by successive rushes, they succeeded in reaching the

* *See* Vol. I., page 530.

† If, as appears probable, the dates are given according to the Russian calendar, this is San-kuai-shih Shan; the account of the attack is in Vol. I., pp. 533–42.

‡ Probably San-tao-kang-tzu, Vol. I., page 501.

banks of the Sha Ho. There they opened out to fifty or sixty paces interval between men, and hid behind natural cover or behind the bundles of millet stalks that they had brought with them.

They appeared at first to be lying still, but after careful observation we perceived that they were engaged in making trenches, and very soon these were all connected up, and a long line of trench was formed, which they defended obstinately.

By this skilful method of advance the Japanese succeeded in bringing up their main body to within eight hundred yards of Putilov Hill without attracting our attention; fortunately we then discovered them from the position of the 33rd Eletski Infantry Regiment and brought an effective fire to bear.

On the 4th October 1904 we observed that about half a Japanese battalion had assembled in a trench that we had previously abandoned, which was directly in front of the 33rd Eletski Regiment. Here they hid themselves for about half-an-hour. Parties of them then extended right and left of the trench, creeping along the ground, and began to dig; by evening their trenches extended from Sha-ho-pu village to San-tao-kang-tzu hill.

We once had an opportunity of closely watching an advance made by the Japanese against the front of the position held by the 36th Orlovski Infantry Regiment. They attacked in widely extended skirmishing order. The firing line advanced at the double for a short distance, lay down and commenced to dig. Notwithstanding our extremely heavy fire, they again doubled forward, giving up their half-constructed trenches, and began to dig new ones. The supports then doubled forward and occupied the first trenches and completed them. When the firing line advanced from the second line of trenches these were occupied by the supports, and the reserves then moved up into the first line of trench. The advance continued by successive rushes in this manner.

The Japanese make a very careful reconnaissance of ground over which it is intended to attack. On the 30th September we could very clearly discern their various reconnoitring parties from Shang-lan-tzu village. At 10 a.m. a patrol of about 30 infantry appeared near Huang-hua-tien village, and shortly afterwards an individual soldier crept down quite close to our firing line, keeping well under cover and making careful observations. Some men of the patrol in rear then intentionally showed themselves, fired a few volleys at our lines and hid themselves again, evidently in order to divert our attention, and to allow the scout to reconnoitre without being disturbed. This went on all that day until 5 p.m.

The Japanese artillery almost invariably opens fire after that of the enemy.

They utilize their infantry to draw the enemy's fire, and to locate the positions of his batteries. They then fix the positions of their own guns accordingly—usually by night.

They are very particular in providing cover for their guns, even if they are concealed from view behind a village or wood.

The Japanese artillery concentrates its fire first on the enemy's batteries, secondly on the troops, ammunition wagons, &c., in reserve, and finally upon the ground in rear of the enemy's position, in order to prevent reinforcements from being sent up.*

They occasionally cease firing for a short time and then re-open fire with renewed energy. These pauses in the fire are apparently to make us believe that we have got the true range, and have caused them damage. During the cessation of fire the gun crews all take cover under shelters or in a trench.

It is evident, from the accuracy with which they hit villages, hills, &c., at almost the first shot, that the Japanese batteries are provided with excellent maps.

The Japanese infantry fire is, as a rule, wild, but it is superior in rapidity to ours. The Japanese infantry does not hesitate to make night attacks, and in these cases they make great use of hand-grenades. It is impossible not to admire the bravery and activity of the Japanese soldiers; the latter is doubtless due chiefly to their light equipment and to their natural fondness for the offensive.

---

* *Vide* account of capture of 203-Metre Hill in Diary of the Siege of Port Arthur.—C. N. C., page 401.

(30) Russian Notes on the Japanese Forces.

TRANSLATION of a Paper found in the Russian Lines after the Battle of the Sha Ho, and forwarded by Captain J. B. JARDINE, D.S.O., 5th Lancers, Yen-tai Colliery, Manchuria, 8th February 1905.

The following statement was found among the papers taken from the Russians subsequent to the battle of the Sha Ho. It seems to have been distributed to each battalion in addition to several other statements concerning the forces, organization, and uniforms of the Japanese Army.

It has been translated from Russian into Japanese, and from Japanese into English by Japanese interpreters.

THE TACTICS AND WAR PREPARATION OF THE JAPANESE ARMY.

The Appearance and Characteristics of the Japanese Army.

The soldier is short and his physical development is imperfect, but he has a healthy-looking frame, and though a little slow in action, he is quick in understanding and ingenious. Lightness of heart, ingeniousness, perseverance and unselfishness are the chief qualities of the Japanese soldier. He can march long distances without taking many things with him; this simplicity is due to his simple way of living at home. Since the North China troubles in 1900 some of the Japanese papers have been complaining that the Japanese Army has done long marches with heavy equipment that exhausted the men greatly. The Japanese are naturally a military race and take readily to a soldier's life, adapting themselves readily to military discipline, while the non-commissioned officers and men observe even the minutest details of army discipline.

The fighting training of the Japanese Army is modelled upon the German system of 1880, with some modification. The infantry, whether in company or battalion, are clever in manœuvring, their movements are precise and quick, and they have a wonderful capacity for marching. The non-commissioned officers and lance-corporals are the senior soldiers, and they show intelligence as well as ingenuity in dealing with problems independently as they arise. The company commanders are diligent and clever in management. Their capacity for shooting is slightly inferior to the rest of their attainments.

The horses of the cavalry are very poor, weak and badly trained, and they are not quiet in the ranks. Each man rides after his own fashion, and generally his seat is neither well balanced nor easy. The riders use four reins with the bridle, and the speed of the horses is not well developed; they do not trot. In their march they cannot keep together. These defects show that the Japanese have no good cavalry instructors, and they are not well trained in handling their animals. These defects are partly due to the physical character of Japan, which has few wide plains and gives no opportunity of improving their horsemanship. The equipment is not uniform and is unscientifically made; in other words the saddle is placed on the necks of the horses, so that when they trot quickly they shake the riders very much, and many of the Japanese cavalry horses have sores on their backs and shoulders.*

The material, horses, and equipment of the artillery are fairly good. Their horses are small and are badly trained. The artillery are extremely slow on the march with heavy guns of later invention, for their horses are poor and the land is mountainous. The gunners are clever in manœuvring and in loading, aiming, and selecting the target, as well as laying their guns. They are wonderfully calm and quiet, and handle the guns skilfully with the utmost confidence, but the training and discipline of the artillery is much inferior to that of the infantry. Their accuracy in shooting is about the same as that of our gunners.

Tactical Preparation.

(The statements under this heading were derived from material gathered during Japanese manœuvres since 1896.)

The infantry march in fours and face to a flank; the cavalry in column of threes; while the artillery march with one gun in line of column. Between detachments are the following spaces:—a battalion or regiment 25 or 40 paces. The marching speed of a detachment, which consists of three arms, is about 4½ to 5 versts (3 to 3½ miles) an hour. The Japanese march in large bodies, though columns extend to a long distance, and a halt of from 1½ to 2 hours is made in each march. In war they send forward a force of independent cavalry, which generally consists of the whole body of the cavalry attached to the column. In advancing they are protected by the advanced guard; out of this advanced guard, they send the vanguard or point. The advanced guard consists of about a quarter of the whole body of infantry, one-seventh to one-third of the artillery, as well as a company of engineers

* The latest Russian papers have published fuller criticisms on the Japanese cavalry, and pointed out also that the Japanese have begun to realize their defects, and are trying hard to improve horses and equipment.—J. B. J.

and a small troop of cavalry. The vanguard consists chiefly of a small body of infantry and cavalry. The point is specially formed of the cavalry, and sends patrols to the front. The Japanese have neither flank guards nor stationary flank patrols; they send out these occasionally in different directions to search localities and note their topographical features. The advanced guard goes forward from its main body like that of the Russian Army; its duties vary with different forces of the army with the distance marched, and with the topographical features of the country through which the army advances; when an advanced guard, sent from a division, marches through hilly country, it always sets out an hour earlier than its main body. The parts and order of a column are as follows:—As point, a small body of cavalry (about a quarter of a squadron), then a large body of infantry, followed by the whole body of artillery; the rest of the infantry and the engineers and bridging columns.

In advancing, they have a small rear guard. When one or more divisions advance, they take several roads; in such a case the advanced guard is sent forward from one of the columns, generally from the middle column. Connection between columns advancing in the same direction is very weak. In retiring, the formation of the army is the same as that in advancing, but in this case the retirement is protected by the rear guard; its force and distance from the main body are the same as those of the advanced guard in marching.

Cyclists and Transport.

There are five or six military cyclists in each regiment; they advance in front of the regiment and do the work of orderlies and patrols. Sometimes a part of the cyclists is attached to an advanced guard, or to a point which consists of the cavalry only. A country like Japan, where roads are good and horses are scarce, gives ample room for military cyclists to compete with mounted orderlies in speed.

In advancing, the first line transport goes immediately after the body to which it belongs. A sergeant or corporal goes with the transport; the second line moves about two versts (1⅓ miles) behind the rear guard. A divisional train is divided into two echelons; the first line of columns is placed at a distance of a day's march from its main body, while the second line of columns is placed at a distance of a day's march from the first. The arrangement of the echelons is settled by the divisional commander.

Quarters.

The Japanese army in choosing its quarters is almost always indifferent to the distance of the enemy or any other circumstance. In quartering, infantry is in front, then the artillery, then the cavalry and trains. The advanced guard

marches in front about one verst (⅔rds mile) from the main force. It, as well as the inlying piquets, goes into quarters, but in quarters, the soldiers never undress.

The Service of Security.

In the service of security, they use from one to several companies of infantry. Each company sends out two small bodies of sentries, and they are posted at a distance of two versts (1⅛ miles) from the main body, and a larger body of sentries in great force is posted half a verst behind the front sentries. As a rule, each piquet is stationed on a road; each post contains three soldiers; two of them take the service of security alternately, while one does patrol duty, advancing a little way forward from the sentry post. Out of each piquet patrols are sent out to search along the sentry lines. Both piquets and patrols, small and large, go into quarters, but they are fully prepared for fighting at any moment. The outposts remain out until the point of an advanced guard arrives at the sentry line, when they rejoin the main body.

Reconnaissance Duty.

Reconnaissance duty and cavalry patrolling are the same as those in our army. The duty of an independent patrol is full of minute details; his report is trustworthy and accurate. The movement of a large cavalry patrol is undecided, that is to say, when it meets with the enemy it tries first to take the defensive, which, however, it soon gives up and retires when a small body of the enemy's infantry attacks the position. Infantry patrols are clever in performing reconnaissance duties.

The Engagement.

The method of fighting in the Japanese army which we have observed in manœuvres is as follows:—

Infantry.

The fighting body consists of skirmishers, fighting line, and supports. There is no support (?) to each of these separate bodies. Each company sends out two sections of skirmishers (one company consists of three sections), and as the skirmishers are not in extended order, they are practically in close order of one line, keeping a short space between the sections. The men in the firing line generally lie down and take advantage of any cover. The non-commissioned officers and leaders of the sections kneel on one knee three paces behind the firing line. The supports take their places 40 or 50 paces behind the firing line, and when the skirmishers stay at the same place for some time, the supports kneel on one knee, holding the rifle close to the leg. The supports generally consist of about one-half of the infantry.

and they are posted from 200 to 300 paces behind the firing line and form a column behind the centre of the firing line. The supports sit down, or kneel down on one knee. Before the firing line is extended, the leading officers go forward to reconnoitre the local conditions, and they do this work exposing themselves and giving good targets to the enemy. When a company is ordered to take some position, it sets out in close order, and when it reaches the position it sends out skirmishers but has no flanking guard.

The infantry fire independently or by volleys. Volley firing is adopted when the enemy is at long range, while independent firing is adopted when the enemy is within 1,000 paces. Company commanders and section leaders command the firing, point out the target, and give the range, but their estimate of distance is imperfect. Independent firing is ordered by whistle of the company commander, the order being repeated by the non-commissioned officers. The sighting and loading of the rifles are accurate and quick.

To reinforce the firing line the supports of the company are added. In this case the supports form in extended order and fill up the spaces between the sections. If additional reinforcements are needed the supports form extended order and go forward between the companies, which are already in extended order. If still further additions are needed they adopt another method, and some portion of the supports will make a second firing line close behind the first, forming in extended order suitable for their firing. In this case the first line takes the lying down position, while the second line takes the standing or kneeling position. The increase of the firing line by reinforcement is accomplished very quickly after the firing begins. In other words, the supports may form part of the skirmishing line in a few minutes after the fighting begins; by this time the fighting body consists of many extended lines and all the supports. The supports also form in extended order quickly (especially when on the defence) as they approach the line. Generally all the supports are joined to the fighting body within twenty or twenty-five minutes after the fighting begins. In doing this the fighting body must move in front of the enemy, quite exposed, in order to extend one or both flanks.

Therefore, as we have observed at manœuvres, when on the defence great confusion is caused when the flanks are threatened or the enemy attempts a turning movement. In advancing the firing line, the whole body goes forward, movement when far from the enemy being at the ordinary pace, when within a short distance at the double. Sometimes each body advances separately by rushes. In rushing, they do not double, but make the rush when they arrive at a distance of forty or fifty paces. All the supports double after the firing line and the advance of the firing line* is generally confused;

* In advancing under fire they do not move by the regulation double, but by rapid rushes of 50 paces.—*Intd.* Ian H.

they get close together and advance obliquely, moreover they expose their flank to the enemy and move right across the front of the enemy. They fire very seldom during the advance. The retirement of the firing line is always too quick and disorderly; they do not fire till they get back to the first position where they were before.*

To defend a position, the infantry form a long firing line in close order, and the supports are also quickly extended; when there is time they make trenches deep enough to enable them to kneel, and if there is no time they take shelter behind the line of defence, and each section sends out a man about twenty or twenty-five paces in front of the line to watch the enemy. The man will remain in his place kneeling down on one knee as long as fire is not opened, and after firing is opened he rejoins the line. The Japanese infantry never attempt to attack with bayonets, for they believe that with the modern rifle, attack with the bayonet is impracticable, and that the issue of the battle must be decided by powder and shot. For this reason the infantry use rapid fire instead of the bayonet. The rapidity of fire varies at distances of from 300 to 800 paces, and with the local features of the ground. As they reach the right distance, the supports, both on the defensive and on the offensive, close up on to their firing lines; a halt is then made at the right distance and a heavy fire opened. The Japanese believe that, then, one of the two forces opposed must retreat.

The fire tactics in defence are as follows:—

When the enemy approaches within a distance of 800 to 300 paces, a special signal is given to the firing line, which leaves the trench shouting "*Ya*," fixes bayonets, advances 40 to 50 paces; at this moment the supports behind the firing line approach the line, forming in close order, and make a second line, firing in a standing position. At this critical moment the force on the defensive leaves cover and is exposed in the open, giving an excellent target to the infantry and artillery of the enemy. In manœuvres the rapid firing continues from (†) minutes to 1 hour, until the order is given to cease fire.

Cavalry.

The cavalry takes very little part in actual fighting, and generally does not keep watch on the flanks; it is anxious to be sheltered behind the line, and does not try to take advantage in attacking the enemy. Even when they see a good opportunity, the men do not ride rapidly forward, being more anxious not to fall off their horses than to quicken their speed.

Artillery.

The artillery takes up an independent position, and on the defensive some part of the gunners (about a third) are held in support. Generally speaking, the selection of positions is badly

* All this is very true.—*Intd.* Ian H. † Omitted in original.

done, and the field of fire is very limited and narrow. When it takes up a position in the open field the artillery constructs epaulments. When it advances to a fighting position, its order is not incorrect,* the speed is slow and exposes it to the enemy, so that it takes from three to seven minutes before the guns can fire after the position has been taken up. Though the firing is very orderly, and the gunners are invariably brave, their practice, though calm and quiet, is altogether slow. The artillery does not change position while the fighting is going on, so that it cannot give proper assistance to the infantry at the moment of attack. The artillery when on the defensive does not open fire upon the enemy† ; though it may see an effective target, it waits for the enemy's fire. The ammunition wagons are placed near the guns, and the speed of the fire is more or less quickened. Some of the Japanese papers, in their criticism of the Pei-chih-li fight of 1900, complained that the Japanese artillery was generally unsatisfactory.

Engineers.

The engineers belong to the advanced guard ; they repair the roads and lay the telephone and telegraph wires between the advanced and rear guards. The telephone and telegraphic communications are put up very speedily. The engineers do active work, taking the leadership in building cover and epaulments for the gunners. The work is done quickly, and has the appearance of being well made, but it is often unsuited to the topographical conditions.

Exercise of Different Arms.

The characteristics of the different arms in manœuvres are as follows :—

1. In defence, they like to take up a position with a wide range in front.
2. In offensive tactics, the order and position of the arms are always the same whatever the circumstances may be.
3. In marching, as well as in fighting, flank guards were neglected.
4. In marching, the main body is separated by a long distance from the advanced guard, so that the latter alone must engage the enemy for some time.
5. In attack the objective is not definitely pointed out.
6. They use the supports too quickly, and exhaust power to repulse the enemy when the latter adopt a flanking or turning movement.
7. They do not recognize the need of continuing the fight till bayonets are crossed.

---

* Correct (?). † All very true.—*Intd.* Ian H.

8. They avoid wooded localities, especially in mountainous country.
9. They make frontal attacks without attempting turning movements.
10. In defensive tactics they take little pains to avail themselves of natural cover, but content themselves with trenches or epaulments.
11. The retreat is made when it is necessary; in this case the infantry of the main body retreats first, then the whole body of the artillery, and lastly the remaining force of the infantry.
12. They do not like night attacks or night marches.
13. In an army of more than two divisions each division has a separate commander, so there is no connection between the divisions, and the action of each is independent.

Several of the Japanese papers have been speaking of the real value of their own army which distinguished itself in the China campaign (1900) and urge that though the Japanese army succeeded when operating in small bodies it will be much inferior to the European armies in combating big armies.

(31) The Japanese Infantry Attack.

REPORT by Lieut.-Colonel A. L. HALDANE, D.S.O., General Staff, Tokio, 15th October, 1905.

Plates.

Battle of Hei-kou-tai. Attack of the 5th Division near Ta-tai - - - -	Maps 83 and 83(a).
Battle of Mukden. Attack of the 8th Division on Chang-tan - - - -	Map 84.
Battle of Mukden. Attack of the 41st Infantry Regiment on Ta-chang-ho - - -	Bound in text.

Formation for, and General Principles of, Attack.

In the formation of their infantry for the attack the Japanese appear to be guided by the following general rules, namely, that formations should—

(*a*) present a difficult target to the enemy,
(*b*) offer the greatest facility for fire at all times,
(*c*) furnish the power of readily taking cover,
(*d*) promote mobility,
(*e*) lend themselves to easy reinforcement, and
(*f*) the maintenance of command.

Some of these points have, during the course of the war in Manchuria, been given at times greater prominence than others, but, on the whole, it may be said that the most striking feature of their attack is that when they move they do so with great rapidity—the pace increasing as they near the enemy; by this means their own *moral* is increased, while that of the enemy is correspondingly diminished, and the target for his rifle and artillery fire made more difficult.

The primary object is to gain a position from 600 to 800 yards distant from the opposing force, whence, supported by artillery, the necessary fire preparation by rifles can be made. This position reached, days of heavy fighting sometimes follow, involving much entrenching before a parallel still more in advance is secured, from which, after a further weakening of the enemy's strength and *moral* by fire, occasionally assisted by the use of hand-grenades and mortars firing bombs, the line would be assaulted. Thus, in spite of the fact that mobility

—obtained although the men carry packs and much ammunition—is the most noteworthy feature of the attack, the operation is performed with great deliberation combined with extreme patience, and, as in the attack of a fortress, the ground is gradually but firmly secured.

The stubborn resistance of the Russians, posted generally behind a line of obstacles, and the open nature of the ground, have caused engagements to be much prolonged, and battles, which in the earlier days of the campaign were concluded between dawn and dusk, some months later covered several days. But their unusual, and indeed unexpected, length is not to be attributed alone to these causes, for experience has taught the Russians the value of concealing men and guns, and as that lesson has been taken to heart, the troubles of the Japanese in attack have proportionately grown. At Mukden, where, for this reason apart from *moral* or other considerations, the Russian power of resistance was at its best and the difficulties of the attack were at their greatest—for the ground was not only exceptionally bare but frozen hard—the battle lasted many days and progress made was slow.

Three principles seem to be invariably followed by the Japanese in carrying out an attack. The first is careful reconnaissance, such as will ascertain with as much accuracy as possible the conditions of the enemy's position, the nature of the obstacles before it, and his strength; the second a rapid advance to a spot from 600 to 800 yards from the opposing line, where, as already stated, the preliminary fire preparation is carried out; and lastly, entrenching to secure the ground gained and to furnish a parallel from which to make the next advance. Oftener than not the next step forward is undertaken at night, but the same procedure in the operation—to reconnoitre, advance, and then entrench—is rigidly followed. Nothing is done carelessly or in haste, and rare must be the occasions where an obstacle unknown or unforeseen is found across the path.


Prior to the outbreak of the recently terminated war the frontage allotted to a battalion in attack was 300 metres (about 328 yards), and to a brigade of six battalions four times as much, and up to and including the battle of Liao-yang the regulation front was generally kept by the Second Army. After that battle, however, and markedly in that of Hei-kou-tai—when the ground was bare and frozen hard—the front became wider, and more open formations than those employed at an earlier period were adopted. Some divisional commanders, it is true, prior to the war appear to have foreseen the necessity of practising more open formations, and the success of Lieutenant-General Kigoshi's Division (the 5th) at the battle of Hei-kou-tai,* and the small losses that befel it as compared to those of the 8th Division, are a testimony to his wisdom and furnished

* *See* pages 41 and 45.

an example which was followed by the Second Army in the great struggle that took place shortly after before Mukden. After the battle of the Sha Ho, and before that of Hei-kou-tai, several regiments of the 5th Division—more especially the 42nd—were frequently seen at drill, and the first of the following examples may be taken as typical of the formations adopted at that period.

Example I.

Before extending for attack a battalion is drawn up, or probably already stands, in one of the three following formations :—



Besides these formations in section columns, companies may be in line, column, or quarter-column with their three sections abreast, and from one or another of these assembly formations the battalion deploys for the attack.

In the example under examination the position to be attacked was an isolated hill, distant from the battalion which carried out the practice about 2,500 yards, and was assumed to be held by hostile artillery and three companies of infantry. The ground from the point of assembly was open, but a little cover was obtainable on the right flank at some small hillocks 800 yards from the imaginary enemy, whose trenches were assumed to be at the base of the hill and 400 yards from the top.

The battalion was drawn up behind a low hill a couple of hundred yards south of the Sha Ho, and the major in command explained at some length what his intentions were and how they were to be executed. Following this, a dozen scouts were sent to the front of the left wing, and these, going forward under an officer, reported the imaginary strength of the enemy. The battalion commander, whose men were standing in line of section columns at close interval, now ordered three companies to advance at deploying intervals—*i.e.*, about 150 yards. These companies formed fours right and wheeled to the left, and so advanced, the front they covered being about 600 yards, or double that laid down by the Japanese infantry regulations. Scouts were thrown out to the right flank to keep touch with the imaginary battalion on that side or to watch the ground. After covering about 800 yards in quick time, with arms at

the slope, the two flank sections of the three leading companies doubled up into line, extending their inner flanks until they met. The men were now in single rank, with intervals of about two paces between them. The captain of each company remained with the supporting section, which followed, still in fours, from 150 to 200 yards in rear of the centre of its extended line. Up to this time and until he joined the firing line the commander of the battalion had maintained command over the three leading companies by means of connecting files furnished by the reserve, who passed on his orders to extend, &c. The reserve company followed in rear of the centre of the extended line in the same formation as that in which the other three companies had left the assembly point. A little in front of it moved the battalion commander, with his adjutant, taking cover where available. (He was on foot, and the ground afforded such cover as Chinese graves and occasional trees.)

As soon as the companies of the firing line had extended, section rushes of 50 yards were made, one section doubling forward at a time. The sections did not go forward in regular order, and so furnished a more difficult target for the imaginary enemy's guns. Up to 1,000 yards from the position there was no firing; but after that distance some rounds were fired independently at each halt, the sections in front covering the advance of those in rear, and *vice versâ*. When the firing line had reached a point 800 yards from the position, the supporting sections joined it. The company on the right sent its section to the extreme right; that in the centre appeared to fill up a gap between two companies, and the left company probably sent its section to the left. From the extreme right everything could not be clearly seen. The advance was continued by section rushes, made with greater rapidity and for shorter distances than earlier in the attack. Meantime the reserve company was closing up towards the firing line, and when that portion of the battalion had arrived at 600 yards from the position, preparations were made to reinforce. Line was formed, and the men, extending widely, rushed to the front and reinforced the line wherever there were gaps. Prior to this a long pause—10 minutes or more—had been made by the firing line, which, presumably, was supposed to be unable to get forward until its own imaginary artillery had assisted and a heavy fire had been poured on the enemy's position by itself. It was at this period that the reserve company came up, and after its arrival the pause continued for a brief time. Rushes then were resumed, these being made by sections, and were continued until a point 300 yards from the enemy's trenches was reached. Here bayonets were fixed, officers drew their swords, and, led by them and the battalion commander, one long rush was made by the whole line for the position. It was made with considerable rapidity—much faster than a double—and, despite the fact that the men were carrying packs and had to move up a slight slope, they were not unduly out of breath and

kept very fair order. On reaching the assumed entrenchments of the enemy, the cheering with which the rush had been accompanied ceased and the reserve company went forward about 200 yards and fired on the supposed retreating enemy. The other companies formed up and marched off, followed by the reserve company. For at least an hour—bitterly cold as it was—the battalion commander harangued his officers upon what had taken place.

The points observed during the exercise were as follows :—

Intervals were not particularly well kept, and where a slightly hollow road ran parallel to the right for some distance the men crowded into it, and would have presented a good target to an enemy.

The firing—"snapping"—was steady, and the backsight was adjusted with care to the distances named.

Words of command were given clearly but quietly, and no whistles or signals were used.

The signal to rush was the appearance of the officer in front of his section, but, as is natural, the men did not rise up or lie down nearly so quickly as they habitually do in a real attack. Under such circumstances the manner in which the Japanese infantry rushes, lies down, and rises when ordered is remarkable, and gives the enemy a very brief space in which to direct aimed fire upon it; but many men are killed and wounded during the pauses which follow each short advance, so much so that it is considered that the period of movement is safer than that of halt, an inducement, where possible, to make the attack as mobile as possible.

The reserve appeared to be well-handled, but would probably have suffered fewer losses—imaginary ones—had it extended earlier, as bullets intended for the firing line would have reached it.

The same battalion whose attack has above been described took part in the battle of Hei-kou-tai, and, although the following account thereof has been given in the operations of the Second Japanese Army from 20th October 1904 to 29th January 1905,* it is thought well to repeat it here as exemplifying the gradual evolution of the Japanese infantry attack and its approximation to that at present practised in our own army.

Example II.—The Attack of the 41*st and* 42*nd Regiments on the* 27*th and* 28*th January* 1905.†

During the battle of Hei-kou-tai the 5th Division was sent from the neighbourhood of Shih-li-ho to Ta-tai in order to protect the right of the 8th Division, and fill the gap which existed between it and the Second Army to the north. Two of the regiments, the 41st and 42nd, belonging to different

* *See* page 51 *et seq.* † *See* Map 83.

brigades, were ordered to attack the Russians who were holding the river-bed from Liu-tiao-kou to Li-chia-wo-peng and the villages in rear. In carrying out this operation they were supported by 5 mountain batteries (30 guns). The ground lying to the north-west of Ta-tai is a dead level for about 3,000 yards, and singularly bare, and as the Russians were practically invisible and safe from fire of artillery in the river-bed, the advantage of position was entirely upon their side.

Lieut.-General Kigoshi ordered the left wing—consisting of the 42nd Regiment—to advance from Ta-tai towards Liu-tiao-kou, while the I./41st Regiment, as right wing, was directed to move through Hsiao-tien-tzu on Li-chia-wo-peng, its other two battalions being at first kept as a reserve. Snow fell during the deployment, and the troops advanced unperceived for 1,000 yards, when they came under the fire of three batteries (24 guns) in position near Li-chia-wo-peng.

Right wing attack—41st Regiment.—When the I./41st first deployed at a distance of 3,000 yards from the enemy it had two companies as firing line and two others in rear of the right flank in echelon. The leading companies, Nos. 3 and 4, had each two sections extended with an interval of five yards between the men, and one section similarly extended 150 yards in rear. Nos. 1 and 2 Companies followed, as stated in echelon, No. 2 being 500 yards behind the support of No. 3, and No. 1 50 yards behind its right rear. Both the reserve companies were in column of sections and unextended. When the Russian artillery opened fire the battalion lay down, and when a pause occurred in the firing, company rushes, about 60 yards in length, were made, and a line 1,200 yards from the enemy reached. Here rifle and machine gun fire was met. At this time the supporting sections joined the firing line, and No. 2 Company, coming up from the reserve, prolonged the firing line to the right, while No. 7 Company of the II./41st was echeloned 100 yards behind that flank in column of sections extended, with 100 yards between the sections. By section rushes a line some 900 yards from the enemy was reached, by which time Nos. 7 and 5 Companies of the II./41st had joined the firing line coming up on the right, while No. 6 and No. 8 were in rear as battalion and regimental reserve respectively. Thus the firing line consisted of five companies, each company with a frontage of about 200 yards. As it was getting dark no further advance was made and trenches were dug during the night. The II./41st was at this time forming part of the brigade reserve.

Left wing—42nd Regiment.—The 42nd Regiment was ordered by its commander to send forward as first line its 2nd and 3rd Battalions, while the 1st Battalion was retained as regimental reserve in echelon on the left rear. The commanders of the two battalions forming the first line allotted two companies to the firing line, and kept two in reserve. Those in

the firing line had each one section in support, and the frontage of each company was about 250 yards. The two reserve companies followed in column of sections extended like the firing line, with about 300 yards between them and the support and an interval of 200 yards between sections. When a line 900 yards from the Russians was reached the supports and reserve companies had joined the firing line, the frontage still being about 1,000 yards, or 500 yards per battalion, and behind the left flank followed the 1st Battalion.

Thus the frontage of the brigade was about 2,000 yards, which was considerably greater than that taken up by the brigades of the 8th Division—if the 4th Brigade be excepted. The losses in the 5th Division on this day, considering the very open nature of the ground and the moderate artillery support which the attack received, were not heavy, and were less in the right wing than in the left, since the former found some slight cover behind Chinese graves. That wing too had had a thinner firing line and fewer lines of troops following it in support.

The losses on reaching a line situated at about 900 yards from the Russians were as follows :—

	Shell Fire. Killed and Wounded.	Rifle and Machine gun Fire. Killed and Wounded.	Total. Killed and Wounded.
41st Regiment - - -	3	91	94
42nd ,, - - -	115	369	484
	118	460	578

Comparison of Losses during Rushes and when Halted.

	During Rushes. Killed and Wounded.	When Halted. Killed and Wounded.	Total. Killed and Wounded.
41st Regiment - - - -	18	76	94
42nd ,, - - -	128	356	484
	146	432	578

On the 28th the advance was continued,* supported by additional artillery, and the position was taken with comparatively small loss, but by this day the opposition was growing weaker, and it was evident that the Russians intended to break off the action.

* No information regarding the details of the attack on this date were vouchsafed.—A. H.

*Example III.—The Attack on Chang-tan by the 8th Division.**

The greater part of this attack took place on the right bank of the frozen Hun, whose bed is about 15 feet below the surrounding country, but a small portion of the force engaged operated on the left bank of the river. The ground on both sides is very open.

Distribution of the Troops.

Right Wing (on left bank of the Hun Ho) :—
II./32nd Infantry Regiment.
2 machine guns.
1 section of engineers.

Centre (on right bank of Hun Ho) :—
16th Brigade† (less II./32nd Infantry).
6 machine guns.
1 company of engineers.

Left Wing (on right bank of Hun Ho) :—
II./5th Infantry Regiment.
1 squadron cavalry.
1 battalion mountain guns. (18 guns.)
2 machine guns.
2 sections of engineers.

Artillery (irrespective of the guns mentioned above) :—
1 battalion mountain guns. (18 guns.)
1 battery captured field guns. (6 guns.)
1 battalion Independent Field Artillery. (18 guns.)
1 company of engineers.

Reserve of the Division :—
I. and III./5th Infantry Regiment.

N.B.—The 31st Regiment of infantry of the 8th Division was with General Oku, forming part of the reserve of the Second Army.

1*st March.*

Connection was maintained with the 5th Division on the east, and from an early hour, in order to ascertain the enemy's condition, a heavy fire of artillery was directed against Yueh-pu-tzu and the vicinity of that village. During the previous night and the early hours of the 1st the infantry had crept forward and had succeeded in reaching a line distant only 700 yards from the enemy, where they had established themselves under cover of a parapet constructed partly of earth dug with difficulty, but mostly of sandbags, filled and carried forward. Here the troops lay concealed until such time as the advance was ordered to take place. The Russian infantry had opened rifle fire at daybreak, but the Japanese were ordered not

* *See* Map 84. † 17th and 32nd Regiments.

to reply. They were at this time disposed as follows for the coming attack :—

Right Wing Column.—II./32nd all deployed with the section of engineers in reserve.

Centre Column.—In first line, four battalions, with one battalion in reserve.

Left Wing Column.—Not deployed. (Beyond the left wing was Major-General Akiyama's Cavalry Brigade, and further to the west the Third Army was coming up.)

While these preparations were being made reconnaissances took place, and it became known that the enemy was in occupation of two houses at the southern side of Yueh-pu-tzu, and that his line of defence, which was strongly constructed and held, extended thence towards the north-west. From the south of Yueh-pu-tzu as far as the bank of the Hun there was abattis, but the defences west of the village were comparatively weak. His strength was uncertain, but it was judged to amount to about one brigade of infantry, while his artillery, east and west of Nien-yu-pao and north-west of Yueh-pu-tzu, could not only bring a direct fire on the division but also assail the right and centre with flank fire from the sand hills east of the Hun.

After a short time the Japanese infantry opened a deliberate fire, but no advance was made as it was necessary, in accordance with General Oku's orders, to await the progress of the 5th Division across the Hun. About 10.40. a.m. information was received by the G.O.C. the 8th Division that "the centre column of the 5th Division had advanced against the enemy at Li-chia-wo-peng* from the eastern corner of Liu-tiao-kou," whereupon orders were issued for the right wing and centre columns to open the attack towards their respective fronts. The enemy's condition was by this time known to be as follows :—About one brigade of infantry held the ground from the southern corner of Chang-tan to Yueh-pu-tzu. These troops were behind loopholed mud walls, and other bodies, whose numbers were unknown, held the walls round Chang-tan itself. In the neighbourhood of Nien-yu-pao there was about one regiment of infantry. His batteries were placed as follows :—

East side of Chien Nien-yu-pao,	2–3	batteries.
N.W. of Yueh-pu-tzu - -	3–4	„
N. and N.E. of Chang-tan -	an unknown number of guns.	

At 11.45 a.m. the commander of the centre column ordered up the remaining battalion of the 17th Regiment which was in reserve, and sent it to his left. The Japanese artillery was at this hour firing partly against the Russian infantry south of Yueh-pu-tzu, but the greater portion was engaging the enemy's guns. By 12.30 p.m. the reserve battalion had come up and

* 2,000 yards north by west of Shen-tan-pu.

joined the left of the centre column, and that force began a series of rushes towards Yueh-pu-tzu. Seeing that their infantry was advancing, the Japanese artillery quickened its fire, while that of the Russians became more intense. Part of the 32nd Regiment of the centre column kept up a hot fire to cover the first advance of the remainder, who soon came under a flank fire from the left bank of the Hun as well as from artillery posted at Nien-yu-pao. The centre column now suffered severely, for the dust thrown up by the enemy's shells prevented it from replying accurately to his fire. Rush succeeded rush, and at length the southern corner of Yueh-pu-tzu was reached. Meantime the 32nd Infantry (two battalions) had come forward, and arriving at the line of abattis, had begun to destroy it in spite of the heavy musketry fire poured upon it; while the 17th Regiment, pushing east of Yueh-pu-tzu, threatened to surround that place. The Russian guns, however, near Nien-yu-pao, took that regiment in reverse, but in spite of their fire two battalions broke into Yueh-pu-tzu, while a company of the II./5th Regiment with a machine gun engaged the offending guns at a range of 1,000 yards and forced them to withdraw with heavy loss. At 1.30 p.m. the enemy was driven from Yueh-pu-tzu, leaving 11 prisoners and 104 dead behind him, while those who had expelled him from it received a heavy shell fire from near Nien-yu-pao and from the left bank of the Hun.

The right wing column (II./32nd Regiment), connecting with the centre column, succeeded at 1.55 p.m. in occupying a wood some 400 yards north-west of its original position, but coming under a cross-fire could advance no further.

At 2.40 p.m., the G.O.C. the 8th Division issued orders to the G.O.C. the centre column. These were as follows:—"The I. and II./31st Regiment from the Army reserve will be given to you, and, on their arrival, you will attack Chang-tan so as to help the 5th Division on our right. These battalions are now on their way from Ku-cheng-tzu to join you, and will come up through Fei-tsai-ho-tzu and Yueh-pu-tzu."

The left wing column was at this hour operating against Nien-yu-pao, but it was making no progress, and the Russian guns—24 north of and 24 near that village, and four north of Chang-tan—were in consequence able to shell with impunity the centre column in Yueh-pu-tzu. A battalion of Reserve infantry was, therefore, given to the left wing column, and the attack was ordered to be pushed on. Connecting with the left wing column, Major-General Akiyama's Cavalry Brigade was assisting the attack, but, as there appeared no possibility of Nien-yu-pao being taken before dark, the left wing column commander decided to continue the operation by night, a course which, when attempted, failed.

Meantime the commander of the centre column had reported to General Tatsumi—the commander of the 8th Division—that

the opposition at Chang-tan was greater than the troops under his command could overcome, upon which the battalion of reserve field artillery was sent forward to help in demolishing the walls of that place, but before it could come into action darkness supervened.

General Tatsumi now issued the following orders:—

"1. To-morrow the division will continue the attack on Chang-tan.

"2. The centre column, profiting by the darkness, will approach as closely as possible and prepare to rush that place at dawn; one battalion of mountain guns is given to this column.

"3. The right wing column will continue the attack at dawn towards its front.

"4. The left wing column, connecting with Major-General Akiyama's Cavalry Brigade, will attack the enemy before it and help the operations of the other columns; to this wing will be attached Tanada's Detachment—one regiment of infantry and two regiments of cavalry."

During the night the artillery took position west of Yueh-pu-tzu, whence it could bombard Chang-tan.

2nd March.

Before dawn the commander of the centre column sent one company forward to reconnoitre Chang-tan, and finding that all was quiet there, the place was occupied. The right wing column, driving back small parties of the enemy, occupied the northern corner of the same village, while the left wing column easily took Nien-yu-pao.

During this attack the 8th Division had been opposed by one and a half Russian divisions, and lost about 1,500 all ranks killed and wounded, but the enemy's casualties, though estimated at 2,000, could not be accurately ascertained.

In the above-described attack the methods employed by the 8th Division approximated more nearly to those of the 5th Division as related in Example II., for the infantry was more widely deployed than at Hei-kou-tai, 10 battalions covering a frontage of about two and three quarter miles. The losses, though considerable, were much lessened through the occupation of a position at almost decisive range from the enemy under cover of darkness, whence the machine guns, protected by sand-bags, were able to help in the attack. The village of Yueh-pu-tzu, which was captured on the 1st, was only an outlying post of the main position, from which the Russians withdrew on the night of that date on finding their retreat endangered by the arrival, on their right, of the Third Army.

The preceding examples show generally the methods followed by a battalion, regiment, brigade, and division of the Second Army in the attack of a position during the later portion of the

campaign in Manchuria, but as it is fully recognized in that Army that circumstances and ground are variable quantities, no attempt is made to restrict the initiative and warp the intelligence of officers by laying down hard-and-fast rules for their guidance. There are, however, certain characteristics of the Japanese attack, a knowledge of which will go further towards elucidating the methods employed by them than the mere relation of examples culled from the battlefield or drill ground, but, before touching upon them, the nature of the country fought over by the Second Army since the capture of Liao-yang must be taken into account. Up to that time the approaches to the Russian positions, with the exception of a portion of the field of Nan Shan, were broken and hilly or hidden by crops, but north of the Tai-tzu Ho and west of the Mukden highway Manchuria is, for a considerable distance, a great open plain, which, in winter, after the harvest has been gathered, is almost entirely devoid of cover. Thus the conditions under which General Oku's troops necessarily carried out their attacks have been well-nigh as difficult as it is possible to imagine, and for this reason, as well as because the losses sustained by them, though heavy, can scarcely be called excessive, their conduct of the attack possesses peculiar interest.

The main points regarding it are the following :—

Reconnaissance.

This is carried out with great care by the Japanese, and all that can be ascertained regarding the nature of the enemy's position, where his guns are posted, and his strength is communicated to the troops before the attack is begun. The actual reconnaissance is carried out by a few scouts led by an officer, and much of the work is performed under cover of darkness, but even by day much can be learnt, as the Russians do not, as a rule, fire at ranges exceeding 1,200 yards. As the attack progresses, further reconnaissances are made, and should the enemy attempt to hide the actual state of affairs, ruses—such as drawing his fire at one point and scouting at another—are employed. The exact information which is frequently, if indeed not generally, obtained by Japanese reconnoitring parties—examples of which information has been given in reports already submitted of the operations of the Second Army—is a proof that both officers and men sent on this duty have been thoroughly trained in peace time, and understand how to utilize their power of observation to the best advantage.

Formations.

Formations under Artillery fire.

When advancing at long range, lines of company columns (*a*) on page 503) at deploying intervals, or lines of companies at deploying intervals with the sections in fours, are much used.

Under such conditions the troops advance occasionally at the double. At effective ranges lines of skirmishers are used, and between the lines there is a distance of from 150 to 200 yards.

Formations under Infantry fire.

As has been stated, the Russian infantry rarely fire at distances exceeding 1,200 yards, and Japanese dead are seldom seen lying further from the object of attack than 800 yards, and as a rule the greater number will be found within 400 yards of it. Thus, since the Russians, unlike the Boers, do not employ long range fire, formations, except to avoid loss from artillery, have not been so open in Manchuria as were those employed by us during the late war in South Africa. Moreover, the Japanese, like the Germans, desire to keep a firm hold over their troops as long as possible, and for that reason there is an unwillingness to fully deploy sooner than can be helped even at the risk of some loss.

During the earlier battles in Manchuria, supports were not extended behind the firing line, but it is now the custom to open them out in a manner similar to those troops in front of them. Thus when under effective fire of artillery or infantry the general appearance of a force of Japanese infantry engaged in an attack is well shown by the illustration* attached to this memorandum, which depicts the 41st Infantry Regiment of the 5th Division—whose attacking dispositions at the battle of Hei-kou-tai have been already described—advancing against the village of Ta-chang-ho during the battle of Mukden. The troops are shown moving to the front from an entrenchment which they have been occupying south of the point of attack, and are entirely distributed in skirmishing lines.

Frontage.

The frontage, as mentioned, is greater than at the beginning of the war in Manchuria, but it is generally considered in the Second Army that that of a single battalion, forming part of an attacking force which has a general reserve behind it, should not exceed 400 metres (about 437 yards).

Methods of Advance.

It has been pointed out that rapidity of movement is the great feature of the Japanese infantry attack. The men are so well developed physically that they can move forward at a quick double or rush, carrying packs, equipment, arms and 300 rounds of ammunition, without exhaustion. In peace time the men are trained in gymnastics under their own officers, and in war, during halts, every opportunity is taken to continue that training and practise them in running in the manner described by the memorandum already submitted on Japanese infantry running exercises.† It may here be noted that this

* *See* Photograph facing page 514. † *See* Report 47, page 670.

training is not confined to the infantry alone, engineer companies being put through exercises which will prove of value when assisting in the attack of a position.

The length of the rushes made in an attack depends upon the distance of the enemy, and whether the troops be under artillery or infantry fire. In the former case long rushes up to 100 yards are made, and at times, more especially when there is cover to the front, considerably greater distances are passed over without a halt. Under infantry fire the rushes may at first be about 60 yards, but, as the position is approached, they grow shorter and shorter in proportion as the enemy's aim can be more quickly taken. Long halts are avoided when possible, as they tend to damp the ardour of the men, and losses, where no cover can be found or thrown up, have been found to be greater than when on the move.

The further from the enemy, the greater the body that rushes forward; thus, in the earlier stages of an advance, the whole skirmishing line may double together. As the line gets thicker section rushes are made, and these again are succeeded by rushes of squads. When a point is reached—perhaps about 300 yards from the position—where it is impossible to advance in a formed body, single men and officers—sometimes volunteers—creep forward and establish themselves nearer to the object of attack. A fresh fire position is then gradually built up along the front on which they have arrived. In order to make the men expert in lying down, rising up, and rushing forward, so as to reduce to the utmost the time during which they are fully exposed to the enemy's fire, the men have sometimes been seen going through an individual drill under their officers, when faults were pointed out and corrections made.

Supporting sections are sent up either on the flank of the company they support or more generally into the gaps in the firing line. The range at which firing is taking place is called out as they come up, so that no time may be lost in making the fire of the additional rifles effective. At times these supports are brought up very widely extended, and at other times are sent forward by twos and threes or singly, many hours being spent in dribbling them or reserves to the fire position. The first reinforcement by the supports takes place as a rule at the time when the firing line opens fire, and the reserves come forward as it is found necessary to strengthen that line and maintain the volume of fire, or prior to the final rush. At times that rush is made for a considerable distance, as, when the enemy shows beyond a doubt that he is about to retire, it is undesirable to waste time in front of his position.

Subsidiary means of Advance.

At the battle of Mukden, the ground being frozen, bags filled with earth were carried as a substitute for the slight protection usually thrown up during the attack with the light



Attack of the 41st Infantry Regiment on Ta-chang-ho (Battle of Mukden).

[To face page 514.]

entrenching tool. Since that action, a small, comparatively light, steel shield has been manufactured which it is intended to utilize as a means of getting men forward when the enemy's fire has become deadly. An officer or man would creep forward covering his head with this shield to which is attached a rope. Arrived at a certain distance to the front, he would take such cover as was obtainable and the shield would be hauled back by the firing line and used again and again. To further assist advance when at a distance of from 200 to 300 yards from the position wooden mortars have been used, but these have been replaced by a light metal mortar firing a bomb containing high explosives. It is considered in the Second Army that some such weapon must be used in the final stages of the attack at a time when a kind of stalemate often ensues, and when the least advantage will turn the balance in favour of the attack. Similarly, hand-grenades are of value, though their range is limited by the power of a man to throw them, and would be of special benefit to the attack in village fighting. Such devices, though perhaps of little value in ordinary European fighting, are worthy of consideration when it is a question of a campaign against the Russian army, which almost invariably takes up a strongly defended position, prepares other positions equally strong behind it on which it can fall back, and endeavours on every occasion in which it is engaged to give to the battles the characteristics of fortress fighting.

Firing.

The Japanese infantry does not fire at distances exceeding 1,000 yards, and endeavours to retain its fire until a distance of about 800 yards from the enemy is reached. The reasons for adopting this course are that it is considered that, what would be regarded in the Japanese army as long range fire, has little effect, and moreover tends to delay the advance, which, for the sake of moral effect, should be as rapid as possible. Long range fire by supporting units is also not made use of. The first object of the attack is to reach a fire position 600 yards from the enemy, where as thick a line as possible directs its fire upon him. The fire is what we call "independent" and is opened by order of the battalion commander, the target being given by those section leaders who are with the firing line, under direction of the captains of companies.

Co-operation between Units.

Co-operation between the several units of an attacking force is very carefully looked to in the Japanese army. Men, and sometimes officers, are used in order to maintain intercommunication so that one unit may know the precise condition of the next to it and be prepared to assist its action in the

best possible way. The advantage of the Japanese organization of three battalions in a regiment, accustomed to work together in peace time under a regimental commander, is undoubted as compared to a system in which a brigade is composed of several units having no immediate connection with each other, and, as often as not, having had little opportunity of enjoying peace training in each others' company.

So intimate is the connection between the several parts of a Japanese battalion, regiment, brigade, or division in battle that for a portion of a force to fall back as did one of our companies at Nicholson's Nek in Natal, in ignorance of what was occurring elsewhere, and so compromise to some extent the action of the whole, suggests a condition of affairs that can scarcely be conceived in the Japanese army. The only instance in the late campaign against Russia in any degree resembling that above referred to occurred at Wan-pao Shan, during the battle of the Sha Ho, where a battalion was ordered by its commander to retire in the belief that such an order had emanated from the general in command, which was not the case. A few moments served to create such a disadvantageous situation for the Japanese that 14 guns were lost, and though the general in command was not personally to blame he was removed from his command in the field, possibly for failure to ensure a proper transmission of his orders by night, at which time the mishap occurred.

Co-operation of Artillery.

As mentioned, the nature of the battles in Manchuria resembles that of the attack and defence of a fortress, and as a consequence the Japanese artillery has generally been able to take up positions under cover of darkness in order to support an attack. The Russians generally disclose their own gun positions by firing upon the infantry from the first moment of the advance, expending most of their efforts against it. The effect of this fire when any cover is available may be judged from the fact that the Russians fired an average of 1,000 shrapnel shells with a loss to the Japanese of only one man during the four days that elapsed immediately after the latter took up positions on the Sha Ho in October 1904 when the defences were of the slightest. Great vigilance is displayed by the Japanese artillery commanders in following the stages of the infantry attack, and though orders are generally sent to them prior to some new development thereof, it is rarely the case that they have not already been anticipated and arrangements made accordingly. Whenever possible enfilade fire is brought to bear upon the enemy, the guns of one division turning their attention temporarily to a flank when it is evident that a neighbouring division will thereby be assisted and the general movement against the enemy furthered.

Entrenching.

Much spade work has been done by the Japanese infantry during the attack, and no sooner is a point seized than it is secured by an entrenchment, no matter how slight. As digging in a prone position is difficult, men are taught in peace time to perform that operation with the light entrenching tool, while exposing themselves as little as possible. In many of the battles of the Second Army the advance, though rapid from point to point, has from start to finish been slow and methodical, and the troops have worked their way forward by day and night somewhat as would be done in attacking a fortress. A good example of this method will be found in the attack of the 13th Regiment on Yin-te-niu-lu during the battle of the Sha Ho, which was described in detail in the appendix to the Operations of the Second Army from 5th September to 19th October 1904.*

Reserves.

The Japanese are not in the habit of maintaining either a large local or general reserve, and would seem to rely upon the containing power of the rifle to beat off counter-attacks, or, in face of the passive attitude almost invariably adopted by the Russians, have found it unnecessary to do so. For instance, at the opening of the battle of Mukden, General Oku kept as a general reserve only one brigade of infantry, or about one-eighth of his whole force, preferring rather to use the mass of his men in the line of battle, and relying on his divisional commanders to keep a sufficiency in hand in case of necessity. A perusal of the account of the attack of the 8th Division on Chang-tan will show that the divisional commander east of the Hun did not hesitate to throw every battalion into the fight even on the first day of a battle which all foresaw would be a prolonged struggle.

Machine Guns.

The Japanese endeavour to push their machine guns in the attack up to the firing line, and do not regard them as long range weapons. When a position is taken up over night, as in the attack on Chang-tan, the guns can easily be placed in a forward position, but unless provided with shields it has been found impossible for them to remain in action at decisive range.

Ammunition Supply.

The difficulty of keeping the firing line supplied with ammunition is so great that every opportunity of doing so is taken, and reinforcements are frequently employed to carry up additional quantities. Special ammunition carriers are not

* *See* Vol. I., pages 514–6.

included in the Japanese infantry organization, and in those armies of which they form part it may be accepted that, unless they are numerous, it is improbable that they will be able to take forward as much ammunition as is required. Moreover, every man, so employed, who does not carry a rifle, is a loss to the fire power of a battalion.

Communication.

This subject has been referred to in Example No. I. It is usual when a section or line of skirmishers advances at the beginning of an attack for the captain of the company to keep touch with it by means of four men, who divide the distance between him and it, and pass on orders or send back information regarding the enemy from the front line. By a similar method the commander of a battalion, with the reserve, maintains touch with the captains of companies until he himself comes up to the firing line. This close touch throughout a battalion does not appear to affect initiative injuriously in any way, though it leads at first to a slight diminution of the number of rifles in the firing line. Troops have been seen practising this method of communicating information and passing orders, a section being extended at intervals of from 30 to 40 paces, and messages passed backwards and forwards along the line. When practising the attack on a position, men are posted along it, who, by means of flags, indicate their supposed strength, which is reported to the battalion commander through the line of men who maintain communication between him and the firing line. From the firing line to the divisional commander there is, when possible, continuous communication effected partly by the means sketched above and partly by telephone. The position of the firing line is thus accurately known, and this and the custom of raising a national flag on a conspicuous spot of the captured position obviates to some degree the danger from friendly artillery. The whistle and signalling of any kind are little used in the Second Army, word of mouth being preferred.

Counter-attacks.

As the Japanese have assumed the offensive throughout the campaign in Manchuria, no opportunity was offered of observing their method of employing counter-attack.

Holding Attacks.

These attacks are carried out with such energy by the Japanese as to be indistinguishable from decisive attacks. Indeed, wherever the Japanese infantryman attacks, there he endeavours at all costs to succeed, for his training and national spirit make no broad distinction between a feint and a real blow. The heavier the opposition, the more determined the assault, and thus it arises that the most vulnerable points of the

enemy's position possess the least attraction for him. Upon them the greatest attention is not bestowed, but wherever the position is strongest there the fiercest struggle will be found. To hold the enemy, or at least prevent him from moving reserves to another quarter of the field, while keeping outside decisive range, is not a view that finds favour with the Japanese army. It is held that if the position be not closely approached, it is often difficult to prevent a transference of the reserve unseen, and that unless the enemy be actively menaced, he will not hesitate to move a portion of his troops, thus accepting the risks that may arise from a reduction of force at a secondary point in order to strengthen one more important. Imbued with such ideas, it is not a matter for surprise that the Japanese have never during the campaign with Russia appeared in greater numerical strength than the enemy at the decisive point, and that their victories have in consequence been shorn of some of the fruits that they would seem to have merited.

General Remarks.

The attack under modern conditions requires great patience and bravery to enable it to be carried through to a successful issue when directed against an enemy occupying a strongly defended position, the extent of which makes the operation of manœuvring him out of it nearly impossible. Victory can only be won by the closest co-operation of artillery and infantry. The latter covered by the former works its way forward rapidly yet deliberately until a parallel at a short distance from the object is gained, whence the slightest signs of disturbance in the defenders' ranks can be observed. The Japanese have frequently won success through the initiative of a single officer, who, keenly watching the enemy, has detected what has seemed to be an inclination to retire, and has forthwith dashed forward at the head of his men. It is recognized that the attempt to rush a position before the psychological moment has arrived only leads to heavy loss and failure, and that the leaders, therefore, of the firing line must display great coolness and patience. That some such moment will eventually come is felt to be certain, and it would seem that the Japanese never forget that, after a long fire fight, when their own condition seems least hopeful, that of the enemy is perhaps no better and often worse. Inspired with such a belief, and determined to lose their lives rather than yield an inch of ground once gained, it is not to be wondered at that unbroken success has shone upon their arms in the recent conflict with Russia.

(32) Night Attacks.

REPORT by Lieut.-Colonel A. L. HALDANE, D.S.O., General Staff, dated Head-Quarters Second Army, 1st June 1905.

Plate.

Japanese night-attack formation - - In text.

See also Map 56 and Panorama 8.

The extreme difficulty of approaching by daylight a strongly defended position with numbers sufficient to ensure success in the assault has, on many occasions during the present campaign, led the Japanese to endeavour to bring forward their infantry under cover of darkness. Accounts of such undertakings, in more or less detail, have been given in the various reports on the operations of the Second Army in Manchuria, but it is proposed here to summarize the general system which has been adopted by the Japanese in carrying them out.

In one feature the successful night advances of our allies differ from manœuvres such as those which preceded the engagements of Tel-el-kebir, the Atbara, and Magersfontein. In the case of these actions a march of several miles taking some hours to accomplish had to be made, while, as regards the distance covered by the divisions of the Second Army under somewhat similar conditions, it has rarely, if ever, exceeded 1,500 yards. In fact the Japanese gaining close touch of the enemy by day, have merely utilized the hours of darkness to better their position, and, true to their principle of reducing risk of failure to a minimum and reserving to themselves every possible chance of success, have studiously avoided those dangers which are concomitant with the launching of a large force over a considerable space against a position whose strength or weakness has been only gauged by reconnaissance from afar or by the possibly unreliable reports of spies. In acting thus they have shown that they recognize that the size of modern armies and the wide fronts covered by them make the maintenance of correct direction in night operations and their accurate timing matters of almost insurmountable difficulty, and they have therefore wisely limited the scope of such movements, thereby eliminating from them the dangers which have caused them in the past either to be shunned, or carried out only under special conditions or for urgent reasons.

The system followed has been the same in all the battles in which the Second Army has been engaged, and its success has depended upon certain elements which may be described under the following headings:—

(*a.*) A precise knowledge of the enemy's strength and position.

(*b.*) A knowledge of the character of the ground to be passed over in the advance.

(*c.*) The maintenance of the proper direction during the advance.

(*d.*) The maintenance of connection with troops to flanks and front.

(*e.*) A full appreciation on the part of all concerned of the service about to be undertaken and how it is to be carried out.

(*f.*) The most suitable formation of units.

(*a.*) During daylight the enemy's position, so far as it can be seen, is examined and his strength as far as possible ascertained. After dark, scouts—specially selected men—under an officer, or officers, are sent forward, their duty being to push close to the defensive line and discover its extent and nature, what obstacles there are, and how they may be avoided or passed through. These scouts, while exercising great care to avoid detection, act with boldness, for on their reports depend to a considerable degree the success or failure of the ultimate advance. Their task has been much simplified, and night attacks have frequently come as a surprise to the enemy, from the fact that the Russian sentries are not remarkable for excessive vigilance, and that the outposts are generally retained in close proximity to the works they cover.

If the intention of the Japanese is to assault a work by night, a plan of it would be prepared by means of information obtained from scouts.

(*b.*) The features of the ground to be passed over, so far as the eye can see, are noted by day, and further examined by the scouts sent to perform the duty mentioned in heading (*a*).

On several occasions, where circumstances have prevented a deliberate reconnaissance of the ground, or even when this has taken place, bushes and trees have in the dark been mistaken for the enemy, or a bank or natural ditch for his defensive works.


(*c.*) During daylight all marks or objects which might assist in maintaining direction at night are noted; these include bushes, trees, houses, and hill or mountain tops. At dusk a small party under an officer is sent forward to place sticks or flags in the direction which is later to be taken. From the foremost of these marks, back to the troops in rear connecting files are posted, so that when the advance is undertaken there may be the least possible trouble in maintaining the correct line.

(*d.*) Connection with troops on either flank or with those in rear is maintained by means of connecting files.

(*e.*) The object of the operation being to reach the enemy or a point as near to him as possible without discovery, and so render the attack a surprise, silence must be maintained, and no firing is permitted to take place. Should the enemy open fire during the advance the troops immediately lie down without word of command. Frequently the Russians have opened fire for a short time more as a precaution than as an indication that the advance has been discovered, and, by making a brief halt, the Japanese have been enabled to continue the movement and at length approach the position unobserved. If, however, fire be opened when the attackers are on the point of assaulting, bayonets if not already fixed would be fixed and the position charged. As it is inadvisable to issue orders during the advance, everything that can be foreseen is explained beforehand, and all precautions are taken to avoid the possibility of panic or confusion.

(*f.*) The formation adopted by the Japanese, one to which it is understood they have adhered on all occasions, is column of sections, and in the diagram below will be found the dispositions of the units in the last night attack undertaken by a portion of the Second Army in the battle of Mukden.

Night Attack on Yu-hung-tun.



Sometimes the first line consists of two and at other times of three companies, from each of which one section is extended in single rank at one pace interval. The two remaining sections of each company follow, unextended, the one behind the other, at a distance of fifty yards from the extended line and ten paces between themselves. The reserve of the battalion follows in line of section columns about one hundred yards further to the rear; and behind it again, also in line of section columns, and at a distance of about two hundred yards comes the second line. Connecting files link the whole body together, and whether the enemy is attacked in this formation, or a further extension takes place, must depend upon the particular circumstances of each attack. The companies of the second line would be moved behind the centre or on either flank, according to the orders of the regimental commander.

In order to remove obstacles a small party of engineers invariably follows directly behind the extended line, and with the supports or reserve is another party whose duty it is to throw hand-grenades or work the mortars which are used for firing bombs.

It is recognized that mixing up of sections, companies, and battalions must occur during a night attack, but, as each Japanese regiment consists of three battalions accustomed to work together on all occasions, the confusion and intermixture of units are not material. Nevertheless every effort is made to keep them separate during the advance, and each battalion commander is held responsible that the proper direction is maintained and that his unit is kept as intact as possible.

In spite of every care being taken by the Japanese it is admitted that mistakes have occurred which have on several occasions made attacks by night fail in their object, and though, as stated, the distance to be covered is generally short, there has sometimes been a lack of co-operation, one portion of the force striking the enemy's line before another. Except when the *kaoliang* was standing, the ground has been exceptionally favourable for night operations, and the generally passive nature of Russian defence has allowed of their being carried out with great deliberation and comparative safety—a fact which has in no way made the Japanese lessen those precautions which are a marked feature of their advances in the dark. During the movement over level, open ground their losses have been inconsiderable, and this may be accounted for by the fact that the Russians when firing at night invariably shoot high.

Examples of Attacks by Night.

(*a*) In Appendix 4 to operations of the Second Army, 4th August to 5th September 1904,* there will be found a detailed account of an unsuccessful night attack.

* Vol. I., page 264, No. III.

(*b*) In Appendix 7 to operations of the Second Army, from 6th September to 19th October 1904,* there will be found a detailed account of an advance by night followed by an attack early in the morning. In this instance the movement was carried out with great deliberation, trenches being dug thrice in order to secure the ground won, so that should the attack fail or a counter-attack be made the Japanese would have had points of support upon which to fall back. This attack exemplifies the importance of providing infantry with a light tool for entrenching purposes.

(*c*) During the battle of Mukden the 3rd Division was entrusted with a very delicate operation—that of endeavouring to hold a force of the enemy out of all proportion to its own numbers so as to allow the Third Army time to work round the Russians, who were then retreating in some confusion towards the north. A display of strength on the part of the division might have led to a general retirement, and for this reason General Oshima was instructed to use his men sparingly so as to induce the enemy, if possible, to stop his retreating movement. The 3rd Division—which in all the earlier battles of the Second Army had especially distinguished itself—was in reserve, and had taken no part in the opening phases of the battle of Mukden. It arrived during the 5th March in the vicinity of the village of Li-kuan-pu,† (D 2 N.E.), which was occupied on the morning of the 6th by the 5th Brigade under Major-General Nambo. This village is distant only 1,500 yards from the Russian last line of defence on the west of Mukden, and from the eastern corner of it the position, and in some degree the strength, of the enemy could be observed. From this part of Li-kuan-pu General Nambo examined the situation on the morning of the 6th, and saw that the ground between him and the Russians was perfectly open and devoid of any kind of cover. It was also seen that the enemy held in strength the village of Yu-hung-tun and a hamlet of three houses within a low wall some 300 yards south of it. On rising ground north of Yu-hung-tun and some 500 yards distant from the northern end of the village was a redoubt, and the same distance south of the hamlet was a similar work.

Arrangements were made for an attack at dawn on the 7th instant, the front to be assailed being limited to that covered by the village and hamlet.

For the attack on the hamlet, General Nambo allotted two battalions of the 33rd Regiment, while two battalions of the 6th Regiment were to proceed against the southern and south-western portion of the village. A company of reserve infantry was to demonstrate against the north-western side of the village so as to draw attention from the main attack.

At 5 a.m. on the 7th, the troops above mentioned deployed for the advance on the eastern side of Li-kuan-pu, the operation

* Vol. I., page 514. † *See* Map 56 and Panorama 8.

being covered by scouts, and shortly afterwards advanced. On reaching a point from 500 to 600 yards from the enemy he opened fire, but the movement was continued and no reply made. At from 200 to 300 yards the fire became very hot and, fixing bayonets, the position was charged. Meantime the party on the left of the Japanese detailed for the demonstration had opened fire and had drawn upon itself a good deal of the enemy's attention, but this was soon diverted from it when the real attack developed, for the Japanese soldiers on this occasion let their feelings get the better of their discretion and shouted *Banzai!* as they approached the enemy's position.

By 6 a.m., the village was partly in the hands of the Japanese, and very desperate fighting went on there and at the hamlet, from both of which places the Russians were eventually driven forth, with the exception of a portion which held some houses in the northern part of Yu-hung-tun. During the advance the occupants of the redoubt south of the hamlet had made a counter-attack on the right of the 33rd Regiment, which was driven back by the two companies of the reserve of the right battalion. General Nambo, aware of the danger on this side, sent forward the II./33rd at 6 a.m. with orders to protect the exposed flank and help in the attack. Between 8 and 9.30 a.m., the reserve battalion of the 6th Regiment was sent into the village, two companies at a time, with ammunition for the troops engaged. These companies were sent at different times. The troops in their original advance had suffered heavy loss, and the reinforcements, coming under a cross fire from the two redoubts as well as from artillery, had also many casualties. In fact the ground behind the village, but more especially in rear of the hamlet, was littered with dead. By the time that the Russians were repulsed the force was still further reduced, and later in the day it had to sustain the attack of over an army corps coming from the direction of Mukden.

The night advance and the ensuing attack were entirely successful, but the losses in the operation were greater than on previous occasions, being mainly due to the lack of surprise which characterized it. The ground, too, was still frozen, and it is probable that the noise of the men's footsteps was audible to the Russians.

(33) The Japanese Cavalry in the Field.

REPORT by Captain J. B. JARDINE, 5th Lancers, Yen-tai, 16th November 1904; with Remarks by Lieut.-General Sir IAN HAMILTON, K.C.B., D.S.O., dated Head-Quarters, First Japanese Army, 16th November 1904.

Remarks by Lieut.-General Sir Ian Hamilton, K.C.B., D.S.O.

I have the honour to forward herewith a report by Captain Jardine, 5th Lancers, on the Japanese cavalry. I will not say he has had exceptional opportunities of forming a good opinion, as that might give a false impression, but certainly his opportunities have been altogether exceptional compared with those that have fallen to the lot of any other foreigner. It is true that an American colonel shared his experiences during the time he accompanied the 2nd Cavalry Brigade on a reconnaissance, but he, and he alone, has thus far been attached to a Japanese cavalry regiment in the field. Whilst thus employed he was treated like a brother officer by everyone from the colonel downwards in the cavalry of the Guard. He shared their quarters and their meals; he heard orders given out and reports rendered; he witnessed all the details of regimental life, and went out with the advanced guard to skirmish with the Cossacks.

2. I hope you will agree that while I was fortunate in obtaining permission from the Chief of the Staff, First Army, to send an officer on this detached duty, I was no less fortunate in having at my disposal the services of so level-headed and competent a regimental officer as Captain Jardine, who speaks Japanese and needs no interpreter, and who is a campaigner of sufficient experience to be able to carry on for a prolonged period on what he can take with him on his horse. I feel bound to mention these points, for with a modesty that does him credit he has said as little as possible, either about his special opportunities, or of those special aptitudes which have enabled him to take advantage of them.

3. Para. 4 of the report. The ammunition seems insufficient. Our cavalry carried 135 rounds per man towards the close of the South African war. I learn, however, on good authority that in the Japanese cavalry it is now becoming the rule rather than the exception for rounds to be carried in the wallets.

4. Para. 5 of the report. As I have already reported, the cavalry have recently asked for and received permission to substitute tripod for wheel mountings for their Maxims. A committee of which I was a member, recommended this some

twelve years ago to Army Head-Quarters, Simla. There can, I think, be no question at all that from every point of view the tripod mounting fitted on to a pack saddle is the best.

5. Para. 13 of the report. I would like to add a few words on the question of feeding and watering. Where the Japanese got their idea about accustoming a horse to an unnatural diet, and what they think to gain by it, are to me mysteries. I have strenuously endeavoured to combat the application of this theory to my own horse, but always entirely without success. I believe the notion must have been started by the *bettos* or grooms, merely to save themselves trouble. I may claim a fairly long and wide experience in this matter, and I am certain that the feeding and watering of horses should be adjusted to the amount of work which is being required of them at the time. When a horse is in hard and continuous work (I do not mean hard work for a spurt as in the case of a hunter or racehorse) he should be fed and watered as often as possible. Chinese carters, whose animals keep a perfectly marvellous condition under a strain of very severe work, feed and water whenever an opportunity offers. A good London cabby does the same. Even in South Africa it was always possible to tell the man who was riding a horse of his own and not a Government animal, by observing that he would always take advantage of even a ten minutes' halt to give his mount a mouthful of something to keep him going. The Japanese system may do for peace time, but if they worked their cavalry as we work ours, with extensive turning movements at a fast pace, or marches of fifty miles as the crow flies (as in the drives in the Western Transvaal at the end of the Boer war), then every single horse in their ranks would be dead as a door-nail before a month was past. I do not think the Japanese have, as a rule, that natural affection for the horse which a few Englishmen have, which, with its little instinctive girth slackening, dismounting, feeding and attention, may supply to some extent the want of technical training. The personnel of the Japanese cavalry is so fine that I hope their Government will after the war send a number of these officers to do a turn at big remount depôts and with cavalry regiments in India to learn horse management by practice as well as theory.

6. Para. 15 of the report. I agree with Captain Jardine that the country over which the First Army passed *en route* to Liao-yang was not well suited to the development of shock action. Still the *kaoliang* is no impediment to a charge, as was proved by the 1st Bengal Lancers during the Boxer outbreak; the valleys were often over a mile wide, and in fact there was ample space and convenience for squadrons, if not regiments, to have indulged in shock tactics on a small scale had there not been some restraining influence at work. As Captain Jardine says, the Japanese were keen enough to charge, but nevertheless they did not once succeed in coming to close quarters with their enemy except in the case of a few accidental *rencontres* of

patrols. If there is any other explanation of these facts than that suggested in my report, namely, that a body of cavalry armed with modern rifles can deny to their opponents all opportunities of executing a charge with any prospects of success, then, so far, I have not heard it put forward. Since the Japanese Armies have been operating north of the Tai-tzu Ho the country fulfils all the conditions for a successful application of shock tactics to an extent which I have never seen equalled. The theatre of operations consists of wide plains stretching for miles, unbroken by nullahs,* fences, swamps, stony places or other undesirable obstacles, whereas occasional hills, undulations, patches of forest or villages, afford opportunities for concealment from fire and from view. I asked a cavalry officer if this country was not absolutely ideal for shock tactics, and he confessed that the only possible improvement he could suggest was the addition of a few more clumps of trees to give still better cover. Notwithstanding these facilities there have been no shock tactics, and what has been done by cavalry has been done by Japanese machine guns and carbines and Russian horse artillery. The Japanese would have done more I think if they had possessed the rifle. All the Japanese cavalry officers I have met are, without a single exception, very strongly in favour of a re-armament without any delay. The rifle is sighted only to 2,000 yards, although it carried some 3,300 yards. The carbine has the same sighting, but as its range is about 800 yards less than the rifle it is probably not accurate over 1,000 yards.

7. I hope it will not be thought because I express so strong an opinion as to the supremacy of the rifle over the sword and of the superiority of the dismounted cavalrymen to the mounted cavalrymen at fighting ranges, that I therefore sympathise with those who would deprive cavalry of their *arme blanche*. Far from it. I would no more like to see the sword taken away from the cavalry than I would wish the bayonet to be withdrawn from the infantry. It is true that in making such a comparison it must not be forgotten that the chief use of the bayonet is in a night attack or night defence, and that it would not be profitable to employ cavalry with swords for the same purpose. Still, as I have actually witnessed here, a bayonet charge may even nowadays be the crowning feature of an attack, especially if it can be delivered under the support of fire from friends. So also, although it has not occurred with the First Army in this war, a cavalry charge may sometimes be possible at a certain stage of the cavalry fire fight, especially if it can be supported by the rifles of a portion of the force dismounted. My arguments are not then directed against the sword as such, but only against those who would train cavalry so that they

* There were, of course, a certain number of nullahs running down into the rivers, and also just about the foot of the hills, but on the whole the country was remarkably free from them.—Ian H.

enter upon a field of battle thinking rather of where they may deliver a charge than of how they may employ their mobility to enable them to use their rifles with the best effect. I have watched thousands of men trained on this system through my glasses during the battle of the Sha Ho. There they were sitting idle on their horses whilst infantry and artillery were fighting for their lives, waiting for an opportunity to charge which never came, whilst hundreds of opportunities to do good service with their rifles passed unheeded by them.

8. It may be said that English cavalry would have acted differently. Possibly; but certainly it would have been equally helpless and at sea under the conditions of training in force at the time of the outbreak of the South African war. One example is preferable to many arguments. In August 1899 I was commanding a brigade of infantry on Salisbury Plain. Orders were received that the division was to march across the plain and that it might expect to be attacked by two brigades of cavalry. I was directed to form my brigade into a hollow square, four deep, and to move cautiously across the plain in echelon behind the brigade commanded by Colonel (now Major-General) Clements. From the centre of my square rose a balloon, and had it not been for the presence of this comparatively modern invention I should not have been surprised to see Harold at the head of an English wedge, or a Macedonian phalanx marching over the hills to take a part in the proceedings. After various alarms the brigades themselves did actually appear, very conspicuous and splendid, and cantering up to my square were declared by an umpire to have ceased to exist. Had that cavalry chosen to dismount even two squadrons and opened fire in extended order from behind a ridge they could have annihilated the squares, whereas by charging them they almost justified the absurd formation of the infantry by being annihilated themselves. Many of the cavalry officers present knew what should have been done, but very senior cavalry officers were on the ground, and to dismount and use the carbine in those days (I hope it is not so now) meant a certain black mark to the enterprising individual who tried it.

9. So far I have been writing only of experience gained in the First Army, or with brigades of cavalry operating within its sphere of action. I hear that at Te-li-ssu there was an indecisive shock action between two squadrons of Japanese and two squadrons of Russian cavalry.

Report by Capt. J. B. Jardine, 5th Lancers.

1. *Formations and Establishment.*— There are 12 divisional regiments in the Japanese army (the 13th is not yet organized). A divisional regiment has 3 squadrons. A squadron consists

of 140 men. Besides the above there are two independent brigades of two regiments each; a brigade has 8 squadrons, as each regiment of a brigade is composed of 4 squadrons. A squadron of a brigade regiment is of the same strength as the squadron of a divisional regiment.

A troop consists of 32 men (theoretically), *i.e.*, has a front rank of 16 men, and is led by a subaltern officer. A troop has 4 sections of, theoretically, 8 men each. Captains command squadrons. The brigade is commanded by a major-general, and is directly under the orders of the commander of the Army. The junior subaltern carries the standard (covered in waterproof case), and is accompanied by an escort of 6 men. The standard on active service accompanies the regiment whenever the 3 squadrons are on parade.

Telephone Party.—There is one telephone party *per* regiment of 1 officer and 5 men, who have charge of the apparatus. From 10 to 20 men *per* squadron understand how to use it. Every man in the squadron can fix the apparatus; 50 (?) kilometres (30 miles) of wire are carried. The whole apparatus is carried by 7 pack horses, who are in charge of men of the regiment.

Pioneer Equipment.—In each squadron 4 charges of dynamite are carried, distributed among the men—all the men in the squadron know how to use it; 5 axes and 5 saws are also carried, but no other tools, such as shovels or wire clippers.

2. *Arms, Saddlery, Equipment, &c.*—(1) The saddle at present in use is stuffed like a hunting saddle, with low cantle and smooth seat. There is no numnah, but a blanket is worn under the saddle. These saddles are really on trial, no fixed pattern having been decided on. (2) Cotton string girth (plaited). (3) Stirrup irons lighter than the latest British patterns, and I am inclined to think too small. (4) Ordinary double bridle is in use. (5) Head collar and head rope are in one piece; one end of the rope, plaited into shape, forms the head collar. The head rope is double, and is fastened to the near wallet strap. (6) No breast plates or cruppers are used by the men. (7) Two shoe cases, one on each side, are attached to the cantle. (8) Cloaks and waterproof sheets (same pattern as infantry) are carried behind the saddle, latter on the top of the former. (9) There are capacious leather wallets. (10) Capacious canvas saddle bags are carried. In one of them is carried the *bento* box, or mess tin. (11) Canvas bucket (concertina shape) is carried on the off side, resting on the saddle bag and hanging from the cloak strap.

The saddle is not of good material. The wallets and saddle bags seem too capacious, but perhaps during the severe Manchurian winter the men being able to carry more comforts than would otherwise be the case, they will mitigate the hardships that must be endured. The bucket seems serviceable and light. Its shape is also convenient. The same remark applies to the

girth. I have seen few girth galls. The sword is 3 feet long and slightly curved. It is considerably lighter than ours. It is suspended from one sling from a waist belt worn under the jacket. No attempt has been made to discolour the steel scabbard, which I have often noticed flashing in the sun. The carbine is worn slung on the back, Boer fashion. The revolver is worn at the waist; it is Japan-made, but of Smith and Wesson action. During the summer khaki tunics, jackets and breeches were worn, in lieu of the ordinary uniform. The cloth of the men's ordinary tunics and breeches seems of fair material. The bulk of the men of the Guard Divisional Regiment have been wearing one pair of breeches since they landed over seven and a half months ago in Korea, and they are still wearing well. The same cannot be said of the boots, which are made of most inferior leather. In seven and a half months the men mentioned above have already worn out two pairs, and are now wearing the third. To render themselves less visible, the men are now wearing their summer khaki tunic over the cloth one.

3. *Weights.*—The average weight of man and equipment, *i.e.*, everything carried by the horse, is 17 stone 12 lbs. The average weight of horse is 900 lbs.

4. *Supply of Ammunition.*—The supply of ammunition carried by the man is 60 (?) rounds. Carried on saddle (wallet generally), 50 (?) rounds (sometimes increased to 60 (?)). Divisional cavalry regiments replenish their ammunition from the nearest infantry. The ammunition of a cavalry brigade is carried on pack horses.

5. *Machine Guns.*—Machine guns are not employed with the divisional regiments. The two cavalry brigades each possess a battery of six guns (Hotchkiss pattern, made in Japan). These are mounted on travelling carriages with limber more similar to that of a field gun than even that of our pom-poms. The whole turnout looks clumsy, heavy and conspicuous, in fact the total weight behind the teams is 15 cwt. with pole draught and four horses. The gun is sighted up to only 2,000 metres (2,187 yards) and fires 500 rounds a minute. It is loaded from the side, 50 rounds fixed on metal plate (forming a sort of clip) being inserted in the slot at a time. Radiators used instead of a water jacket. There is a permanent shield on each carriage. I saw, however, that a rough tripod of wood had been improvised, which was carried on the limber, discarding the ordinary carriage and shield. On this tripod the gun could hardly be traversed at all. It fires the rifle cartridge.

In a gun of this calibre the equipment is far too cumbersome and conspicuous.

6. *Signalling.*—No form of signalling is used. I have seen a few men using the semaphore system with improvised flags, but the authorities have given them little encouragement,

ill-adapted as it is to cavalry. I have called the attention of many officers to the drawbacks incurred by having no signallers, and they all, without exception, agreed with what I said. Of course the telephone, when it can be employed, they find admirable. It very often takes the place of a heliograph when troops are detached from the main body.

7. *Corn and Method of Carrying it.*—In time of war the regulation allowance of grain is 6 *sho*, equivalent to 13½ pounds. This seems a very liberal allowance, but is in order to meet the eventuality of hay or its substitute not being available. Of course it is of necessity often reduced. During the days of the battle of the Sha Ho (October 1904) for instance, the allowance was reduced to 5 *sho*. Barley is the principal grain, with a small quantity of rice, but it varies according to circumstances. There is, of course, a fixed allowance of hay (or its equivalent), but in Manchuria, *kaoliang*, millet, &c., being plentiful as a rule, the horses have received no fixed allowance daily. Horses are fed twice a day—morning and evening (*vide* section 13). On the march the food is carried in both saddle bags evenly distributed.

Emergency Ration.—The man's emergency ration (same as the infantryman's) is carried in the wallets.

8. *Bivouacs, Picketing of Horses, &c.*—As in the infantry, a waterproof sheet is carried on the saddle, which, when combined with others, forms good shelter. As a matter of fact, when possible, troops are always quartered in Manchurian houses and the horses tied up in the compound or yard. The regular method of picketing a horse is as follows:—Two pegs about one yard apart, two ropes from the headstall (the head rope is double) fastened on to each peg. They tell me this method is employed, as 10 per cent. of the horses are stallions. Otherwise it has nothing to recommend it. When means are available, and the halt exceeds one day, temporary stables (if others cannot be obtained) are always erected, as a rule of branches and *kaoliang*, in summer and in winter. During the latter season one rug is carried for the horse, under the saddle.

9. *Transport.*—The transport of a regiment is composed entirely of pack ponies, *e.g.*, the transport of a squadron is 3 for cooking pots, &c., 21 for food and forage, and 2 spare = 29* pack ponies. The pack ponies are attended by men of the regiment. The contrast between this amount of transport and that of a European squadron is great.

10. *Reconnaissance and Scouting.*—The German system of reconnaissance and scouting is employed, but modified to suit circumstances. As a rule, infantry support is provided. All distances such as those between the advanced squadrons and the main body of the brigade, &c., are much the same as in our army under like conditions. There is no signalling, and all

* The detail totals 26; 3 for baggage have perhaps been omitted.

messages between advanced squadrons and the main body are carried by orderlies. On one occasion when I accompanied the 2nd Brigade, two squadrons went out from the defensive line at 7 a.m. After advancing 4 miles or so the whole halted and the two advanced squadrons took up positions being reinforced by one company of infantry and two machine guns, which had marched, the former in rear of the latter, with the main body. The enemy were very strong in front with guns, and no further advance was made. The total infantry with the brigade was one battalion. The brigade did not retire from the positions taken up till late in the afternoon. Enemy made no attack, but there was "sniping" at intervals between patrols. The distances kept, and the way the brigade was disposed, struck me as being excellent, as well as the manner in which the advanced groups or patrols passed over difficult ground.

It is noticeable how much more the Japanese patrols chance rifle fire than ours did in the late South African war, the Cossacks being notoriously bad shots. It is somewhat upsetting to our preconceived ideas and experience of patrol work (in South Africa) to see the enemy desist from firing, and a patrol break into a walk as soon as a distance of 1,000 yards separated them. Neither Japanese or Russians quite comprehend the value of long-range fire nowadays. By this, I do not mean that neither ever employ it, but it is never employed to the same extent as it was in South Africa, nor with the same success. The Japanese cavalryman as a scout is resourceful and quick-eyed. Whether the average man is more long-sighted than is usually the case in other armies, I do not know. He may sometimes be blamed, perhaps, for showing unnecessary inclination to make a fight of it when a judicious withdrawal after observation would better suit the case. No special scouts are trained in the squadron. Each troop officer instructs his own men. Officers' patrols are much used in the divisional cavalry. When in touch with the enemy I noticed that the Guard Cavalry Regiment always had two out from dawn until dusk. The officer (of a patrol) receives his orders direct from the colonel the evening before. On the 16th October half a squadron of the Guard Cavalry Regiment was in the neighbourhood of Wai-tou Shan (a mountain south of the Sha Ho) which lay in the debatable ground between the opposing armies' defensive lines. One officer's patrol (ten men) was posted on the hill. At 1.15 p.m. the enemy's guns from across the river opened a heavy fire on it, under cover of which one regiment of Cossacks and one regiment of infantry crossed the Sha Ho and advanced against the hill. The subaltern officer disposing his men with ingenuity over the hill and ordering each man to fire as rapidly as possible caused the enemy to deploy and make a regular attack on the mountain. The resulting musketry may be described as heavy. The patrol

fell back without loss slowly, and by its movements not only delayed the enemy, but obtained excellent information as to his strength.

11. *Dismounted Work.*—In dismounted work the usual system is as follows:—One man holds the horses of each section. A complete section is 8 men, a troop (complete) being 32 men. Four men therefore hold the horses of a troop.

This system no doubt places a maximum of men in the firing line, but cannot be suitable in an open country. In the mountains, where there was invariably good cover at hand for the horses, the system has worked well. From what I saw, the men mounted and dismounted promptly, care being taken always to obtain good cover for the horses, from which the men were never unduly separated. The old-fashioned method of wearing the sword on the body has been found to be a great nuisance when dismounted, and that of slinging the carbine on the back has little to recommend it. In regard to the former officers are unanimous, in regard to the latter opinions are divided. I do not quite see how either sword or carbine is to be carried on the saddle as long as the present saddle bags are worn.

12. *Medical, Veterinary, Shoeing.*—There are two surgeons in a regiment and one medical sergeant, with one sick orderly to each squadron. Simple medicines are carried in a satchel.

There are two veterinary surgeons in each regiment, and one farrier sergeant in each squadron, who carries on his saddle a few simple medicines.

There are eight shoeing smiths per squadron, who carry on the saddle bellows, tools, &c. The squadron portable forge is carried on one of the pack ponies. Horses are shod once a month; six nails are used in each shoe, fore and hind. One set of shoes and fifty nails are carried by each man of the squadron. A heavier shoe is used in winter. The shoeing seems fairly well done.

13. *Feeding and Watering.*—In peace time the horses are trained to do without a midday feed. This practice is continued in war time. They receive half their ration of corn in the morning and half in the evening.* It takes two months to make a horse accustomed to this. At first he falls away, but at the end of this period he has begun to pick up, and is getting quite used to doing without a midday feed. In war time the horse receives no corn between the hour of departure and the hour of arrival in camp. I have often asked officers and veterinary surgeons the advantages gained by this practice, and have never received a satisfactory reply. The argument used in favour of only watering twice a day does not hold good, for water has to be met with and obtained, while the corn is always on the saddle.

* The cavalry horse of the Chinese Army is fed twice in the 24 hours: in the afternoon and at midnight.

I produced such arguments as smallness of horse's stomach, &c., and they could not controvert any of them. All officers do not, however, approve of this practice. As far as the work which the horses of the Japanese cavalry have to perform is concerned, the practice seems to have worked well enough, but one cannot believe that it would do otherwise than weaken the horses had they been employed on the continent of Europe. It must be remembered that in Manchuria there have always been plenty of substitutes for hay, which the horse could pick up as he marched along, such as *kaoliang*, millet, &c., so that his stomach was rarely empty during the daytime.

In peace time the horses are watered twice a day and so in war time. Thus if water cannot be obtained in the middle of the day, the horses are the more accustomed to do without it. In the advance on Liao-yang until the Tai-tzu Ho was crossed there was water everywhere, which was a great advantage to the cavalry during the very hot days in July and August. After the crossing water became scarce; I have no doubt the want of it in the middle of the day was not felt to any great extent by the Japanese horses, certainly not to such a great extent as our horses in South Africa felt it. I know it is heresy in the eyes of many, but from what I saw, the practice of watering in the morning and in the evening only in peace time, and at these same times in war time, unless water is very easily obtained in the middle of the day, seems to have much in its favour. One cannot forget the perpetual anxiety of the squadron leader in South Africa about getting his horses watered in the middle of the day.

14. *Remounts.*—Remounts are purchased by the Government in the country districts for cavalry and artillery purposes for 100 *yen* each (about 10*l.*) as two-year-olds. After three years' residence at the depôts they are sent as required to the different regiments, due attention being paid to the horses' suitability for cavalry or artillery. On the 23rd October, 1904, I saw twenty-five remounts that had just arrived from Japan for the Guard Regiment. They were mostly five-year-olds and of a worse stamp than the horses already belonging to it. Eight of them were stallions. For reasons mentioned later on the percentage of entires in the cavalry is likely to increase. I imagine the Japanese Government finds great difficulty in obtaining suitable horses, and this difficulty will increase as the war is prolonged unless horses be purchased in Canada and elsewhere. As far as I can find out, no cavalry horses other than Japan-bred have been supplied to the troops. Captured Russian horses are found to be more suitable for transport than cavalry so far, but of course a Russian officer's horse is generally a prize.

15. *Shock Action.*—As already mentioned, the country over which the First Army has passed *en route* to Liao-yang is by no means suited to shock action. The wooded mountains, mostly unrideable, and narrow valleys (often a sea of *kaoliang*)

did not lend themselves to charging, yet opposing patrols, as was natural, occasionally met suddenly so close that the sword was used, and with some effect by the Japanese. The desire, however, to employ shock action lay with the Japanese, the Russians showing no inclination for this form of fighting. It is, perhaps, unnecessary to state that this conduct on the part of the enemy did not fail to engender contempt in the minds of the Japanese, who had also already found them to be worse shots than themselves. Since the Japanese have crossed the Tai-tzu Ho and entered a country—now that the *kaoliang* is down—suitable for cavalry, their cavalry has been outnumbered to such an extent that it has been employed almost entirely on the defensive. They have had to oppose, moreover, the Russian horse artillery, being themselves without mobile guns.

16. *Divisional Regiments.*—The country from An-tung to Liao-yang (I saw no movements in Korea) cannot be described as a cavalry country. In parts, such as in the neighbourhood of An-tung, it is rideable everywhere, but in by far the greater part of the country the cavalry were restricted practically to the mountain paths (when horses must go in single file) and to the roads, which run through steep wooded valleys generally not exceeding three-quarters of a mile in width. Two-thirds of these valleys during July and August are covered with the Chinese crop termed *kaoliang*, at that period 11 feet to 13 feet high. This crop is planted in drills eighteen inches apart, and at a short distance much resembles Indian corn and *bajra* as grown in India, but owing to this way of growing it, it is no obstacle whatever to a man on a horse. It affords, of course, great cover from view even to a cavalryman when it has reached its full height. On this account during the advance of a division the cavalry in front often consisted of only one squadron with infantry, the latter (especially as they were the mobile Japanese infantry) doing the advanced guard work far better. The remaining two squadrons either went out and took up positions to protect the flanks or marched in rear. During a halt the cavalry were generally out holding villages and positions of strategical and tactical importance to the front or flank of the division, but owing to their small number and the great number of the enemy's cavalry opposed to them, they were very often accompanied or supported by infantry. In front of Feng-huang-cheng in the first half of June last the cavalry regiment of the 12th Division was out day and night 16 miles or so in advance of the defensive line, but even then it was often supported by infantry. It is unnecessary, perhaps, to state that as there was no independent brigade or division (cavalry) with the First Army, the Cossacks always vastly outnumbered its cavalry. The orderly duties of a divisional regiment are very heavy owing to the fact that no signalling is used in the Japanese army.

From the foregoing it will be seen that the cavalry regiment of a Japanese division has to fulfil many duties in addition to

those usually fulfilled by divisional cavalry, but these duties become far more arduous when a cavalry country is reached. When I was with the Guard Cavalry Regiment in September last the strength on parade, after deducting men on divisional duties, such as orderlies to the generals, &c., was about 85 per squadron, non-commissioned officers and men.

17. *The Brigade.*—The 1st Brigade has been acting with the Second Army during its movements up to date. I stayed a few days with the 2nd Brigade after the occupation of Liao-yang, which place it did not reach until the fighting was over, having landed near the port of Dalny from Japan. The *kaoliang* was cut, but what may be described as sheaves of it were still standing in the fields. Altogether, the country to the front was by no means bad for cavalry though hilly in parts, for it was rideable anywhere. To the east and north-east, the nature of the country was much the same as that south of the Tai-tzu Ho, but the brigade did not reconnoitre in these directions. I could see very quickly that the Japanese cavalry were unable to reconnoitre further than four miles from their defensive line without an engagement. This they naturally wished to avoid, for the enemy's cavalry were far more numerous and were always accompanied by horse artillery. Of course small fights between patrols took place from day to day. Hence we see how easy it was for Kuropatkin to mask his movements by means of his cavalry and horse artillery, and keep the Japanese in suspense during the early part of October as to where he meant to deliver his blow. This is only one of numerous cases illustrating under what disadvantages the Japanese labour owing to the paucity of their cavalry.

18. *Personnel.*—As regards the personnel—to commence with the officer, I am bound to say as far as fighting is concerned he knows his business. His training before he becomes an officer is thorough, and after joining his regiment there seems to be little "easing-off." The average officer is keen about his profession to a degree unknown in some armies, and one who is careless in his duties does not stay long. He is not a man of the world; his experiences outside his profession are neither varied, nor do they give him any assistance in it. He has not travelled; he is no sportsman and he has mixed little with men outside his profession (I am judging from the standpoint of our army), but like all Japanese his keenness and attention to work counterbalance it all. We know of an army in which the officer is supposed to be of this stamp and people conclude at once such a man must be a drill-book officer, but this is not the case in this army, for the Japanese officer, and civilian, for that matter, is never too proud to learn, and I have never in my experience heard any Japanese lay it down that Japan's way of doing a certain thing was the best. The officer may think so frequently, but he will always listen politely to criticism, never missing the chance of picking up a wrinkle or two.

The burden of responsibility does not weigh heavily on the Japanese officer. Turning to the cavalry in particular, the officers all struck me as young men. The regiment I spent some days with, to observe how things were done, was commanded by an officer of twenty years' service. The squadron leaders were much younger men than one is accustomed to see commanding squadrons in the British army. Officers' patrols are much used, and, although my knowledge of the Japanese is slight, as I was privileged to listen to their nightly reports to the colonel of the regiment, I could see that the subalterns were no novices at the game. The adjutant was, of course, always busy, but it struck me that there was far less writing and paper work than is prevalent in our regiments. I think the non-commissioned officers are as intelligent and as attentive to their duties as those of any nation: they can all draw a rough sketch by the compass. The men of the cavalry are chosen from recruits as being the most intelligent and suitable for the work. They are not horsemen—they are too round-thighed, but the longer the war drags on the better they ride. I cannot compare their riding with that of our troops—especially those stationed in India—but they ride well enough to defeat the Cossack, with all the reputation he bears as a horseman. They are carefully instructed by their officers in peace time and possess individual initiative. I am inclined to think the Japanese soldier requires less leading than any European soldier. All can read and write, and every cavalryman understands and can read a map.

19. *Horses.*—Promiscuous breeding is responsible for the great inferiority of Japanese horses. This the Government is, and has been for some time, trying to prevent, but as long as the farming population prefer a stallion (they think the entire horse stronger) to a gelding, it is difficult to see how the Japanese horse can improve much. Up to now lack of funds (Parliament always cuts down the proposed amount in the budget allotted to horse breeding) has prevented the Government breeding studs from being a great success. There are three Imperial studs, besides others under Government, viz.:—(1) In the island of Hokkaido, where horses are bred for riding and draught work; (2) at Sotoyama, where horses are principally bred for farming purposes; (3) at Sanritsuwa, where horses are bred for riding purposes. Stallions from Great Britain and elsewhere have been imported, especially to Hokkaido, the best breeding country, for there there is grass—but from what I have heard, few mares. As in the case in South Africa the progeny of imported sire and dam decreases in size each generation, so in Japan it seems unlikely that a breed of the required size and substance for cavalry can ever be maintained. Good grazing, too, is scarce in Japan. The Japanese horse is commonly 14·2 and under, weedy, narrow chested, straight shouldered, short in neck, with bad quarters and lacking in substance; but in many cases one can see how the introduction of good blood from

abroad has to a certain extent counteracted some of their bad points. Some of the horses ridden by officers are excellent examples of what can be done by careful breeding, but one rarely sees an officer riding one over 14·3. I have not seen a troop horse that is what one can call up to weight, and at the same time possessing quality. In fact, it takes the troop horse all his time to carry the small Japanese soldier, who, by-the-bye, is by no means light for his size. What would happen to the troop horses had they to travel the distances ours had in South Africa can be easily guessed, although, of course, that was an exceptional case. I am of opinion, also, that they would be quite unable to perform the work required of them in a European campaign.

It is astonishing what a difference there is between the horse of Japan and that of the nearest mainland, Manchuria and Korea, although only some hours' sail distant. Both Manchurian and Korean horses are smaller, 13·3 is the ordinary height in the case of the former, 13·0 in the case of the latter; but both look more like what a horse should be, especially for draught work: the former being an ideal field gun horse in miniature, the latter perhaps showing more breeding, and both possessing bone and substance. Yet with all his defects the Japanese troop horse is not prone to unsoundness. It must be allowed that the cavalry regiments of divisions have not had great distances to go, nor has their work, as far as I can ascertain, ever been exceptionally severe, but their casualty lists have been by no means large (the Guard Cavalry Regiment, since the commencement of war in Korea, has a total loss of 100 horses, *i.e.*, in eight and a half months; the 12th Division Regiment, the first cavalry to land at the commencement of hostilities, up to the end of July had lost—totally disabled—40 odd) and inherent unsoundness does not seem to have been the cause of any large number being incapacitated. I think, considering all things, the troop horse may be considered hardy, especially when one considers what indifferent horsemasters the Japanese are, although it seems to me the cavalry do not err in this respect nearly so much as the artillery. The Japan-bred horse is far easier to train and handier than the China pony, and possesses a far better mouth—the latter seems to be born with a mouth of iron. Altogether, the troop horse does not do so badly considering the weight he has to carry. His lack of size and substance, which would be fatal to him when meeting European horses in a charge, have this advantage, that the Japanese soldier can mount and dismount more easily.

In a cavalry regiment 90 per cent. of the horses are geldings, the remainder being entires. No mares, no white horses, and only the darkest greys are used—a great contrast to the Cossacks, who attach no importance to a horse's colour, and, as I have myself noticed, can the more easily be distinguished at a distance. Looking through one's glasses, one can always tell whether the troops are Russian or Japanese.

20. *Resumé.*—It is very regrettable that owing to the conditions of this war there is little to learn from a cavalry point of view. It is due primarily to the disparity of the numbers of that arm of both sides, and secondly, to the nature, so far, of the country. It had been the custom until this war to attribute a very low standard to the Japanese cavalry. This was due principally to the inferior kind of horse employed by them, which, in the opinion of expert European officers, could not stand up before a charge of the cavalry of Europe, and which was overweighted. The bad riding of the Japanese soldier was also much commented on. I think, perhaps, it had been forgotten that a comparison with the cavalries of Europe was only necessary in one case, *i.e.*, that of Russia, the only opponent the Japanese were likely to meet. What the Russian cavalry has effected in this war up to date speaks for itself. Few of their regular regiments have been at the seat of war—Cossacks, a large number Trans-Baikal, forming practically 90 per cent. of their cavalry. These are for the most part as badly or worse mounted (the Cossack of course is a heavier man than his adversary) than the cavalry of Japan which in the earlier part of the campaign—in Korea—quickly asserted its superiority.

The main quality that makes the Japanese infantryman what he is, and for which foreign officers in the last China war gave him credit unanimously, is the quality that has enabled the Japanese cavalryman to prove himself superior to the Cossack. We call it "bravery," which is but a feeble translation or equivalent for *Yamato-damashi*—the term used by the Japanese themselves. Added to this is their superior fighting skill, for they are better educated at school before entering the army and are better trained. If we balance accounts between Cossack and Japanese, it is soon seen which is on the credit side. Neither possesses advantage over the other to any great extent in regard to horseflesh. The Cossack's sole asset, and no doubt a great one, is his riding. His enemy's assets are these: *Yamato-damashi* and superior skill in the employment of his weapons, both carbine and sword. A cavalry general of the United States Army has aptly said that the Japanese have no "horse sense." In regard to the cavalry their care for their horses all seems to come from the book (German), modified to a small degree by ideas of their own not always to be commended. The Japanese, it is perhaps unnecessary to state, are not a horse-loving people and do not attach the same importance to the horse that we do; hence the groom class, from which we draw some of our best recruits, are the worst servants in Japan both as regards work and character. The farming class of course know something of horses, but very little from our point of view, and they never ride, which, strangely enough, may be said of nine out of ten of the grooms. Little details such as the "etiquette of the road" may perhaps exemplify what I mean. During the march horsemen, both officers and orderlies,

never seem to have any compunction in riding off infantry to the side of the road, or, in the case of Manchuria where roads are narrow, off the road altogether. The officers (90 per cent.) before joining know little of and have had no experience with horses. What they subsequently learn, is learned like their drill as part of their duty and not amplified, as is the case of the British officer, by the experience gained off duty, in the hunting field, on the polo ground or after pig in India. Hence, though attention is not wanting on his part, the officer cannot be described as a good horsemaster. To give one instance, I have again and again seen the horses both of officers and men standing for hours with the saddles on their backs, the girths not even loosened. It must be allowed that the percentage of sore backs among the casualities is not great, but it should be remembered that there have been so far few long marches in the campaign. Some of the foreign attachés are of opinion that up to date the Japanese have carefully nursed their cavalry. Two of them (not cavalrymen) are men who being strongly pro-Cossack at the start would listen to no adverse criticisms on Mishchenko's men until Liao-yang was reached. I think they use too strong a term. To nurse, and to be careful or economical of your cavalry are two very different things. It must be allowed that Japan has been economical of them. How could she have done otherwise? From observation I can assert they have had plenty of work to do notwithstanding the slow advance of the Japanese armies.

To sum up, I think it will be agreed that the Japanese cavalry, in spite of their very great inferiority in numbers and lack of horse artillery, have done exceedingly well.

(34) Japanese Cavalry.

REPORT of a visit by Colonel W. H. BIRKBECK, C.B., to the 1st Cavalry Brigade; Fa-ku-men, 21st June 1905. With remarks by Lieut.-General Sir C. J. BURNETT, K.C.B.

Appendices.

Details of Japanese cavalry raids	Appendices 1, 2, 3.
Details of cavalry actions	Appendix 4.

Plate.

Map illustrating Japanese cavalry raids	Map 85.

Remarks by Lieut.-General Sir C. J. Burnett.

The accompanying reports are the outcome of a visit which General Nogi was kind enough to allow Colonel Birkbeck, accompanied by Colonel Pertev Bey of the Turkish Army, to make to the 1st Cavalry Brigade. They were accompanied by Lieutenant Ota of the Japanese Cavalry, who is one of the officers told off to look after the foreign attachés of this army. Unfortunately both Colonel Pertev Bey and Lieutenant Ota were wounded by shrapnel fire on the morning of the 16th June.

* * * *

As regards the Japanese horses. No one knows their failings better than the Japanese themselves, and I have reliable authority for stating that just before the war broke out they were in treaty with a dealer in the United States for the purpose of the purchase of suitable mares to be sent to Japan for breeding purposes.

The statement that the Japanese are not natural horsemen is true, but what European cavalry, at all events, is composed of natural horsemen? Is it not a notorious fact that the very large majority of the men are trained *ab initio* in the riding school? The Japanese pursue the same methods, and as their men take to it with a zest and are naturally bold and fearless there is no reason why, in the matter of riding, they should not prove the equal of any European cavalry. It appears to me one might just as well talk of a natural cavalry horse as of a natural cavalry man. That they both exist I admit, but in such small numbers that they are not worth considering.

The question as to whether the Japanese are good horse-masters or not must be gauged by results, and that they have gone through a long, hard and trying campaign with so few losses in horses from preventible causes, so few sore backs, and practical immunity from infectious and contagious diseases, speaks most favourably for their system of horse management. These remarks apply with equal force to the artillery. I was allowed to inspect the horses of two batteries in their temporary stables a few days ago on the way to the front. They were for the most part in good serviceable condition, no sore backs or galls that I could see, and only five sick horses in the two batteries. During the whole of the campaign these two batteries have only had between them sixty remounts. It is true that in the matter of stable management their methods do not accord with our ideas, but facts are facts from which there is no getting away, and mounted troops who have been able to accomplish such splendid results in the way of horse preservation in the field cannot be classed as either bad or indifferent horsemasters.

The intelligence and training of the cavalry leave little to be desired, and, if their horses are not up to our standard in make or shape, they do the work they are called upon to perform, and it is often hard; and this after all is the true and only criterion of their worth.

When the history of this war comes to be written, I think it will be found that, up to date, the Japanese cavalry have been much maligned, and it will have to be admitted that, under the circumstances, they have performed their duty admirably and with a self-denial which is worthy of all praise. The very life blood of the Japanese soldier is the offensive, and, being imbued with a thorough knowledge and an inborn appreciation of shock tactics, it must have been gall and wormwood to the Japanese cavalry to have to hang on to the skirts of the infantry, or get into a village, instead of riding straight at the opposing cavalry when opportunity offered.

The reason for this is clearly set out in paragraph 4 of Colonel Birkbeck's report, and I would draw attention to the concluding sentence of that paragraph with the remark that I fully and entirely agree with every single word therein set forth.

The remainder of the report speaks for itself, and needs no comment from me, beyond saying that I agree generally with the conclusions drawn, more particularly with those enunciated in the concluding paragraph.

The Japanese are, above all things, thoroughly practical, and, once having had their eyes opened, they never close them until they can do so with safety. I would invite special attention to the accounts of the long-distance patrols, which form not only interesting but also instructive reading.

Report by Colonel W. H. Birkbeck.

On the 12th June I joined the Head-Quarters of the 1st Cavalry Brigade. Unfortunately both the officer-interpreter, and my companion, Colonel Pertev Bey, Turkish Army, were wounded on the 16th June, and I was obliged to return to the Head-Quarters of the Third Army on the 17th June.

1. The Japanese Army, as is known, is organized in territorial divisions, and included in each is a regiment of cavalry of three squadrons.

There are in addition two independent cavalry brigades.

The brigades work independently of each other, though, as during the battle of Mukden, they can be formed into a division.

2. The 1st Brigade is commanded by Major-General Akiyama an officer who spent four years studying in France and has graduated at the Japanese Staff College. He is the senior cavalry general in the Japanese service, and it is to him, I fancy, that the cavalry brigades owe their organization and the undoubtedly high standard of efficiency to which they have attained.

3. Japan labours as regards her cavalry under grave initial disadvantages: the islands are mountainous, almost every available square foot of ground is carefully cultivated in order to support the dense population, there is no grazing, and very little open country, and the people are naturally neither horsemen nor horsemasters.

The horses of Japan, though hardy and full of courage, are small and ill-shaped, and show all the signs of degeneracy consequent upon the indiscriminate mating, which has only recently been stopped by legislation.

It is, I conclude, to the above difficulties, as well as to the fact that in such a country the value of cavalry to an army could not be fully demonstrated, that the Japanese owe the inadequacy of their mounted force, which does not exceed 1 cavalry soldier to 70 of other arms.

That it is inadequate no one realizes more fully than the Japanese themselves and one of their first steps after the war will be to increase largely its numbers.

Apart, however, from the question of numbers, the cavalry brigades are, judging from the one with which I had the privilege of spending a week, serviceable and formidable units, animated by the truest spirit of cavalry, and as superior to their opponents in intelligence, efficiency and *moral* as are their comrades of the infantry.

4. I naturally discussed as often as possible with the general and the commanding officers the question of the armament and employment of cavalry, and their conclusions coincide in a remarkable manner with what I believe to be the

opinions of our cavalry leaders. The firearm is the weapon upon which they have learned in the peculiar circumstances of this war to rely, and in which they have the greatest confidence.

Since the beginning of the war, when several charges were made, their tactics have greatly changed, and now, except in the case of small parties, they almost invariably fight dismounted.

By their regulations the cavalry soldier is directed to take 36 rounds only into action, and having no ammunition column the brigade is permitted to replenish its pouches from the nearest infantry ammunition column.

At the present time each soldier carries 150 rounds or more, and an improvised ammunition column accompanies the brigade.

From the above it must not be supposed that there is any intention of abandoning the sword, or that the training for shock tactics will be relaxed. Greater stress will be laid upon dismounted action and upon musketry, but the power of rapid manœuvre culminating in the charge is considered not only as necessary as ever for the maintenance of the spirit of the arm, but also essential for the combat against opposing cavalry.

I put the question directed to Major-General Akiyama thus:—

"It is argued in England that if the cavalry of Japan—a nation which has a veritable cult for the sword, which boasts that the bright steel is their very soul—have in this war abandoned it for the firearm, then indeed the day of shock tactics is definitely over, and cavalry need in future no longer waste time in such useless exercises as the charge."

His reply was that his cavalry are fighting in altogether exceptional circumstances; they are continually outnumbered, and forced to act on the defensive; his squadrons are too few and too valuable to risk in an encounter with superior forces in the open, and therefore he always finds himself at a disadvantage and forced to act with the greatest caution. Fortunately for him, he said, the Russians appear to be incapable of forcing an issue with him at close quarters, and it is to that fact, and to the individual superiority and *moral* of his officers and men that he attributes his ability to accomplish what he has.

Had he to encounter a Russian cavalry, truly trained as such, and determined when opportunity offered to close with him and ride him down, instead of unenterprising masses who fight only on foot, the case would be a very different one.

There is no doubt that this question of cavalry is one of the very few in which the foresight of the Japanese statesmen who prepared for this war has been at fault, and it is a mistake for which the nation has all along paid a heavy price, culminating in Marshal Oyama's inability to reap the full fruits of his victory at Mukden. As Major-General Akiyama remarked, one of the most important lessons of the war is that a proper proportion of thoroughly efficient and properly trained cavalry is as essential to success as the guns and other parts of the

whole machinery of an army. No cheap or hastily improvised substitute can properly take its place.

5. *Organization.*—The two cavalry brigades are organized as complete and permanent units both in peace and war. The five squadrons of which each regiment is composed in peace, put four only in the field, and the fifth forms a depôt, where recruits and remounts are trained. It is there that some five hundred Australian remounts per regiment are being now trained and conditioned.

Each squadron is accompanied by an allotment of spare horses (about 5 per cent.) and pack transport with one day's food and grain and cookery utensils, and there is a train company which, besides providing the above transport, remains as close as possible to the brigade, joining it whenever possible. With this company I understand, are the sick horse hospital, the reserves of material, workshops, &c. There is no supply column for the brigade, which when not stationary and within reach of the regular communication line depôts, lives by requisition. The squadron system is thoroughly carried out both in theory and practice; squadrons, as I saw them, were quartered in separate villages. The unit is complete, and the squadron commander, a captain, is entirely responsible and is never interfered with in the performance of his duty. The full strength of the squadron is in the ranks, transport drivers and other non-combatants belonging to the train. This delegation of full responsibility is a very marked feature of the Japanese military system.

6. *Personnel.*—The officers struck me as a particularly bright, keen, intelligent and self-reliant body.

The colonels of the two regiments were 40 and 42 respectively, both active men in the prime of life.

The mere fact of the graduation at the Central Military Preparatory School, or the equivalent educational tests demanded, ensures that all cadet officers are possessed of sufficient intelligence and ability, while the system of the distribution of the graduates gives to the cavalry an equal proportion of any special talent.

But brains alone are not enough for the officers of the cavalry brigades, and these veritable *corps d'élite* wish for and do attract the sons of the best families in Japan, men whose home training and traditions are the best guarantee for the possession of that character of self-reliance, courage and self-sacrifice needed to make the best cavalry officer.

With the best possible stuff to work on, *esprit de corps* and sound regimental training have done the rest, and have produced the cavalry officers who have made themselves famous during the war by their daring raids and patrols into the Russian lines, as far even as the Sungari and Harbin. (*Vide* Appendix 1.)

Long-distance riding and judiciously arranged competitions form part of each year's training, and to this is largely due the wide scope of the officers' patrols.

I understand that private means are no more necessary in the cavalry than in the other arms, all extra expenses consequent on life in a cavalry regiment being paid by the Government.

The cavalry recruits are selected from the conscripts of the year for their conformation and superior intelligence, and the general superiority of the cavalry non-commissioned officers and men over those of other arms is most marked.

7. *Horses.*—Much has been and is being done to improve the Japanese horse, an ill-shaped but enduring little beast of a very distinct type.

The cavalry horses I saw were very uneven, some being stout good little cobs, while many were weedy and misshapen; but they all do an extraordinary amount of work when asked to, and reminded me strongly of the South African ponies, many of whom looked quite incapable, but went on carrying heavy men day after day without failing.

The remounts received to replace losses and casualties do not amount to 50 per cent. in more than a year's campaigning; they are drawn from the horse depôt of the Army to which the brigade happens to be attached, from captures and from local purchases. There has been no pressure upon the Remount Department; as a fact the mounted troops have never been asked to do more than they could very well manage; their hardest work was during and after the Mukden battle, when, continually taking the enemy's rear guard positions, the main body averaged 15 miles a day for 40 days with plenty of food.

8. *Armament.*—The carbine and sword are the weapons used, the latter a curved single-grip weapon slung to the waist-belt, and the former carried on the back with no other attachment than its sling. I was informed that to keep the carbine steady the sling must be tight and therefore press on the chest, which is unsatisfactory. The men are often far more tired than the horses.

The carbine is considered satisfactory enough, but the breech has to be kept wrapped in rags when not in use to keep out the dust, which clogs it.

As regards the lance, opinion appeared to be divided. Some officers think it most effective, and told me stories of its use with effect, even at close quarters, by Cossacks who wielded it with both hands, dropping their reins and guiding their horses by voice and leg. Others dislike it, as weighty, visible at a distance and awkward to dispose of for dismounted service. Although the moral effect is acknowledged, the general conclusion appears to be against it, and I do not think that the Japanese will adopt it for their cavalry.

Many officers, among them Major-General Akiyama, are in favour of a bayonet for use dismounted, particularly at night.

9. *Equipment.*—Though the horses are small the men are light, and though each man carries practically all that he requires there are no complaints of the horses being overweighted, such as were made in South Africa.

The saddle with its accessories is very serviceable, and I commend it to the notice of the Master-General of the Ordnance. It is heavy for its size, but the material is excellent, the panels, which are detachable, are stuffed with wool, there are no burrs in front, and the fantails are short. The kit is carried in very roomy wallets, and saddle-bags easily detachable; two blankets are carried under the saddle, one for horse and one for man, and the cloak is rolled and strapped on behind. The whole kit is extraordinarily simple and serviceable.

I saw only three sore backs among the horses of six squadrons inspected in watering order, and the marks of the old sores, except in the case of Mongolian ponies injured before they joined the service, were conspicuous by their scarcity.

The saddle appears to fit all sizes and shapes of back, and I have myself been riding a high withered Australian in a soldier's saddle and find it quite comfortable, and infinitely preferable to the European pattern staff officer's saddle first provided for me; neither breast plate nor cropper is used unless specially required, and the girth is of string.

The troops were in summer clothing, loose khaki drill breeches and dust coats; the boots are various, many men wearing Russian boots; the cap is covered with khaki drill, and curtains hang down the back and sides.

10. *Hygiene and Shoeing.*—I cannot think that the stable management is altogether good; the Japanese regulations only provide for the horse being fed twice daily, morning and evening, a system which, though utterly foreign to our ideas, prevails still in the American army. The Japanese defend it on the ground that the war horse cannot often be fed at midday, and must be accustomed to the privation.

In spite of this regulation, the horses were, when I saw them, in first-rate condition, though many are so ill-shaped that they can never look really round and fat; but it must be remembered that the brigade had had nearly two months' rest since the forty days' hard work of March and early April, and they are quartered in excellent grazing ground, of which they take advantage.

Improvised shelter was provided for all the horses, but the standings were bad, and quite deep holes had been worn, in which the horses' forelegs were resting.

It is worthy of remark that more than one officer whom I asked said he fed and watered his horse in long distance competitions as often as possible, and a little at a time.

The absence of infectious and contagious diseases among the horses has been very remarkable.

The shoeing is most carefully attended to; many of the ponies' feet are very contracted, their forelegs often seem to grow out of the same hole, and their hocks actually touch as they stand, yet somehow they are kept going, and the marks of brushing are very few. I saw a good many animals standing in the ponds, and I am sure there is a good deal of trouble with feet.

There are eight farriers and shoeing-smiths *per* squadron, and the shoeing is cold when on the move, and hot when opportunity offers.

There are two veterinary officers to each regiment, one of whom looks after the sick horses in the hospital with the train company, while the other accompanies the regiment, supervises the shoeing, and attends to the accidents and slight cases which remain with the squadrons.

Veterinary officers lecture constantly to all ranks on hygiene, dietetics, treatment of simple ailments, &c.

Japan is by tradition a country of class distinctions and the veterinary profession has ranked low in the civil social scale.

The value of hygiene as regards the men is one of the first principles of the military system, and it is being realized more and more how similarly the health of the animals is essential to the efficiency of an army in the field. I anticipate that the status of veterinary officers will be raised and all possible stimulus given to the profession generally to attract to its ranks the brain and talent with which the Medical Department is so abundantly supplied.

11. *Equitation.*—I cannot say that the horses appear to be generally well broken, but the men ride well enough; they stick tight and ride fearlessly at speed over rough country. Most of the officers I saw were very nice horsemen, and rode good horses.

They all speak of their Cavalry School as being excellent, and I hope to be able to visit it later.

12. *Artillery and Machine Guns.*—The value of both light artillery and of machine guns is fully recognized, and a horse artillery battery has been improvised, the gunners being all mounted.

I had a long conversation with the brigade machine gun officer. He has six machine guns formed as a separate detachment, extra-regimental, and attached to the brigade. Two guns under an officer form the sub-divisions of his command, and can be detached at will, but no machine gun is ever employed singly.

The guns are usually kept at the disposal of the brigadier, and have been used more in defence than in attack; they seldom open at long ranges, unless against an exceptionally good target. It is rather the rule to reserve the machine gun fire, as indeed that of rifles too, for decisive ranges. In many actions which cavalry officers described to me, the practice has

been to allow the enemy to come within 600 yards before opening fire and then suddenly to overwhelm him. The principle with such well-trained troops is sound, for the moral "knock-out" of a 10 *per cent.* loss suffered in a few minutes is far greater than a similar loss spread over the advance from 1,000 to 600 yards, and the expenditure of ammunition is less. Concealment is an essential feature of the Japanese machine gun tactics, and the officer told me he had not had a single gun put out of action by opposing artillery. The guns have shields. The manipulators of the machine guns are very expert, and there is now seldom a jam. Like a good *chauffeur*, the Japanese machine gunner knows all the peculiarities of the weapon he fires, and can tell almost by instinct when anything is going wrong. Four thousand rounds is the most that has been fired in a day by three machine guns of the 1st Cavalry Brigade; the number of guns is now increased to six.

Throughout the Japanese Army the machine guns introduced during this war are very popular, and instead of three *per* regiment, six *per* regiment are being provided.

13. *Conclusion.*—In conclusion, I would again draw attention to the Japanese system which allots to divisions in peace and war a liberal complement of cavalry for protection, despatch riding, &c., and organizes the independent cavalry brigades separately and as complete and permanent units.

It is worthy of remark that though these brigades have frequently been stiffened by infantry, the latter have not been, and are not going to be, mounted, though the country abounds with Chinese ponies.

Infantry lightly equipped can keep near enough to the cavalry, and are thought to be better without ponies to think of and guard when fighting.

Though admittedly and lamentably weak in cavalry, no attempt has been made to supplement it by hastily improvised levies. Economy is a necessary factor of administration in Japan, and cavalry, being expensive, is there, as everywhere else, looked on with suspicion by taxpayers in times of peace; but our allies evidently realize that the arm they lack cannot be improvised, and they have no spare millions to waste in mounting and remounting newly-raised corps, who have neither the knowledge and discipline required to keep their horses alive nor the training to use them.

The result will be a considerable increase in the Japanese cavalry at the conclusion of the war, probably upon the lines already established, *i.e.*:—

(1) Independent brigades, completely organized and trained as such in time of peace, including horse artillery and machine guns, and of a peace strength sufficient to enable them to take the field complete in every detail, after eliminating all temporarily inefficient or untrained horses and non-effective men.

(2) Of these brigades the officers will be the very best obtainable, both in brains and character, and there will be enough of them and to spare, so that casualties may be efficiently replaced. The men will be of the highest intelligence, and of suitable weight and shape.

(3) The system of training will remain what it now is, *i.e.*, that of Germany and France, and will aim at producing—

(*a*) Collectively, a brigade whose suppleness and power of rapid manœuvre will enable it to attack with the utmost advantage whether with firearm or sword.

(*b*) Individually, men thoroughly trained for independent reconnaissance, experts in the use of their weapons, and confident in themselves and their horses, of whose powers they are able to make the very most.

(4) Difficulty will be experienced in finding suitable training grounds for new cavalry brigades in Japan itself, but the Japanese are far too practical to attempt to train cavalry on insufficient ground.

I attach three accounts of long-distance patrols, which show the class of cavalry which the Japanese system has, in spite of initial disadvantages, produced,

---

APPENDIX 1.

The following story of a patrol was told me by a young cavalry officer, to illustrate his route, I attach a sketch map.*

This officer started from Shen-tan-pu, the head-quarters of 1st Cavalry Brigade, on the 15th January 1905, with orders to reconnoitre the enemy's rear in the direction of the Sungari, to endeavour to cut the railway, and to do any other damage he could. His patrol consisted besides himself of four non-commissioned officers and forty-five men, of whom three were trained as shoeing-smiths.

As they intended to pass through Mongolia, where horses are plentiful, they took no spare animals, and no transport, as they were to live on the country. The men wore their winter coats with fur collar, sheepskin waistcoats, felt boots, and fur ear-caps ; each carried two blankets under the saddle (one for horse, and one for man), one set of spare shoes and three sets of frost-nails (36 nails) ; the horses were unclipped.

Each man had 500 rounds of ammunition in wallets and saddle-bags, six days' reserve rations, and four slabs of explosive.

---

* *See* Map 85.

The load was a heavy one, but the horses carried it well.

Reaching Hsiao-pei-ho, he came across the tail of Mishchenko's column returning from the Niu-chuang raid, and had to make a considerable detour southwards; when crossing into Mongolia he turned northwards, intending to strike the railway between Chang-chun Fu and the Sungari.

The route is shown by the thick black line on the map.

Finding all the bridges too strongly guarded for him to attempt to destroy them, he decided to be content with cutting the line.

Selecting his point, he arrived in the night, and posting two groups of three men, one at each end of his section, some half a mile apart, he got to work in four parties, three of which prepared mines, while the fourth destroyed the telegraph line.

Two of his mines exploded successfully, the third failed; and hardly had he collected his men, when a Russian patrol of fifty cavalry appeared, and he was obliged to escape with his party northwards.

Hearing from spies of a Russian supply depôt on the Sungari at She-li-chan weakly guarded, he determined to attack it.

Taking ten selected men he approached the depôt at night, and succeeded in surprising and securing the sentry before he could give the alarm, then surrounding the barrack huts where the soldiers lived, his men threw fuzed slabs of dynamite through the windows and killed and wounded 17 of the guard. After destroying the storehouses and stacks of supplies, he escaped without loss before the arrival of a Russian cavalry squadron, and carried off with him two prisoners.

His presence being known and his horses tired, the officer withdrew into Mongolia, but at Shao-tao-hu-tung, having shaken off all signs of pursuit, he decided to make another attempt on the railway, and turned in again to Cheng-chia-tun.

Hearing, however, from Chinese that the railway was too well guarded, and in view of the presence at Liao-yang-wo-peng of a considerable force of Russian cavalry, he gave up the idea and turned back into Mongolia.

At Hsi-sha-li-chieh he got into trouble, being surrounded by three hundred Russian cavalry, with some Chinese bandits.

All thought their time had come, and determined to sell their lives dearly; however, after half-an-hour's fighting the Russians thinking their numbers much greater, drew off and took position on rising ground north of the village.

The patrol at once mounted and made off southwards.

The Russians pursued, and after covering five miles, the party came to a suitable hill where it dismounted and turned to bay.

The Russians held off and declined to close, so again mounting, it made good its escape and eventually reached

Hsin-min-tun, and Mukden on the 17th March without further trouble.

The patrol had covered 1,160 miles in 62 days, averaging nearly 19 miles *per diem* including halts. It had generally travelled through the dangerous districts by night.

Of the four non-commissioned officers one was killed, and of the forty-five men who started two had been sent back with messages before the patrol first entered Mongolia, seven were killed or missing, and thirty-six returned.

The health of the party was good notwithstanding the intense cold, which fell to 30° below zero: it got plenty of Chinese food, meat, *kaoliang* and Chinese butter, or bean curds.

Besides seven horses killed or missing, two went slightly lame, but recovered, and there were three cases of sore withers which also were cured *en route.*

The officer brought back with him 41 horses that had started and two Mongolian ponies ridden by the two prisoners, who had learned to ride *en route.* Cover in stables had always been found for the horses when halted.

APPENDIX 2.*

Another cavalry officer of three years' service gave me from his diary the following account of an expedition in which he took part:—

On the 4th January 1905, when serving with his regiment of the cavalry brigade near Shen-tan-pu, he received orders to join the first independent, long-distance, reconnoitring detachment.

This detachment consisted of two squadrons (270 all ranks) of selected officers, non-commissioned officers and men under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Naganuma, an officer born and bred in the cold northern island of Japan.

The equipment was similar to that described in Appendix 1, including 800 slabs of explosive, and the orders were to go northwards to the neighbourhood of the Sungari and do as much damage as possible to the Russian line of communications.

On the 9th January the party left Hsiao-pei-ho, and proceeding cautiously they next day observed Mishchenko's two columns going south. As his march was already being watched by other patrols, they avoided him and went north-west across the Hsin-min-tun railway.


Wishing to conceal their presence from the Chinese railway employés, they selected a misty morning and crossed the line between two stations at speed. My informant did not say so, but I think this detachment probably followed very much the same line through Mongolia as that taken by the patrol dealt with in Appendix 1, and I have therefore marked it so with a dotted line on the same sketch map.

* *See* Map 85; *see also* Report 5, page 66, which gives a detailed account of this raid.

On the 1st February they reached a large village, Tungi, of which I have marked what I believe to be the approximate position on the map. The weather had been intensely cold and fell to 35° below zero on the 24th January, and at Tungi the party halted for six days, and for the first time found Chinese rice for their men to eat.

Meanwhile preparations were made for an attempt on the railway, and on the 7th February about one squadron set out for a point where the railway crosses a small stream, the Shui-hsi Ho, which I believe to be where I have marked it on the map near Kundulan.

At midnight on the 8th/9th February they reached the village A (*see* sketch below), where they left their horses and divided the party as follows:—40 men moved up the left bank



Section of masonry pier showing explosives placed in six mines of 120 slabs each round base.

of the stream, and 40 up the right bank, while 36 in two divisions of 18 each with explosives followed up the frozen river bed; the remainder, about 30 men, were left to guard the horses, with orders to hold the village at all costs, for the destruction party would return and probably surprise the attackers.

Their information was vague, they knew from Chinese spies that there was a railway station near the village, and that the bridge, which was not far off, was guarded by a blockhouse, but fortunately as they were making their preparations a train came along, stopped at the station and then steamed on along the line and across the bridge showing them plainly where it was. The night was dark and snow was falling.

Just as the left bank party reached the bridge four Cossacks appeared, of whom the leader had a bell round his horse's neck, and were all killed; the blockhouse defenders, alarmed, opened fire, and simultaneously the right bank party commenced the attack.


Meanwhile the explosives' party had reached the bluff B where they were sheltered from the blockhouse. As soon as their preparations were made they dashed out, attached six mines of 120 slabs each to the pier of the bridge, three on each side, and having lighted the fuzes withdrew under shelter.

The mines exploded successfully, the bridge was destroyed, and the whole party returned to the village after three hours' absence.

The fight at the blockhouse had been heavy, and an officer and several men were killed, besides many wounded.

The village had not been disturbed, and mounting their horses the squadron retired unmolested and reached Tungi on the 11th February; on the 14th February the party started homewards.

When some fifteen miles west of Tungi, and seven miles from Chenchan (*see* sketch below) a force of Russian cavalry



about three squadrons with two guns appeared upon their left flank.

The guns opened fire at some 4,500 yards and the Japanese retired behind the hill A, from which the colonel observed the Russians.

As the latter seemed disinclined to make a move, Colonel Naganuma moved his squadrons out from behind the hill and advanced; the guns limbered up and the Russians retired towards C, followed by the Japanese. The Russians occupied the village B with the guns on the hill east of it. Colonel Naganuma now engaged the village with one squadron dismounted, while he directed the other to move round the Russian left flank and threaten the guns.

The Russians commenced to retreat in some confusion, and the mounted squadron charged, taking the retreating Russians in flank, and pursuing captured a gun and wagon at the entrance of village C.

The Russians left 50 killed and wounded on the field, and the Japanese loss was also considerable.

The party halted that night at Chenchan, and proceeded homewards the following day.

On the 5th March about the point marked X on the route,* a message was received through Chinese hands from the brigade head-quarters near the Liao, dated the 28th February, saying that the battle of Mukden had begun, and the detachment was to try again to cut the railway.

The squadron to which my informant belonged, now reduced to some 70 men, was therefore directed on Liao-yang-wo-peng.

Fearing that they would be unable to reach the railway in a body, for many Russian cavalry were reported between Cheng-chia-tun and Ta-wa, the squadron divided, my informant's party making for Chang-tu Fu. They captured a Russian intendance party making requisitions near Liao-yang-wo-peng, and crossing the Liao shortly afterwards captured and destroyed a convoy of sixty Russian wagons.

The bridges were too strongly guarded, and the party too weak to attempt their destruction, but they succeeded in slightly damaging the line near Chang-tu Fu, though with some loss to themselves.

The party returned by Hsin-min-tun to Mukden, which it reached on the 29th March.

APPENDIX 3.*

A very young cavalry officer, who only received his commission in February 1905, gave me from his diary the following account of a patrol which he made as a cadet officer of a cavalry regiment of the 1st Brigade.

* *See* Map 85.

On the 4th January he received orders to reconnoitre the rear of the Russian position in front of Mukden, and to ascertain how far the railway extended towards Fu-shun, and what was going on in that direction.

Taking with him one non-commissioned officer and two men he proceeded to Hsiao-pei-ho, and thence, crossing the Hun and Liao Rivers, he followed up the right bank of the latter, avoiding Hsin-min-tun to San-miao-chuang-tun (C 7)*, which he reached on the 15th January.

From this point he sent back one man with the result of his observations.

Crossing the river at Shih-fo-ssu (C 7) his difficulties, which had all along been great, increased, for the country was swarming with Russians, but he succeeded in reconnoitring the river by way of Chu-chu Shan (D 6) as far as Nan-tai-tzu (D 6).

His intention had been to reach Tieh-ling (E 6), but he could not get through the Russian patrols, and decided to pass by Ku-chia-tzu (D 6) and try and cross the railway near San-tai-tzu (D 7), 15 miles south of Tieh-ling.

In the early morning of the 16th February the patrol crossed the railway to San-tai-tzu (D 7), and during the night of the 17th February reached Lien-to-wan, 5 miles north-east of Fu-shan (F 7).

Hiding there the young officer and his non-commissioned officer observed the neighbourhood of Fu-shun for twenty four hours, and having found out what they wanted, the patrol withdrew by a different route to San-tai-tzu (D 7), and crossing the railway again on the night of the 19th February, reached the Liao about La-mu-tun (D 7 north) and got back to Hsiao-pei-ho on the 28th February.

Most of the travelling was done at night; the Chinese were friendly and gave the patrol all possible help and food; still, they had many narrow escapes of capture, or rather death, for, as the young officer remarked quite simply, he would never have been taken alive.

APPENDIX 4.

The following is an account of an action at which I was present. Owing to the reluctance of the Japanese authorities to allow their guests to go near any danger, I was unfortunately not permitted to accompany the cavalry, of whom I only caught sight occasionally through glasses.

Briefly the affair was as follows :—

A considerable body (some fifty squadrons) of Russian cavalry have long been cantonned in and around the village C, in the diagram shown on next page.

---

* *See* Map 82.

Having made a raid upon the Japanese communications, they had returned to C, and after rest, were reported to be preparing for another offensive movement.

The Japanese commander immediately decided to strike the first blow.

The Japanese outpost line runs roughly along the line B, A, the Russian line passes through D.

The plan of attack was for the cavalry brigades, each supported by a regiment of infantry and two brigades of artillery, to advance simultaneously on C by night, capture and destroy the Russian cavalry head-quarters, drive them northwards and return to their own quarters.

On the 15th June the general commanding the 1st Cavalry Brigade rode over to visit the commander of the infantry division on his left.



At about noon on the 16th June orders were issued for the cavalry brigade to rendezvous at A on the outpost line at 10 p.m. that evening.

There was a heavy thunderstorm while the troops were marching to the rendezvous, after which the full moon came out bright and clear. The rain had made the roads very heavy, the water in one place being knee deep for a mile.

The whole column, infantry, cavalry and guns moved out of A at 11 p.m., the infantry forming an advanced guard with the cavalry and artillery following.

The Russian outpost line was crossed at 1.30 a.m., and the column opened out, the cavalry moving out on the right flank, and the infantry forming successive lines.

At E some opposition was encountered, but the Russians were surprised, their flank was threatened, and they made no real stand, but retired on C.

The Japanese advance continued, successive lines of infantry skirmishers on both sides of the road, guns in rear, and cavalry slightly in advance some two miles on the right flank.

The country was level sandy plain with lines of willow plantations, which restricted the view in places.

The Russian batteries came into action about 5 a.m. south-east of C, and engaged the Japanese guns, but the advance was not seriously checked, and by 3.30 a.m. C was in Japanese hands, and the Russian cavalry in full retreat northwards.

The cavalry brigade guns inflicted severe loss on a long Russian column, upon which they played with shrapnel from a point near F, at some 3,500 yards range.

The Russians lost 66 killed, a considerable number wounded, a few prisoners, and all their supplies, clothing, sick horses, and other accumulations, at the head-quarters of a large cavalry force.

The result of this expedition would no doubt have been greater had the column from B arrived to time ; delayed by the heavy roads it was late.

The Japanese lost some 50 killed and wounded. The force returned to A by evening, and remaining there that night returned to their quarters next day.

(35) Field Artillery.

REPORTS by Lieut.-Colonel C. V. HUME, D.S.O., Royal Artillery, and Captain B. VINCENT, Royal Artillery; with REMARKS by Lieut.-General Sir W. G. NICHOLSON, K.C.B., and Lieut.-General Sir IAN HAMILTON, K.C.B., D.S.O.

Remarks of Lieut.-General Sir W. G. Nicholson, K.C.B.

In submitting the accompanying report, dated 20th November 1904, with annexures, from Lieut.-General Sir Ian Hamilton, I have only to remark on the paragraph dealing with the massing *versus* the dispersion of guns.

The question in its essence is a simple one. The assumed object being to bring a concentrated artillery fire to bear on a given point, this object can be attained either by the massing of guns for the purpose of directing their simultaneous fire on the desired point, or, should the ground admit of it, by dispersing the guns while at the same time taking steps to direct their simultaneous fire on the desired point. The latter course, the advantages of which were pointed out by Napoleon and are indeed obvious, depends for its success on the existence of adequate means of rapid communication between the chief artillery commander and the subordinate commanders of the separated artillery units. Do adequate means exist or can they be created? That is the crux of the whole question. Anyhow, I am of opinion that batteries should possess the means of rapid communication under normal conditions, and that in field artillery training it should be recognized that the dispersion of units may be as advantageous under certain circumstances as the massing of units may be unavoidable under other circumstances. And what applies to the battery units seems to me also to apply to the component and self-contained parts of that unit.

Remarks of Lieut.-General Sir Ian Hamilton, K.C.B., D.S.O.

I have the honour to submit the accompanying papers on artillery by Lieut.-Colonel C. V. Hume, D.S.O., and Captain Vincent. The lessons to be learnt from the use made of artillery in this war should be much more complete than those afforded up to date by the other arms, for only in artillery can it be said that, other things being equal, the combatants were at all evenly matched. Cavalry operations in Korea and Manchuria have generally resulted in an uninteresting and

uninstructive succession of stalemates; the vaunted Russian Cossacks and dragoons having only had, at the best, the negative effect of neutralizing and containing the very much weaker cavalry of the Japanese. The infantry conflict has been one-sided as a rule, the Japanese so long as they remain animated with their present flaming patriotism possessing the best foot soldiers in the world. The Russians, on the other hand, although their men are brave and formidable antagonists whenever close order is possible, as in the defence of a prepared position or in a night attack, have yet so many serious defects in the very qualities most needed under the conditions of modern warfare, that in battles of *rencontre* or in the attack by day they can only be classed as very second-rate troops. In artillery alone, taking personnel and material together, have the Russians been able, battery for battery, at least to hold their own.

Indirect Fire and Cover.—In these days of the *rafale*, which is capable of destroying a battery in so short a time, concealment and cover have become absolutely essential. Whether the fire employed be indirect in the full sense, or whether the guns are only so far hidden as still to admit of a sight being taken on the object, there is no doubt whatever (in my mind) that the days of artillery driving up and unlimbering in the open are as dead as would be the battery which attempted to resuscitate them during a battle. The Japanese do not advance their artillery, even behind cover, until they have supplemented their natural cover by digging gun pits to drop into at once.

Much of the time now spent by our field and especially by our horse artillery, in trotting or galloping smartly into action in the open, had better, in future, be devoted to teaching officers and men to dig entrenchments and to sink as rapidly from view as possible.

Another result of this development will be that if a battery commander wishes to see his object over the sights, the guns will now always have to be man-handled up the last few yards of the slope. This question of man-handing guns is one which will henceforth require special consideration. At present, although the battery comes up the slope with the drivers stooping in their saddles so as not to show themselves, thus leaving only a very few yards to be covered by man-handing, we have often, even with the 15-pounder, to put the men of a section on to a single gun to get it into position. If it so happens that we have to handle guns up to thirty or forty yards of a very steep ascent, then drag ropes have to be put on and the best part of the battery has to set to work at hauling up each gun in turn. The fact thst these difficulties present themselves even with the present type of field gun leads to some apprehension lest they should become still more accentuated with the 18½ pounder. However this may be, it will be necessary to note

for future guidance that no battery should ever give the smallest indication to the enemy of its intention to occupy a position, whether by the battery commander making a preliminary inspection of the ground, or by the layers when selecting the position for their respective guns, or by the drivers letting their heads appear above the sky line. A battery which by any such carelessness betrays where the position has been selected renders itself liable to lose half the battle before firing a shot. A small separate point in connection with concealment which has not been mentioned in the accompanying papers, is the question of the flash. I think the flash of the Russian guns is much more conspicuous than that of our own or of the Boer artillery.

Massing versus *Dispersion of Guns.*—This is a favourite field of argument for the theorist, and one of the most hackneyed exercising grounds for his pen and ink. I will therefore try and confine my remarks as much as possible to what I have seen and heard in Manchuria, which fully bears out, under very different conditions, conclusions drawn from the battle of the 2nd November 1899, before Ladysmith. The Japanese have imbibed their military principles from unadulterated German sources. At the outset of this war, all, or at any rate a vastly preponderating number, of Japanese artillery officers believed in the massing of artillery. At the battle of the Ya-lu the artillery was massed in proper style. Since then there has been no massing, and there has been some change in the feeling of the Japanese artillery officers on the subject. Many of the senior officers still believe that massing is essential, if effectual fire direction and control is to be maintained. These assert that it was not only because of the great superiority of their artillery that the guns were massed on the Ya-lu, and that the only reason they have not been massed on subsequent occasions is that the ground necessitated dispersion. On the other hand, a certain senior officer speaking to me of massing batteries, said that certainly *l'idée a un peu vieilli*, and gave me as a cause for this, the fact that one battery of quick-firers could produce fully the effect of three of the old batteries, so that it had now become useless as well as dangerous to have too many of them on one spot. He admitted also that the great loss that must accrue from offering such a target could hardly be compensated for by unity of command, which might after all be secured by devising good methods of communication. As far as I can judge the views of Japanese officers generally, I would say that the seniors, although they have given up the idea of a hundred or more guns in line at close interval, would always like to keep a regiment* together, or, if that prove to be impossible, at any rate they would not go lower than the battalion for the unit. The younger officers are greatly

* The Japanese artillery regiment has two battalions. In each battalion are 18 guns in three batteries.

impressed by the extreme dispersion of artillery practised by the Russians, and its effects, and in their view the battery should be the unit. Nor do I think they would hesitate to break up a battery in a small engagement or for any special reason. Speaking generally, then, I may say that since the commencement of this war, the theory that it was necessary to mass batteries to produce concentration of fire has, on the Japanese side, been considerably shaken, and has receded in favour of the theory that the advantages of dispersion may often be such as more than to counterbalance the less perfect control which may then ensue.

The Russians carried dispersion to great lengths. I am not quite clear in what sense Captain Vincent* was disappointed not to see the Russians' guns massed. As a sympathizer with Japan, I was certainly disappointed that the Russians did not concentrate their batteries, but as an impartial military critic, I was pleased to see tactics which deserved success, and would have obtained it, had observation, ranging, &c., been up to the same standard. Recently the Russian artillery unit has been in practice, whatever else it may be in theory, the half battery of four guns.

Signalling.—The Continental army taken as her model by Japan regards the British army as nullity—a myth and non-existent. It is hardly then to be wondered at that our methods have not received the same attention as those of the German, French, Austrian, or Russian armies. Still, during all the years these mighty organizations have quietly been resting on their laurels (or the reverse) our forces have been continuously at war, and khaki, which is henceforth to be the only wear of the Japanese army, is not the only hint that they could have got from their allies. One of the most important of these might have been the use we make of the heliograph and of flag signalling. They are the nerves of our troops in the field, and are as indispensable to their tactics as are their arteries and veins, the lines of communication, to their sustenance. It is true that under the provision of a deplorable order issued just before the South African war broke out, batteries were deprived of their signallers, but necessity knows no orders, and the system was immediately reconstituted. The Japanese are now well aware that the dispersion of guns they have been forced into by the practical exigencies of the campaign, demands a system of signalling as its complement. They have on many occasions felt the want of reliable communications between units very keenly, and I have no doubt that in their next war they will employ a system of signalling, adapted very possibly from ours, not only for the infantry, but also for the artillery.

Ranging.—In my report on the battle of the 31st July,† I have already written at some length on the subject of ranging.

* Para. (17) *et seq.*

† *See* Vol. I., page 186.

I said then that the Russians were showing signs of improvement. They have now certainly improved very much, and I have noticed them pause and correct their fuze after a fight has been for some time in progress, with the best results. This precaution never seemed to occur to a Russian battery commander in the earlier battles. Still, range they never so wisely, they have a radically bad method in endeavouring to fix the position of an object on the ground by puffs of smoke in the air. The results of what I have seen, and especially of the terrible mistakes I have seen, mistakes influencing the course of a battle, have strongly prejudiced me against the system of ranging with time shrapnel. Judging by instances which have come under my personal observation, it seems specially easy to confuse one piece of rising ground with another when ranging by time shrapnel. At distances over 4,000 yards, it is extraordinary how ridges blend into one another, and how easy it is to think a battery on the nearest ridge is really on the furthest, or *vice versâ*. Captain Vincent gives a very good example of this which occurred in front of Manju-yama on the 1st September. Only, instead of saying hundreds of shell, he should have said thousands, as the Russians were firing eight shells every two minutes for the best part of the day. How the five men were wounded I cannot imagine. I suppose a faulty fuze. At any rate, all the shell I saw went two hundred to three hundred yards over. And yet one single correction with common shell, or even shrapnel on graze, would probably have rendered effective, instead of absurdly useless and ineffective, all this Russian fire! Whether gun or rifle be the weapon, if the range is not correctly judged, then material, personnel, everything, is a great deal worse than thrown away. A battery had much better not fire at all than blaze away at an incorrect range whereby ammunition is expended and barrels worn out merely with the effect of giving very considerable moral encouragement to the enemy. This is why I have always maintained that to get full value out of an infantry brigade it should have a pom-pom handy to set its sights by, and why I hold now that every battery should carry high-explosive shell, were it only for the purpose of ranging.

High-explosive Shell.—In my report on the battle of the 31st July,* I wrote at some length regarding the high-explosive shell carried by field and mountain artillery as well as, of course, by the howitzers. Newspaper correspondents, as Captain Vincent says, have employed a good many superlatives in their press notices of these projectiles. This famous and mysterious high-explosive is just plain lyddite, not less and certainly not more. I have watched the shells carefully, and noted their effects afterwards. Chemically they may differ from lyddite, but practically they are just the same. I have not seen any craters as big as those described by Lieut.-Colonel Hume.† I

* *See* Vol. I., page 186. † Page 582.

think the craters he described must have been made by the howitzers. A staff officer of the First Army told me that he attributed much of the Japanese success from the 26th to the 30th August to the use of these shells. In this connection I may say that I also saw the almost magical effect of the opening of two mountain guns in the Russian trenches described by Captain Vincent,* but I thought it was high-explosive and not shrapnel that was used on that occasion. After the 30th, owing to the *kaoliang* which concealed everything and soft plough which prevented detonation and sometimes explosion, I do not think the high-explosive shells were quite so successful. For the artillery fight, for infantry in deep trenches and against villages, I think they will always be invaluable.

Howitzers.—I agree with Captain Vincent that the First Army would have been very much better off had it been able to keep a few howitzers with it for its march through the mountains. I cannot think of a single engagement between the Mo-tien Ling and Liao-yang where howitzers would not have been invaluable to that army. There is this to be said, however, namely, that the Japanese often used their mountain gun very much as a howitzer. They used to approach by night, or under cover, fairly close to the long-range Russian guns and attack them with, comparatively speaking, high-angle fire. Nothing could have been more successful than the way these mountain guns were worked, in every case which came to my notice.

Casualties.—Since Lieut.-Col. Hume and Captain Vincent wrote their reports I have secured actual medical statistics which lift the question of casualties entirely out of the region of argument. I may say here that the Russian artillery has caused the Japanese about 20 per cent. of their casualties, taking all the battles together from the crossing of the Ya-lu inclusive. I am speaking here only of the First Army.

Finally, I should like to express my opinion that in all but two points the Russians were either superior to or equal to the Japanese as regards their artillery efficiency. But these two points were sufficiently weighty to prevent the scale turning altogether in favour of the Russians. They were :—

(1) The battery commander.

(2) The layer.

* Page 382.

Report by Lieut.-Colonel C. V. Hume, D.S.O., Royal Artillery.

1. *Scope of Notes.*—The following notes deal with the action of the field artillery of both combatants as it came under my notice during the advance on, and capture of, Liao-yang, and during the recent fighting on the Sha Ho. From the 24th June, the date on which the First Army commenced its advance from Feng-huang-cheng, till the 10th September, I was attached with four other foreign officers to the Guard Division, and accompanied divisional head-quarters during the whole of that period. After the 10th September all foreign attachés with the First Army returned to Army Head-Quarters, and have since remained with them. During the recent fighting on the Sha Ho, we were generally allowed to accompany the division of our choice, and I continued to follow the fortunes of the Guard. This I was able to do during the greater part of the fighting.

2. My observations have been therefore more or less limited to the action of the artillery with, and opposing, the Guard Division, and thanks to the few restrictions placed on our movements by the general officer commanding, and to the splendid observation stations available in the mountainous country in which the division has always been operating, I have enjoyed good opportunities of watching artillery fighting. An exceptionally clear atmosphere and a powerful pair of glasses have helped considerably.

3. *Nature of Guns and Equipment.*—The Guard Artillery Regiment consists of the usual six batteries of field guns. During the advance of the division from Feng-huang-cheng to Ta-wan, including the fight at the Yang-tzu Ling on the 31st July, there was also attached to it a mountain battery from the 12th Division for advanced guard work in the difficult roadless country which it had to traverse. On arrival at Ta-wan the mountain battery rejoined its own division, but before leaving that place for the final advance on Liao-yang the artillery of the Guard was reinforced by the "Hijikata battery" which has remained with it ever since. This battery is the one formed and commanded by Captain (now Major) Hijikata of the Guard Artillery, its armament consisting of six of the Russian field guns (model 1900) captured at the Ya-lu on the 1st May.

4. The Hijikata battery was formed during the month of May, and fired its first experimental shots at Feng-huang-cheng about the end of that month. It was not till three months later, 25th August, that it came into action in earnest for the first time. I saw the battery on the march on the 23rd August, and it then consisted of six guns and six wagons with some thirty-six pairs of spare horses. Since then, I think six more wagons have been added. Horsing the battery has been a matter of great difficulty. In the lead and wheel of each gun, and in the wheel of each wagon was a pair of big, captured Russian horses,

15·1 to 15·3, while in the centre of the guns, and lead and centre of the wagons were stout Japanese or Chinese ponies, with here and there a mule. The harness was all captured Russian collar-harness, and the centre pair was traced to a metal swingle-tree, hooked to the end of the pole. Whether this mode of harnessing is that employed by the Russians, I do not know, and can hardly believe it is,* and I think that owing to the difficulty of obtaining a sufficiency of big horses, the Japanese have improvised this low point of attachment to enable them to use a small pair of horses in the centre. The guns and wagons retained their green colouring and Russian lettering, and to emphasize the Russian character of the turn-out the gunners and drivers wore short Russian swords. The Japanese found these guns very heavy to move about the hills, and the battery was generally kept "in reserve," to be used when favourable positions or opportunities presented themselves.†

5. The Russian guns opposed to the Guard Division have almost invariably been the field guns, model 1900. On the 3rd September, outside Liao-yang, I was informed that a battery of 15-cm. (5·9-inch) guns or howitzers joined their fire to that of the field artillery, but I think this is about the only occasion on which the artillery of the Guard has engaged guns of heavy calibre.

6. The artillery fighting I have witnessed has therefore generally resolved itself into a trial of strength between the field guns of the two armies, under the following conditions:—

(1) No. of guns engaged -	Japanese almost invariably superior.
(2) Calibre - -	Japanese, 2·952 in. Russian, 2·996 in.
(3) Muzzle velocity -	Japanese, 1,660 f.s. Russian, 1,930 f.s.
(4) Weight of projectile -	Japanese shrapnel, 13·23 lbs. Japanese H.E. shell, 13·45 lbs. Russian shrapnel, 14·44 lbs.
(5) No. of bullets in shrapnel - -	Japanese, 234 of 10·1 grammes (·35 oz.). Russian, 260 of between 11 and 12 grammes (·38 to ·42 oz.).
(6) Extreme length of fuze	Japanese, about 5,000 yards. Russian, about 6,000 yards.
(7) Ammunition - -	Japanese, separated. Russian, fixed
(8) Rounds carried *per* gun, in gun and wagon.	Japanese, 40 + 40 + 50 = 130. Russian, 40 + 48 + 50 = 138.

* From inquiries I am inclined to think this is after all the Russian method.—C. V. H.

† In order to some extent to pay back the Japanese in their own coin the Russians turned some of the guns captured on the night of 16th October against the Japanese three or four days later.—C. V. H.

(9) Maximum rate of fire	-	Japanese, 6 to 7 rounds *per* minute. Russian, 15 rounds *per* minute.
(10) H.E. shell	- -	The Japanese carry a percentage of H.E. shell, the proportion varying according to circumstances, probably between 20 and 30 *per* cent.

7. *Mobility.*—As regards the actual mobility of the two guns, I think the advantage lies with the Russians. I believe the weight behind the horses, exclusive of gunners andkit, to be something over 38 cwt. for the Russian gun and 34¼ cwt. for the Japanese. The Russian gun has a long trail, and the weight is therefore badly distributed, which adds to the drag, but the teams are composed of strong, useful animals (a Scotch medical missionary at Liao-yang, described them as "splendid"), while the Japanese are dependent on their ponies which, even when picked, are but weedy animals between 14 and 14·2 hands high. Both sides use teams of six horses. On the level either gun can probably meet all necessary demands for mobility, but where the going is heavy or mountain roads have to be negotiated, I feel sure that the heavier Russian teams would have a decided pull in that they would have a much greater reserve of power for any extra effort demanded of them.*

8. For reasons both practical and economical there is no difference made in the Japanese field artillery between gunners and drivers; they are interchangeable, but as the requirements of a gunner are first taken into consideration and he is picked for size (5 feet 4½ inches as against 5 feet 2 inches for infantry), the little horses suffer. This seems to us, who put specially selected light men even on our big horses, a somewhat unnecessary handicap on mobility, and it might be well worth the while of the Japanese military authorities to reconsider the question of the interchangeability of gunners and drivers of field artillery. In the mountain artillery it is, of course, a very sensible arrangement.

---

* Colonel Waters, C.V.O., C.M.G., R.A., who was attached to the Russian forces, is of a different opinion. He mentions (*see* Vol. III., p. 169):—

"During the second and last day's retreat of the 1st Siberian Corps from An-shan-tien to the Liao-yang position, on the 28th August, the roads were in such a state owing to mud that the eight guns of one battery of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division had to be abandoned; in one instance 16 horses were attached to an empty limber, and failed to move it; large numbers of ammunition wagons were also abandoned. I heard some of the officers concerned rated soundly, but I am not prepared to say that it was possible to have saved what was lost. At the same time the fact remains that the Japanese, after the retreat of the 1st and 4th Siberian Corps from An-shan-tien had made the tracks even worse than they had been, managed somehow to get their guns, and plenty of artillery ammunition, over these same tracks, and very close on the Russian heels, too, for they made a general attack within less than 36 hours after we reached the Liao-yang position, and had already been feeling their way a few hours only after we got to it."

9. This would, however, be a mere side issue if the question of re-arming the Japanese field artillery came under consideration. Increased gun-power means increased weight, and with the latter the Japanese would have to face the expense of importing horses for artillery purposes; for, though horse-breeding operations are carried on in Japan, there is as yet no home supply of suitable animals. The importation of horses would also necessitate the introduction of a new system of horse-management throughout the country. The horse question is a very serious one in Japan.

10. The fighting at the Yang-tzu Ling on the 31st July furnishes a good example of the disabilities under which the Japanese field artillery labours as regards horses, when operating in a hill-country. Owing to the want of "horse-power," two batteries of the Guard right column took so long surmounting a stretch of road, which had been specially prepared for them, over a pass, that they were unable to carry out their intention of getting into position under cover of darkness and opening fire at daybreak. The pass delayed them so long that they had to come into action in daylight, piecemeal, and in view of the hostile artillery, and the wagons took so long to follow that a lot of ammunition had to be brought up by hand. Consequently the two batteries never had a fair chance, and though they opened fire six or seven times during the day, they invariably received such a hail of shrapnel that they had to cease firing again after the lapse of a few minutes.

11. Again, when the division was on the march to join the right of the First Army on the 5th September, there was a heavy thunderstorm during the morning, and the road became slippery in some places, deep in others. I passed the Guard artillery struggling bravely along, but the least rise brought the guns to a standstill, and the gunners had to help. The slipperiness of the roads would have been bad for any horses, but I do not think the Russian field guns would have been stopped by such slight rises as I saw the Guard guns stopped by.

12. The scratch nature of Hijikata's teams forbids his battery being taken as a standard whereby to judge of the mobility of the Russian field artillery, but as I have heard Japanese artillery officers complaining of its weight, and as it is usually in reserve, it may be assumed that the officer commanding the Guard artillery finds it a good deal more difficult to move in the hills than a Japanese battery. On the other hand, I have come across no instance of the Russians having lost guns or abandoned them through mere want of mobility.

13. I have occasionally seen Japanese batteries moving at a trot over easy ground, and on one occasion (*see* para. 39) I saw gun after gun and wagon after wagon, under exceptional circumstances, break into a gallop for a short distance on the level, but their usual and most suitable pace is undoubtedly a walk.

To do the little horses justice, they seem sound and hardy, and thanks to an abundance of green forage of all sorts, they look but little the worse for the summer campaign in the mountains.

14. *Training and Gunnery.*—It is in training and gunnery that the Japanese gunner excels his Russian prototype. The superiority of the Japanese artillery in these respects goes a good way towards minimizing the advantages accruing to the Russians from the longer range, quicker rate of fire, longer fuzes and greater shell capacity of their gun. To it, I think, are also to a great extent due the exaggerated reports which appeared in English and Continental newspapers, to the effect that the Japanese possessed the finest artillery in the world, though the effect of the unexpected howitzers at the Ya-lu may also have had something to say to it.

15. The Japanese gun, with a well-trained squad, is said to be capable of firing 6 or 7 rounds a minute, but putting the maximum in the field as low as 5 per minute, I have never seen a battery in action firing in a way that would lead one to think that it was capable of attaining even that low figure. Every shot fired is fired with care and deliberation and with the intention that it should tell, and it is therefore easy to understand the moral effect which Japanese artillery fire is said to have upon the Russians.

16. Very stringent orders exist in the Japanese artillery as to the care to be exercised in the expenditure of ammunition, and setting aside the waste of ammunition and wear and tear of guns which continuous rapid fire produces, such an order was very necessary in the First Army, which was operating in mountains where every round of ammunition represented a considerable amount of transport. But, on the other hand, such restrictions tend to slowness, and as an onlooker I have been sometimes surprised to see a good, though fleeting, target vanish unfired at, or receiving only a belated round or two, and also to see the time taken in coming into action or in switching on to a fresh target. On one occasion, however, during the recent fighting on the Sha Ho, in the case of an attack on which very much depended, these restrictions were removed by special order of General Kuroki, and the field and mountain batteries engaged fired 10,000 shell in the course of a very few hours at the hill which their infantry was attacking.

17. A marked contrast to the steady shooting of the Japanese is the often wild shooting of the Russian field artillery. They nearly always range with time-shrapnel alone, as the French do, and one short, one over, one between the two, and then the *rafale*, is their usual mode of procedure. When they are occupying a carefully prepared position and know their ranges, this system is sometimes very effective, as, for instance, in the case mentioned in paragraph 10, when the Japanese batteries were prevented from effecting anything all day. Again, on the

26th August near Ta-tien-tzu the Russian field guns, twenty or twenty-four in number, were able all day to maintain their supremacy over forty-eight Japanese guns, most of the damage being done by one particular battery of eight guns. On the other hand, I have seen cases where the Russian battery commander has fired his two or three rounds of trial shrapnel and then, jumping to conclusions, has poured in a rapid fire which from its intensity should have been devastating, but which proved comparatively innocuous to the battery aimed at. I will give two instances.

18. On the 25th August, during a preliminary reconnaissance of the position which the Guard Division attacked the following day, Hijikata opened fire with his guns against a Russian battery in an elevated position, at a range of nearly 7,000 yards. He had come into action behind the crest of a low roll of ground in a comparatively level bit of country, and some 1,000 yards in front of him was a similar and parallel rise. The Russian battery fired three trial shots at the *front* ridge—over, short, and range—and then poured in rapid fire for a short time. After that it fired slowly at intervals, and three hours later, thinking all was not right, the battery commander lengthened his range and dropped his shell in a village half way between the two ridges. Not a shell reached the Japanese battery all day, though the bright flashes of Hijikata's guns must have been plainly visible to the Russians. Later, I heard from an artillery officer that on the same day the Russians made the same bad shooting, under similar circumstances, on the left of the division, but in this case they ranged and fired on the ridge *beyond* that occupied by the Japanese battery.

19. Again on the 30th and 31st August, in front of Liao-yang, four Japanese batteries were in action on the right of the Guard; they were behind low spurs, two batteries on each side of a high hill. The Russian batteries opposed to them failed to locate them with their fire during the whole two days, and it could not have been for want of observation stations, as there were points on the adjacent hills from which they must have been visible. The amount of ammunition wasted by the Russian gunners on this occasion was appalling, one battery in particular firing bouquets of shrapnel all over the hills and valley, apparently on the off-chance of hitting something. It may have made an occasional lucky shot, but not a man in the four Guard batteries was hit during the two days.

20. On many occasions have I seen the Russians thus throwing away ammunition and wearing out their guns, but Kuropatkin's order* seems to have had some effect, as the Russian gunnery opposite the Guard was certainly better during the fighting on the Sha Ho. At the same time, to an onlooker with the Japanese army, it seems as if the Russian gunners depend

* *See* Captain Vincent's report, para. (52), page 600.

more on the rapidity than on the accuracy of their fire, more on the gun than on the man behind it, and the result is that the effect, both moral and actual, on the Japanese artillery bears but a small proportion to that which from all appearances it ought to. This is especially noticeable at long ranges, when the fact that their own gun is out-ranged ought to have great moral effect on the Japanese.

21. The moral of this is that the possession of a Q.F. or Q.L. gun by an army requires a very thorough training of the personnel in order that full value may be got out of it; otherwise it may lead to a consumption of ammunition wholly out of proportion to the results obtained. In the present instance, to take an illustration from the cricket field, the Japanese artillery may be compared to the steady if somewhat slow bat, always a source of strength to his team, and the Russian to the brilliant but uncertain hitter who, as often as not, doesn't come off. The best bat is he who combines steadiness with ability to hit, and a knowledge of how and when to do so.

22. *Shrapnel.**—It is hardly fair to the Russian gunners to put down the whole of their lack of effect to bad gunnery. The Japanese have formed but a poor opinion of the Russian shrapnel, though it contains more, and slightly heavier bullets than their own. They say it acts very unevenly, as the case so often breaks up and so upsets the velocity of the bullets and cone of dispersion. I have seen very many Russian shrapnel cases which have broken up, and at first I used to think it was due to impact with rocks or other hard objects. As, however, I continued to find broken up shell in ploughed fields, I felt sure this was not the case. After the earlier fights we were present at, some of my foreign colleagues started a theory that the Russians used two different kinds of shell, one of which opened and the other did not. However, they soon gave this up and agreed that they only carried the one pattern, but whether a "bursting" or a "shooting" shrapnel some of them are even now not quite certain, as the percentage of failures in either character is so great.

23. I think, myself, that it is a "shooting" shrapnel. Though not an expert in these matters, examination of the Russian shrapnel case gives me the idea that the upper part of the walls is too thin for their length; that the desire for as much bullet room as possible has led to a dangerous whittling down towards the head. The metal employed appears to be a soft steel, which, when a shell gives way, tears, rather than breaks, into large sections which are often twisted, bent or flattened out; sometimes a shell opens out almost flat from the head downwards, the base flying off. The fuze is of aluminium and exceptionally light. The head is screwed in and then fixed in

* I have heard the opinion expressed that in both Russian and Japanese shells the shrapnel bullet is too light.—C. V. H.

position by four rivets, the holes for which are bored so close to the top of the walls as to leave only the thickness of a sheet of brown paper above them. I will examine some more shell to see if these rivet holes are a source of weakness. One more point about the shell is that in most of the cases which I have examined the driving band has split and opened from $\frac{1}{8}$ to $\frac{1}{4}$ of an inch, at one point.

24. The Japanese shrapnel, on the other hand, seldom breaks up. It is shorter and stronger than the Russian, and seems well able to stand the pressure which its heavy brass fuze must exert on discharge. The head is merely screwed in and not riveted. It contains fewer and lighter bullets than the Russian shell, but I think this is compensated for by the greater evenness and reliability of its effect.

25. The Japanese fuze is a good, reliable one; the action of the Russian fuze is, on the other hand, decidedly uneven, but whether from bad setting or inferior make I am unable to say.

26. *Observation and Control of Fire.*—This subject is a most important one in a hill country. The failure of the Russian gunners in observation of fire was well exemplified in the three instances given in paragraphs 18 and 19, and in those cases I am inclined to put it down to two causes: (1) want of training; and (2) the unreliability of the system of rapid ranging with time-shrapnel alone at long ranges. I do not think that the Russian gunners suffer from the want of good glasses, as I have often noticed how quick they are to spot a target, and artillery officers have remarked to me that the Russians possessed better glasses than they had.

27. Mountain artillery may, as a rule, be left to observe for itself from the elevated positions it is able to occupy, but when it is a question of the concerted action of several batteries of field artillery in mountains, the problem is one of great difficulty in many cases. Attacking artillery, such as that of the Guard Division in the advance on Liao-yang, must be prepared to content itself with low-lying positions capable of accommodating a couple of batteries at the most, while the next group of guns may be on the far side of a high ridge. Observation from the positions may be difficult or impossible, and most of the fire may be indirect and aimed at targets invisible except from an elevated station. In such cases a good system of signalling is invaluable, and both the Japanese and the Russians suffered from the want of it. I do not know whether any system of flag-signalling exists in the Russian army, but I have seen no sign of it, and only once saw a heliograph used at Liao-yang. In the Japanese army semaphoring with flags is practised in a desultory fashion by the infantry, and I saw it once or twice used during the advance on Liao-yang by the Guard Divisional Staff, warned by the breakdown of their telephones on the 31st July. But

it is only in its infancy, and unknown to the Japanese artillery who have had to depend, for the transmission of orders in action, on a chain of posts or on orderlies, slow and clumsy methods when the rapid communication of orders may be a matter of urgency. With our system of flag-signalling we should have found no difficulty in accommodating ourselves to the circumstances, but the more rapid and "shorthand" artillery signalling can be made the better, and the control by signal from a central observation station of the fire of a scattered group of batteries should, in the light of recent operations, form an important part of field artillery training.*

28. On one occasion I saw the officer commanding the Guard artillery passing orders down to two batteries, which were in position some 250 feet below him, by means of orderlies, a slow method, and by shouting orders to a communicating post half way down the steep hill, a method which would have been impracticable in a high wind. On another occasion some Japanese guns in a valley were shelling a Russian rear guard which was holding a ridge, and when the latter retired, though I myself could see them from the hill I was on, the gunners evidently had no means of locating their line of retreat, and the shrapnel sent after them went wide and did them no harm.

29. In addition to a system of rapid signalling, the possession of very powerful glasses is an absolute necessity to artillery. At all times an advantage, they are especially so when, as in recent operations, most of the artillery fighting has taken place at long ranges, and among hills where observation of fire is often puzzling. Most of the Japanese artillery officers I have met use No. 8 prism glasses, and though these may be good enough for section commanders, I do not think that a battery commander could do himself justice without No. 10, or, better still, No. 12, while every battery should possess a good telescope. As far as I could see there is only one telescope to a regiment of artillery in the Japanese army.

30. I saw a curious mistake made by a Russian battery commander on the 11th October. Hijikata's battery had come into action in a somewhat exposed position on some high ground, and a Russian battery firing indirectly from the bottom of a valley about 4,000 yards to the front had got the range to a nicety and was doing considerable damage. Another Japanese battery, about 500 yards from Hijikata's, opened fire at this juncture from a concealed position, and commenced shelling some Russian infantry on a ridge between the two artilleries. To assist his infantry, the Russian battery commander switched his guns off Hijikata and tried to find the new battery. Failing in this he returned to his former target but never got on to it again,

* Telephones would be excellent under certain circumstances, but would they be reliable in the noise of a battle?—C. V. H.

and continued for a long time to shell a row of *kaoliang* heaps one hundred and fifty yards to Hijikata's flank. His observation was somehow at fault, as the bright flashes of Hijikata's guns must have been plainly visible.

31. *Tactics.*—The chief feature of the artillery fighting I have seen has been its generally indecisive nature, owing mainly to the long ranges at which it has been conducted. The superior range and rapidity of fire of the Russian gun has, I think, been to some extent instrumental in influencing the Japanese in the choice of their artillery positions; but one must also take into account the fact that the Japanese attacks have mostly taken place across broad valleys, the Russians being in prepared elevated positions, the Japanese having to content themselves with lower ones, time not admitting of the road-making and other heavy work which the preparation of elevated positions involved. The Japanese have seemed to me, consequently, inclined to minimize the disadvantage of inferior command by concealing their batteries and lengthening the range. Their losses have therefore been comparatively small,* but on the other hand they have seldom produced decisive results in an artillery duel, however superior they may have been in the number of their guns.

32. The Japanese army, however, possesses an infantry second to none in the world, and capable, if necessary, of going on in the face of an unsilenced artillery. When the enemy's artillery is altogether too strong, a night attack is resorted to, and many night attacks have been directly or indirectly due to the inability of the artillery to cope with that of the Russians. On one occasion during the fighting on the Sha Ho, I saw an infantry brigade unable to make headway against a strong Russian position and remain stationary during most of the day while its artillery prepared its further advance. Next day I met the brigadier, a fine old fighting officer, and, talking about the incident, he told me that he did not hold with the slow methods of artillery preparation, and that on this particular occasion he had asked permission to make a night attack, but had been refused. Two nights previously he had made a night attack with his brigade, and finding himself involved in the mêlée in the dark, he had had to draw in self-defence and had cut down his opponent. When all is said and done, however, the choice of artillery positions in hills is very limited, and they have often to be made rather than selected.

33. When attacking a position, the usual procedure of the Japanese artillery is to prepare and occupy positions during the preceding evening and night, and at daybreak to commence the artillery duel. If the Russian artillery is shooting in its

* The difficulty of keeping up a supply of thoroughly trained gunners must also be taken into account.—C. V. H.

usual indifferent manner, the duel may go on all day without any decisive results; perhaps the Japanese batteries are smothered, and if so, the gunners take cover temporarily, emerging again when a lull or some opportunity occurs; or should the Russian guns be weak in numbers, the Japanese may obtain the upper hand and be free to choose their own targets for the rest of the day.

34. In the fighting on the Ya-lu the Japanese had a tremendous preponderance both in number and calibre of guns and easily silenced the Russian artillery. In the first duel I witnessed, the 31st July, the Japanese batteries on the flank, where I was, never had a chance. On the next occasion, the 26th August, the result was a draw greatly in favour of the Russians in spite of the Japanese superiority in number of guns. In a reconnaissance on the previous day, the 25th August, the Russians had unmasked one battery of eight guns on an elevated spur on their right, and to cope with this and to support an infantry attack against the Russian right, the commander of the Guard Division had placed eight* field batteries in position on his own left on the night of the 25th. When, however, he opened fire early on the 25th, he found that he had not only to deal with the battery on the spur, but with two others hidden in crops on lower ground to the left (Russian) of the first. Three of the Japanese batteries occupying a forward position were soon smothered, and did little or nothing for the rest of the day; the remainder concentrated their fire on the Russian battery on the spur and it retired during the afternoon, but they never seemed able to locate the two batteries on the lower ground, which emerged triumphant at the end of the day and shelled every hill and ridge which they thought might be covering troops. On the other hand, on the 30th and 31st August, as mentioned in paragraph 19, the four batteries in action on the right of the Guard Division had everything their own way and were able to choose their own targets during the whole two days. The Russian batteries were never able to locate them, and there was practically no artillery duel.

35. *Choice and Change of Positions.*—The choice of positions is of the utmost importance in hill-fighting. In the case of the attackers, the choice is, as already explained, limited, and, unless the enemy's gun positions have been accurately located, luck enters largely into the results of the choice. To take the 26th and 30th/31st August again; on the former date the Japanese batteries were placed in positions from which, owing to the formation of the ground, they were unable to compete with the two low-lying Russian batteries, while on the 30th the positions chosen by the Japanese were equally unassailable by the Russian

* He had been reinforced by three batteries from another division for this particular fight.—C. V. H.

guns. It may be asked, "Why were not the positions changed during the day?" I think the main reasons were:—

(1) The time required to prepare a new position.

This reason affected the Russians principally, as they perched their guns up high and had to make roads to get them up by; and

(2) The exposure involved.

This reason applied specially to the Japanese, who usually had to choose positions behind low spurs on the forward slopes of a main ridge, and the destruction of the Russian battery at Ma-kou on the Ya-lu had been an object lesson to both sides on the danger of manœuvring in range and view of guns in position. It is dangerous enough to move guns under fire even when they are behind the crest of a hill.

36. The usual Japanese procedure, therefore, was for batteries to open fire at daylight from their prepared positions, and if overpowered they did their best during that day and re-arranged their positions at night. Under such conditions they occasionally were unable to efficiently support their infantry which had been launched on an attack, and the latter had to get on as best they could, having sometimes to hold on during the night to the line they had managed to reach early in the day. Such situations occurred both on the 31st July and 26th August. In the former case the enemy retired shortly after nightfall, but in the latter the Russian infantry did not fall back till the following morning, and during the night the artillery was redistributed, while the Japanese infantry held on with difficulty to the line they had fought their way to.

37. The Russians nearly always arranged for small local changes of positions under cover, by making a good many more gun pits or epaulments than there were guns, either in one line or in adjacent groups. Sometimes their object was to enable them to use the same guns at different targets, a slight move in mountains often uncovering a different *terrain*, but as a rule I think their object was to lessen damage and loss by moving their guns so as to confuse the Japanese gunners. As mentioned in report on the battle of the 31st July,* General Keller issued an order on the 6th July to the effect that guns in defence should occupy a false position to start with, and, having drawn the enemy's fire, should then shift to their real position. One result of this was that it was generally impossible to estimate the number of guns along any particular section of front.

38. On the 26th August, for instance, the positions for the low-lying batteries were arranged as follows:—

In one battery were ten gun pits for indirect fire; they had all been used, but though there may have been a whole battery (eight guns) occupying them, I never saw more than four firing

* *See* Vol. I., page 202.

at one time. In another battery were twenty-four gun pits, sixteen in the front line and eight for indirect fire behind the right; the latter could not be used at the same time as the eight in front of them, so sixteen guns could have been in action at one time, but I never could locate more than eight. I noticed that later, before Liao-yang, Japanese batteries occasionally dug more epaulments or pits than they had guns to fill.

39. On the 12th October I witnessed a good instance of the risks incurred by artillery manœuvring in daylight within range of the enemy's guns. On the 11th the Guard Division held two adjacent high hills from which long ridges ran northwards and down to a broad valley running east and west across their front. Russian infantry clung obstinately to these ridges, so on the night of the 11th the Guard attacked, and after severe fighting drove them off; by daybreak on the 12th the infantry of the division and two batteries had made good their footing on the north side of the broad valley, the enemy retiring in a north-westerly direction. During the morning of the 12th the remainder of the Guard artillery crossed the valley far enough east to be out of range of a Russian battery in position to the north-west, but in order to support the further advance of the infantry, three batteries were sent westward along the valley to a village, north of which the ground flattened out and gave them a field of fire. During this movement they had to cross a level open piece of ground between two villages, 800 yards apart, the western one of which was, as far as I could judge, some 5,000 yards from the above-mentioned Russian battery. The guns and wagons of the Japanese batteries followed each other across this open at an average interval of about 500 yards, and the leading battery got into the village unnoticed. When the second battery began crossing, the Russian battery spotted the movement, and ranged on a point on the road about 80 yards short of the western village, and as each vehicle reached it, it was received with a bouquet of shrapnel, which tore up the ground all round it. Out of the twelve guns, twelve wagons, and two store wagons I saw cross, sixteen or eighteen were fired at. At the same time their losses were very small, and though some men and horses were hit, not one vehicle was stopped, and they all got safely into the village without leaving anybody or anything behind them. Each vehicle went at a walk till the danger zone was reached, and then every driver sat down and rode for the last 150 yards. The ground was luckily level, and even the heavy store wagon managed a canter. It is the only time I have ever seen Japanese artillery gallop, and the little horses answered gamely to the call.

40. *Support of Infantry.*—The way the Japanese artillery supports its infantry is admirable, concentrating fire on important points, firing over the heads of the attacking lines, and keeping it up to the last moment, sometimes to a dangerous extent. If

an infantry attack is checked, every available gun is concentrated on the enemy in front of it, and, if successful, shrapnel fire follows the retiring Russians as long as possible. I noticed instances of this promptitude on both the 27th and 28th August. On the morning of the 27th the Russian guns had already retired from their position near Ta-tien-tzu, and the Guard advanced in pursuit of the retiring infantry. Suddenly, from the far side of a valley a Russian rear guard opened a heavy fire against the Japanese right, from a ridge some 1,000 yards in their front. Almost immediately some Japanese batteries, which had advanced from the positions occupied during the previous day's fighting, and which had evidently been on the look-out for something of the kind, opened fire against the Russians, firing over the heads of their own men. During the 27th and 28th the Russians in front of the Guard retired through the hills, fighting a rear guard action the whole time, the right of the Guard Division pushing them back, the left working round their right. On the afternoon of the 28th the Russians occupied a final rear guard position, out of which they were pushed by the right of the Guard, very much assisted by a single gun on the extreme left, which, with much expenditure of labour in road-making, had been hauled up to a position on a commanding spur, from which it could bring a flanking fire to bear on the retiring enemy.

41. But, as mentioned in paragraph 36, circumstances sometimes prevented the Japanese gunners from giving adequate support to their infantry. Whether from the necessity of timing his action to conform with that of other divisions operating along a wide front, or from the necessity of advancing his infantry across a wide, open valley under cover of darkness, the commander of the Guard Division, both on the 31st July and 26th August, found his infantry committed to the attack before his guns had made any headway against the Russian artillery; and in both instances the Russians offered such stubborn resistance on such difficult ground, that the infantry attack came to a standstill, and could not obtain the required help from its artillery, which in the meantime had more than met its match. This simultaneous commencement of artillery duel and infantry attack may have been, and probably was, necessary in both cases, and is to a great extent justifiable in an army possessing an artillery inferior in power to its opponents, but an infantry second to none in the world, and in which it has unbounded confidence; but when the artillery is unable subsequently to support it, the infantry is bound to suffer heavily.

42. As I have said before, a change of position, and therefore also an advance in support of infantry, are risky things to undertake in mountains, especially for the Japanese, who usually had an unsilenced artillery to reckon with, and the only instance I saw of an actual advance of guns during a day's fighting occurred on the 31st July, when the single mountain battery

attached to the division crossed a valley unseen from the Russian batteries, and came into action on the opposite ridge after a very stiff climb. Owing to the established superiority of the Russian artillery on that day, it was unable to effect much, and suffered considerably, but when operating in a hilly country I think mountain artillery will generally be able to advance to support its infantry, but that opportunities for field artillery to do likewise will be few and far between.

43. *Cover for Guns.*—The Japanese invariably dig cover for their guns before bringing them into action. Only twice have I seen guns brought into action without having gun pits or epaulments ready prepared for them. The first occasion was on the 31st July (*see* paragraph 10) when the situation admitted of no further delay, and the second was on the 11th October, when Hijikata brought his battery into action on a cultivated ridge out of sight of the opposing guns. On this latter occasion, however, Hijikata took his time (25 minutes) before opening fire, and by the time the Russian guns replied the detachments were provided with cover, into which they disappeared, when, as before related (paragraph 30), the Russian shrapnel became too hot for them.

44. The Russians, too, almost invariably entrench their guns. On only two occasions have I seen batteries in action in the open, and on both they were out of range of the Japanese guns. The first occasion was on the 26th August (*see* paragraph 34), when a battery, probably the one withdrawn from the spur, came into action in the evening and fired along the broad valley separating the two forces, enfilading a Japanese frontal attack, which was being made with the object of extricating the left, which had got into difficulties; the situation was unforeseen and unprepared for by the Russians, and I think it was just a stroke of luck that the battery happened to be there at the time. The second occasion was on the 31st August, outside Liao-yang, when I saw a battery in action on the edge of the plain, out of reach of the Japanese batteries, but able to reach their attacking infantry by firing indirectly over the ridge in its front.


45. Both Russians and Japanese have a normal type of shallow gun pit or epaulment,* which they use on the level and which, in the hills, they modify according to the ground and other conditions. For instance, in a Japanese position, where it was probable fire might be expected from the right as well as from the front, the splinterproof cover for the detachments was arranged for both eventualities, that on the right having the opening facing to the left, and that on the left having the opening facing to the rear.

46. The Japanese are especially good at artificial concealment of guns and wagons, &c., screens or fringes of *kaoliang*

* *See* figure opposite.

To face page 580.

Japanese Field gun Epaulment with Infantry trench in front used by the 2nd Division.



SECTION ON AB

Scale 1/48.



or screens of boards covered with a few stalks of *kaoliang* or branches, &c., being used very ingeniously; their artistic temperament helps them to make such things blend with their surroundings. The Russians also make good use of growing crops to hide their guns, but do not pay so much attention to artificial concealment as the Japanese. Yet, although guns and detachments are nearly always hidden from view, neither side can conceal the bright flash of the smokeless powder which, together with the dust raised on discharge, gives away every position, whether for direct or indirect fire.

47. Three wagons are brought up and put in position close in rear of a Japanese battery in action, the remainder of the wagons and the limbers being, as a rule, kept a long way in rear, the horses still further away and to a flank. In an elevated position prepared in the hills, with difficult approaches, I have seen all six wagons put in shelters behind, and close to the battery. I think their orders on the subject are practically the same as ours, and liable to alterations to suit the situation. Judging by the considerable number of dead Russian artillery horses I have seen, I do not think the Russians are as careful about the position of their horses in action as the Japanese are.

48. *Effect of Artillery Fire on Entrenchments. High-explosive Shell.*—As is known, the Japanese carry a number of high-explosive shell with their field batteries, probably between 20 and 30 per cent. of the rounds carried. I think the Japanese have arrived at the conclusion that shrapnel is of little use against strong, deliberately prepared infantry entrenchments, and produces but little effect against artillery in gun pits. For this reason, when engaged in a duel, they use a mixture of high-explosive and shrapnel, and when shelling strong infantry entrenchments they use a preponderating number of high-explosive shell. When shelling the battery on the spur on the 26th August (paragraph 34) it seemed to me as if one or two batteries were specially told off to fire high-explosive shell while the others used shrapnel*; and in an attack on an isolated hill, which I witnessed on 27th October, high-explosive shell were very freely used† when firing at the trenches, shrapnel being added when any Russians showed in the open. It was, however, difficult at times to know what was going on, as we had no maps and could not therefore tell whether high-explosive shell were being used purposely, or whether they were being used of necessity on account of the range being beyond that of time shrapnel. Yet on one occasion I saw a few shrapnel clear a Russian trench, but it was an isolated case, and why the Russians went I cannot make out, as on visiting the trench afterwards I found they had had six feet of good cover.

---

* The only damaged material left was a broken wheel; six dead horses and a dead gunner lay near the battery.—C. V. H.

† During the day 551 H.E. shell and 631 shrapnel were fired.—C. V. H.

49. The high-explosive shell has a point like an armour piercer, and a base fuse. In soft ground it makes a crater some six feet across, and, as usual, much of the effect is lost in the ground, the crater being full of splinters of all shapes and sizes. When the shell bursts it is torn apart along the lines of the fibres of the metal; the fibres run longitudinally, and the splinters vary in size from a nail's head to a piece half a pound in weight. The edges of the splinters are as sharp as razors. A good many fail to burst in soft ground.

50. *Casualties from Artillery Fire.* — Casualties from artillery fire are a very variable quantity, and I can do no more than give a few instances.

(1) In the fighting on the 31st July, the two batteries I saw smothered by Russian shrapnel (paragraph 10) lost during the day 1 officer and 4 men killed and 1 officer and 13 men wounded. As previously mentioned, when a Japanese battery is being really smothered with shrapnel, the men take cover, emerging again to fight their guns directly an opportunity presents itself; but if the occasion demands it, the service of the guns is carried on between the bouquets of shrapnel which usually arrive at intervals of from ten to fifteen seconds.

(2) On the same day the mountain battery in its advanced position on a high ridge had over 20 casualties.

(3) On the 26th August a company of infantry lying in a loose mass behind a low knoll at the forward end of a long, low-lying spur, was discovered by the Russian guns on the opposite side of the valley, and at a range of about 3,000 yards received a considerable number of apparently very effective shrapnel; yet I was informed afterwards that their casualties were only seven men wounded.

(4) The casualties to the two batteries which I saw running the gauntlet on 12th October—*see* paragraph 39—were only 3 men and 17 horses hit.

(5) On the same day, the 12th October, I saw a company of infantry moving across the open in the formation adopted under such circumstances—*i.e.*, line of sections at deploying intervals, each section in files. It was discovered by a Russian battery which fired a few rounds of shrapnel at it, at a range of about 4,000 yards, taking the company in flank. What its casualties were I have not been able to find out, but the effect on the company was instantaneous, and in less than a minute it had scattered and disappeared, the men taking shelter in nullahs and behind bits of rising ground.

(6) On the 27th October the Russians were occupying, with about two companies of infantry, a long, high hill in advance of their own position. It projected into the Japanese position like a wedge and as it overlooked them the Japanese determined to turn them out. The crest of the hill was about 800 yards long and strongly entrenched across the crest at four points. From

8 a.m. the Japanese artillery, out of effective range of the Russian guns, shelled these entrenchments at ranges between 2,500 and 5,000 yards, employing two field batteries, two mountain batteries, a 9 cm. (3·5 inch) howitzer battery* and a couple of Russian guns; they took each trench in turn, and when the infantry attacked, concentrated their fire on the point required, and did not cease firing till 4 p.m., when the hill was finally captured. I do not think the Russians could have carried off many of their dead, as I was watching them closely all day, but when they finally retreated, after having checked the Japanese infantry for two hours at one spot, they only left 30 dead on the hill, and this in spite of the heavy fire of high-explosive shell, shrapnel, and musketry to which they had been exposed.

(7) On the other hand, out of about 750 wounded, in a field hospital we visited on the 22nd October, 50 per cent. were, the medical officer in charge informed us, casualties from artillery fire. This was due to the fact that the area from which this particular hospital drew its patients had lately been the scene of some desperate attacks by the Japanese infantry, which had captured successive hills in daylight while exposed to a galling fire from the Russian field guns.

51. The inference to be drawn from the above instances is the old one that, with high velocity guns, shrapnel produces but little effect on good infantry entrenchments, but is deadly against troops in the open, and that the effect of high-explosive shell is more moral than actual. A line of entrenched guns is, of course, a much more vulnerable target if the gunners continue to work their guns under shrapnel fire, but if they take cover, as the Japanese are taught to do when the fire is intense, the same remarks apply.

52. *Massing* v. *Dispersal of Guns.*—In the fighting on the Ya-lu the artillery may be said to have been massed, anyhow on the Japanese left, but since then the ground has not permitted the massing of guns with the First Army. In its advance through the mountains the Guard Division has never been able to have all its batteries in one position; the nearest approach to it was on the 3rd September, when the division was fighting only a containing action and managed to find a position in which it was able to put no less than five batteries close enough together to be under the control of the officer commanding the regiment. On one occasion (26th August) there were four batteries in a group, a very few times three, generally two or one, once four guns, once two guns, and once only one gun (paragraph 40). Each group had practically to be fought by itself owing to the difficulty of control in mountains without some means of rapid communication, and it says a great deal for the training of the artillery officers of the Japanese army

* Six howitzers.—C. V. H.

that collaboration of groups was promptly forthcoming when required.

53. The Russians almost always dispersed their artillery in batteries or half batteries. They were also, of course, hampered by the ground, but they were also on the defensive, and even on the plains round Liao-yang they had to scatter their somewhat meagre artillery along the whole front to be defended.

54. So at present there is little to be said, from personal observation, on the subject of massing *v.* dispersal. I hear the question is being much discussed among the Japanese gunners, some of whom have been much struck by the excellent results obtained in some instances by the obligatory dispersal of guns. One thing is certain—that dispersal with concentration of fire cannot be worked successfully without a better system of communication than at present exists in the Japanese artillery.

55. *Organization.*—Although in the mountains the commander of the Guard Division had no hesitation in splitting up his regiment of artillery and attaching one or two batteries to a column when occasion required, yet, whenever possible, the battalion of three batteries is adhered to, and the major* does his best to control and command them in action. The battalion is looked on as the tactical unit, and is maintained as such whenever practicable, but as previously explained its employment in the hills has been limited. The Russian artillery opposed to the Guard was invariably, as far as I could judge, worked by batteries or half batteries.

56. From the 24th to the 28th the Guard Division had three batteries from another division attached to it, and the whole was designated in orders "Independent Artillery."

57. *Night Firing.*—There was occasional night firing by the artillery of the Guard, but I never had an opportunity of witnessing preparations for it. The Russians have been firing almost incessantly at night opposite the Second Army, since the positions on the Sha Ho have been taken up, but I hear it has resulted in little or no loss to the Japanese, though it has kept them on the alert and robbed them of their rest.

58. *Indirect Fire.*—Indirect fire was used by both sides. I think the Japanese made a very free use of it in the positions which, as described, were prepared over night, and from which they opened fire at daylight. These positions concealed the guns from view before fire was opened, and made subsequent observation of fire by the enemy difficult, but except under exceptionally favourable circumstances I do not think they ever hid the flash of discharge from the Russian gunners. The Russians also made use of it, and in the first battery mentioned in paragraph 38 the gun pits were all prepared for indirect fire

* A major commands a battalion (three batteries) in the Japanese army.

while an elevated wooden observation platform was erected on each flank. It is possible that, owing to the thick crop of *kaoliang* along the front of this battery, its gun flashes were hidden from the front, but from my post of observation, somewhat to their flank, I was able to see them. It has often taken me some time to spot a Russian battery whose shells were bursting, but only on one occasion did I fail to do so (31st August), and that was when a battery was firing from beyond a gorge, a spur in which hid it from view. This battery was so well concealed that it could not be located by the Japanese batteries in its front, nor could the Japanese batteries be located by it.

59. *Conclusions.*—To summarize a few of the principal points:—

(1) Given normal conditions, the more powerful Russian artillery always kept the Japanese batteries at arm's length, even when the latter were considerably superior in number of guns.

(2) When Japanese batteries established themselves within —to them—effective range of the Russian guns, they were generally smothered.

(3) Though the Japanese never allowed themselves to be destroyed, their fire remained more or less under their opponents' control, and the latter would not allow them to adequately support their infantry, which suffered accordingly, often very severely.

(4) The superior training and gunnery of the Japanese covered many shortcomings, but never made up for inferiority in range, rapidity of fire and length of fuze. On the Russian side, with a Q.L. gun, inferior gunnery led to an appalling waste of ammunition.

(5) The maximum weight, and therefore also power, of the Japanese gun is dictated by the Japanese horse which has to drag it. Opposed to the Russian artillery the power was inadequate, even with the margin of mobility reduced to a minimum.

(6) High-explosive shell were a valuable adjunct, but did not compensate for want of gun power.

(7) Mountain artillery was invaluable in the mountains, as it was able to creep up under cover to positions within effective range; on the level, when opposed by the Russian field guns, it often was unable even to come into action. In the hills, mountain batteries were able, even with unsilenced artillery in their front, to creep on in support of infantry during an action. Field artillery, under similar circumstances, never left its positions, and could not have done so, and neither the one nor the other could hope to do it on the level.

(8) In conclusion, I think that, given more careful training and a better shrapnel, the Russian field artillery, even though

weaker in number of guns, would have been a still more important factor in the campaign than it has so far been, and that, even as it is, the deterrent effect it has had on the Japanese advance and the severe losses it has indirectly caused the Japanese infantry have hardly been recognized, or else have been slurred over, by the newspaper critics.

Happy is the Japanese army in the possession of a magnificent infantry which, when required, can make up for the want of power of its artillery by brilliant attacks by day or by night.

Addenda.

Since writing the foregoing I have been placed in possession of the following items of information.

1. "During the Liao-yang operations, the damage done to our batteries by artillery fire was comparatively small, as they were well protected by the hills. After the 1st September the enemy's artillery was much superior to ours, and we avoided the artillery duel."

2. "Our line of communication *viâ* Feng-huang-cheng was so long and difficult that we had to economize ammunition. The commander of the artillery of the First Army, said that at this time every shell fired shortened his life."

3. "From documents found at Liao-yang after the battle, Kuropatkin had, it appears, been issuing orders to his artillery to take lessons from the Japanese as to the choice of positions on slopes, and not on the tops of hills, as to care in observation, and as to a more general use of concealed positions and indirect fire. The result was that at Liao-yang the Russians used concealed positions, and we often had great difficulty in locating their batteries."

With regard to this last remark, it is only fair to say that in some instances the concealment of the Russian batteries made it still more difficult for them to locate the Japanese guns, and led to an enormous waste of ammunition. This was the case opposite the right of the Guard Division on the 30th and 31st August (*see* paragraphs 19 and 34). And *vice versâ*, on the 26th August the Guard artillery, probably in most instances firing indirectly, were never able to locate the low-lying Russian batteries (*see* paragraph 34). The moral is that in a broken, hilly country, though elevated positions give command and view, they are easily found by the enemy, while low ones are more difficult to locate, and therefore afford very often greater protection; but on the other hand, no battery should ever be committed to a low and concealed position until it is sure that the enemy's guns can be reached from it. It is but a poor consolation to a battery commander to know that his guns

are in a snug position if he subsequently finds that some slant of ground prevents him from reaching the enemy's batteries, which in the meantime have found their ranges and made it impossible for him to move without very heavy loss, possibly even annihilation.

Report by Captain B. Vincent, R.A.

(1) *Nature of Guns and Equipment.*—With regard to the large number and variety of guns, howitzers and rifled mortars, which have been used by both belligerents in this campaign, we with the First Army have had little opportunity of observing the working or fire effect of any but the ordinary field and mountain guns of either side. Since General Kuroki's army left Feng-huang-cheng, in June last, it has been accompanied by nothing heavier than the 7·5-cm. (2·95-inch) field guns, and the shorter mountain guns of the same calibre. One battery of captured Russian guns was also attached to the Guard Division. The five batteries of 12-cm. (4·7-inch) Krupp howitzers which did such good work at the battle of the Ya-lu were sent elsewhere at the end of May.

(2) A battery or two of these howitzers would have been invaluable on many occasions in the mountains for searching the steep hill-sides, ravines and gorges, and in order to approach the long-range Russian field guns with high-angle fire, unseen from behind cover. The transportation of these light howitzers would not have been more difficult than that of the ordinary field guns; but presumably their services were considered to be of more importance elsewhere.

(3) From the battle of the Ya-lu, at the end of April, when the Russian artillery was hopelessly outnumbered and defeated, till the present date, we have witnessed an interesting struggle between the light field gun of the Japanese and the heavier, longer-ranged, and more rapid-firing weapon of their adversaries. Intelligence in handling batteries, and skill in working the guns, have to a certain extent made up for the Japanese inferiority in gun power, but the fact remains that the Russians have the more powerful weapon of the two, and can bring effective shrapnel fire to bear at ranges at which it is useless for the Japanese to try to respond with time shrapnel.

(4) *The Russian Gun.*—The Russian gun has a muzzle velocity of 1,930 f.s. and an effective time shrapnel range of 5,500 metres (6,014 yards), with an extreme range of 7,000 metres (7,655 yards). Its highest rate of fire is said to be 15 aimed rounds a minute, and the weight behind the teams is 1,920 kilos., or 38 cwt., exclusive of the gunners and their kit. The gun and carriage weigh 1,037 kilos. (20·4 cwt.), or just over a ton. It certainly looks extremely long and unwieldy for

a field gun, but, with enormous expenditure in road making, the Russians managed to drag their guns to very high elevations in the mountains, and generally succeeded in getting them safely away in a most praiseworthy manner when retiring before the Japanese.

(5) During the severe fighting round Pen-hsi-hu, the extreme right of the Japanese army, from the 10th to the 13th October, the Russians employed 9·5-cm. (3·74-inch) rifled mortars and 15-cm. (5·9-inch) howitzers, the fire of which was very effective, causing heavy losses among the Japanese. Mortars and 15-cm. howitzers were also used by both sides during the fighting south of Liao-yang from 20th August till 4th September. On this occasion the Second Army is said to have employed some sixty mortars captured from the Russians at Nan Shan, as well as 15-cm. howitzers and 10·5-cm. (4·1-inch) Canet guns, also taken at the same place. Unfortunately, I have not been able to see any of these special types yet, but hear that the 10·5-cm. Canet guns are probably of a now nearly obsolete pattern, which were captured by the Russians from the Chinese in the Boxer rising of 1900.

(6) Again, on the 2nd September, when the Russian artillery rained shrapnel on to the hill near Hei-ying-tai, now called Manju-yama, which had been captured by the 15th Brigade, 2nd Division, on the previous night, large dark bursts were noticeable among the ordinary white puffs of field gun shrapnel, which came from three field howitzers placed so as to enfilade the Japanese trenches. I saw many of the bodies of these howitzer shrapnel scattered about the hill next day. They measured (with an inch rule) 3½ inches in diameter, 7 inches in length, and were painted bright yellow. An officer told us that one-eighth to one-seventh of the 1,300 Japanese casualties on Manju-yama were caused by shell fire.

(7) The whole of the 19 regiments of Japanese field and mountain artillery are armed with a 7·5-cm. (2·95-inch) steel gun, which is manufactured, together with the rest of the equipment, at the Osaka arsenal.

Though both field and mountain guns are of the same calibre and take the same projectile, the difference in range and charge is considerable, due to the shorter length of the mountain gun.

The Japanese shrapnel weighs 6 kilos. (13·22 lbs.), and the high-explosive shell 6·1 kilos. (13·44 lbs.), compared to the Russian shrapnel of 14·351 lbs.

The recoil is checked by heavy dragshoes attached to the dragwashers by steel chains, and two wire ropes which take a turn round the enlarged part of the axle just inside the wheels, and the other ends of which are fixed near the point of the trail. I have noticed field guns recoil about one yard in gun epaulments on a dry ploughed field.

The ammunition is not "fixed," and the gun is no more a quick-firer than is our 15-pr.

(8) *Shields.*—Neither the Russian nor the Japanese field guns are fitted with shields. I was much interested in observing during the battle of the 31st July that the six field batteries of the 2nd Division, to which I was attached, had during the previous night constructed wooden shields about 2 feet high and 1 inch thick, with hinges in the middle, which they fixed over the guns in action. From that date the 2nd Division artillery always carried these shields, and maintain that they afford great protection against shrapnel fire.

In my opinion the protection afforded by shields, when the men have to stand to and work their guns under rapid shrapnel fire, more than compensates for the disadvantages of providing a more conspicuous target to the enemy and a larger area for a high-explosive or other shell to hit.

(9) *Quality of Personnel and Horses.*—The tallest and strongest men in the Japanese army are the gunners, as the necessary height for artillery conscripts is 5 ft. 4·2 in., compared with 5 ft. 2·02 in. for the infantry. Gunners and drivers, field and mountain, are all interchangeable, and receive a general education in the care of horses, both pack and draught, as well as in gun drill.

(10) *Horses.*—As regards the horses, all I can say is that they are better than they look, and that when I saw the Guard field artillery labouring through the muddy roads near Pingyang in March last I little thought that the horses would have lasted as well as they have done. They are far too light for gun teams, and, though willing enough, have not the weight necessary to pull the guns easily along level hard roads.*

(11) The drivers are too heavy and have little idea of how to make the horses pull together. The Japanese fully realize their weakness in horseflesh, and have saved their gun teams as much as possible. The want of mobility of their field artillery, however, has been a continual handicap. They know also that gun power has been badly sacrificed to suit the weedy horses of their country, and that even in spite of this sacrifice the horses are not able to do the work. Manchuria is full of splendid mules, four of which would do the work of six Japanese horses, but so far I have not seen any used with artillery.

(12) *Mountain Artillery.*—As there are no mules in Japan, the mountain artillery also employ ponies, and these batteries are if anything more mobile than the field artillery, even on the flat. It is a common sight to see a mountain battery at the trot, all the men doubling at the pace which seems to come as naturally to soldiers of all branches of the Japanese army as the walk.

(13) The mountain batteries of the 12th Division have done excellent service all through the mountain fighting between the Ya-lu and Liao-yang, and through skill in approaching within effective range of the Russian field guns without exposing their

* *See*, however, footnote on page 568.

position, have on many occasions effected excellent results with little loss. At the fight of Chiao-tou on 18th and 19th July, Lieut.-General Inouye attacked a very strong Russian position with only five batteries of mountain artillery, which succeeded in preparing the way for the infantry attack. Against them were three Russian field batteries and a mountain battery which never succeeded in really locating the attacking artillery.

The Russians knew the ranges to various points on the landscape and their fire was accurate, but the Japanese batteries chose unexpected positions. On one occasion the Russians fired 400 rounds at a hill behind which they evidently thought the Japanese might be.

(14) A few days ago I watched a mountain battery of the 5th Division coming into action in a leisurely manner when time was no object. From the order to unload it took 40 seconds to place the gun and wheels in position in previously prepared gun pits, and two minutes before the first gun was ready to fire. It doubtless could have been done quicker, but it is a noticeable characteristic of the Japanese artillery not to hurry. There is a marked absence of what we call smartness in the British army, though everything is carried out with intelligence and precision.

(15) As regards the personnel and horses of the Russian artillery I have had little chance of judging. Their batteries seem to trot easily over plough and stubble, and the gun horses which I have seen lying about dead have been of a good useful stamp. The guns are sometimes fired with amazing rapidity, which betoken accuracy of drill.

(16) *Harness.*—Judging by captured artillery the Russians use heavy collars, whereas the Japanese employ nothing but breast harness.

The Japanese carry large canvas bags attached to the pads of the off horses with shoe-pockets and canvas buckets above them, cloaks with bundles inside them behind the saddles of the riding horses, and large wallets in front. Each man also carries a long blue cotton bag slung over his shoulders, which contains food, &c. The limbers and wagons are piled up with gear, and at least two blankets are carried under each saddle and pad. I have seldom seen the gunners mounted on the carriages when moving. The drivers are armed with cavalry swords "to give them confidence in case they are attacked by Cossacks." 18 carbines are carried on the carriages of each battery, and the gunners are armed with bayonets.

Both Russian and Japanese field artillery use pole-draught, and the latter have breechings on the wheel horses only.

(17) *Formation of Artillery units and their Dispersal or Concentration during Action.*—There is one regiment of field or mountain artillery as part of each of the 13 divisions of the Japanese army; it is commanded by a lieutenant-colonel. There are also two independent brigades of three regiments each.

Each regiment is divided into a major's command, a battalion of three batteries, and each battery of six guns is commanded by a captain.

(18) In action the normal condition is for the artillery battalion commander to allot a portion of the target to each battery commander, who then carries on the ranging independently. I have watched the 2nd Division artillery very closely to see whether the fighting unit would be the battery or the battalion of three batteries, and have come to the conclusion that the major takes actual command of his three batteries, but that owing to the difficulty of finding positions for more than one battery, or at most two, and the almost total absence of any method of signalling, the battery often becomes an independent unit.

(19) I have only twice seen as many as four batteries together in one line, *i.e.*, within speaking distance of one another. The first occasion was at the action of the Yang-tzu Ling on the 31st July, when four batteries were together in one place, and the other two some 1,000 yards away. Again on the 1st September north of the Tai-tzu Ho, during the attack on Manju-yama, four batteries were in line.

(20) On the 10th October, at the fight north of Yen-tai coal mine, three batteries of one battalion were entrenched within a few hundred yards of one another on Ta Shan and the other three were scattered about on the plain. On the 11th three moved up, one being two hundred yards in advance of the other two. Next day, the 12th, these three remained as they were, while the other three came into action about four hundred yards to their right. As soon as the Russian batteries retired, and they were ordered to advance in support of the infantry attack, the batteries all scattered again. On the 12th October I saw three batteries of the 14th Regiment, Independent Brigade, in action with about two hundred yards interval between each. On this occasion all three were apparently being commanded by the colonel of the regiment, who was connected with them by a chain of some twenty men posted at intervals of forty yards. This is the only method of communicating orders from a short distance which the Japanese employ. At longer distances mounted orderlies are used. There are always plenty of spare men with the Japanese artillery, and a large proportion are trained in passing orders, but the process is slow and the personal element too great. The absence of visual signalling is one of the most marked characteristics of the Japanese army. They trust entirely to the telegraph and telephone—methods which in this war have proved successful owing to the friendliness of the inhabitants and to the lack of enterprise on the part of the enemy in not cutting the wires. There are no special telephones for the artillery. On several occasions I have seen opportunities lost through want of quick communication with

the batteries. For instance, on the 14th October, I was talking to a young officer on the top of Okasaki-yama, who had been sent up there with a telescope to observe. Three batteries were in action some two thousand yards in front, engaging a Russian battery in the distance. While watching we saw the Russians set fire to several stooks of *kaoliang* in front of the battery and, under cover of the smoke, bring up the limbers and retire unseen by the Japanese batteries, which had temporarily ceased firing. The young officer sent off a mounted orderly, but recognized that it was too late, and before the orderly had reached his destination the batteries had wasted many more rounds in firing at the position from which the batteries had safely retired.

(21) Again, on the 12th October, when the batteries were grouped together by battalions as above mentioned, orders were apparently issued at 11 a.m. by the divisional commander to the artillery to advance in support of the infantry attack. From the hill on which we were, Russian infantry could be seen on the hills in front, offering a splendid target for artillery fire. They were not observed, however, from the guns, and it was 11.30 a.m. before the first battery limbered up to advance.

(22) *Ammunition Columns.*—Each regiment of artillery has its own ammunition column of 27 wagons, manned by reservists. This is really the second line of wagons, six per battery being the first line.

Both the Russian and Japanese carry 40 rounds in the limber, but the Russian wagon holds 132* rounds, while the Japanese only carries 80.

(23) *Russian Organization.*—The tactical artillery unit of the Russian army is the eight-gun battery under the command of a lieutenant-colonel or colonel, with a captain, a second captain, and four lieutenants under him.

The Russians, both on the offensive as well as the defensive, frequently divide their batteries into two parts. During the mountain fighting south-east of Liao-yang, and round Liao-yang itself, four-gun batteries were very often used. On the defensive, when the Russians had to endeavour to be strong everywhere, it was natural that their batteries should have been split up; but on the offensive, when we expected to see guns massed together according to Continental lines, it was somewhat disappointing to find that their artillery generally fought by batteries or half batteries.

(24) In mountainous or broken country it is seldom possible to find a suitable position for an eight-gun battery, but on the plains north of Yen-tai there was no such difficulty. On the 10th and the 11th October there were two Russian batteries about two hundred yards apart, apparently controlled by telephone by one man from the top of the neighbouring "Fort Hill."

* 92 is the number usually given: 44 in wagon limber and 48 in wagon body.

The batteries were on low ground with undulations in front, over which only the highest points of the Japanese position could be seen. All their fire was therefore indirect. This is the only occasion on which I have seen two or more batteries working together on the offensive.

(25) When these batteries retired telephone wire was found, from which it may be inferred that the Russian artillery is more advanced in this respect than the Japanese.

(26) The whole question of *signalling* is a very difficult one for artillery. It is quite conceivable that in Continental warfare, where large numbers of batteries are massed together, or at any rate are acting in a somewhat limited extent of ground, visual signalling of any sort might only lead to complication and confusion. For this reason the French seldom, if ever, use flags. For the conditions, however, under which the British artillery is likely to be called upon to fight, visual signalling will probably be the best and simplest means of communication with batteries.

(27) *Battery the Fighting Unit.*—Though this war seems to have proved that the battery is the fighting unit, however many of these units may happen to be grouped together in one place, the position of artillery officers senior to battery commanders has become more important than ever. Instead of being with his guns, the artillery battalion commander should be on the very best point of observation which offers itself in the vicinity. Here he should be equipped with the most powerful of portable telescopes, and with an adequate staff. From such a position he can observe the movements of the enemy, and communicate by signal with all the batteries under his command.

(28) On many occasions during this campaign I have found myself in the very best position for observing the field in general, in fact on ideal points of observation for the divisional artillery commander, provided that he could have transmitted orders quickly to the batteries. From such elevated positions I saw mistakes made daily by both the Russian and Japanese artillery, and had magnificent opportunities for observing fire.

(29) *Indirect Fire and Cover.*—Indirect fire has not been used nearly so much in this war as I expected. The Russians at the beginning of the war practically never employed it, but always brought their guns into action on or a few yards behind crestlines, whence they could obtain a clear view over the sights. At the Ya-lu the Russian guns were in glaringly conspicuous positions, with very little attempt at cover for the detachments. Since then, however, they have grown far more artful in choosing positions for, and in concealing, their guns. Now their favourite plan is to place their guns, well entrenched, just behind the crestline of a ridge or saddle, but so that the target may be seen over the sights.

From the Japanese side such positions are only to be detected by the flash, which invariably gives them away.

Round Liao-yang the Russians had constructed gun pits in hollows, and most unexpected places, from which only indirect fire could have been used, but the absence of wheel tracks denoted that most of these fancy places had never had guns in them.

(30) At the action of the 31st July round Ta-wan the Russians had taken infinite trouble in constructing roads in order to place their guns in most commanding positions, but the epaulments themselves were of a very meagre description. They were mere levellings, sometimes quarried into the ridges, with ammunition recesses and shallow pits for the detachments, the latter roofed over in a few cases. The positions were well chosen, in that there was invariably high ground on either side, which protected them well from enfilade fire Prisoners stated that the effect of the Japanese shrapnel on these gun positions was very deadly, and certainly the cover for the gunners on the series of positions captured by the Japanese near An-ping a month later was of a much improved type. Round Liao-yang the Russian gun pits and epaulments were carefully made, and left nothing to be desired. The Russian gun epaulments as now constructed may be described as levellings for gun platforms, with roomy detachment pits about 4 feet deep, affording complete cover to a six-foot man standing in them.

(31) With regard to indirect fire on the Japanese side, I think it may be said that they only use it when absolutely necessary. They are taught to use it only at the commencement of an engagement, but not when advancing in support of infantry, and rarely when on the defensive. Owing to the inferiority of their field gun to that of the Russians, the Japanese are bound to expose their batteries as little as possible, and to endeavour to find the range before being discovered by their more rapid firing adversaries. In short, fear of the Russian gun compels them to employ indirect fire more than if they were more evenly matched.

(32) Throughout this war the artillery of both sides has, as a rule, taken up its position during the night before a battle, and dug itself in by dawn. Batteries have very seldom come into action in the open without previously prepared cover. I have only once seen Japanese field batteries advance in support of infantry, namely, on the above-mentioned 12th October, and then one battery had gun pits three hundred yards in front to drop into, while the others came into action well down the reverse slope of low hills and threw up cover for their detachments before firing a single shot.

(33) The only occasion on which I saw a Russian battery come into action in the open was on the 31st August, when under cover of a battery in position, a reconnaissance in force of one battery, two companies of infantry and a troop of cavalry, advanced along the valley of the Tai-tzu Ho in the direction of An-ping. Its intention was evidently to try to discover what

had happened to the 2nd Division, First Army, which was at that time marching north in the turning movement across the river. This force passed close to the hill on which I was hidden, and the battery came into action on the sand of the river-bed, with the limbers drawn up behind the guns, just as if it had been on a parade ground. After firing some thirty shrapnel on the surrounding hills without response, it retired again in the same leisurely manner in which it had come.

(34) With modern Q.F. artillery on the enemy's side, limbering and unlimbering has become a very difficult operation, as the effect of a minute's rapid shrapnel fire on the gun teams would be annihilating (*e.g.*, the Russian battery at Ma-kou during the battle of the Ya-lu). For this reason the Japanese hardly ever move their guns until darkness sets in.

(35) Owing to their shorter range the Japanese mountain batteries utilize indirect fire more than the field artillery, in order to obtain perfect concealment. They have thus been able to creep up close, and sometimes fire all day without their exact position being discovered.

(36) Metal aiming posts are carried by the Japanese field and mountain artillery, and also step-ladders by the former, from which the commanding officer of the battery can observe.

(37) The Japanese gunners are very clever at concealing their guns, limbers, and wagons. Their usual procedure is to bring up three wagons as close as possible to the guns, and to disguise them from the front with bundles of *kaoliang*, branches, &c. Deep holes are dug for the wagon numbers and reserves, also for the battery and section commanders. The horses are always sent to some safe place behind a hill, or in a valley well out of harm's way. If more ammunition is required, it is as often as not brought up by hand instead of bringing up fresh wagons; the reason being, of course, that the slightest movement of a wagon or even of a single horse would probably cause a series of *rafales* from the enemy. On the 1st September, during the attack on Manju-yama, as mentioned before, four field batteries of the 2nd Division were in action along the crestline of a long low ridge. Behind them was a shallow valley two hundred yards wide, and then another similar ridge with a clump of fir trees on it. During the whole of that day, the Russian artillery burst hundreds of shrapnel over the second ridge, and the Japanese gunners escaped with one killed and five wounded. Later I stood in the Russian position and saw how deceptive the two ridges were. If, however, the Russians had fired a percussion shrapnel or two they might have discovered their mistake. One Russian battery at this fight, which absolutely baffled detection, was placed close up to and in rear of a *kaoliang* crop. The thick crop concealed the flashes, while the section officers standing 50 yards in rear could see plainly over the *kaoliang*.

(38) During the last ten days' fighting, the artillery positions on both sides have been very well chosen, and the entrenchments carefully made. In connection with this it may be said that one of the many great advantages of being with a victorious army is that after the fighting one can stand in the enemy's gun pits and look back on the field from his point of view.

(39) *Japanese System of Ranging.*—The normal system which the Japanese use is very similar to that employed in the British service. They bracket up to 25 metres (27 yards), and then load up all six guns with the corresponding fuze, ranging for fuze by sixes instead of by pairs as we do. Japanese artillery officers have lately assured me that this system has not been changed since the beginning of the war. A senior staff officer stated that, on the contrary, regimental commanders have had to tell their subordinates on more than one occasion to "stick to the book" in these matters.

(40) *Range-finder.*—The Japanese artillery carry telemeter range-finders, but seldom use them. Their usual method is to measure the ranges on the map, and when they get an "over" and a "short" at medium ranges, they "feel pretty safe," and if the urgency of the case demands it, they then open at once with time shrapnel. At close ranges or when firing in hilly country, when percussion shrapnel are likely to get lost from view in valleys, ranging with time shrapnel is permitted, but the tendency to use it too quickly has had to be checked.

(41) The Russians always range with pairs of time shrapnel, or if necessary with groups of four or more. Over and over again I have seen them fire two or four time shrapnel, and then "loose off" a series of *rafales*. As often as not they were wrong, the shells bursting either like fireworks in the sky, far too high, or hundreds of yards over or short of where they had detected the flashes of the Japanese guns. The Russian gunners are most extravagant with their ammunition, more especially so since the scene of operations has been close to the railway. They do not seem to realize that with such a powerful and devastating weapon as rapid salvoes from quick-firing guns, it is well worth time and trouble to ascertain the range accurately before committing themselves to the large expenditure of ammunition which these *rafales* entail. The Russians, however, are improving, and latterly I have noticed them make small corrections in their length of fuze, which have just perfected their fire, a thing which they apparently never did earlier in the war. Once they had determined what the length of fuze ought to be, they often stuck to it all day, and were sometimes aided in their illusion by the Japanese batteries ceasing fire, while the Russian *rafales* were bursting harmlessly behind them. They have also learnt from the Japanese the value of distribution of fire.

(42) *The Artillery Duel.*—One of the marked features of this war is the indefinite prolongation of the artillery duel, due

to the fact that whenever the fire of the enemy becomes too hot, the gunners get under cover and stay there until the storm is over. This constantly happens, especially on the Japanese side, and I have good reasons for believing that the same thing takes place on the Russian.

(43) On the 31st July I saw for the first time what a terrible thing an accurate shrapnel fire from a quick-firing battery can be. On this occasion the Russians knew the range, and as soon as the Japanese guns exposed their position a series of *rafales* arrived. The Japanese gunners were ordered under cover immediately; as their trenches were rocky and shallow, they took cover under the bank of a road in rear of the guns. The storm of shrapnel only lasted ten minutes, when they returned to the guns as if nothing had happened. During the fighting north of Yen-tai coal-mine on and after the 10th October I saw Japanese batteries absolutely smothered by Russian gun fire. All day on the 11th the Japanese hardly dared return the fire, and only did so during a pause in the enemy's cannonade. The only effect this had, however, was to bring a fresh storm of shell from the Russians. Otherwise the officers and men remained practically under ground, and in consequence suffered very little loss. This took place at ranges of about 4,500 yards. The same day I saw a Japanese battery in a well entrenched position being enfiladed by a Russian battery at 6,000 yards, and of course unable to reply.

(44) This question of taking cover under fire is a very important one, though opposed to all ideas of the British artillery, and a dangerous one to train for, but it may have to be considered. That it has been done so much during this war has been due to the fact that the hilly nature of the country necessitated long delays in the course of an action, and to the fact that the Japanese infantry will go on whether supported by artillery fire or not. In so-called European warfare, however, I imagine it would seldom if ever be possible for gunners to cease firing and take cover, once the infantry fight had begun.

(45) If only our nation could realize the superiority of fire of a quick-firing battery over a battery of ordinary and lighter field guns, there would be little delay in re-arming our artillery with the best procurable gun, cost what it may. Skill can make up for a great deal, but it cannot compensate for rapidity of fire or for difference in weight of projectile.

(46) *Ranging with Time Shrapnel.*—With regard to this, the fact that the Russians and French do so ought to make the subject one for deep consideration.

The small burst of a percussion shrapnel at ranges of over 4,000 yards is extremely difficult to see, especially in broken country, where it may be lost in a dip of the ground, or in a ravine. The ideal projectile to range with is of course a common shell with a large smoky bursting charge, or a

high-explosive shell; but failing this, the white puff of time shrapnel is the only thing one can make a certainty of seeing in a hilly country. The difficulty of ranging without getting bursts on graze is well known to all gunners, but perhaps the difficulty might be overcome by practice. Certainly the Russians in this war have not made good enough shooting to fully persuade one that their methods are the best. The fact, too, that the Japanese have not modified their former system is a strong argument in favour of percussion shrapnel for ranging purposes.

(47) *The Effect of Shrapnel.*—There is a common idea that the principal use of shrapnel is for its moral effect; and that its killing effect is small. This was the opinion of many officers of all branches of the British army after the South African war. It was also the opinion of nearly all the foreign attachés with the Japanese First Army. For this reason I have made constant enquiries from officers and men, and have come to the conclusion that the destructive power of shrapnel has been greatly underestimated. Hospital returns are no criterion, as probably the proportion of killed and wounded is greater with shell than with rifle bullets. On the 1st September I went round one of the 2nd Division field hospitals at Huang-ku-fen, which was full of wounded soldiers from Manju-yama. The assistant who showed me round said that about half the wounds were from shrapnel bullets or splinters of shell. Again, on the 22nd October I went over another field hospital of the 2nd Division at San-tai-tzu, which was full of men from the 15th Brigade who were wounded during the attacks on Temple Hill and Okasaki-yama on the 13th October. The doctor informed me that of 780 wounded men belonging to this division, over half the wounds were caused by shell. During the evening and night of the 13th October the 15th Brigade had about 4,000 casualties in taking Temple Hill, and we were informed by the Chief of the Staff that a large proportion of these were from artillery fire. On the morning of 12th October the Russians attacked the Ta Ling and succeeded in capturing a hill on the east of the pass called Gunki-yama, which was, however, commanded by four Japanese mountain guns at 700 yards range. The Russians were soon driven off, and left 150 dead on the hill, nearly all of whom were killed by shrapnel bullets. After the action of Yü-shu-lin-tzu on the 21st July, a Russian prisoner stated that the trench he was in was enfiladed by some Japanese mountain artillery of the 12th Division and two shrapnel swept it from end to end hitting all the men in the trench. Again, the day after the battle of the same date in front of the 2nd Division, a prisoner stated that some 40 men had been killed in and near his trench by shell fire, and that a Russian mountain battery had been put out of action and a field gun overturned by Japanese shell fire. I saw the gun with a broken wheel when the Russians retired, and think that probably the rest of his statement was equally true.

(48) A point which many people forget is that no great killing effect can be expected from shrapnel at the long ranges at which it is usual for artillery to engage, owing to the low remaining velocity of the bullets. Also against well-made entrenchments anything but high-angle howitzer fire can have very little effect, but I am more convinced than ever, from what I have seen in this war, that well-aimed shrapnel fire at medium ranges against infantry in the open, however scattered their formation, at artillery working their guns and not sitting under cover, and especially against artillery on the move, is very deadly.

(49) One occasion when a battery of Japanese field artillery really had an ideal target at Russian infantry in close formation was in the early morning of the 17th July at the Mo-tien Ling. A Japanese battery had been for some days entrenched on the top of the pass, and when the morning mist cleared away, the Russian main column appeared in mass advancing up a valley at a range of about 2,000 yards. They retired leaving 300 dead on that part of the field, and another party were shelled out of the temple at 1,500 yards range. I saw the holes made by ten Japanese shells which had penetrated the thin brick walls of the building and burst inside.

If this battery had only been pushed forward to a position commanding the valley by which the Russians were retiring, it might have done great execution. For some unexplained reason, however, this chance was missed.

(50) I venture to give two further examples of shrapnel fire against entrenched infantry. On the 28th August the Russians were holding a very strong position in front of the 2nd Division, on a ridge, part of which had been captured during the previous night by a well-executed bayonet attack, but on the remainder of which the Russians held out stubbornly, having inflicted heavy losses on the battalions attacking it. On that day the divisional field artillery was away with the Guard Division on the left, and its place was taken by one mountain battery from the 12th Division on the right. This battery was hotly engaged with the Russian field artillery all the morning from a well-entrenched position on the ridge. Things were at a standstill on the left, the infantry facing each other across a space of 500 yards, when about 10 a.m. the officer commanding the battery detached two guns to the bottom of the valley, from which position they were able to shell the Russian trenches. After a few shrapnel, the Russians evacuated them and the whole of the ridge was taken. These trenches were deep and narrow. In them were many Russian dead, and in one place five corpses mixed up together as if they had been killed simultaneously by a single shell.

(51) Again, on the 28th August I saw a very interesting duel on a small scale between four Russian field guns and a Japanese mountain battery, at about 2,000 yards range. The

mountain battery was well concealed as usual behind the crest of a low hill opposite San-chia-sai on the Tang Ho, and for half an hour after it opened, the Russians failed to discover it and rained shrapnel wide of the mark. After a few ranging shots at the Russian guns, the Japanese battery turned the whole of its attention on a deep trench lined with Russian infantry at about 1,200 yards range across the river. After some fifteen or twenty shrapnel had burst accurately in front of the trench, I was surprised to see the Russians leave the cover and retreat up the slopes of the hill behind. In a few minutes they had nearly all left and were scrambling up the steep hill side, like scattered sheep, fully exposed to view from the battery, which continued to follow them up, but somewhat sparingly, with shrapnel. Whatever the killing effect of shrapnel may be, the moral effect has been evidenced in this war by the fact that troops always dig themselves shelter wherever they may happen to be.

(52) In an order issued by General Kuropatkin to his artillery on the subject of unnecessary expenditure of ammunition, found after the capture of Liao-yang, the normal effect of artillery was aptly described in the following sentence. "The enemy fear the ammunition yet to be fired far more than the rounds already fired or being fired."

(53) *High-explosive Shell.*—That the Japanese carry a proportion of high-explosive shell (about 25 per cent.) is now well known throughout the world, thanks to war correspondents, who have allowed themselves, when writing, to go into ecstacies about the destructive effects of these projectiles. The Japanese have used them a great deal, and claim to have obtained satisfactory results, but as far as I have been able to observe, their principal use has been in reaching the Russian artillery at distances beyond the effective range of the Japanese shrapnel, These shells split up into numerous elongated sharp splinters capable of causing terrible wounds, and when properly detonated in a confined space such as a trench or even on rocky hilltops, their man-killing effect is probably very great. On the cultivated plains, however, they cannot be of very much use, and the large number of unexploded shells which I have seen lying about during the recent fighting shows that on soft ground the base fuze does not always act. In an ordinary ploughed field they make a pit of about a yard in diameter.

(54) After the fighting on the 12th October near San-tai-tzu, I counted 130 pits, many of which had been made by Japanese high-explosive shell, in and within twenty yards distance of where a Russian field battery had been for two days. Some of the pits were within a few feet of where the Russian guns must have been, yet the battery retired without leaving any further trace of its equipment having been damaged than a broken ammunition tray. I have often inquired from Japanese officers what their opinions about these shells are, and

have generally met with the answer: "that they are very useful for reaching the enemy's artillery."

(55) Provided we can procure an explosive as good, if not better than that used by the Japanese field artillery, it would seem advisable that our field and mountain batteries should also carry about 20 per cent. of these projectiles.

(56) *Artillery Fire at Night.*—Artillery on both sides has been generally silent at night. In the fight at Chiao-tou on the night of the 18th July, the Russian artillery fired at two Japanese infantry regiments which spent the night entrenching in some crops about 1,200 yards from the Russian position. The Japanese did not expose their position and numbers by returning the fire until the morning, but had 280 casualties.

At 2 a.m. on the 12th October, two Japanese mountain guns which had been placed in position on the road at the Ta Ling opened fire on a large body of Russians advancing from the north, at 400 yards range, and repulsed them.

On the 16th October I watched a Japanese mountain battery of the 10th Division take up its position for the night in the line of defence. At first the gun pits were carefully made; then, before the guns were brought up, lines of fire were laid out to six important points in the landscape. This was done with short lengths of *kaoliang*. One man stood in the gun position with a long piece of *kaoliang*, and directed the others, who planted three more in line with him and each of the points aimed at. After this was done the centre pieces on the top of the crest of the ridge behind which the guns were placed were broken off short.*

(57) *Case Shot.*—No case shot is carried by the Japanese field artillery. It is considered that, though undoubtedly useful in defensive positions at night, it is not worth carrying for such occasional use.

(58) *Horse Artillery.*—It is difficult to say much about horse artillery with reference to this war, as the Japanese have not got any, and owing to the lack of enterprise on the part of the Russian cavalry the horse artillery with it has had little opportunity of distinguishing itself.

(59) Owing to the mountainous nature of the country in which most of the fighting of the First Army has taken place, and the absence of cavalry work on both sides, had there been any horse artillery with the Japanese army it would have had little opportunity of doing more than the ordinary field batteries. After the capture of Liao-yang, however, the relative positions of the two opposing forces offered excellent chances for cavalry and horse artillery work.


(60) The whole Russian army was allowed to retreat under cover of its artillery practically unmolested by the Japanese

* *See* figure opposite page 602.

guns. On the 4th and 5th September rain made the roads so heavy that the Japanese field artillery was hardly able to move at all, much less pursue. On the 5th I passed the 2nd Division artillery toiling along the road west of Manju-yama, over which any British field battery could have gone at a steady trot. Guns and wagons were strung out at intervals of a hundred yards or more, and it was only by the exertions of the gunners that the worst places were negotiated. The roads by which the Russians were retiring were doubtless equally muddy, so it speaks well for them that they were able to get all their transport and guns safely away.

(61) Once the crops were cut, the country between Yen-tai Coal Mine and the railway presented no difficulty to the rapid movement of cavalry and artillery in any direction. Plenty of water, forage stacked in every field, no fences or ditches, in fact an ideal country for mounted troops. The Russians are said to have had a very large force of cavalry, yet beyond a futile attempt to get behind the Japanese right wing, they did nothing.

Japanese method of laying out lines of Fire for Night use with short lengths of kaoliang.





(36) Field Artillery; with special reference to the Battle of Mukden.

REPORT by Lieut.-Colonel C. V. HUME, D.S.O., Royal Artillery, Tokio, 30th May 1905.

Plate.

Sketch of a portion of the Sha Ho Valley to illustrate the control of fire from 26th February to 7th March 1905 - - - - Map 86.

1. *Fire Control along a Wide Front.*—The portion of front I was able to observe during the first ten days of the battle of Mukden (the 26th February to the 7th March 1905) was seven or eight miles long and extended along the Sha Ho valley in the mountains.* Both antagonists had been entrenching themselves since the 15th October, and the Russian position along the belt of hills on the north side of the valley had become a most formidable one, with two or three lines of trenches and plentiful obstacles. The Russian artillery positions were generally in the cols, between 200 and 300 feet above the valley, and the formation of the ground afforded the Russians every opportunity for withdrawing guns or altering positions under fire and for the employment of indirect fire; the knolls and peaks also provided good observation stations.

2. For the Japanese, the opening stage of the battle along this section of front partook, therefore, of the nature of mild siege operations, and the guns were distributed as shown on the map. With the exception of groups B and E, the positions were on comparatively low ground, but the command was the best obtainable, due regard being had to accessibility and range. The guns of groups A, C, and D were from 100 to 200 feet above the valley; group B on Wai-tou Shan, on the other hand, was about 400 feet up, and group E probably under 100 feet lower. Groups A and B belonged to the Guard Division, but owing to the lie of the ground, the officer commanding the Divisional Artillery was unable to direct the fire of both. The same may be said of groups D and E, which belonged to another division: group C belonged to an independent brigade.

* *See* Map 86.

3. To assist the direction and control of the fire along this front, to locate the enemy's batteries and keep the groups informed of their whereabouts, the artillery colonel on the staff of the First Army was stationed on the north point of Hsiao-liu-chia-yu Shan which rose about 450 feet almost sheer from the valley. It was a central and commanding point from which an extensive view of the Russian position and of large portions of the valley beyond was obtained. On this point the colonel on the staff remained from the 26th February to the 7th March, assisted by two adjutants and connected by telephone with all five groups and with First Army Head-Quarters on Hua-kou-ling Shan.

4. *Russian Artillery Tactics and Gunnery.*—On the 26th and 27th February the Russians brought about sixty-four guns into action, but on the latter date the Japanese established their superiority, and the Russians either took to concealing their guns or withdrew some of them from this practically unassailable front for use elsewhere. Anyhow, after that date their cannonade slackened, and on the 1st March they only brought thirty-five guns into action, on the 4th March twenty-eight, on the 5th only sixteen, while on the 6th and 7th they hardly fired at all against the left and centre. Some prisoners taken in the position ascribed the weakening of the fire partly to the necessity for husbanding ammunition.

5. During this fighting the Russians made a very extensive use of indirect fire. Of the sixty-four guns in action on the 26th and 27th, the flashes of only forty were visible, while of the twenty-eight firing on the 4th only one battery of eight guns "showed flash." This latter battery was very well placed behind some subsidiary crest, on what looked to us like the forward slope of a hill and seemed difficult to locate exactly. To conceal their flashes thus, the batteries must have been placed far back from the crests, as the observation station on Hsiao-liu-chia-yu Shan was from 150 to 200 feet above the Russian positions for direct fire; they must therefore have added considerably to their range in concealing their field guns so admirably. They had also a battery of four 15-cm. howitzers firing from somewhere due north of Wai-tou Shan, which on the 1st March shelled village P at intervals during the whole day, making very good practice, without the Japanese being able to find it. The difficulty of locating guns when the flash is hidden suggests the idea that some contrivance for simulating the flash* would often be very useful in mystifying and misleading an enemy.

6. In addition to using indirect fire, the Russians, when they found themselves in an inferiority, took to placing their guns in groups of two or four, and to shifting these small groups whenever the Japanese located them with their fire.

* This was done by both sides.

Also, when they thus shifted position they would leave dummy gun detachments in the vacated epaulments. Some of these dummies I found in position after the Russians retreated.

7. During night attacks an artillery duel generally took place, and at such times the Russians employed direct fire, the flash of every gun being visible. Their shooting at night was as good as by day, and besides firing at the Japanese artillery, they also shelled any villages they thought might shelter reserves.

8. From the foregoing it will be seen that the Russians made good use of their inferior force of artillery. A marked improvement has taken place since last summer in the Russian artillery ; their positions are generally better chosen, their shooting is better and their batteries more intelligently handled. Moreover, press correspondents captured at Mukden speak of the high estimation in which the Russian artillery is held by its own army. The Russians had certainly had over four months to consider the artillery requirements of the Sha Ho position, but they had made good use of their time, prepared plenty of alternative positions, knew their ranges well, and had provided each set of epaulments with a range-chart.

9. Only in observation are they still frequently at fault, and though their layers are good and their fuzes burst at a good height, a very large percentage of time-shrapnel is too long. This is sometimes excusable when firing at a battery in action, as some shell may be intended for the wagons, but the same fault was noticeable when they were shelling infantry in position. Sometimes the error was one of only twenty yards, but it made all the difference to the Japanese gunners. On the 5th March I also saw two instances of carelessness, which reminded me of some of last summer's shooting. In the first instance a battery wasted a good many shell in firing at a mere line of abattis round the foot of Hsiao-liu-chia-yu Shan. The only excuse for this was that the range was a long one, over 6,000 yards, and too far for ordinary glases to determine whether there were trenches and infantry behind the abattis or not ; and though this particular obstacle ought to have been a familiar object, the Japanese had, a few nights previously, pushed infantry forward into village P, and the Russian gunners probably regarded that bit of front with suspicion. In the second instance a battery —the same one I think—wasted a large number of perfect time shrapnel on some rows of *kaoliang* stalks laid out in the bare valley. This mistake was much less excusable as the range was a fairly short one, and the said stalks had been lying there for nearly five months. It is true that the Japanese infantry had advanced across that portion of the valley the previous night and obtained a foothold on the Russian side, and it is also true that the rows of *kaoliang* in question were arranged like a company lying down in column of sections but both these instances serve to show how useful it is for a battery commanding officer

thoroughly to examine all ground in his front and carefully note any object which the heat of action might cause to masquerade in hostile garb. I have seen the same mistake made with respect to a line of hurdles at an Aldershot field day.

10. Now and then the Russians would fire a series of shrapnel burst rather short and very high, but this the Japanese consider is done purposely with the object of obtaining greater dispersion. The *rafale* still holds its sway. Time-shrapnel is also still used for ranging, an occasional percussion-shrapnel being fired during a "series" for purposes of verification.

11. In fact, during the ten days' stationary engagement, the Russian gunners furnished several good lessons as to how an inferior force of artillery can best be employed on the defensive.

12. *Russian Shrapnel.*—In a previous report I mentioned that such a large proportion of shrapnel broke up when burst, that some of my foreign colleagues could not make up their minds whether the Russian shrapnel was intended for a "shooter" or for a "burster," or whether a proportion of both was carried. Very many cases break, or rather tear up, the lines of rupture almost invariably starting from one or more of the small holes at the very top edge of the case, through which pins or rivets are driven to hold in position the collar into which the fuze is screwed. The collar is screwed in, in addition to being riveted. During the artillery fighting across the Sha Ho, I noticed a great change in the behaviour of the Russian shrapnel. A Japanese artillery officer first drew my attention to it, and I was able to verify his statement, a broken case being the exception along the section of front I examined, and unbroken cases were lying about in great numbers. I must, however, have hit on a special consignment, as from no other parts of the field could I obtain conformatory reports.*


13. *Japanese Tactics and Gunnery.*—I could not observe that any change in Japanese methods had taken place. Their shooting was of the same deliberate, careful nature, and, judging from the marks I found round the Russian batteries and trenches, their ranging and laying were as good as ever. Their positions were chosen as previously, the guns being generally placed just behind a crest in what is known as "the half-covered position." This position is the favourite one of the Japanese gunners in the attack. The flash and the tops of the wheels are visible to the enemy, but cover is easily obtained for the detachments. The tops of the low parapets of the epaulments also show. A portion, anyhow, of the enemy's position must be visible over the sights, and if it becomes necessary to fire at points invisible over the sights, indirect fire is then used. The

* At the battle of Mukden British Attachés with the Second Japanese Army rarely saw any broken cases.

guns on Wai-tou Shan fired directly. A good deal more ranging with time-shrapnel alone is, I am informed by artillery officers, now being done. It is used (1) when the range is short, (2) at a fleeting target, and (3) in ranging on a hidden battery. Practice makes perfect, and the saving of time is considerable. Range-finders are now seldom used. A gun is served kneeling, except during rapid fire when the men stand.

14. *Telephones, Signalling and Telescopes.*—At the commencement of the war one or two regiments of artillery possessed a set of telephones, the private arrangement and property of the regiment. These have proved so valuable in the deliberately prepared attacks which the Japanese have had, as a rule, to carry out, that they have come to be considered an indispensible article of field artillery equipment, and every regiment is now being served out with a set by the Government. The flag has also come to be considered an equally indispensable adjunct to the telephone, to be used with detached batteries, in a fight on the move, or in the event of the telephone wires being cut or getting crossed. Flag signalling in the Japanese army is in its infancy, only small flags, visible with glasses up to 2,000 yards, being used on a semaphore system, Though every battery carries them and uses them, there is no recognized system in use. A general system will, in all probability, be introduced after the war, based on the English one, on which Japanese officers have reported favourably to their Government from Aldershot. In some regiments megaphones are also used. As previously reported, a regiment of artillery carries but a single telescope, but one is now shortly to be served out to each battery.

15. *Shields.*—Since the battle of the Sha Ho, the Japanese field artillery has adopted the shield. The Japanese field gun is now fitted with a light steel shield, made in the Japanese arsenals (Fig. *a*). It is small and light, and just comes down to the gun. It is about 18 inches high, and ought not to weigh more than 35 lbs. It is bolted to the back rails of the axle-tree seats along the inside of them, so that the occupant of the seat leans directly against it; the ends are therefore curved slightly forward towards the muzzle. The top is about 4 feet from the ground.



The captured Russian guns have also been fitted with shields. These latter were made at Liao-yang and are very heavy, weighing about 165 lbs. Their shape is shown in Fig. *b*. The

top of the shield is about 5 feet from the ground. The sides between the trail and the wheels are about 14 inches wide, and clear the ground by some 6 inches. They are hinged about 15 inches from the bottom, and the hanging end is fastened up under the axle-tree seat when travelling. The shield is clamped to the axle-tree by two clamps on each side of the carriage, and bolted to the top rail of each axle-tree seat by a single bolt. It is thick enough to stop shrapnel bullets and splinters. I saw one shield which had been struck by shrapnel cases near point (x); two large rents had been made and the back of the axle-tree had been smashed off. The rents had been hammered to on the field, leaving only a small hole, and, as a temporary measure, a stay of telegraph wire had been fastened from the bolt-hole to the front of the axle-tree seat.

16. That the shields had prevented many casualties was evident from the large number of bullet marks they show, but the great majority of the officers I have spoken to on the subject are of opinion that the advantage of the protection afforded by a large shield is more than outweighed by its weight, especially in the case of the undersized Japanese horses. As, however, they find layers hard to pick and train, they are nearly all in favour of a small, light shield, which would protect a layer's head and shoulders and give him confidence. An artillery officer on the staff of the First Army does not see any sense in the continental objection to shields on the ground that they furnished a big mark to the enemy's gunners: he says they are not large enough to assist laying—anyhow at ordinary ranges.

17. *Alteration in Elevating Gear.*—Another innovation since the battle of the Sha Ho is an arrangement by which increased elevation can be given to the Japanese field-gun, thus necessitating less trail-sinking than heretofore. 15 degrees extra elevation can now be given by means of a gun-metal detachable base to the clinometer arc. The side elevation of this base represents a right-angled triangle, the breech end of the base being a right-angle and the muzzle end an angle of 15 degrees. When attached to the clinometer arc and fixed to the gun, it tilts the former forward through an angle of 15 degrees. The stay-plate between the cheeks of the carriage, underneath the breech, which was formerly horizontal, has now been bellied downwards to allow the breech to sink to the position which a long range requires. When laid with the maximum elevation of 35 degrees, the axis of the gun and the trail are practically in a straight line. The original 20 degrees on the arc gave a range of nearly 6,900 yards, the 35 degrees now available give a range of 7,750 yards—a very useless one with these little guns.

18. *Cover for Guns.*—At the beginning of the war the sealed pattern gun pit was invariably used, but now every commanding officer makes his own, suiting the form to the ground and circumstances. The pits are now made deeper and give more cover

to the detachments, a hint taken from the Russians, and when time admits head-cover is added. During the artillery fighting across the Sha Ho, some of the guns of group A* were firing from regular field-casemates with splinterproof roofs resting on walls of sandbags and timber. Group B was subject to enfilade fire, so much so that the left gun, posted on a knoll behind that flank, was firing at right angles to the remaining guns of the group. The guns were, therefore, provided with ample flank protection. Owing to the extreme difficulty of working the frozen ground, sandbags were very largely used, batteries carrying large numbers on and under the axle-tree seats, on the footboards, &c. Wagons were seldom provided with artificial cover, being as a rule left standing on the open slopes behind the batteries or placed behind any natural cover which happened to be handy. Each officer, as usual, had his own shelter and, in the case of group A, the commander of the regiment had a splinterproof look-out on a knoll behind the centre of his line of guns, whence, with the help of his telescope, he directed the fire of his regiment. As regards the size of sandbags, the commander of one of the infantry brigades informed me that he used two sizes, both stopped shrapnel bullets equally well, but when the Russians used percussion shell, as they sometimes did. he found that the larger the sandbag the better.

19. *Effect of Fire, Losses, &c.*—The experiences of this war as to the material effect which artillery in the field can produce have been of a disappointing nature from a gunner's point of view. I was told by an officer that up to and including the battle of Liao-yang the casualties caused by Russian artillery fire were only seven per cent. of the total Japanese losses, but that he expected the percentage would be greater in the battle of Mukden owing to the improvement in the Russian shooting, and to the fact that the Japanese gunners had come to entertain no great respect for the Russian shrapnel, and had therefore become somewhat careless about exposing themselves. The losses in one Japanese artillery regiment (six batteries) from Te-li-ssu to Mukden had been 12 officers and between 50 and 60 non-commissioned officers and men. I hope shortly to obtain some statistics on the subject from the First Army Staff, and can only, at present, give a couple of examples which came under my notice during the battle of Mukden :—

(1) As mentioned in paragraph 1, between one hundred and twenty and one hundred and thirty guns were engaged in an artillery fight for ten days along a front of between seven and eight miles. During that time the Japanese gunners only lost 1 warrant officer and 9 men killed, and 3 officers (one colonel) and 73 men wounded. These small losses are attributable to the provision of good cover, the introduction of

* *See* Map 85.

shields, the somewhat long ranges at which the fighting took place, and the large percentage of "overs" among the Russian shrapnel. Group B only had 11 casualties, and 3 of these were caused by a lucky shrapnel which burst in the look-out station at the north end of Wai-tou Shan. This group had been subjected to some severe "series" at ranges of from 4,200 to 6,000 yards. Group C, the guns of which were unprovided with shields, received the most continuously severe fire of any group, but during the first seven days of the duel it only had a score of casualties. Its ranges certainly were long—5,000 to 6,000 yards.

(2) As mentioned in paragraph 5, a Russian battery of 15-cm. howitzers shelled village P at intervals during the whole of the 1st March. The village was occupied by what I estimated to be two companies of infantry, say, four hundred men, who lay behind the mud and stone walls of the houses and enclosures. The Russians used only common shell containing apparently, something stronger than black powder, and they caused the Japanese 30 casualties and set a couple of houses on fire.

The effect on material has also, as far as I know, been a negligible quantity. Not a single gun has been put permanently out of action in the First Army during the war though very many wheels have had to be replaced. The officer referred to in para. 19 also told me that he never saw a gun put out of action, though nearly every gun-wheel has had to be replaced at one time or another. The immediate supply of spare wheels being insufficient, many partially damaged gun-wheels were replaced with sound ones from the wagons, and the wagon-wheels have therefore at times presented a somewhat ragged appearance. As for the effect of the Russian shells on the Japanese trenches, it has been practically *nil*, and the Japanese do not consider that they have any valid reasons to suppose that on this head they have been any more successful than their opponents.

20. *Heavy Guns.*—Group E, as stated, contained both 12-cm. (4·7-inch) guns and 15-cm. (5·9-inch) howitzers. The former were old and had not much effect beyond the moral one due to long range but the latter were new and did good work. They were generally used to assist any field-guns which happened to be engaged in a duel with Russian batteries, especially if the latter were hidden, and they were also very useful in searching the mass of ravines opposite them. Common shell were always used against visible targets on ridges and in rocky and frozen ground, but to search the ravines shrapnel were used, burst low. The Fourth Army on our left had some of the 28-cm. (11-inch) howitzers from Port Arthur attached to it, in addition to some

12 and 15-cm. batteries. Although a good ten miles from us, we could plainly see the heavy columns of smoke which followed the discharge of the former. The results obtained from these big howitzers were, however, very disappointing. Any holes made by them in the Russian trenches during the day were always repaired at night, and though the attack of the infantry of the Fourth Army was meant to be pushed home if a favourable opportunity offered, the opening never occurred in spite of the 28-cm. shells. The cannonade of the Fourth Army was very heavy and continuous, but the Russians stood it for ten days, and did not finally go away until the dangerous situation at Mukden caused a general withdrawal all along the line. As regards the 12 and 15-cm. guns and howitzers of the Russians, I was told that the men were a bit shy of them at first, but got quite used to them after a couple of days.

21. From the foregoing paragraphs two deductions may be made:—

(1) That field artillery, though provided with high-explosive and common shell, can produce little or no effect on good trenches, even when well supported by heavy guns.

(2) That though in a siege the heavier your guns are the better, yet against the lines of trenches and movable batteries of an entrenched position in the field there comes a point beyond which additional gun-power means energy wasted.

22. *Artillery in the Pursuit.*—The pursuit of the retreating Russians from the Sha Ho by the First Army was an infantry pursuit. The lack of cavalry which the Japanese army suffers from, and the absence of horse artillery, robbed it of its essential characteristics, and I do not think I am wrong in saying that a couple of divisions of cavalry with their complement of horse artillery would have made the defeat of the Russians complete and overwhelming. It was the one opportunity for the use of such a force which the war has offered to the Japanese. Nevertheless the pursuit was well pressed by the indomitable Japanese infantry, and that it was effective, results show. The artillery had on several occasions to abandon its usual deliberate method of occupying positions, and act very much on the lines laid down in our regulations for artillery in the pursuit. I will mention shortly a few incidents which occurred, and which will be more fully described in the report on the battle.

23. The division on the left, on the afternoon of the 10th March, attained a position 9½ miles north-east of Mukden.* Early in the afternoon it found its advance opposed by a Russian battery of eight guns and some cavalry, which took up a position in front of the village of Fen-chia-kou,† 1,500 yards east of the

* *See* Map 61.

† Unmarked; it is 1,000 yards south of Ta-lien-pu-tzu (D 3 south).

Mandarin road. The division put six batteries in position, in two groups, on some high ground south of the village, the three four-gun batteries (Russian guns) on the right, three field batteries on the left, and opened a heavy fire on the Russian battery at about 3,000 yards. After about one and a half hours' firing, four guns of the Russian battery with some cavalry were seen retiring across the open in an easterly direction from the village of Ta-lien-pu-tzu, which lies about 1,000 yards north of Fen-chia-kou, towards the village of Ma-chang, 4,000 yards away. All six batteries immediately concentrated a tremendous fire of shrapnel and high-explosive shell on them at about 4,000 yards, and when the clouds of dust and smoke, caused by the bursting shells, cleared away, all four guns, which had been following each other very closely, were seen to have been brought to a standstill through casualties among the horses. The other four Russian guns remained in action in front of Fen-chia-kou, firing at the Japanese infantry which was now advancing against them. The men of the disabled guns and cavalry took cover and made various attempts to advance and withdraw the guns, but every attempt was foiled by the accurate shooting of the Japanese guns. In the meantime the three four-gun batteries changed position to one six hundred yards more to the front. Half-an-hour after the first four guns had been brought to a halt, a fifth gun appeared retiring in the same direction, but taking a zigzag course at full gallop. This gun safely ran the gauntlet to Ma-chang. The three guns which remained in action in front of Fen-chia-kou, kept up their fire till the infantry got to within six hundred yards of them, and then surrendered, there being no horses to take them away. In addition to the seven guns thus captured, a large number of ammunition wagons and a good supply of ammunition, badly wanted by the four-gun batteries, fell into the hands of the Japanese. Later on, both groups of batteries changed position again and advanced. These changes of position were slow and cumbrous, and as they were undisturbed by the enemy's guns, they afford no lesson; but I am convinced they could not have been made under fire. During the whole of this action no epaulments were made.

24. Captain Jardine, who accompanied the centre division, has furnished me with the two incidents which follow:—

(1) In forcing the passage of the Hun Ho, on the 10th March, three mountain batteries came into action on the level, in the river bed, early in the morning. The crests of the hills on the north bank were visible to them, but they themselves were concealed by the morning mist which spread like a sheet over the valley to a height of twenty or thirty feet. The only other cover was provided by the thin withy beds, in the centre of a stretch of which the batteries took up their position. The mist and withies were cover enough and after a ten minutes' duel with a Russian

half battery on the hills, the latter had to withdraw to a position more in rear. The Russians used direct fire but were unable to locate the Japanese guns, and caused them no casualties as their shrapnel were all burst too long.

(2) The division entered Tieh-ling on the morning of the 16th, and marching through the town, reached the village of San-to-pu (E 2), 8 miles further north, at 3 p.m. Two companies of the enemy appeared on a slope 3,000 to 4,000 yards away, whereupon the general commanding promptly ordered up a field battery which came into action in an enclosure and fired over the wall which, being a high one, it had to stand thirty or forty yards behind. A few minutes later a second battery came up at a gallop and went into action in the open one hundred and fifty yards to the left of the first; it was followed by a third battery which came into action in a position similar to that taken up by the first battery. As the second battery came into action, four Russian guns opened fire and a rear guard action took place and lasted till dusk. The action of the Japanese artillery was as prompt as could be desired on this occasion.

25.—(1) The division on the right arrived close to the south bank of the Hun Ho on the night of the 9th March and bivouacked. It started at four the next morning to cross, believing, as its cavalry had reported, that the hills along the north bank were only thinly held by a small Russian rear guard. On approaching the river, however, a hot infantry fire was opened from the north bank, near the village of Wan-pu-chieh (E 4), where a wooden bridge made by the Russians was still standing. In the darkness, intensified by the morning mist, two mountain batteries were put into position in the open valley south-east of the bridge and a field battery south-west of it. The valley is here two and a half miles to three miles wide, and on the south bank, flat and bare. On the north bank rolling hills rise one hundred feet or so close to the river. The river bed is about a mile wide, flat and sandy, with some extensive but thin willow beds. When the first streaks of dawn appeared a few Russians could be seen on the sky-line, and when day broke the Russian trenches became visible. The mist, however, lay over the valley, and though the mountain batteries opened fire at 7.30 a.m., and the field battery at 8 a.m., the Russians could not see them, and it was not till 9 a.m. that the mist cleared sufficiently for their guns to open fire. The Russian guns were in two commanding but concealed positions, four guns in each, which the Japanese were never able to locate. The Japanese guns were unentrenched and in the open, but the withies in which the field battery stood rendered observation difficult for the Russians. The action continued nearly all day, and at 12.30 p.m. two more field

batteries came into action west of the first, partially sheltered by a village. The Russian shooting was, I hear, very straight, but the Japanese batteries do not seem to have suffered much. Eventually, finding the enemy much stronger than was expected, the general commanding ordered the position to be attacked. The attack commenced at 1.30 p.m., and at 4 p.m. the Russians retired without waiting for the assault.

(2) During the pursuit this division had two other engagements, the first in crossing the Fan Ho on the 14th March. This action was a severe one, and the Japanese artillery was used as in the deliberate attack of a position. During the course of it, one artillery incident of interest occurred; the Japanese reserve was pushed across the open valley in somewhat dense formation and half a dozen well aimed Russian shrapnel caused it 20 or 30 casualties. The second engagement was the shelling of the Tieh-ling position, on the 15th, prior to its evacuation by the Russian rear guard. On this occasion the artillery of the division came deliberately into action in a previously prepared position behind the crests of the low, rolling hills, the only thing notable about the action being that it was the first time any of us had seen six batteries come into action in one continuous line.

26. *The Question of Four-Gun Batteries.*—Previous to this battle, there was one battery of six captured Russian guns in use with the First Army. This battery has always been under the command of the officer who formed it after the battle of the Ya-lu, Captain, now Major, Hijikata. At Port Arthur a considerable number of serviceable field guns were captured and turned to account by the Japanese. Major Hijikata at first received two more guns and his command was then converted into two four-gun batteries; subsequently he was given another battery of four guns, and during the battle of Mukden he therefore commanded a battalion of three four-gun batteries. These batteries had to be very sparing of their ammunition, the supply of which came from the front instead of from the rear, and one wagon per gun sufficed to carry what was available. On arrival at the Hun Ho during the pursuit, all that remained was four rounds per gun. Luckily a small supply, abandoned by the Russians, was found just after crossing the river, and the batteries were able to carry on till the 10th, when, as already mentioned, an ample supply fell into their hands.

27. The formation of these three four-gun batteries was therefore somewhat fortuitous and depended (1) on the supply of guns and ammunition available and (2) on the supply of officers. They were not formed as four-gun batteries for tactical reasons. Major Hijikata has, however, had the almost unique experience of commanding in the field both six-gun and four-gun quick-loading batteries (the guns are not quick-firing as the laying has to be corrected after every round), and I took an

opportunity of asking him his opinion as to whether a quick-loading or quick-firing battery should consist of six or four guns. He is decidedly of opinion that four guns are ample* for one officer to control in action, and he is further of opinion—a natural one for a commanding officer in the field—that there should be three wagons per gun. I attach a good deal of importance to Major Hijikata's opinion as, over and above his experience, he is a keen artillerist; his appointment to form and command these batteries being due to the fact that he had made a special study of the Russian field artillery while instructor at the artillery school before war broke out. The Japanese choose their professors and instructors from among their very best officers, and the large number of officers holding high staff appointments in the field, who have at one time or another filled instructional billets, is very striking. It seems to be part of their training.

28. On the other hand, a staff officer of the First Army informed me that, should the field artillery be re-armed with quick-firing guns after this war, it would probably be by six-gun batteries. The chief reason he gave was that if but one gun of a four-gun battery be disabled, the unit becomes too small for efficient fire effect. He was also against the addition of a third line of wagons, saying that the more ammunition a battery had, the more it fired away. This is a calumny on good artillery. There are two other reasons for retaining six-gun batteries, which I think would have great weight with the Japanese—(1) the cost such a change would involve, especially in the provision of extra officers, for I do not think the Japanese contemplate any reduction in the number of guns per division; and (2) the difficulty of obtaining the extra officers required. It is only natural that after the war the strictest economy, commensurate with efficiency, should be practised, and the question of the supply of officers is always a difficult one. Moreover, a reserve of efficient artillery officers is always a matter for anxious consideration in a big war, and to increase the requirements is to increase this anxiety.

29. Though the factor of economy must always be an important one in any scheme of reorganization, it would not be such a vital one to England as it must be to Japan for some years to come. Our field artillery is shortly to be re-armed, and with a view to efficiency, both in peace and in war, I would advocate the adoption of a modification of the Russian field artillery organization, and make the unit one of eight guns, *i.e.*, a double battery commanded by a major, and consisting of two four-gun batteries, each commanded by a captain. This would meet the desire for a four-gun fighting command, without reducing the number of guns in the tactical unit. A field artillery battalion would then consist of sixteen instead of

* I afterwards asked several artillery commanding officers the same question. They all prefer four guns.—C. V. H.

eighteen guns and the field artillery with a division of thirty-two instead of thirty-six. Under this scheme the proportion of field guns per 1,000 men would be reduced, but considering the special natures of field ordnance which are demanded in each and every campaign to supplement the field artillery, I do not think this reduction of four field guns per division would be felt.

30. The above organization has advantages from an administrative as well as from a tactical point of view. It would make the chain of command in a field artillery battalion a much more efficient one than it is at present, while both majors and captains would have commands and responsibilities more suitable to their standing. Nothing has struck me more in this campaign than the thoroughly efficient way in which, in every branch of the service, captains perform the duties we assign to majors, and majors those we assign to lieutenant-colonels, age and standing in the two armies being more or less on a par.

31. The question of the cost of such a reorganization is one I do not feel competent to touch, but taking the experiences of this war in conjunction with our own methods, it would probably be found necessary to have two extra subalterns at the disposal of each major, one for ammunition supply and one for observation, signalling, &c. In the Japanese artillery these duties are performed as a rule by warrant and non-commissioned officers, and signalling is a minor consideration.

32. In the foregoing paragraphs I have referred exclusively to field artillery, but the same organization offers tactical advantages to horse, mountain, and heavy artillery. When working with cavalry, four guns would be easier to handle than six; it is easier to find a position for four mountain guns on a difficult hillside than for six; while cumbersome heavy artillery is easier to move and work in batteries of four guns.

33. *Some Tactical Points.*—I submit some tactical remarks based on observations made and information received during this and former battles:—

(1) With the increase in the power of field guns has come increased caution on the part of artillery commanders, involving an extensive, I may say invariable, use of artificial cover, and a tendency to begin engaging the enemy's guns at long or even distant ranges with consequently indecisive results. This last is a dangerous tendency, as subsequent advances and changes of position are, as a rule, impossible by daylight.

(2) Infantry treats shrapnel with great respect, and seldom gives the opponent's guns the chance of a good target. Moreover, field artillery can produce little or no effect on infantry in good trenches beyond making the men keep their heads down. Except on a few special occasions, therefore, the casualties caused by artillery fire have been very small. But its moral effect is great

and though it is the fashion for certain hard-fighting infantry regiments to abuse the artillery, and affect contempt for its support, the great majority of infantry commanders look more and more for the support of the guns during an attack. One brigade commander told me he liked the artillery to keep on firing till the very last moment, in spite of any losses it might cause him, while another, to emphasize his point, averred that as long as the artillery kept up their fire he didn't mind if they knocked over a third of his men! I have heard of other instances of infantry commanders sending back to request that the guns would go on firing, and of artillery commanders receiving requests to concentrate their fire on some particular point, or on some specially destructive machine guns.

(3) To bring guns into position, or to change position, in the open, under artillery fire, is nowadays to court disaster. In the attack, therefore, the precedent set in this campaign will generally have to be followed, *i.e.*, batteries will be put into prepared positions under cover of darkness, and will open fire at daylight. A mistake in the selection of a position in open country will not be rectifiable till the following night, so that care in the selection of positions becomes all-important. Not only must they be chosen with reference to the enemy's guns, but also with a view to supporting the advance of the infantry when it shall take place.

(4) If the teaching of this war is to go for anything, it has so far proved that the complete artillery preparation introduced by the Germans in 1870 as a preliminary to the infantry attack, is no longer the absolute necessity we, in common with continental nations, consider it to be. In the first place, except under the most favourable conditions of ground, or with very great superiority in number or power of guns, it is practically impossible to silence an opponent's artillery if it be well entrenched. In the first fight of the war, the battle of the Ya-lu, fought by the First Army, the Japanese did everything according to the letter of the drill book, and, with a vastly superior artillery, spent a whole day in an artillery preparation which was most complete and efficacious. On this occasion it may, however, be remembered that the Russian guns were very badly handled, and very few of them were entrenched, so that everything was in General Kuroki's favour. Since then the artillery has never been strong enough to silence the Russian guns, and the Japanese, recognizing this, having accepted the situation and launched their infantry without waiting for the result of the artillery duel, I am quite prepared to admit that the Japanese infantry has suffered more losses than it would have had its artillery been strong enough to thoroughly prepare its attack, but the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and the fact remains that the Japanese have won all their battles. What I want, therefore, to point out is that it is dangerous to allow such sentences as the following to remain in our "Combined

Training "—" it should be clearly understood by all commanders " that no further advance* should be made until the artillery " preparation is complete."—Section 18, paragraph 3.† Had the Japanese adhered to these principles, very few infantry attacks would ever have been delivered, and I have often wondered why our writers on tactics should assume that British artillery in the attack will always be able to silence the defender's guns, and will then always be able to turn its attention to his infantry and to the points to be attacked, and that then only will the infantry be able to advance to the final attack and assault. They prescribe no course of action to be followed in case the above programme cannot be carried out, and they leave it to be inferred that the only alternative is to abandon the attack. Owing to the inferiority of the French artillery in 1870, the Germans were generally able to go through with the programme in question, and so it has come to be regarded by Europe as a necessary preliminary to a successful infantry attack.

I do not agree with some critics who say now that the artillery duel and preparation have ceased to exist as a separate phase of the combat. I think opportunities will occur, as at the Ya-lu, when they can be carried out in their entirety, and on such occasions the procedure laid down should be closely followed. But what I do believe is that when the opposing artilleries are fairly well matched such opportunities will be rare, and that when the artillery of the attacker is inferior in quality to that of the defender, the former must invariably be prepared to launch his infantry against a position without waiting for the result of the artillery preparation. All he can then hope to do with his artillery is to engage the attention of the defender's guns to a greater or less extent. This is the present attitude of the Japanese *vis-à-vis* the Russians. One senior officer, a colonel of Japanese artillery, gave it to me as his opinion that the infantry must be always ready to attack directly the artillery has got its ranges; it was hopeless to wait till the artillery had established its superiority, as guns were never knocked out nowadays.

* * * * *

With reference to this question, an artillery staff officer gave me his opinion as follows:—" In the country we have been " working in, our duels have been across broad valleys, and " therefore with long ranges. We could not go further down " into the valleys than we have done, as we should have " exposed our guns and been obliged to fire too much up hill. " Therefore the duels have been indecisive. Without *great* " superiority of guns one cannot silence those of the enemy.

* i.e., from positions within effective range of the defender's lines.—C. V. H.

† Lieut.-Colonel Hume is quoting from the 1902 edition; there is nothing of this kind in the 1905 edition, *see* Section 118.

" Therefore infantry must attack without waiting for the result " of the artillery fight. Then, if our artillery is strong enough " to engage the whole attention of the enemy's guns, our " infantry is comparatively safe. Also, as in the last battle, " if the enemy puts his guns into hidden positions, the infantry " can get on all right, as the guns cannot reach them with their " fire." What he said about ranges was quite true. The ranges at which the artillery of the First Army has opened fire have generally been dictated by the formation of the hills and the breadth of the valleys, and though the Japanese artillery cannot be acquitted of the charge of over-caution, I do not agree with the somewhat sweeping criticism passed on it by some of the foreign onlookers and even by its own infantry. As regards the difficulty of silencing guns, I would refer to paragraph 4 of this report, from which it will be seen that it took the Japanese two days to establish their superiority along the section of front in question, although they had double as many guns as the Russians. On the following day, however (28th February), twenty-four Japanese field guns and four 15-cm. howitzers silenced twelve Russian field guns after an hour's duel. The Russian gunners fought gallantly and continued firing for ten minutes with only two or three guns. Many of them were killed and the Japanese could see them being replaced.

Another reason why infantry must nowadays be prepared to attack without due artillery preparation comes from the enormous length of the modern battle-front. The success or failure of any particular division may make it necessary that the neighbouring division or divisions should be suddenly launched on an attack without reference to the state of its artillery fighting. Similarly, a division on the flank of an army may have to make a wide turning movement, the distance it has to cover making it necessary that the movement should be initiated before the artillery duel has even begun.

(5) As I have remarked, to manœuvre guns in the open under hostile artillery fire is to court disaster. The artillery of both sides has been most careful not to expose itself needlessly, and the instances that have come under my notice where it has had to do so have been but few. They are not, therefore, convincing; but such as they are, they hardly tend to show that the movement of batteries or brigades, as a whole, as recommended in our " Field Artillery Training," is a feasible operation, though theoretically it is the thing to do. Rather should guns be moved singly. At the battle of the Ya-lu, it will be remembered that a Russian battery which exposed itself on the move was overwhelmed by the Japanese guns, and had to be abandoned. Again in this last battle a half battery of Russian guns, moving as a whole, was brought to a standstill and captured (*see* paragraph 23 of this report). On the other hand, a single gun on this latter occasion got safely away: while in the battle of the Sha Ho, two whole batteries moving gun by

gun at long intervals, crossed a bit of shrapnel-swept open without dropping a man. This last incident I described in my former report on artillery. That occasions will occur when artillery must advance and willingly undergo losses is a tradition we cannot afford to dispense with, but the amount of caution to be mixed with the dash is an increasing quantity. The range, power, and accuracy of field artillery has, however, so much increased that, if attacking batteries choose their positions well to start with, they will probably not find it necessary to leave them till the pursuit begins.

(6) A remarkable feature of the artillery work in this war has been the extensive use made of artificial cover. Never during the year's fighting have I seen a battery come into action without first making epaulments or gun pits, or at all events throwing up some cover for the detachments before opening fire. Not till the pursuit began, on the 8th March, did artillery begin to do without them, and then it rightly cast them aside whenever the occasion demanded.

34. *Mountain Artillery.*—In spite of its small range and power, mountain artillery has played a very important part in this campaign, not only in the hills but also in the plains. The artillery regiment of one of the three divisions composing the First Army is armed with mountain guns, and in the mountainous country in which the First Army has operated this regiment has, on several occasions, had to be indented on by the other divisions when advancing through country where their own field artillery was useless. But mountain artillery has also appeared in a new *rôle*, that of the only form of artillery which can, during an action, change position or advance in support of infantry by daylight, either in mountains or plains. At the battles of Te-li-ssu and Ta-shih-chiao the field artillery tried to advance in the open in support of their infantry as laid down in the drill books, but they lost so many horses that they were forced to the opinion that, except under peculiarly favourable conditions of ground, the manœuvre was impracticable for field artillery. (Here let me again draw attention to the fact that the Japanese field artillery is inferior in power to the Russian, and that the Russian guns are seldom silenced.)

35. Mountain artillery, on the other hand, is a much less conspicuous target, and the killing of a pony does not bring a gun to a standstill. There have been several instances in which mountain artillery has been able to advance successfully during a fight, and in the battle of Mukden some mountain guns with the Third Army in the plains were able to follow up the infantry to within 1,500 yards of the enemy.

36. Of the thirteen divisions composing the Japanese Army, eight have divisional regiments of field artillery, four of mountain artillery, and one a mixed regiment of four field and two mountain batteries, but there is now a growing opinion among

Japanese officers of standing that *every* division should have a proportion of mountain artillery attached to it for use under the circumstances described in the preceding paragraph. Among other advocates of this new departure, the Chief of Staff, First Army, gave me his opinion that every division which had a field artillery regiment should have two batteries of mountain artillery in addition to its field batteries. He would, however, only mobilize these batteries in time of war. He did not think the training of the personnel would be a hard matter, as the difference between field and mountain artillery training is not very great. He would like to have a more powerful gun than the present one, each load of which would be light enough to be carried by one man on an emergency (a Japanese can carry 225 lbs.) so as to render the target still more inconspicuous, or to replace an injured pony. He recognized the difficulty of combining these two conflicting conditions—power and lightness—in a gun.

* * * * *

37. One more point with regard to our mountain artillery. It is at present a branch of the Royal Garrison Artillery, having been made so when the separation of the field and garrison artillery took place, as a matter of expediency, to render more acceptable the dulness of Royal Garrison Artillery service by giving a lover of the horse a chance of indulging his tastes. Is not the separation of the branches complete enough by this time to enable us to put an end to this anomaly? Mountain and field artillery have one and the same *rôle*, and now that field artillery has succeeded in freeing itself from the trammels of horse artillery traditions, it is quite time that there should be some stronger and more permanent link between field and mountain gunners than an *entente cordiale*.

38. *Remarks on Organization.* — I have gathered the following information from Japanese officers whose opinions carry weight.

(1) As regards the number of guns per division, a staff officer of the First Army told me he would like to see the artillery of a division increased to—

9 batteries field artillery - -	54 guns.
3 batteries howitzers - - -	12 or 18 guns.
2 batteries mountain artillery -	12 guns.
Total - -	78 guns.

Of these only six batteries field artillery, and possibly the three batteries of howitzers, need be maintained on the peace establishment. His reason for desiring this large increase in artillery was that in questions of organization all they had to legislate for was to beat Russia, and he had been much struck with the great effect a concentrated artillery fire produced on the Russians. Howitzers, he said, were invaluable in any

country, especially in the plains where the Russians obtained most of their cover from village walls.

(2) The campaign was started with the fixed principle of concentrating guns, but the necessity and advantages of dispersal were soon recognized. This was especially the case in the hills, where, even if a position for six batteries in line was forthcoming, the chances were that from one flank at least either the target was not visible or the range was too long for the Japanese gun. Dispersal of guns with concentration of fire is of course, recognized as the ideal to be attained, but this requires more practice in signalling and in perfecting rapid communication between batteries; the Japanese mean to devote very great attention to this in the future.

(3) As the concentration of the batteries of a regiment was the principle to be followed, so the second line of wagons (1 store and 27 ammunition wagons) was organized as a regimental unit. Now that dispersal of batteries has come to stay, commanders of regiments organize their regimental wagons to suit the circumstances of the case. After the war some subdivision of these wagons into smaller units will have to be made.

39. *Remarks on Personnel.*—The following information on points connected with the personnel of the Japanese field artillery may be of interest:—

(1) The supply of artillery officers is a difficult question for the Japanese, a fact I mentioned earlier in this report, the reserve being insufficient. In one regiment, I was informed by the officer commanding that one-third of his officers are now men promoted from warrant rank. He said they gave him a lot of trouble as, not having been through the Officers' School, they required a deal of instruction.

(2) In a former report I mentioned that the Japanese train their gunners and drivers with a view to their interchangeability, and I remarked on the drawbacks of this system with reference to the overweighting of the little horses. The other day I was informed that the system had also failed to attain its main object, as it could not be kept up in the field. When the armies are halted, the gunners get four or five days a week instruction in gun-drill and one or two days in driving, and *vice versâ*. As a result, the drivers make fair gunners, but a gunner under two years' service makes but a very indifferent driver. The shortest and lightest men are therefore selected as drivers.

40. *Remarks on Material.*—I append a few remarks on the material of the Japanese artillery:—

(1) The Japanese take great care of their guns, and when in quarters I have sometimes seen them encased in wood in addition to their canvas covers. The result is that in some regiments the guns, after over a year's campaign, look as if they had only lately been browned. The wheels have, however, suffered very

much from the dryness of the Manchurian climate, and they all rattle. The guns shoot as well as ever, and show but little sign of wear. The vehicles are all painted a slatey blue, but I hear they are all to be repainted khaki.

(2) In the 14th Regiment, a premature high-explosive shell, which burst in the bore, blew about eighteen inches off the muzzle of the gun.

(3) No spare carriages are taken into the field. With the present gun, the carriage is part and parcel of the gun, and any damage to the former means that the gun has to be repaired at an arsenal in Japan. No carriage has as yet been damaged in the First Army.

(4) The little 9·5-cm. (3·7-inch) howitzers, or rifled mortars, have been found very useful at short ranges. They are mounted on beds and weigh, bed and all, under 450 lbs. They are easily carried on the 1-horse transport cart.

41. *Position of the Battery Commander.*—The place of the battery commander is with his guns. The observation is done by the battalion commander and regimental commander. Even if a battery is detached, the commander remains with his guns, sending an officer to observe.

42. *Orderlies.*—The absence of signalling makes the use of orderlies very necessary at times. During an attack, for instance, the commander of the supporting guns usually sends an orderly with the regimental or battalion commander executing the attack. This orderly brings back any important messages as to points on which the fire of the guns should be concentrated, &c.

43. *Russian Field Gun.*—The only pattern of Russian field gun which has been captured by the Japanese is the one with the rubber buffer. The rubber buffer-joints require constant replacement, especially in winter. The guns used by Major Hijikata show no signs of wear, and continue to shoot accurately; they are horsed with Russian horses, Chinese ponies, and mules, as before.

44. *Horses.*—The Japanese have imported some Australian horses, I expect, for artillery purposes only. A ship-load arrived at Ujina on 15th May.

(37) Russian Defence Works, from Nan Shan to Liao-yang.

REPORT by Colonel J W. G. TULLOCH, Indian Army, undated, with REMARKS by Lieut.-General Sir W. G. NICHOLSON, K.C.B.; Tokio, 1st October 1904.

Plate.

Russian Redoubt - - - Map 87.

Report by Colonel J. W. G. Tulloch.

Nan Shan to Hai-cheng.

1. All positions prepared for defence by the Russians have been astride of, or immediately covering, the railway line. Their guns, where positions have been available for them on hill tops, have invariably been placed there; where a sufficiency of such positions has not existed they have been placed on cols connecting the main features of the position, and in the valleys separating one portion of the position from another.

2. Except at Nan Shan, all works for field guns have been of the ordinary type of gun pit. At Nan Shan, guns of position with high mountings were used; these necessitated higher parapets and works of a more permanent character.

3. In a few instances, notably so at Nan Shan, trenches for infantry have been constructed at the foot of the hills forming the main features of the position; but in the majority of cases they have been dug on the crest line or part way up the slopes. At Nan Shan all three lines of trenches can be seen on the same hill, giving three tiers of fire one above the other. It was here in the lowest line of trenches that the only attempt was made to provide head-cover; it consisted of sand-bags of a size to contain 100 lbs. of grain.

4. Infantry trenches have invariably been constructed so as to give cover to men standing, but, whether they be for infantry or for artillery, the main feature of all works has been their extreme conspicuousness. They have been dug in red clay soil and the excavated earth thrown up in front. The approaches to the position have been over green crops and the background has been either the grassy slopes of the hills or the sky itself; it is easy to imagine how very conspicuous all these works have been, and how much the task of the attackers has been facilitated thereby. Up the Hai-cheng the Russian does

not seem to have realized the value of smokeless powder to the defence, but has advertised his positions to the naked eye at long artillery range.

5. In some positions a portion has been prepared for all-round defence—a sort of reduit, perched on a hill top and visible for miles—no false positions have been prepared and no cunning seems to have formed part of the Russian defence tactics, there has been no particular limit to the length of the infantry trench, no intervening spaces by which the defenders could advance from them, and not even a foothold constructed in the parapet to aid the defenders in climbing out to the front. Passive defence has been the order of the day, and although the flanks of positions have been well thrown back and gun pits and trenches dug even to face the rear, yet, when once the flanks have been attacked and their communications along the railway line threatened, the Russians have evacuated the position.

6. The above was the state of affairs up to Ta-shih-chiao, but here the beginning of a great change was noticed. The nature of the defences was the same as those already described, but the Russians abandoned their prepared artillery positions in favour of placing their guns behind the hills and employing indirect fire. The introduction of this change had a very marked effect. The Japanese searched in vain for the Russian guns, and failing to find them, resorted to an infantry advance without full artillery preparation, with the result that they were checked during daylight, and suffered heavily from shrapnel fire.

7. The prepared position at Hai-cheng had all the defects of previous ones, but was never defended. The Russians fell back from Hai-cheng to the vicinity of Liao-yang, fighting rear guard actions only.

Shou-shan-pu and Liao-yang.

8. At Shou-shan-pu and Liao-yang two separate positions, the former position covering the latter, faced the Second Japanese Army, viz. :—

(1) The line of the Shou-shan-pu Hills, 5 miles south of Liao-yang.
(2) An inner line of defences covering Liao-yang.

The assault of these two positions formed two separate battles.

Shou-shan-pu Works.*

9. In the first line of works we see the same type of infantry trenches, situated on either the crest line or the slopes of hills, but with this marked difference, namely, that

* *See* Map 31, Vol. I.

instead of the superior slopes of the parapets standing up conspicuously above the surrounding ground, they merged gradually into that of the hillsides, and were made to resemble them as much as possible by being carefully covered with green sods. The interior of some of the trenches differed from any previously constructed, inasmuch as they were provided with a banquette 2 feet wide and excavated to a further depth of 18 inches—making 6 feet in all. Where this had not been done the defenders had endeavoured to make more cover for themselves by scooping out the parapet, as was done by the Boers in South Africa.

10. Shou-shan-pu was an excellent position for indirect artillery fire—one of long cols connecting the main features of its front, and also joining up the latter to hills thrown back on either flank. The most was made of it, and the command of view given by Shou-shan-pu Hill on one flank, and the use of a balloon in the centre. The guns were placed in ordinary gun pits calling for no special remark, but the accuracy of their fire was astonishing.

11. This position was remarkable for the deep covered ways, which, twisting and turning so as to avoid enfilade, connected the trenches with strong splinterproofs cut into the reverse slopes of the position, and also for the introduction of two semi-permanent field works—the one a redoubt between the western slopes of Shou-shan-pu Hill and the railway, with a command of 8 feet and a deep V-shaped ditch, and the other a lunette in the valley between the above hill and those to its front. The whole of the front and flanks of the Shou-shan-pu position, except where roads lead through it, or a cross-fire could be brought to bear on attackers, was protected by wire entanglements or military pits. It was owing to these obstacles that the Russians were able to make as prolonged a resistance as they did.

Liao-yang Works.*

12. Between Shou-shan-pu and Liao-yang the country is quite flat and open but for villages and millet crops ten to fourteen feet high; the Liao-yang works were therefore necessarily constructed on the flat.

Liao-yang is a walled town situated on the left bank of the Tai-tzu River. Between the city and the railway line on the west is the Russian settlement, 3 miles north of which is the railway bridge across the river. The Liao-yang works run in a general line from the river on the south-east, and, after skirting the south of the town and settlement at a distance of 2,000 yards from them, cross the railway line, and after going west for 2,000 yards gradually trend towards the north until the river is reached again north-west of the railway bridge.

* *See* Map 30, Vol. I.

These works consist of a series of eleven closed redoubts, with infantry trenches and gun pits between them. The redoubts were heavily protected by wire entanglements, and in some cases the intervening spaces were covered by the same obstacles.

13. The redoubts were all of a semi-permanent nature. Their command varied up to as much as 12 feet. The ditches 6 feet in depth and 15 feet wide and flanked by orillons. They were constructed for garrisons of 500 infantry or less, and for machine guns, and were never more than 1,400 yards apart. The total length of the works was about ten miles.

14. The soil is a very stiff dark clay; the works had evidently been constructed for some months, as their slopes were covered with a luxuriant growth of weeds. The redoubts were conspicuous by their height, and were not well covered, but the trenches looked like ordinary banks between fields. The ground to their front had been cleared up to 800 or 1,000 yards, but they were even then invisible to the Japanese gunners, because of the intervening fields of millet; in some cases a fringe of millet was left standing in front of the parapets, and this, mingling with a background of the same crop growing up to the trenches, makes them very difficult to see at decisive infantry ranges.

15. Sunken gun pits were constructed in some instances, in others they were of the ordinary type. A complete system of covered ways connected all works on the eastern side of the railway line with the city in rear, the battlements of which were defended for a time.

16. No redoubt was captured by assault on front or flanks —some were entered by the gorge, but most were abandoned before the Japanese got into them. In the redoubt of which a plan* is attached there are upwards of one hundred shell marks on the parapets and bombproofs from projectiles of, it is believed, field mortars, and possibly a few high-explosives, but no appreciable damage was done to it.

Remarks by Lieut.-General Sir W. G. Nicholson, K.C.B.

I concur generally in the views expressed in the accompanying report by Colonel Tulloch, with regard to which I offer the following observations:—

(*a*) All or almost all the more important defences from Nan Shan to Liao-yang appear to have been constructed by Chinese labour. From this I should be inclined to conclude that the Russian troops have not been adequately trained, or at any rate are not adepts, in the construction of entrenchments and field works; and this view is borne out by what Sir Ian Hamilton has reported with respect to the superiority of the

* Map 87.

Japanese in providing cover for their infantry and artillery in the presence or vicinity of the enemy.

(*b*) At Nan Shan, owing to the restricted and conspicuous nature of the site and the sparse vegetation, concealment of the defensive works was almost, if not quite, impossible. This remark, however, does not apply to the works between Nan Shan and Liao-yang.

(*c*) At Shou-shan-pu and Liao-yang the design of the defences was, in my opinion, excellent. Moreover, the former position was almost an ideal one, being very strong against frontal attack, well protected on the flanks, and with ample facilities for reinforcement or withdrawal to the rear. The works also between Shou-shan-pu and Liao-yang were most formidable. Moreover, the railway line from Liao-yang for about a mile to the north had, I understand, been prepared for defence by the construction of earthen parapets on the embankment upon which the rails are laid. This materially facilitated the withdrawal of the Russian troops, as it secured their use of the railway until the last moment. Although I went over the works at Shou-shan-pu in company with General Oku, and also saw most of the defences intervening between Shou-shan-pu and Liao-yang, I regret that I was unable to visit and examine the works protecting the railway, and therefore can only speak of them from hearsay.

(*d*) I noticed at Shou-shan-pu and Liao-yang that *trous de loup* were freely used as obstacles in combination with wire entanglements in front of the entrenchments. These were some 8 feet deep, with pointed stakes fixed at the bottom. The work had been very neatly executed, obviously by Chinese labour.

(38) The Defence Works of the Second Japanese Army North of Tieh-ling.

REPORT by Colonel J. W. G. TULLOCH, Indian Army, Calcutta, 6th January 1906.

Photographs.

(1) Low command
(2) General view
(3) Traverses
(4) Communication under cover
(5) Do. do.
(6) Overhead cover
(7) A small redoubt
(8) Machine gun emplacement
(9) Do. do.
(10) Observation posts
(11) Do. do.
(12) Interior of machine gun emplacement
(13) Head-cover
(14) Infantry firing from cover
(15) Do. do.

bound in text.

It was not until after the armistice had been signed that the attachés of the Second Army were permitted to inspect the line of defence constructed by that Army or even to gain any exact information regarding the line taken up or the character of the works.

So far as the Second Army was concerned, the line taken up extended from a point 5 miles north of the township of Chang-tu Fu, due west for a distance of 15 miles, and was held by three divisions, the 5th, 3rd and 4th, in order from east to west. Of these the works of the 3rd Division were the only ones which were visited.

Up as far north as Mukden the railway line skirts the spurs of the mountains, and the country side to the west is one vast plain. At Tieh-ling, however, the valley of the Liao narrows to a gorge and then runs in a westerly direction, while the railway line continues its course due north. At Kai-yüan station undulating country is reached and everywhere north of this is a succession of spurs and valleys trending from east to west with underfeatures to the north and south. It was along

one of these spurs that the Japanese took up their line of defence, but the works constructed did not follow the spur in its entirety; the line seemed on the contrary to have been drawn arbitrarily from point to point, the fact being that the country was one of those tempting ones full of gentle undulations where, if too much initiative had been left to individuals, there would have been a temptation to go on and on, discarding positions in rear and taking up points in advance until cohesion between the different defence works would have been lost.

For once in these gently sloping hills, the large villages which formed the most prominent feature in the plains of the Liao disappear, and their places are taken by small hamlets of from ten to twenty houses each. It was only here and there that these hamlets came into the line of defence and could be utilized, and the works for the most part took the form of long lines of universal pattern trenches with the flanks thrown back—almost too long to be called redoubts—with open gorges and deep approaches leading into them from cover in rear. The fronts and flanks of all these works were strongly protected with wire entanglements, never more than three rows, sometimes less, fastened to stakes about three inches in diameter and so strongly embedded in the ground that it was almost impossible to shake them.

These entanglements varied from 25 to 50 yards from the trenches which they were protecting; and in some cases after an interval of 15 yards a row of abattis was to be found beyond the wire. This abattis consisted of one branch only and seemed to be intended to conceal the wire entanglement rather than to offer an obstacle in itself as it was not embedded in the ground or concealed in any way.

Poles with conspicuously large tin discs nailed on to them were placed to mark the distances in front of the trenches; observation platforms were arranged among the upper branches of all suitable trees; while everywhere along the roads in rear were sign posts showing where each road and cross road led to, and rough maps painted on boards marked the positions of the nearest villages and their names.

The main features of the works were :—

(1) Their low command, which is best shown by photograph No. 1, which was taken at a distance of 25 yards: the figure shown in it was standing on the exact crest of the parapet. It will be noticed that only the tops of the main traverses are visible, that the crops were left standing behind the works, and that grass was growing on the tops of the traverses themselves.

(2) The large number of traverses. *See* photograph No. 2.

The main traverses were never more than 15 yards apart, and in many cases considerably less, while smaller intermediate traverses were often so close together as only to give room for three and sometimes only two men between them.

The dimensions of the main traverses were :—

Length	9 feet.
Thickness	5½ „
Height above crest of parapet	13 inches.

It will be noticed that these traverses were constructed so as to leave room for men to stand between them and the parapet. The works were not, so far as one could see (the *kaoliang* was then at its highest), open to enfilade fire from any direction, but the undulating nature of the country rendered this provision a wise precaution.

Photograph No. 3 shows up the position of the wire entanglements with reference to the trench, and also the proximity of the traverses to each other. The entrance to a machine gun position can be seen on the extreme left.

(3) The third important feature was the immense amount of labour spent in making free communications under cover in rear of the parapets. This can be seen from photographs Nos. 4 and 5. The ditches shown were 5 feet deep and as many broad.

Photograph 6 is a nearer view of the overhead cover shown in photograph 4. This was only provided in a very few instances; for the most part there was neither head-cover nor overhead cover of any sort provided.

One small redoubt was constructed entirely as shown in photograph 7. The work was intended to be used for a man to fire over standing, and the inside space below the logs gave sufficient room for him to sit down under perfect cover.

Photographs 8 and 9 are the exterior and interior views of a machine gun position: the dark shadow in No. 8 shows where the superior slope of the works has been cut away so as to clear the front for a second gun.

Photographs 10 and 11 show the commanding officers' observation posts in the centres of their respective works.


Photograph 12 is the interior of a machine gun position. Standing crops in front almost conceal the embrasure.

Photograph 13 is a sample of the head-cover—the only one I saw. The bags are ordinary ration ones.

Photographs Nos. 14 and 15 are very important ones. The first shows Japanese infantry firing from a trench, and the second—taken from a few paces in front—how little they expose themselves to the enemy.

Every Japanese trench has a niche cut out of the crest of the parapet, as shown in section of a trench on the next page. This niche is for the sake of giving him free play for his *right hand* and forearm. His *left hand*, instead of resting on the parapet, holds the butt of the rifle at the toe and presses it into the shoulder. The rifle itself rests on the crest of the parapet, and he can get a steady aim while at the same time offering a minimum amount of exposure to the enemy.

The whole of the works were a marvel of neatness in their construction, and it is worthy of note that they were done entirely by infantry soldiers. The commandant of each divisional engineer battalion merely directed that a certain type of work



Section of the Universal Pattern Trench used.

(Measurements are approximate only.)

should be made on certain ground, and then left it to be carried out entirely under the superintendence of infantry regimental and battalion commanders.


No. 1.



Japanese Fieldworks.
To illustrate the low command.

To face page 652.


No. 2.



Japanese Fieldworks.
General view.

To face page 632.

No. 3.



Japanese Fieldworks.
Traverses.

[To face page 632.


[*To face page 632.*]

No. 4.



JAPANESE FIELDWORKS.
Communication trench and overhead cover.


No. 5.



Japanese Fieldworks.
Communication trench.

[To face page 332.

No. 6.



Japanese Fieldworks.
Overhead cover.

[To face page 632.]


No. 7.



Japanese Fieldworks.
Interior of small redoubt.

To face page 332.


No. 8.



Japanese Fieldworks.
Machine gun emplacement.

To face page 632.

No. 9.



Japanese Fieldworks.
Machine gun emplacement.

To face page 632.


No. 10.



Japanese Fieldworks.
Observation post.

[To face page 632.]


No. 11.



Japanese Fieldworks.
Observation post.

[To face page 632.]


No. 12.



Japanese Fieldworks.
Machine gun emplacement.

To face page 632.

No. 13.



Japanese Fieldworks.
Head-cover.

[To face page 682.]

No. 14.



Japanese Fieldworks.
Infantry firing from cover.

[To face page 632.]

No. 15.



Japanese Fieldworks.
Infantry firing from cover.

[To face page 632.]

(39) Russian and Japanese Field Defences.

REPORT by Lieut.-Colonel E. AGAR, Royal Engineers, January 1906.*

Plate.

Russian defensive position near Tieh-ling - - - Map 88.

The recent campaign in Manchuria has been specially remarkable for the abnormally long intervals, according to modern ideas, which have elapsed between the important pitched battles. The climate and nature of the country were such that during certain portions of the year, extending over considerable periods of time, active operations on a large scale were quite out of the question. During this enforced cessation of hostilities ample opportunities occurred for both sides to very greatly increase the strength of their respective positions by means of field defences. As a general rule the soil, except during the hard frosts of winter, when nothing could be done with it, was easily worked, and stood well of itself without revetting; while the Chinese villages, with the mud walls surrounding them, and with the numerous mud walls in their interiors, readily lent themselves to preparation as strong defensive posts.

An extensive use of field works, combined with a strong national tendency to act on the defensive, have always been marked characteristics of Russian troops.

* * * * *

I much regret that the very day upon which the foreign military attachés were permitted to start on a visit to the Japanese first line of defence, I had to leave the front for Japan in accordance with my orders, and my information as to this excellent line of defences is therefore only second-hand: the accompanying photographs, too, of this line were not taken by myself, but were taken by other attachés at my request.

Japanese Defensive Line at the end of the War.

The line of defence taken up for the Second Army, under ins ructions from the General Staff, was not defined by any marked natural feature. There was, as a matter of fact, a fairly well-defined natural ridge, but this could not be utilized, as it ran somewhat obliquely to the line of defence, which had

* A number of photographs were submitted with this report, but as the field defences shown did not materially differ from those illustrated in the preceding report, they have not been reproduced.

to be taken up in such a manner as to conform to the requirements of the Armies on either flank.

The country was undulating, but fell gradually to the front for a little over a mile, and then rose gradually again to a distance of some three miles from the Japanese defensive line. The works were more or less continuous, especially those constructed by the 3rd Division, which had had throughout the campaign more experience in entrenching than any other divisions composing the Second Army, and whose works were therefore perhaps the most carefully executed. At the same time, however, large gaps were left sufficient for the passage for counter-attacks of regiments or even of brigades. All important points were occupied by closed works, the most noticeable feature about which was their unusually large size. Whereas such works had hitherto been constructed for only a company, these were made to be held by three companies of two hundred men each, with probably the fourth company of the battalion in reserve. The forts were some 2,000 yards apart, and were intended for defence by rifle and machine gun fire only, and contained no guns. Positions for the latter had been prepared some distance in rear, in the intervals between the forts, flanking the latter, and bringing a cross-fire to bear on the ground in front.

Such villages and hamlets as could be utilized in the general scheme were put into a state of defence—walls loopholed, communications made, &c., &c., while between these and the gun positions and forts stretches of trench and parapet of varied lengths were erected, with obstacles (barbed wire entanglements and abattis), under close infantry fire, at about 60 yards, in front of all defences.

In one case, where the ground was favourable, a small stream had been dammed up and formed into an inundation. In another, an old Chinese wall had been utilized in the defensive line. In fact the whole terrain had been made use of to the greatest possible advantage. Along practically the entire front of this position was a glacis-like slope, extending for at least some twelve or thirteen hundred yards, while beyond this again the ground was well exposed to artillery fire. In parts of the line the *kaoliang* had been half broken off a few inches above the ground and bent down, thus making a most formidable additional obstacle in front of the artificial obstacles already prepared in advance of the works. A few of the front rows of the *kaoliang*, which is some ten feet high, were left standing in order to conceal the works from view.

Every effort had evidently been made to provide concealment from view, the works themselves, whether fire-trenches or redoubts, having a low command of only 18 inches, combined with a suitable background, which would prevent heads from showing up against the sky-line, this background being frequently made up to the height required to fulfil this object. In

many places, both in the trenches and in the redoubts, overhead splinterproof cover against shrapnel fire was provided on the parapet itself, the men firing through a horizontal aperture some eight inches in depth. No doubt, in the event of the background being bad, and heads showing up through the horizontal slit, strips of canvas would, as a matter of course, be suspended from the rear of the overhead cover, as was done, I believe, towards the end of the siege of Port Arthur. An elbow-rest is an invariable feature of all Japanese fire-trenches; these trenches gave very good concealment from view and very good cover to the men occupying them.

Another very noticeable feature in this defensive line was the very large amount of traversing provided. In some places, it is true, there was room for from eight to ten rifles between traverses, but as a rule there was not space for more than two or three. A fairly common type was to have two larger traverses with two splinterproof traverses in between, leaving room for two rifles in each of the intervening spaces. Occasionally the traverses were alternately attached to and detached from the parapet.

Blinded cover was everywhere very freely provided, both in the interior of the redoubts and for the intervening trenches.

The redoubts themselves were closed works, in the form of blunted lunettes, with angles of about 120 degrees at the shoulders.

The front faces were about 100 yards long, the flanks 50 yards, and the work was closed with a straight gorge some 150 yards in length. The ditches were about 10 feet wide at the top, and from 7 to 8 feet deep, and were flanked by a double caponier at one shoulder and by a single one at the other. The machine guns were placed in these caponiers, but could also be utilized for the general defence of the work. High barbed wire entanglements, well concealed from view, were placed about sixty yards in front of the firing parapets.

In the centre of the work was a blinded conning-tower, to be used as a post of observation by the commanding officer.

The whole of the work on this defence line had been most neatly and carefully executed. Among the foreign military attachés present with the Second Japanese Army it was the universal opinion that had the war continued, and had the Russians ventured to attack this defensive line, they would certainly have met with a most signal reverse. There is, however, no possible doubt that they would never have been so rash as to do so.

Russian Defensive Works.

Acting generally on the defensive, the Russians have always realized to the full the value of field defences, and even at the commencement of the campaign their works were greatly superior to those of the Japanese. As a rule, their redoubts

were well placed, and the positions of the fire-trenches carefully and judiciously selected and, generally speaking, very difficult to locate, more especially as the war progressed. As a rule, the lines of trenches were very much multiplied, there being several rows one behind the other, with numerous connecting trenches and approaches to the front line. Unless several tiers of fire are obtained thereby the principle does not seem a good one, as there would appear to be a likelihood, with the knowledge that there are other lines behind to fall back upon, of a less obstinate defence of the first line.

A good instance of this multiplication of lines of fire-trenches will be found in the Russian defensive position on the heights to the east of Tieh-ling, which was fortified but never held. A complete plan has been, so I was informed, already forwarded of this defensive position by Lieut.-General Sir C. J. Burnett, K.C.B.*

The works were very extensive, and as most of them had to be made in very hard and rocky soil the amount of labour involved, which was carried out by Chinese coolies, must have been very great indeed.

The upper summit of each prominent spur was occupied by a closed work, provided with ample blinded cover in the interior and with well-covered deep approaches from the rear, leading up to the continuous line of fire-trenches which followed the uppermost form-line of the hills, but generally some fifty yards (rarely as little as twenty yards) below the actual crest line. This, I noticed, was the usual position selected by the Russians for their fire-trenches both here and elsewhere, as the men's heads did not then show up against the sky-line.

Between the redoubts, and following the intervening contour line, was an almost continuous trench, while below the redoubts were two other tiers of fire-trenches, the one following the topmost contour of the spur and the other the contour at the first change of slope below. Each of these was connected, by numerous covered approaches, with the trenches and redoubts above and to the rear. All the guns were apparently intended to be placed in batteries situated in the uppermost line of trenches, where there were emplacements for some thirty guns and two howitzers.

The works were all cut out of the solid ground and the earth scattered both to front and rear, while the glacis of the redoubts was cut away so as to conceal the obstacles placed in them. The works must have been most difficult of detection from the enemy's side, even at a very short distance.

Where favourable natural features existed, such as low-lying knolls, &c., the Russians, both here and elsewhere, would make use of them for excavating redoubts out of them. These redoubts, of course, had little or no command, but they were most admirably concealed from view.

* *See* Map 88.

At Chang-tu Fu, the northernmost town of importance occupied by the Second Japanese Army, I found precisely the same system of several lines of defence, one behind the other, in vogue in the Russian lines of defence there; but whereas at Tieh-ling there were several tiers of fire, at Chang-tu Fu only one could be used at a time, the ground being quite flat.

* * * * *

The Russian defences were not always uniform in character. Around Mukden, for instance, there was a marked difference in the character of the defences. Wherever the works were of great tactical importance, there the best engineers had been employed. Thus the works in the front line were of the most modern design and were exceedingly well made. They had been executed at a later date than the works in the second line. They were particularly well concealed from view, were well enfiladed, had a good cross-fire over the intervening ground, which was also swept by fire from occasional fire-trenches in the interval (specially disposed so as to take full advantage of the contours of the ground), as well as from short wing fire-trenches of the works themselves.

In the second line, however, which was considerably further to the rear, the defences were of a very ordinary character and of antiquated design. Here the works were all laid out more or less regularly, without taking advantage of the nature of the ground, and with the connecting trenches laid out in straight lines.

The most striking characteristic of the later Russian defences was undoubtedly *concealment*. Every care was taken to have as little showing above ground as possible, and, whenever it could be done without showing up the position of the works, the excavated earth was not used in any way as a parapet, but was scattered over the ground, if possible to the rear. When obstacles were used they were placed below ground level and kept out of sight of the enemy. Rather than let them show above ground they would omit them altogether. As already explained, where the ground was favourable, works were simply excavated and given no command. Very particular care was devoted to the concealment of the machine gun emplacements, as it was well known that if their position were once located they were liable to be quickly put out of action by artillery fire.

As a natural consequence of having so little showing above the surface of the ground it followed, that in order to obtain the necessary amount of cover, it became obligatory to dig deeper. Whether such a vast amount of labour as this entailed would be possible in a European campaign, and whether sufficient time for its execution would be available, is very much open to question; but, given the necessary amount of time at disposal, it would as a rule undoubtedly be fully justified by the result. In the campaign in Manchuria there was nearly always ample time for digging as deep as desired.

In place of making loopholes a common practice with the Russians was to make a small hollowing out of the interior crest and superior slope from the spot at which the man fired, the hollow falling away to nothing a couple of feet in front of the crest, thus giving the top of the parapet a corrugated appearance.

Owing to the excellence of their defences the Russian troops, while actually holding them, apparently lost comparatively few men either by infantry or artillery fire. A very good instance of this is offered by the redoubt at Sha-to-tzu on the south-west front of the Mukden defences, just north of the Hun Ho. This work was attacked over and over again by the Japanese 5th Division on the 9th March 1905, but owing to the heavy losses the progress of the attack was very slow. Finally the attacking troops succeeded in getting up to within about two hundred and eighty yards of the redoubt, but once there could advance no further. At this point alone, owing to the stubbornness of the defence, the dead lay side by side more than one man to the yard (according to the evidence of eye-witnesses foreign military attachés, who visited the site the following morning), while the wounded were obliged to lie beside the dead till the following morning, when the general retreat of the Russians caused the enemy to evacuate the redoubt.

During the 9th March the Japanese 5th Division lost some 3,000 killed and wounded, of whom the great majority fell in the attack on this fort at Sha-to-tzu. Inside the redoubt, on the other hand, there were only found some 15 Russian dead, while about 50 rifles were collected.

No doubt the above did not represent the total of the losses of the Russians holding the work, but in any case the difference between the losses of attackers and defenders must have been very great.

So well had the works along the whole of the first line of defence on the west front of Mukden been concealed that the Japanese troops in several instances got up to within some three hundred yards of them before they were able to locate them exactly.

Improvised Cover on the Field of Battle.

Passing now from the more permanent field defences which it was found possible to construct in advance, it will be of interest to see what amount of hastily improvised cover could be obtained by troops on the actual field of battle in presence of the enemy and also during the progress of an attack.

At the beginning of the war one tool—either a shovel, pickaxe, or cutting implement—was carried by 50 per cent. of the infantry. By the experience gained during the war, however, it was found necessary to increase this proportion, and towards the end of the campaign two out of every three infantry soldiers, or 66 per cent., carried either an entrenching or a cutting tool.

The light shovels and pickaxes, together with the hand-axes and saws, constitute the light entrenching tools and are carried on the men, the remainder being the heavy entrenching tools, which are carried with the light baggage of the battalion.

The infantry entrenching tools are practically the same as those used in Germany. The shovel is 50 cm. (about 19¾ ins.) length. It has no T-head to the handle, but has a small knob and weighs a little over 2 lbs., which is also the weight of the small pickaxe. Some of the men also carried a small case containing tracing cord or nails or a box-tape.

The Russian entrenching tools differ principally from the Japanese ones in having no knob at the end of the handle. So many of these were captured by the Japanese that they never ran short of entrenching tools, and the Russian ones were very largely in use at the latter end of the war.

Acting almost always on the offensive, the Japanese came to most thoroughly appreciate the value of these tools, for the employment of which the soil of a great part of Southern Manchuria is peculiarly well adapted. There are, in the plains, no stones whatever and the clayey soil is easily worked, and in the dry weather, lasting most of the year, it stands well without revetting.

As a rule, when the crops were down, the ground over which the attacks had perforce to be made was as bare as the barest South African veld, and even the very smallest particle of cover was invaluable. Contrary to the experiences of the South African war, where, owing to the excellent shooting of the Boers, especially at the longer ranges (which shooting, amounting to markmanship, should in my humble opinion be looked upon as wholly exceptional and not taken as a guide in future campaigns), very heavy losses were experienced at even the very longest effective ranges, there were, in the campaign in Manchuria, generally speaking, very few losses indeed at the more distant effective ranges, and comparatively few at even close effective ranges. The losses were also minimized by the wounded being ordered, whenever capable of doing so, to run back from the firing-line, during its advance, to the nearest first-aid dressing station. On the other hand, it would not be safe to take the losses at the longer ranges in Manchuria as a guide to probable losses at similar ranges in a European war, for it would seem to be quite within the bounds of probability that the shooting of the Russian soldier is not up to the average standard of the marksmanship in the principal armies of the Continent. I have no data to go upon beyond the fact that very few Japanese dead were ever observed at distances much beyond 700 yards from the Russian positions. At the shorter decisive ranges, however, being, as he nearly always is, behind very good cover, it is probable that the shooting of the Russian soldier would more closely approximate to the European standard.

Still, at even medium and closer effective ranges, certain losses were necessarily incurred, and it was to avoid these that

on very many occasions advantage had to be taken of the cover of darkness to get up to the closest possible range.

It was, however, when the attack had worked up to close decisive ranges that the enormous losses were incurred. To diminish these as far as possible the men had at once to throw up whatever cover they could get. Whenever possible under the circumstances each man was furnished with two sandbags, which he filled or partially filled with whatever earth he was able to dig up, and used for making a loophole. For some five months in the year the ground is frozen so hard that even with the generally easily-worked soil it is impossible to do much digging. Even in the severest winter, however, there is a top layer of earth some four inches thick which can always be scraped up, so that with this soil it was always found possible to fill or nearly fill the sandbags. Where small ravines or water-courses are at hand, it is found that the soil there too is always more easy to obtain than it is on the level. No special sandbags were prepared in advance, but the ordinary "gunny-bags" of the country were made use of.

Sandbags were found very useful in making small look-out places on the tops of houses; these were sometimes used as artillery signalling stations in the infantry firing line.

In the village fighting the mud walls which surround every Chinese village, and which are usually about a foot thick, were found to very readily lend themselves to purposes of defence, and were made use of to the fullest extent by both sides. These walls were not bullet-proof in summer, but became so in winter as soon as hard frost had set in. In addition to the outside wall which surrounds every Manchurian village, every house has its own walled garden, and is itself also made of either brick or mud, and each and all of these are capable of affording a very considerable amount of protection. Each side, therefore, did its utmost to forestall the enemy in the occupation of such villages, and some of the most severe fighting in the war occurred in connection with the struggle for their possession. Whenever the Japanese succeeded in wresting such villages from the hands of the Russians, the great value they placed upon such strong defensive *points d'appui* was peculiarly noticeable in the way in which they at once proceeded to put them in a state of defence capable of withstanding any possible counter-attacks. Rough holes were cut through the walls for cover kneeling and standing, and sometimes for firing lying down as well.

The effect of heavy artillery fire on the villages with high-explosives and common shell was very great, but shrapnel fire, owing to a large amount of cover furnished by the mud walls, had very little effect in the village fighting.

Obstacles.

The most usual form of obstacle consisted in abattis and barbed wire entanglements—the latter sometimes combined with

deep military pits. These obstacles were usually from sixty to eighty yards in front of the fire-trenches. Fougasses were occasionally used, as for instance at Port Arthur when, in the night attack on Sung-shu Shan Fort on the night of the 26th/27th November 1904, the Russians exploded three with very disastrous results to the Japanese attacking force. As an instance of an inundation, that referred to earlier in this Report may be cited.* Excellent entanglements were made by half cutting through the long millet stalks (*kaoliang*) about 10 feet high, a few inches above ground, and bending them down.

The abattis that I saw was about 9 feet long, with a single strand of barbed wire run through the smaller branches. The butt ends of the trees were staked down in the bottom of a V-shaped trench about one metre (3 feet 4 inches) long and 1 foot deep.

The high wire entanglement was of the usual type, the posts planted in squares of 6 feet side, with a height of 3 feet above the ground. There were three rows of posts, and the barbed wire was of the heaviest type, with barbs every 3 inches.

Summary.

The immense advantage to be derived by the construction of field defences appears to have impressed itself upon both sides more and more strongly as the war progressed. This can be recognized by the continuously increasing improvement in siting, in design and in execution, until, at the end of the campaign, a very considerable degree of perfection had been arrived at.

In the final defensive line of the Second Japanese Army, a little to the north of Chang-tu Fu, and extending a little to the east and a considerable distance to the west of it, the most marked feature was the very large size of the redoubts, each of which was designed for occupation by a garrison of three companies.

The next most prominent feature was, perhaps, the great quantity of traversing and of blinded cover provided.

In other respects there was little of novelty, unless it were the strongly marked tendency to obtain cover by excavation rather than by a raised parapet. This was no doubt due to the very great importance attached by the Japanese to the concealment from view of fire-trenches, redoubts, obstacles, &c., &c., combined with the fact that in this campaign there was almost always ample time available for the leisurely erection of all the more important field works.

In my humble opinion, hardly sufficient importance has been hitherto attached by us to this most important matter of concealment, invisibility only being given fifth place in the essential principles in the design of a fire-trench laid down in

* *See* page 634.

the "Manual of Military Engineering (Provisional), 1903," of which however a new edition is now, I understand, in the press.

It is true that in the same work, under the heading "Siting of Trenches," it is stated that the following points must be considered:—"a good field of fire," "as much concealment as possible from the enemy's artillery fire," and "ground in rear suitable for reserves." My contention is that the concealment to be aimed at should be concealment from all view of the enemy until well within decisive range of rifle fire. If this can be arrived at, the trenches cannot possibly suffer any serious damage from hostile artillery fire, since they cannot be located until the infantry attack has actually been launched and made considerable progress, when the trenches would come as a complete surprise to the enemy, and in so doing would probably help more than in any other way to repel his attack. Given only a limited time for the throwing up of fire-trenches, cover from view would appear to be of more importance than actual cover from fire—in other words, a well-concealed shelter-trench, in which perhaps a good deal of time had been spent in the disguising of newly thrown-up earth (as was so often done by the Japanese with *kaoliang* stalks, rods, straw, &c.), or in spreading it, more especially to the rear, would be of far more value than a deeper trench with perhaps a higher parapet, affording better cover but more exposed to view.

With the exception of the increase in size of redoubts, and the great importance attached to concealment from view, one would have said that the Japanese had simply taken the above-quoted Manual of Military Engineering and accepted all its principles and designs, of course in a general way, *en bloc*, merely carrying them out in an intelligent manner according to the nature of the terrain and the requirements of the moment.

In the execution of works the engineers were only employed in carrying out those either of considerable magnitude or else requiring special technical skill, such as redoubts, abattis, and wire entanglements—placing the more important buildings in a state of defence, construction of bridges (pontoon and otherwise), formation of inundations, construction of temporary shelters and winter quarters, &c., while the troops made their own fire-trenches, gun pits and epaulments, horse shelters, &c., and furnished working parties for the construction of roads, &c., under engineer supervision.

The war has shown that telephones and telegraphs have been utilized to a far greater extent than in previous campaigns, while it has undoubtedly brought into marked prominence the value of field defences in general and of the portable intrenching tools to the infantry soldier.

(40) Port Arthur: Japanese Siege Trenches.

Report by Captain Sir A. Bannerman, Bart., Royal Engineers.
Port Arthur, 21st December 1904.

Plates.

Japanese Siege Trenches - - }
Japanese Sap Shield - - - } In text.
Japanese Siege Approach - - }

During the siege of Port Arthur the Japanese sappers, being pressed for time, found the usual methods of constructing approaches by sap too slow. They therefore almost entirely dispensed with forks, rollers, &c., and sent men out of the trenches to build a parapet, protected only by such cover as they could carry, either in the form of a steel shield or of a filled sandbag. By this method they would, as a rule, construct about five yards of parapet, under cover of which the trench would be excavated. From the end of this trench a fresh start would be made.

The shields were, as a rule, steel plates, roughly 3 feet by 2 feet, with a leg to hold them upright. These were placed in a row, the earth from the trench being thrown behind them, until sufficient parapet had been formed to admit of their removal.

In rocky soil, the parapet had to be built of ready filled sandbags. This method involved a lot of exposure of the men, but was found the only way of making progress when the ground became too hard to dig readily.

All new work was done at night, unless in dead ground. Improvements were frequently carried out by daylight.

At long ranges, say over 500 yards, work could be carried on without difficulty, the searchlights of the defence not giving any trouble. At medium ranges, say from 500 to 200 yards, the work became dangerous, but up to the shorter distance no great hindrance occurred. It would appear that the searchlights could be largely kept from interfering by the artillery of the attack. Even up to 100 yards or thereabouts, the besiegers could count on building 15 yards of trench in one night. Under 100 yards the defenders could annoy the working parties by small sorties, throwing hand-grenades, bundles of rag soaked in oil, &c., and the siege works could be illuminated by star-rockets. The distances given above are purely arbitrary, as no two cases were alike, the difficulties varying according to the ground and the activity of the local defence.

Remarkably little damage was done to the trenches by the artillery of the defence. Even the widest of parallels offers but a poor target to indirect fire with indifferent observation, whilst the direct firing guns of the fortress were placed in such conspicuous positions that their fire could easily be kept down by the artillery of the attack. The most annoyance was caused by the small quick-firers and machine guns. The defence had numerous small 37-mm. (1·2-inch) Hotchkiss guns, with very short barrels. These little weapons appeared to fire the same sized shell as the South African pom-pom and, with a four or five-barrelled Nordenfeldt firing steel shot, formed a most effective means of worrying a sap-head, no portable shield being capable of withstanding them. Both these weapons can be mounted without difficulty in an infantry trench, can be easily moved, and will fire through a loophole differing little from that for an ordinary rifle. The stream of bullets from a Maxim, though alarming, is not very dangerous to men behind shields.

To resist these small shells, the sandbag parapets were made 4 feet thick. Large numbers of empty grain sacks were brought from the Chinese coast ports, which sacks, when laid flat, measured 3 feet by 2 feet. These were cut in half and restitched by infantry working parties under engineer supervision, each sack thus forming two sandbags 2 feet by 18 inches each. Two of these sandbags, laid end to end, gave the 4 feet of thickness to the parapet, and this fact may have determined its dimensions, apart from the resistance of the sandbags to fire.

The ground was generally favourable to sap work, standing well without revetment, but in places was very rocky.

The work in the sap-heads was carried out by engineers or, when sappers ran short, by infantry under engineer supervision, whilst the infantry trench guards in the neighbourhood, using machine guns when available, endeavoured to keep down the fire from the enemy's loopholes. No information is available as to strengths of working parties, reliefs, &c.

Latrines were very freely provided, usually in the form of a small wing trench, in which holes were dug. They were occasionally emptied by Chinese coolies. Refuse from cook-houses was merely thrown out of the trenches, and allowed to freeze or rot according to the weather. Men were not always scrupulous about using the latrines.

Owing to the numerous sharp turns in the trenches, it was impossible to use stretchers, and wounded men had to be carried "pick-a-back" until sufficient space was found; but, with large nullahs on all sides, dressing stations could be safely placed quite close to the front, and there was generally room for stretchers in these nullahs.

Some typical sections of Japanese siege trenches are shown in the attached drawings.* The standard patterns are taken from Japanese sources, the others are from personal observation.

* *See* page 646.

They show an average section, extreme types being sometimes met with. For instance, on 203-Metre Hill itself, where the ground was solid rock, the approaches hastily thrown up during the actual fighting consisted of sandbag breastworks. There was no trench at all. The advanced saps, before they were widened, were sometimes four feet deep, and so narrow that two men could with difficulty pass each other.

The trenches below the glacis of Erh-lung Shan were very little exposed, and approximate to the standard type. An assault was delivered from the parallel, after which the ground on which it lay became dead, otherwise it would doubtless have been deepened. Filled sacks, at intervals, were used as steps.

The approach against 203-Metre Hill was also used as a parallel from which to fire. The men were expected to sit, an arrangement which looks awkward on paper, but is excellent in practice.


The advanced parallel against "Q" Battery was under such a concentrated fire that it was found necessary to blind it. The splinterproof was put on after, or as the trench was dug. It was not mined, though mining operations were started from it.

Japanese Siege Trenches.


Sections $\frac{1}{120}$.




Diagram showing Patterns of Approach.




Standard Communication.




Standard Parallel.




Erh-lung Shan.
Communication below Glacis.



Erh-lung Shan.
Parallel at Foot of Glacis, 60 to 80 yards from Enemy.




Erh-lung Shan.
Parallel, Crest of Glacis.



203-Metre Hill.
Oblique Approach across Front, on opposite Slope of Valley, about 250 yards from Enemy.


North Fort of East Chi-kuan Shan.
Approach round Right Flank, 40 yards from Enemy.




"Q" Battery.
Advanced Parallel, 20 yards from Enemy.

Japanese Sap-Shield.

$\frac{1}{24}$



Side View.




Plan.


Japanese Siege Approach.

Defilade of Exposed Portion.

1
72



Plan.



Section A B, showing how a Trench may be covered without turns.

(41) Port Arthur : Evolution of Russian Trenches.

REPORT by Captain Sir A. BANNERMAN, Bart., Royal Engineers, 5th March 1906.

Plate.

Russian Trenches: Plan and Sections bound in Text.

Port Arthur abounded in excellent examples of the evolution of an almost impregnable field-work out of a simple trench and parapet. The final patterns may be taken as embodying all that was found essential under the stress of war.

Turning to the attached drawings:—

A is the original type, or parent of all Russian trenches. It appeared at Nan Shan. In those portions of the Port Arthur defences which were never closely pressed, miles of pattern A trench remained untouched, frequently beaten and patted so as to get nice rectilinear sections. Of the trenches surrounding the two Pan-lung Shan* works, taken by storm in August 1904, those portions remaining intact after the surrender were of section A.

B shows a trench hastily dug to defend the Feng-huang range of hills immediately to the north of the fortress. These lines were taken by a *coup de main* at the close of July.

C is a section of the trench surrounding 174-Metre Hill, an advanced point in those defences of which 203-Metre Hill formed the keep. The trench was carried, with heavy loss, by the 1st Division on the 20th August.

D lay between Fort Kuropatkin and the village of Shui-shih-ying. It was taken on the night of the 19th September.

E was really a communicating trench, round the flank of the work, from the advanced trench of "P" Battery. But the arrangement of rifle pits shown in the drawing enabled an oblique fire to be got from it, whilst protecting the firing line from flanking fire. The traverses were evidently added as an after-thought. P battery was taken on the 30th October, but not without a lot of trouble.


F was the advanced trench of East Chi-kuan Shan battery and defied all attempts on the part of the Japanese. It was from eight to ten feet deep provided with shrapnel-proof cover overhead and "cubby-holes" beneath the banquette, where the

* *See* Map 69.

To face page 650.


RUSSIAN TRENCHES

Five Feet = One Inch.




A

ORIGINAL TYPE OF TRENCH




C

174 METRE HILL. TAKEN 20.8.04.




B

ON FENG-HUANG RANGE.
TAKEN BY SURPRISE 31.7.04.




D

NEAR FORT KUROPATKIN. TAKEN 19.9.04.



E

"P" BATTERY TAKEN 30.10.04.



F

EAST CHI-KUAN SHAN BATTERY ADVANCED TRENCH ASSAULTED ON 30.10.04. 23.11.04. 26.11.04. NEVER TAKEN

garrison could live in almost complete security. Except for a few small magazines at intervals of a hundred to a hundred and fifty yards, no attempt was made to render it bombproof. In places there was practically no earth on the overhead boards. No straight portion longer than fifteen yards existed.

This trench was assaulted in the most desperate manner again and again. On the 30th October, at 1 p.m., the stormers rushed across the forty yards of open ground from the Japanese advanced parallel, one party entering the trench whilst the remainder jumped across it and made for the battery a hundred and fifty yards up the hill. But the trench proved a veritable trap. Once inside it was a hard matter to get out again, men could only advance in single file, the Russians would only fall back a few yards to shoot from behind a traverse, they pelted the attackers with hand-grenades and blazing bundles of rag soaked in oil, the woodwork took fire, and there seems little doubt that every man in the trench perished. With the failure of the attempt on the advanced trench ended the attack on the battery, which became a rout, two or three national flags and a litter of bodies being left on the ground.

Practically the same thing happened on the 23rd and 26th November, except that no attempt was made to penetrate beyond the trench. The failure of the 23rd November does not figure in any of the official reports, but a war correspondent was in conversation with a general officer, about 11 p.m., at the moment that the news arrived of the successful occupation of the trench, the event being evidently expected. But before daylight the Russians were again in possession. In the morning no trace was left of any fighting, but there were already so many bodies on the ground that the addition of a few more attracted no attention. Still it is possible that the correspondent may have been mistaken as to the work captured.

On the 26th November, in spite of the most desperate gallantry, a determined daylight assault failed. The stormers could get into the trench, but found it impossible to work along it.

A great deal of the difficulty was caused by the trace of the trench, which wound about the hillside so that the works on the top of one spur enfiladed the trench round the side of the next. The same principle was applied at 203-Metre Hill.

The Russians realized, after July, that the communications to their trenches must be as well covered as the trenches themselves. Consequently, steps disappeared from the back, and men were moved in and out by the flanks, or by deep zigzags in nullahs. As a result, except when a portion of trench had been destroyed or filled in by a shell, one never saw a Russian move.

(42) Duties of a Japanese Civil Governor in the Theatre of War.

REPORT by Lieut.-General Sir C. J. BURNETT, K.C.B., Head-Quarters Third Japanese Army, 17th July 1905.

Thinking a description of the duties and functions of a Japanese civil governor of a town in Manchuria might prove of interest, I asked the Head-Quarter Staff of this Army if they would supply me with details. They very kindly sent the civil governor himself with instructions to supply the information required.

It appears that the appointment of a civil governor is made by the officer in command of the Manchurian Army, but in this case was appointed by General Nogi. From this I take it that the Commander-in-Chief selects towns where civil governors are considered to be necessary, and, in some cases, nominates the governor. In other cases, after naming the town he leaves the appointment in the hands of the general officer commanding the Army in whose district such town may be.

Civil governors are duly appointed to important places, but never to any town which is at the moment within the zone of actual active operations. In such a case the military authorities carry out all work that may be necessary. The jurisdiction of civil governor is not confined to the town itself, but takes in the surrounding district as far as may be considered requisite. In this town he has powers within an eight-mile radius.

The establishment at his disposal consists of—

2 medical officers,
1 adjutant,
2 interpreters,
1 non-commissioned officer and 5 men of the gendarmes,
1 subordinate officer.

His duties are threefold and may be classed as follows:—

(1) To conciliate and give confidence to the traders and people in the town.
(2) To advise the civil authorities, and, if necessary, to assist them in seeing that law is efficiently carried out.
(3) To see that proper sanitary measures are carried out, and in this respect his powers are supreme over military and civilians alike.

He also fixes the prices at which things are to be sold in the town, so that no extortion can take place, and the civil population shall not suffer in consequence of the presence of the army by having to pay famine prices for their food.

He is under the immediate orders of the Inspector-General of Lines of Communication of the Third Army to whom, in the ordinary course of events, he reports, but, he can, and does when necessary, report direct to the general officer commanding the Army. In the same way, if he finds the sanitation of one of the men's billets is not what it should be, he reports to the officer commanding the company direct, going to higher authority if no action is taken. The general officer commanding the Army can send for him at any time and order him to do anything he may wish as regards sanitation, &c.—that is to say, the general officer commanding is supreme in this, as in all other matters within the limits of his command.

It appears that in Fa-ku-men and district, the people practically govern themselves by means of a town council of leading tradesmen, with the head military official of the Chinese troops as president. They find and pay their own police, and are supposed to look after the sanitation of the town, but as their ideas are very crude in this matter it does not bother them much. In the surrounding villages it is much the same, only on a smaller scale, and the local police are supposed to protect the villagers from the attacks of the "Hung-hu-tzu." The Japanese have recognized this military official as head of the civil Chinese government, and work in concert with him and his committee. The Japanese civil governor has no power of administering justice. If a Chinese malefactor of any kind is taken up by his gendarmes he investigates the case and hands the man over with the proceedings of such investigation to the Chinese official above alluded to, who sends him on to Kai-yuan to be tried there by a Chinese magistrate just as was the case formerly. In the same way, if his police take up any one connected with the army, he makes an investigation and hands the man over to the military authorities, who alone have the right of punishing. Should a spy be caught he is at once handed over to the Head-Quarters of the Army.

Sanitation forms the chief portion of the civil governor's duties. For this purpose, in addition to his own staff, a sanitary committee, consisting of ten Chinese inhabitants of the town, has been formed. They are leading men, and some of them were nominated by the Japapese authorities, the remainder by the townspeople themselves. The civil governor is president of this committee. They have power of fining for non-observance of sanitary rules. The rate of fines was fixed by the committee and varies, according to the offence, from five *yen* to fifty *sen*, that is, roughly, from ten shillings to twelvepence.

All fines are handed over to the committee and are spent in sanitary improvements. The cost of building and maintaining public latrines is paid for by taxing the people generally, rates being fixed by the committee. If a street is in bad order the people living in that street must put it in good order or pay for its being done. The general rule is that every man has to

keep the road in front of his own house in order. However, the Japanese authorities, finding that the Chinese were incapable of doing the work of draining and improving the roads properly, now employ some 500 soldiers daily at this work, the men getting no extra pay. I must say the work they have done in this way is wonderful.

For purposes of supervision and inspection Fa-ku-men is divided into three districts, and a Japanese doctor, accompanied by a non-commissioned officer and three members of the Chinese sanitary board, goes round each district daily to see that all is clean. Each district is again sub-divided into three sub-sections, for each of which a Chinese sanitary councillor is responsible. In all matters connected with sanitation the powers conferred on the civil governor are absolute. He goes where he likes and inspects what he likes. As regards sanitation, military as well as civil residents are under his orders, and he is empowered with full authority to enforce compliance with such orders.

Civil hospitals have been opened for the treatment of the Chinese inhabitants, rich and poor alike, free of charge, the Japanese finding the necessary establishments. From the 1st to 10th July 133 cases have been under treatment, that is, 72 old cases and 61 fresh ones. The civil governor informed me that his civil duties gave him no trouble, and that he was on the most friendly terms with the Chinese authorities, as also that the Chinese governor-general at Mukden had promised to do all in his power to co-operate with the Japanese authorities in the matter of governing the country. Where he found his work hard and arduous was in carrying out sanitary regulations, inasmuch as the Chinese were absolutely ignorant of even the rudiments of sanitation. He considers that flies play an important part in spreading disease, and, after numerous experiments, he has discovered a weed which, when boiled and put on a plate, with some boiled rice on the top of it to attract the flies, kills all flies that settle on it. I will try and get a specimen of this weed, which he says comes from a distance from Fa-ku-men. As this is the sickly season, a new branch of the sanitary department has been organized, and came into active existence on the 15th of this month. It is called the disinfecting branch, and consists of—

One doctor,
One medical warrant officer,
Two hospital orderlies, and some Chinese coolies.
One cart to carry disinfectants.

He could not tell me what disinfectants were used, beyond lime and carbolic acid. I will try later on to see the brigade at work and report. This is the first organized attempt, on a large scale, at using disinfectants that has come under my notice, and I will find out more about it and see how it works.

The civil governor and all his officers and subordinates are distinguished by a red band, worn on the left arm, above the elbow. The Chinese officials for sanitation and their subordinates wear a yellow band, also on the left arm.

Attached are—

(1) Statistics of Japanese hospital for Chinese.*
(2) Duties of mixed sanitary committee.
(3) Sanitary regulations.
(4) Regulations issued by Chinese committee.
(5) Fixed market prices.*

This last list is posted up all over the town, so that all may see it. The original documents were furnished me by the civil governor.

STATISTICS OF FA-KU-MEN CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

(1) *Statistics of Japanese Hospital for Chinese.**

(2) *Duties of Mixed Japanese and Chinese Sanitary Committee.*

(1) For Fa-ku-men, a general committee is organized to regulate all sanitary questions.

(2) This committee is composed as follows;—

(*a*) Japanese, consisting of the commandant of the city (civil governor) and his staff.
(*b*) A certain number of Chinese.

(3) The officer of each unit is responsible for the cleanliness of the houses in which his men are quartered.

(4) The Chinese section of the committee are responsible for the cleanliness of houses occupied by Chinese. They must see that the orders of the Japanese committee are carried out.

(5) The Chinese section of the committee are appointed by the Japanese section. The committee will wear a distinguishing band on the left arm. A special flag will be hoisted over the committee room.

(3) *Sanitary Regulations.*

(1) Every room must be swept and kept clean, windows left open in fine weather, and as much ventilation provided as possible.

(2) All yards and outhouses must be kept clean, and slops emptied into a refuse pit.

(3) All stables must be kept clean.

---

* Not printed.

(4) In each house a good locality selected for a latrine; hole at least 3 feet deep. Dried earth or ash should be thrown in after use.

(5) The sanitary committee must constantly inspect the public latrines, and report any cases of neglect to the Chinese section of the committee who are responsible for that latrine. Coolies must be employed to keep the public latrines clean.

(6) In selecting a spot for casting refuse, householders must pay attention to the following points:—

(*a*) It must be thrown into a hollow, outside the city, where no drainage from it can run back into the town.

(*b*) Number of refuse places is regulated by necessity.

(*c*) A notice in Japanese and Chinese will be put up on each refuse heap.

(7) Every person (Japanese or Chinese) in charge of a house is responsible that his refuse is taken to the refuse heap, where, if possible, it will be burnt.

[N.B.—Since the regulations were issued, a cart service has been organized to carry away the refuse from each house.]

(8) Every householder must sweep daily his part of the road, and after rain sweep off the water.

(9) A ditch will be dug on either side of the road, care being taken that it drains off properly. Every house is responsible for keeping the road in front of it in good repair.

(10) Anyone committing a nuisance in the streets will be arrested and taken to the office of the city commandant.

(11) Ground near wells must be kept clean, care being taken to prevent dirty water running into the well, or the spilling of water when drawing it from the well.

(12) Any case of sickness amongst the Chinese must be at once reported to the commandant's office.

(13) A Japanese surgeon will immediately proceed to the patient's house, and will at once report any infectious or contagious case to the sanitary committee.

(14) The Japanese section of the committee will at once report the case to every military unit.

(15) Rules (2) and (3) and from (7) to (12) are to be carried out under the supervision of the Chinese committee, who are responsible for their being observed.

(16) The committee earnestly request all Chinese to assist the Chinese committee in carrying out these regulations. Cleanliness must be strictly attended to.

(4) *Regulations issued by the Chinese Committee.*

(1) Every dog must wear a label with owner's name. Dogs without it will be destroyed.

(2) Mad dogs must be instantly destroyed. If anyone is bitten by a mad dog the owner will be punished.

(3) Pigs must be confined in a stye. Anybody allowing his pigs to stray will be severely punished.

(4) Anybody committing a nuisance in the streets will be fined a sum, varying between 50 *sen* and 5 *yen*. Those unable to pay the fine will be employed as coolies.

(5) A suitable place for a latrine and refuse-pit must be selected for every house. These places must be kept in order, and offenders will be punished.

(5) *Regulations of Market Prices fixed by Committee of Fa-ku-men County Council.**

* (Not printed.) This table included not only provisions, but dry goods and all articles in general use down to teapots and cups.

(43) Proclamations and Notices issued by the Japanese Military Authorities to the Chinese in Manchuria.

FORWARDED by Lieut.-General Sir W. G. NICHOLSON, K.C.B., 15th August 1904.

(a) Proclamation by Field-Marshal Marquis Oyama, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Imperial Forces in Manchuria.

Japan and China have been on good terms for many years.

It was an artifice on the part of Russia to pretend to protect Chinese territory, borrowing for that purpose Port Arthur and many other important places. She has now constructed thousands of miles of railways and brought 200,000 troops into Manchuria.

It is plain that she intended to monopolize that part of China and make it her own.

Such action is not only a menace to the independence of China, but it is the root of the "Far East trouble."

So long as the present conditions prevail the peace of the world is endangered.

This is the reason why Our Imperial Majesty has declared war against Russia.

His desire is to maintain peace in the Far East and relieve you from difficulties and troubles.

Providence has assisted us in defeating the Russians in this campaign and in driving them towards their boundaries.

Their occupation of Manchuria will shortly be at an end. I trust that you will all remember the above-mentioned facts and keep your minds at peace.

Our army adheres strictly to military regulations and neglects none of them. It is therefore your bounden duty always to assist us. Heavy punishment will be visited upon such of you who may help the Russians in secret, or give them information of any of the movements of our army.

Hesitate not to become our friends and you will have no cause to regret doing so.

By taking this course you will keep your lives, your property, and your business in security. Moreover, those who do us good service will be awarded praise.

I recommend you to remember this proclamation and keep it ever before your minds.

(b) Proclamation by General Oku, Commanding the Second Army.

1. Whoever gives information to the enemy regarding our movements and secrets shall be severely punished.

2. Whoever captures such offender shall be praised and rewarded.

3. Whoever, knowing of such offender, does not inform us of the same shall, together with his neighbours, be punished.

(c) Notice issued by Lieut.-Colonel Kimura, Chief of the Japanese Military Administration at Hai-cheng.

It is of great importance for us to obtain plentiful supplies of food during the march of our army through Manchuria, and at the same time we desire to give special protection to the inhabitants in the theatre of war.

Now, having been appointed to the above-mentioned office, such matters come under my charge, and I am endeavouring to make the necessary preparations for our army, which expects to be able to drive the Russians out of your territory, when you will be able to pass your lives in peace and enjoyment.

I trust that you will all fully understand what I mean, and that you will be industrious and ready to supply our needs. That is to say, that you will bring for hire carts and horses; and for sale, corn, fowls, vegetables, firewood, &c.

Our army will not fail to pay the proper price for supplies, and will never take your provisions without payment.

I do not anticipate that it will be necessary to inflict punishment for hesitating to do what I require.

You must keep in mind the fact that we have come to this far country in order to deliver you from the Russians.

We fight not alone for our own country but for yours, and it is our desire to maintain peace in the Far East.

There can be no doubt that the Russians are our common enemy. Then why should we not help each other in the present trouble?

Should you behave yourselves wrongfully, or spread unfounded rumours, I shall lose no time in inflicting a heavy punishment on offenders.

Finally, I recommend you to remember this notice and not to offend against it.

8th August 1904.

(44) Powers of Punishment in the Japanese Army and Statistics of Crime.

NOTE by Lieut.-General Sir C. J. BURNETT, K.C.B., Head-Quarters, Third Army, 9th August 1905.

The attached statistics of crime in the Third Army were kindly given to me by the Head-Quarter Staff of that Army. The statistics embrace the whole period that the Army has been in the field *i.e.*, approximately since the 1st June 1904. In the field there is only one form of court-martial—a divisional one. This corresponds to our field general court-martial. A court-martial assembled in a mixed brigade has the same powers as a divisional court-martial.

The following is the scale of summary punishments:—

i. Regimental commander:—
   (*a*) Officers and non-commissioned officers, open arrest up to thirty (30) days.
   (*b*) Private soldiers, imprisonment up to thirty (30) days.

ii. Battalion commander:—
   (*a*) Officers, open arrest up to ten (10) days.
   (*b*) Non-commissioned officers, open arrest up to twenty (20) days.
   (*c*) Privates, imprisonment up to thirty (30) days.

iii. Company commander:—
   (*a*) Non-commissioned officers, up to ten (10) days' arrest.
   (*b*) Privates, up to twenty (20) days' imprisonment.

In all cases, I take it, the imprisonment is with or without hard labour, at discretion of awarding officer.

The commander of a detached or independent battalion has the powers of a regimental commander.

A lieutenant or 2nd lieutenant has no powers, unless he has an independent command, in which case he has the powers of a company commander.

A bandmaster has the powers of a company commander. This last may seem strange, but, it must be remembered, that there is only one band to each Army, and that it is constantly on detachment with the various divisions.

The whole of this supplementary information was also supplied to me by the Army Head-Quarter Staff.

*Statistics of Crime in Third Japanese Army.**

A. Total number of cases:—

Serious court-martial offences	6 cases.
Minor „ „	94 „

Minor punishments:—

Open arrest	21 cases.
Imprisonment	1,538 „
Hard labour	139 „
Confinement to barracks	58 „

B. Punishments in a certain division:—

Illegal exercise of authority	4 cases.
Neglect of orders	2 „
Absence from duty	50 „
Overstaying leave	1 „
Improper use of government property	1 „
Disobedience of orders	181 „
Disorderly conduct	6 „
Drunkenness	11 „
Offering armed violence	1 „
Impertinent language	8 „
Screening crime	2 „
Unpunctuality at or irregularities on parade	59 „
Being improperly dressed	1 „
Violation of regulations regarding government property	1 „
Loss or damage to government stores	9 „
Prevarication and untruth	1 „
Unsoldierly conduct	13 „
Conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline	5 „
Total	356 cases.

* This Army had for the greater part of the period 4 divisions; during the remainder 3.

(45) Daily Life of a Japanese Infantry Soldier in Time of War.

REPORT by Lieut.-General Sir C. J. BURNETT, K.C.B., Head-Quarters Third Army, 14th July 1905.

As I have now visited all the divisions of the Third Army and seen the men in quarters and at ordinary routine work, it may perhaps prove of interest if I give an account of the daily life of a Japanese infantry soldier not in actual contact with the enemy. The life of the artilleryman or cavalryman is precisely the same, except that he has stables and the exercising of his horse. The Japanese soldier, at this season of the year, rises at 5 a.m. and has his first meal at 6 a.m. At 7 a.m. he is on parade, which keeps him employed for three hours, all told. He then returns to his quarters and does what he likes until 12 noon, when he takes his second meal. If it is considered necessary, he has another two hours' parade in the afternoon, but, from all I saw, this is only done in the case of young soldiers or others requiring special instructions. Lectures sometimes take the place of afternoon parade. The hours of afternoon parade are fixed by the battalion commanders, some working from 3 p.m. to 5 p.m., and others from 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. according to weather. At 6 p.m. or 6.30 p.m. the final meal of the day is eaten, and the men go to bed about 9.30 p.m.

All soldiers who are considered thoroughly efficient only go to parade once a week, and when off duty spend their time as they like The men wake themselves in the morning and go to the place appointed for parade independently, just as a British workman goes to his work. I have seen buglers frequently in the field, but I have never yet heard a bugle sounded in quarters. When in their billets the men spend their time in sleeping, writing, smoking cigarettes, drinking tea, and washing their clothing, &c. They hardly ever leave their billets except when duty calls, and do not roam about the towns or villages in the way British soldiers do. On fine days all bedding and clothing is carefully put out to air, and in many cases the men have constructed large clothes-horses for this purpose. The men bathe in the evening, and guards are mounted in the evening also, about 7 p.m. at this season of the year. Games, theatricals, and other amusements are constantly indulged in. In one division I visited, I witnessed an excellent afternoon's sports, commencing with a very creditable gymnastic display on extemporized apparatus, followed by races of sorts and a display of hand-grenade tactics, winding up with wrestling, which latter amusement is indulged in frequently in the cool of the

evenings. In another division an excellent theatrical performance was given. The plot and action of all the plays turned upon men's duty to their country, emphasizing the fact that everything, including life, must be given up, if required, for it and the Emperor.

I saw only a very few tents pitched for the accommodation of troops; this is only done when there is not room in the houses for the garrison told off to any village. It shows, however, that the Japanese do not approve of overcrowding, even in the field. The tents I saw were white bell tents. Notwithstanding the order that no latrines are to be constructed within twenty yards of any place occupied by troops, in all the houses which held Japanese soldiers, latrines, without exception, were dug just in rear, or close by such houses for the use of the men. This goes to show that the authorities prefer to run some risk rather than inconvenience the men by having latrines too far off from their quarters, with the additional chance of their not using them at all. The latrines are usually oblong in shape, some are rectangular, being approximately 39 inches long, 39 inches deep, and about 20 inches wide. Usually they are emptied by Chinese, who use the excrement for manure, but if not, the orderly men left in from parade clean them out and bury the stuff in a place told off by proper authority. I have never seen any disinfectant used by the troops, except occasionally at a line of communication station, but in the hospitals I have visited it was always done. The only disinfectant is lime, procured locally. I have not seen many sentries on wells, but there was always a notice saying whether the water was drinkable or not. Most hospitals had sentries over the wells in use by them, if such wells were on a highway or in any public place. This sentry was always one of the Red Cross men.

The food of the Japanese soldier, as I have already pointed out, is good, plentiful, and varied, and both tea and tobacco being weak, the men's nerves are not affected by their excessive use. Men in actual contact with the enemy and on the outposts are allowed more food than those in rear, as the Japanese consider that, men having hard, continuous, and anxious work require more nourishment than those who have a fairly easy time of it. It is the custom to relieve the outposts about once in ten days.

In addition to the food ration, the men get every three days a pint of *saké* between four, and every week or so twenty cigarettes per man are issued as a gift from His Majesty the Emperor, as well as cakes and sweets, from the same source. Men who do not care for sweets exchange them for *saké* with their comrades who prefer sweets to wine. Rice, of course, forms the staple article of food in the Japanese dietary. This is supplemented by fish, vegetables, meat, pickles, and sauces of sorts. The Japanese have a very large assortment of tinned and dried fish, which are of excellent quality, some

of them being very palatable. The same remark applies to vegetables, but now that any amount of the fresh article can be procured locally there is no necessity to use tinned stuff. Meat is issued, sometimes canned and sometimes fresh, but the Japanese soldier is not a great meat eater. He much prefers rice, fish and vegetables, with pickles and sauces as a relish.

The cooking arrangements are very simple, as will be seen on reference to attached sketch kindly done for me by Major Kuhn, of the United States Army. There are two of these stores with three boilers and three colanders to each company of 240 men, so that each stove is supposed to cook for 120 men. As a matter of fact, the colander only holds sufficient rice for 40 or 50 men at each boiling, so that three boilings are necessary if the company is at full strength and all the men present. The whole of the cooking utensils for one company are carried on one cart, namely :—


Two stoves.
Three boilers (wrapped in netting).
Two large zinc buckets (used to distribute rice when cooked, and for washing rice in).
Three small zinc buckets (for carrying water).
One basket (with bamboo bottom and canvas sides, for receiving rice after washing; this is seldom used).
One bag (containing three wooden spoons and other small cooking utensils).
Three colanders (for boiling rice in).


The colanders fit into the boilers, and the three small buckets fit into the two large ones. Wood for immediate use is, I fancy, also carried on this cart. Water for drinking purposes is also boiled in the boilers.


The following is the procedure followed in boiling rice. The boiler is filled with water, and put on to the stove, where it is brought to the boil. The rice, which in the meantime has been well washed and cleaned, is placed in the colander, which is immersed in the water in the boiler and left there for twelve minutes. The colander is then taken out, the rice strained and put into one of the spare boilers, covered with a cloth, and allowed to steam. If more rice is wanted the process is repeated. The men all take it in turns to cook, but as the cooking is so simple there is no difficulty in this. I notice that all guards have their meals cooked at the kitchen nearest to their posts. From the highest to the lowest, the greatest attention is paid to the feeding of the men. A general who has much to do with conducting the affairs of the whole Japanese Army now in the field has recorded his opinion that he considers the great attention which has been given to the proper feeding of the men has, as much as anything else, contributed to their freedom from sickness. In the present instance, with a railway and river to assist transport, all the carts of the country available, and communications never threatened, the task of feeding the men well

To face page 664.


Japanese Cooking Outfit.









Tinned Sheet Iron Colander ~ Scale ½




Sheet Iron Stove ~ Scale ½



Wooden lid for Kettle Scale ⅛





Cast Iron Kettle ~ Scale ½

has been considerably diminished, but I am perfectly certain that in the face of an active, energetic, and capable enemy, these difficulties would have been enormously increased, and the men would not have lived in the luxury they now enjoy. The Japanese thoroughly realize that prevention is better than cure, and as an instance of this, the other day, when sitting on the banks of the Liao River, watching the engineers constructing a bridge, an officer gave me a cup of tea (he called it), made from roasted barley, which his men drank as a preventative against beri-beri. It was a very palatable beverage.

At this time of year khaki clothing is worn; it is of much the same cut as our own. Cotton shirts and cotton socks are worn in hot weather, with no jersey or drawers. Two cotton shirts and two pairs of socks form the kit of each soldier, and thus constant washing is necessary. Every soldier has a long piece of flannel issued to him for use as a *kamarband*, and this is generally worn in some form or another. In winter, flannel shirts and woollen socks are worn with jersey and drawers. These latter, I am told, are very thin. The same number of socks and shirts are issued in winter as in summer, but these are supplemented by gifts from societies in Japan.

The discipline in the Japanese army is on much the same lines as in our own, that is to say, the Japanese are very strict on duty, and in all matters of duty; but, when off parade, there is a spirit of *camaraderie* and kindly feeling between all ranks, from the Field Marshal down to the private soldier, which ensures mutual affection, respect, and confidence. The officers, assisted by the non-commissioned officers, get up all the amusements for the men and superintend their proper working. As regards crime, none is apparent to the outside observer, but I have asked for some statistics on this head, which I hope will be furnished to me later on. All I can say is that, since I joined the Japanese army, I have not seen a single drunken man. I have seen men who undoubtedly had been drinking, but these could be counted on the fingers of two hands.

When working on roads, entrenchments, &c., the hours of work and the reliefs are fixed by the officer commanding the men. The only large infantry working party that I have seen employed worked from 8 a.m. until 4 p.m., with a 40 minutes interval for dinner. The reliefs worked for 30 minutes and had a respite for 30 minutes. This struck me as an excellent arrangement, as the full value was got out of every man, and no ill-effects could accrue from over-exertion.

The motto of the Japanese Army is, "Every man is capable " of becoming a good soldier. If he is not, it is because he does " not give his mind to it."

From all the information I have been able to gather, the health of this army is perfectly wonderful, and it is extraordinary what a number of officers and men who were wounded at Port Arthur and Mukden have rejoined the ranks.

(46) Japanese Infantry Soldier's Kit.

REPORT by Colonel J. W. G. TULLOCH, Indian Army, Head-Quarters Second Japanese Army, 9th November 1904; with REMARKS by Lieut.-General Sir W. G. NICHOLSON, K.C.B.; Tokio, 20th November 1904.

Plate.

Japanese kit for action - - Bound in text.

Remarks by Lieut.-General Sir W. G. Nicholson, K.C.B.

The appended report by Colonel Tulloch, on the Japanese infantry soldier's kit, is submitted for information.

It will be observed that the soldier ordinarily carries his knapsack, only discarding it and substituting a blue cloth holdall when a severe engagement is anticipated. We have lately relieved the British infantry soldier of much of the weight which he used formerly to carry, with the result of largely increasing the baggage train, and thus rendering a British force in the field the most unwieldy in the world. The change has ostensibly been made in furtherance of mobility; but as the soldier cannot subsist for more than a brief period without necessary articles of clothing and equipment, the actual effect has been in an exactly opposite direction. I repeatedly brought this to notice while I was in charge of mobilization at the War Office.

I can see no reason whatever why a British soldier should be less capable of carrying his kit in the field than a Japanese, or French, or German soldier.*

The large supply of ammunition carried by the Japanese infantry when the holdall replaces the knapsack is deserving of attention, as also the light entrenching tool carried by two men out of every three. Here again the object is to make the soldier, as an individual fighting unit, as independent and efficient as possible.

* Of course, when operating in a tropical climate the aggregate weight of the kit has to be reduced.—W. G. N.

face page 666.


JAPANESE INFANTRY EQUIPMENT IN ACTION

WHEN NOT CARRYING PACK.

FRONT VIEW.




BACK VIEW.



N.B. Canteen, Haversack, Water Bottle not shown.

BLUE CLOTH FOR CARRYING AMMUNITION.



Report by Colonel J. W. G. Tulloch, Indian Army.

The Japanese infantry soldier carries the following articles in addition to his rifle, bayonet, accoutrements, and the clothing upon his person :—

(1)	Ammunition - - -	120 rounds.
(2)	Light entrenching tool -	1 per man for two-thirds of the company.
(3)	Emergency rations - -	2 days' supply.
(4)	Great coat - - -	1
(5)	Haversack - - -	1
(6)	Water bottle - - -	1, about one pint.
(7)	Blue cloth holdall - -	1
(8)	Field dressing - -	1
(9)	Canteen - - -	1
(10)	Shelter tent - - -	1
(11)	Suit of underwear - -	1
(12)	Pair of socks - -	1
(13)	Pair of shoes - - -	1
(14)	Housewife - - -	1
(15)	Blanket - - -	1

This constitutes his normal kit, but the blanket is not carried in the warm season and is stored until wanted.

During this war 30 additional rounds have been carried in the haversack or valise. This has been done because it has been found that the soldier must have at least 200 rounds of ammunition before going into action, and the battalion first reserve ponies carry only 60 rounds per rifle.

The 120 rounds of ammunition are carried in three waist pouches on the waist belt, 30 in each of the two front ones and 60 in the back one. The waist belt is not supported by braces and, therefore, when the pack is not worn, the weight of the ammunition comes upon the waist. Whatever disadvantage, if any, there may be to carrying weight in this manner, the absence of braces has one distinct advantage, viz., the back pouch can be pulled round to the front whenever the soldier wants to get ammunition out of it.

Of the other articles, the water bottle and haversack are carried over the shoulders in the ordinary way ; everything else is either inside of, or strapped on to, the top and sides of the valise, and forms a very fairly compact load.

The valise or knapsack is fastened to the man by leather straps. A strap passes over each shoulder, and its end, a little below the armpit, is connected by a stud to two other straps, one of which is hooked to the waist belt in front, and the other passes back under the arm and is hooked to the bottom of the knapsack. The weight of the knapsack thus supports that of the ammunition in the front pouches.

One of the most important items of the soldier's kit is the blue cloth holdall. This takes the form of a sack 6 feet 6 inches long, but with both ends open: it is 8½ inches across when laid flat. It is made of blue drill, doubled, and is sewn across the centre so as to have two long compartments. It is used by men, such as those of the train, who are not provided with knapsacks, to carry their kit. With the regular soldier, however, it is used for carrying ammunition in one compartment and emergency rations in the other. It is carried empty when the soldier is in "normal order," but when it is known that a severe action is pending, the knapsack with its contents of underwear, shoes, &c. is discarded, the emergency rations are transferred to one of the compartments of the blue holdall and as much as 230 rounds are sometimes placed in the other. The sack is then worn over the right shoulder *en bandoulière* by tying the two ends together across the chest. The weight of the contents rests upon the man's back, supported by the broad folds of the blue cloth on his right shoulder. As the cloth is thin this does not interfere with his bringing the butt of the rifle well into the shoulder when firing—an objection generally raised to wearing anything *en bandoulière* over the right shoulder.

The soldier then stands equipped for action as follows:—

Ammunition, 350 rounds	120 in pouches and 230 in blue cloth.
Greatcoat	Worn *en bandoulière* over left shoulder.
Entrenching tool and canteen	Strapped or tied to greatcoat.
Emergency rations	In one compartment of blue cloth.
Haversack, waterbottle, and field dressing	As usual.

This equipment has evidently been improvised in the field, and points to the experience which has been gained as to the necessity of men carrying as much ammunition as possible into action, and to the importance of training them to carry loads in peace time. At present the entrenching tool and canteen are tied on to the greatcoat, and sometimes to the holdall, with bits of string or anything available. But the idea seems capable of being taken as the foundation of an excellent form of equipment. Our army will, undoubtedly, have to carry entrenching tools, at least two days' emergency rations and more ammunition in the future as well as the greatcoat and canteen. The greatcoat and canteen might possibly be carried high up on the equipment braces, and the remaining articles *en bandoulière* in a holdall. Instances are stated to have occurred of a battalion having been several days without its discarded knapsacks, but when once the soldier is equipped in the special order given

above there is little he wants for several days except a renewal of food and water.

The Japanese emergency ration is not a portable concentrated arrangement, but the full day's rations of either desiccated rice and tinned meat, or biscuits and tinned meat. The desiccated rice, when mixed with hot water, forms the same amount of solid food as 2 lbs. of uncooked rice. The weights of this ration are 1½ lbs. a day, if desiccated rice is used, and 2 lbs. if biscuits are. I regret that it is impossible to ascertain the exact weights of other articles of kit, equipment, &c., carried in the field, but the total amount carried by the soldier, including his rifle and bayonet, must be between 50 and 60 lbs. In spite of this load his movements are characterised by great rapidity and activity.

(47) Japanese Physical Exercise.

REPORT by Lieut.-Colonel A. L. HALDANE, D.S.O., General Staff; Head-Quarters Second Japanese Army, 7th November 1904.

I have the honour to bring to your notice a few points regarding the Japanese infantry soldier, so far as relates to the means taken to keep him in good condition during a halt.

The Second Army has now been stationary for some little time, and I have had an opportunity of observing several of the exercises carried out by a portion of it, which I believe not only help to maintain health, but also tend to increase military efficiency to a considerable extent.

And here I may explain that in the remarks which follow I do not refer to the ordinary drills and physical exercises, which take place in much the same manner as in our own service.

With us it is customary when a halt of any duration takes place in the field, for the men—some, not all—not on duty to get up games such as football, &c., which help to keep those who engage in them in good health. The Japanese soldier on the other hand, though of a most cheerful disposition, does not, so far as I am aware, indulge when on active service in such amusements, although in Japan base-ball and other games are common. Nevertheless he is put through almost daily exercises, during some of which discipline is relaxed and the men are allowed to talk, laugh, and smoke cigarettes.

Some of these military games are as follows:—

(1) Wrestling. A company is formed in line, two deep, and the men of the front rank wrestle with those of the rear rank. Several pairs, with the non-commissioned officers as umpires, wrestle at the same time, and all those who win fall in again separately. The winners next wrestle among themselves, and so on. The wrestling is not by any means scientific like *jiu-jitsu*, and few of the men whom I saw were adepts in the art, but all appeared thoroughly to enjoy the contests and displayed the utmost good temper throughout.

(2) Running exercises.

The Japanese soldier is a good runner, and, even when in marching order and carrying one or two parcels of reserve ammunition, covers the ground at a great rate. His activity may be attributed in a great measure to the constant practice which he gets, practice which in some forms is, I imagine, far from distasteful to him.

The following are some examples of these exercises:—

(*a*) The officer commanding a company will despatch a squad of perhaps a dozen men to run round some object, 400 or

500 yards distant, crossing a nullah on the way. The time is taken, and other squads are similarly despatched.

(*b*) A company will be drawn up with the front and rear rank facing each other, and some 40 yards apart. Midway between the flank men at each end of the parallel lines, and facing inwards, stands another man. These two men are the pivots round which the men of the company have to run. At the commencement of the game, or exercise, one pivot man holds a small white flag and the other a red one.

The game now proceeds as follows:—The right-hand man of the front rank and the left-hand man of the rear rank run directly to their front to the pivot man and take his flag (or they may run diagonally to the more distant pivot man, but this is immaterial), pass round him and run on to the other pivot and return to their place in their ranks. As they approach the rank they respectively belong to, the next man to them snatches the flag and runs off on a similar course. The faster the men cover the ground, and the more deftly they hand on the flag, the sooner will their rank all have run the course, to complete which first is to win the game. The distance may be increased by extending the men and widening the interval between the ranks, and the game slightly varied by making the men run round the opposite rank instead of round the pivots.

This game makes a man quick on his legs and teaches him to turn and stop expeditiously, and I should say that many a man in the Japanese Army during the present campaign owes his life to the rapidity with which, when reinforcing the firing line individually, as is frequently done, he has reached the sheltering trench and dropped down into it.

This game is generally repeated three or four times at one parade, and in order to equalize the ranks in pace men are moved from one rank to the other as considered advisable. It thus becomes more exciting. The men throughout it laugh and talk and watch with great keenness the runners of their respective ranks, as on each man's paces depends the result.

On one occasion I observed a rank which had not run as fast as the other doing ten minutes' extra marching drill, the other rank being dismissed.

(*c*) The following exercise resembles and is based upon the ancient English game of "kiss in the ring," but, as played by the Japanese soldier in the field, is deficient of the female element, and requires, I imagine, considerably greater physical effort than is the case with its prototype at home.

The men of a company are formed in a circle, two deep, facing inwards, and two or three paces between the files. Two spare men, A and B, now proceed to run, A chasing B, who dodges in and out between the groups. When A succeeds in touching B the former places himself at once in front of the nearest group, say, in front of A, C, D. There are now three

men in the group, and D has to escape from B, who, if he is quick, can touch him, in which case B can do as A did. It is, however, customary for B to place himself in front of a group when he is tired, and not wait till he is caught, in which case the rear rank man runs off at once and is chased by A.

As so many of our men are onlookers at and not performers in games, and as rapidity in covering ground is a valuable asset in infantry of the present day, I have been led to describe these games or exercises, which might serve as types for the introduction in our service of something of the kind. In peace time they would go a long way to make lazy men active, and on active service they would help to keep up the men's spirits during a halt, and at the same time reduce the percentage of sick, which usually increases considerably under the latter conditions.

(48) Japanese Clothing.

REPORT by Lieut.-Colonel C. V. HUME, D.S.O., Royal Artillery. Tokio, 15th June 1905.

1. "Clothing" consists of clothes, boots, spurs, curry-combs and brushes. All other articles of kit come under the heading "Arms." "Arms" are divided into (1) "Arms," which include arms, ammunition, carts and harness; and (2) "War Material," which includes all other articles of Ordnance supply.

2. The supply of clothing in the field is carried out entirely by divisions. The system is as follows:—

(1) The cloth, other than that purchased, is made at the Senju factory near Tokio.

(2) All cloth is stored at the depôt at Fukagawa, near Tokio.

(3) From Fukugawa, the cloth is sent in bulk to the head-quarters of divisions all over Japan.

(4) Divisions arrange for the making up of the clothing by contract. Everybody seems to be given a chance, and all over Tokio tailors can be seen at work in their little shops making up their respective lots. During war time, as a labour of love, the wives of the officers and men of the division take over a proportion of the underclothing and make it up under the superintendence of the wife of the general or senior officer of the division.

(5) The division in the field indents on the depôt-battalion for the required clothing and the latter sends it to the army base depôt at the port of Ujina.

(6) From Ujina the clothing is shipped to Dalny, whence it is sent by rail to the most convenient "Despatch Magazine." These despatch magazines are established on the railway, and at them clothing and other supplies are stored till they can be despatched to the troops in the field. They are under the control of Manchurian Head-Quarters and are established at Dalny, Liao-yang, and Mukden, probably now also at Tieh-ling.

(7) At the despatch magazine the line of communication of the Army concerned takes the clothing over and delivers it at the head-quarters of the division to which it is consigned.

(8) On the arrival of the clothing at the head-quarters of the division the intendance notifies regiments and other units of its arrival, and the latter send for it.

(9) No clothing is sent from Japan in anticipation of wants.

3. Should the chief intendant of a division find that it is possible to purchase locally materials for special clothing, such as warm coats for sentries, &c., he reports the fact to the War Minister, who, if he thinks it desirable, orders the division to purchase and make up in the field. The chief intendant then purchases the material and collects the tailors of the division at head-quarters to make it up. There are from thirty to fifty tailors in the ranks of each regiment.

4. In peace time the soldier gets two pairs of boots (shoes) *per annum*, and on service four pairs. The men are getting through about six pairs at present, the extra ones being indented for by divisions on their head-quarters in Japan. Repairs in the field are done by the bootmakers of regiments. The Japanese boots and shoes are, or rather were, cheap, shapeless and over-roomy. They are now improving, anyhow in appearance and stoutness. I am not certain, but I think the government price at the beginning of the war was about 2 *yen** a pair, or even less. Up to the battle of Liao-yang, shoes and gaiters were universally worn by dismounted men. The shoes soon got loose and the gaiters ragged, and the majority of the men took to tying on their shoes with a bit of stout string (under the sole, then crossed over the instep, and then tied round the ankle). This kept the shoe close to the foot. Even when boots were introduced, after the battle of the Sha Ho, they were treated in the same way by the men. Boots and putties are finding great favour in the eyes of the Japanese, and though the troops in Tokio still stick to the shoes and gaiters, boots and putties are being issued in large quantities in the field. If not already the service kit, they will probably become so in the future.

5. Winter clothing is supplied to divisions as described in para. 2. When winter is over, the division collects its warm clothing and hands it over to line of communication, to be conveyed to a despatch magazine, whence it is sent back to Japan. At Ujina it is all disinfected, and then sent on to divisional head-quarters, where it is cleaned, repaired and stored.

6. The winter clothing is excellent, and it is largely due to its good quality that the men have been practically immune from the effects of cold. A box containing a complete winter outfit has been sent home, and as we were each given an outfit in the winter, the following remarks on some of the articles, the result of my own experience, may be of use. I think the lowest night temperature we had was about 14 degrees below zero

* A *yen* = 2*s*. 0½*d*.

(Fahrenheit). There was very little snow and plenty of sun. On still days it was quite warm in the sun, but when the north wind blew, which it often did, ever so little, the cold was intense, even in the sun.

(1) The blanket overcoat is an excellent garment, loose and comfortable. Any amount of clothes and accoutrements can be worn underneath it. The hook fastenings answer admirably. The small keepers on the shoulders are for the tapes of the mitts, to prevent the latter falling off. The only weak point about the coat is that the skirts are not heavy enough to protect the knees when riding in a Manchurian north wind. I think the Japanese recognized this, for they served out to mounted corps a number of sheepskin "pull-overs" to cover the thigh and knee. In some divisions the overcoats were of a khaki colour, like the one sent home; in others they were grey or light brown, and made up actually of blankets, the red stripes to be found in most blankets appearing somewhere on the coat.

(2) The blanket hood is excellent in every way.

(3) The felt mitts I found indispensable. Dogskin gloves lined with rabbitskin were, I found, useless by themselves when riding on cold days, but five minutes in a felt mitt made a numbed hand warm again. So I always hung the mitts round my neck, for use when required.

(4) The woollen jersey is an excellent one, and I always wore it.

(5) The knitted drawers I did not venture on as I had some softer ones of my own, but the men could not have done without them.

(6) The knitted gloves are good, but require the assistance of the mitts, as mentioned above.

(7) I did not try the knitted socks very high, but I found them comfortable both riding and walking, in spite of their having no heels.

(8) The toe-caps I did not use, as my lace boots were not roomy enough and the least pressure produces numbed feet.

(9) The Balaclava caps are too thin. The men wore them all day and all night, but later on in the winter they were served out in addition with sheep or goat-skin ear-covers which were turned up over the cap when not required.

(10) The sheepskin waistcoat was, I consider, the greatest source of protection against the cold. It is worn over the jacket.

(11) The cloth boots were made in Japan. They are very comfortable and men and officers used them, mounted and dismounted, till they wore them out. Having a large

foot, I found Japanese sizes a bit too small. The first desideratum in a cold weather boot is room, and the second is—more room. The Russian felt boots seemed excellent as far as warmth was concerned, but, judging by the vast number I saw scattered along the roads leading north, after the battle of Mukden, they are not good foot-gear for rapid movements.

(12) I did not try the straw boots.

(13) The roomy, solid-hide Chinese shoes were popular with both Japanese and Russians.

7. Khaki was taken into wear by the troops last summer on or about the 1st June. The material was thin cotton drill. The jacket was a plain one, and so skimpy and short that the bottom edge was often hidden by the waist belt. Neither were the trousers and pants roomy enough. Khaki cap-covers, showing the band of the cap, were also worn. The value of the colour was well appreciated, and when, in the autumn, blue clothing was taken back into wear, many officers procured warm khaki serge of British pattern, while the rest of them and the men enlarged their khaki clothes by letting in pieces of drill, and wore them over their blue. The general effect was quaint as the pieces let in by the men varied in hue from white to dark brown. Later on, in the winter, the blanket overcoat provided the required khaki colouring. When the weather got milder again in March last, the blanket coat was discarded. To hide the blue every man was then served out with a loose khaki drill "dust-coat," reaching to the knees. This was put on over the blue, and the belts, packs, &c., put on over the khaki. This was the kit the troops were in when I left the front last month, and it seemed a very practical one. They will now be in khaki again.

(49) System of Pay in the Field.

REPORT by Colonel W. APSLEY SMITH, C.B., Royal Field Artillery; before Port Arthur, 21st October 1904.

Before leaving Japan for the front, officers allot a proportion of their pay, as much or as little as they like, to their families. But all ranks at the front have little chance of spending money, and no means of carrying it about. Non-commissioned officers and men therefore often wish to send money home, and officers wish to supplement their allotments.

Accordingly, the War Office, in concert with the Post Office, are trying the following "experiment":—

The field post offices remit postal orders to Japan, receiving the cash either from the man himself, or if the man prefers it, from the officer paying the unit to which the man belongs, and similarly in the case of officers. The cash is then handed over by the post offices to the field Treasure Chest, and becomes available for re-issue to the troops.

Officers are paid monthly; non-commissioned officers and men, as a general rule, every ten days.

N.B.—A private's pay in the field is only 6 *sen* (1½*d.*) a day.

(50) Japanese Reports and Staff Diaries.

REPORT by Lieut.-Colonel A. L. HALDANE, D.S.O., General Staff, Head-Quarters, Second Japanese Army, 18th May 1905.

Appendix.

Extracts from Japanese Field Service Regulations.

In the Japanese Field Service Regulations (1903) explicit rules are laid down for the preparation of staff diaries and reports on actions. (The name "staff diary" is not, however, applied in the regulations to that compilation, and, as the diaries are frequently kept by others than those on the staff of the army, they are, no doubt for this reason, called "war diaries.")

Attached are extracts from the latest Field Service Regulations on this subject, which, I think, bear favourable comparison with our own.

As it often happens that the preparation of such records and diaries falls upon officers who have had no previous experience in such work—except such as will be presently referred to—the style of the headings given in the Japanese regulations seems to lend itself towards simplifying the task. This is more so in the case of reports on actions than in that of staff diaries. As regards the latter, the possible preparation of a war history is foreshadowed in the regulations, and if this be kept in view by those whose duty it is to draw them up, the labour of preparing such a work after a campaign would be greatly simplified.

As it was my duty when employed at the Intelligence Department to prepare, amongst other things, the Journal of Events in South Africa, and later, that for Somaliland, during the campaigns in those countries—a duty which involved a close study of every staff diary sent from the seat of war—I trust that it will not be thought presumptuous on my part if, while writing on this subject, I offer a few remarks on what came under my notice at that time.

Although some of the diaries from South Africa were prepared with the greatest care, the majority—and I think that the compilers of the war history will bear me out—were deficient in details, which greatly detracted from their value. Such points as orders, method of carrying out an operation, conditions at different periods of an action, position of neighbouring units, casualties, expenditure of ammunition, and the

like, were by no means fully reported on, and some of them were omitted altogether. Orders issued by higher commanders were only to be found—and that rarely—in staff diaries submitted by minor commanders, and much irrelevant matter was sometimes inserted with no apparent object except that of adding to their length. Had the work been carried out more efficiently, it would not have been found necessary to gather material for the history from such sources as the private journals of officers.

In few of the South African diaries was attention drawn to methods which had proved advantageous in carrying out operations, &c., &c., whereby experience for the future might have been gained, and in only one staff diary—that of a cavalry colonel in command of a column—was full attention paid to this point.

On the other hand, the diaries sent from Somaliland, which were ordered to be drawn up in accordance with instructions which were based upon the experience of the deficiencies of South African diaries, contained far more precise information.

The Japanese reports—I have not seen their war diaries—may be taken as an example of what can be attained to in the field. No question that I have asked at any time regarding a battle but could be answered from them. The numerous rough though neatly executed sketches in them show all the detail of dispositions that can possibly be required. The positions of the infantry and artillery at different periods of an action, and the ranges at which the latter fired, are all clearly shown. Indeed, of the reports it may be said that nothing worth recording is omitted, and, in consequence, the greatest of all benefits, experience for the future, can be readily gathered.

It must, however, be remembered that though the work done in this direction by the Japanese is of high quality, they have not waited till their army was before the enemy in order to instruct their officers in some degree in it. During peace manœuvres, from the company and even the section commander upwards to the higher staff officers, reports are demanded, and sketches which I have seen in Manchuria, executed by newly joined officers, showing the dispositions during various phases of an action of their section and company, prove that they have been sufficiently trained in peace time.

As manœuvres are not general in all parts of our army annually, and in any case are usually of short duration, opportunity might be taken of the annual company training to make all officers prepare brief reports, stating the orders given, position of company or half company at different periods, rough sketches, &c., &c., during the days devoted to operations, outpost duty, convoys, &c. Such an exercise, which might be extended in some degree to the non-commissioned officers, would, I believe, add not only to the interest taken in the work,

improve the general standard of ability, make promotion examinations for some less formidable, and create the habit of recording events in simple and terse language. It would, further, have the ultimate advantage of training the whole army to keep, during a campaign, intelligent memoirs whereby the writing of history and the amassing of experience would be greatly facilitated.

APPENDIX.

Extracts from Japanese Field Service Regulations.

When an action is over, a report of the occurrence must be made without delay to higher authority. As soon as possible afterwards a complete report will be drawn up framed in a similar manner, and this report will be based upon the reports received from units. There is no regulation form for these reports, but events will be recorded according to the hours at which they took place. In the case of a battle happening in a large district, this district may be divided up into areas, and what took place in each area will be reported upon separately.

The main object of the full report—which is sent in after the immediate report—is to provide, through general officers commanding, the head-quarters with all important details of what has occurred so that guidance may be obtained in carrying out future operations.

For this reason the full report of a large unit must contain information under the following headings :—

1. Conditions of both hostile armies before the beginning of the action.
2. Time when the action began.
3. Natural features of the battlefield (only necessary ones).
4. Strength of both armies.
5. How the enemy's position was captured.
6. How units were arranged for the attack.
7. Written and verbal orders, &c.
8. Conditions of every period of the fight.
9. Conditions at the crisis or point of the fight which brought about success or the reverse.
10. Movement of neighbouring units during the crisis.
11. How the engagement terminated and the results that followed.
12. Position and movements of both hostile armies after the battle.
13. Plan of operations intended to be carried out on the night following the battle or on the next day.
14. Regimental numbers and names of superior officers of the enemy engaged.

The above are the principal points and those which are considered of first importance, but they may be added to if desired or some omitted if thought necessary. The latter course might be followed when a unit has fought alone or with a much larger force.

Orders and reports which have been received and issued during an action, and which have had a favourable or adverse effect on its conduct, will be attached to the report.

In the full report there must be lists showing casualties, captures, arms lost or injured, and ammunition expended. (In the appendices to the Regulations are forms for these lists, which will accompany the full translation of the work later.)

Gallant actions on the part of individuals or units will also be brought to notice.

Sketches.—For those districts which appear on the map in the hands of the troops, sketches will merely be required to amplify them.

Simple rough sketches are useful in the following cases:—

To show the battle ground at the time when it was reconnoitred, to show the defences of the enemy in detail, to take the place of long explanations and complicated sentences.

As rough sketches have frequently to be made on horseback and in haste, great accuracy is not necessary. The width of a river need not be drawn to scale, but it may be marked in figures alongside it. What is required, above all, is clearness and sufficient accuracy to make the sketch useful.

War Diaries.

Entries must be made in war diaries as soon as possible after the occurrence. If the entry is postponed it becomes less valuable the greater the delay.

1. The following units are responsible for keeping a war diary:—Every department of Imperial Head-Quarters, except the postal department; each head-quarters commanded by a general, and if, from the nature of its organization, this be subdivided into sections, each section, except the postal section, will keep a diary; every department of the inspector of the line of commuication; every line of communication post, regiment, battalion, detached company, regimental column of artillery, unit in a fortress, independent fortress, independent fort, telegraph corps, sanitary corps, hospital columns, corps of observation, arms depôt, reserve corps, reserve depôt, bearer corps for sick and wounded, and horse depôt.

Every head-quarters of a depôt and every unit of reserve at home will also keep a depôt diary according to the above sub-divisions, and the points to be entered in the diary are as shown below under head "B," paragraph 3.

2. A war diary or depôt diary will be kept from the day of mobilization. Those units, especially established for temporary duty, will begin their respective diaries, firstly, by the hand of an officer or warrant officer who may first arrive at the place of mobilization of such unit, and the diary will be continued by the person deputed to take charge of the record.

3. The object of keeping diaries is two-fold, viz.:—

A. To furnish a history of an individual or unit and to keep a record of occurrences which have been actually witnessed. From these accounts a history of the war can be prepared, and from them it can be seen whether each individual has fulfilled his duties.

B. To serve for future reference, with the idea of making improvements in the following:—Organization, education, supply, reserve, sanitation, arms, ammunition, tools, material, clothing, equipment, and all other military matters.

4. In order to attain the object stated under "A," the following points must be borne in mind:—

(1) All orders, instructions, and reports must be recorded. (Matters of a confidential nature will be entered in the confidential diary, note to this effect being made in the diary.)

(2) Every day's position, that is to say, the arrival at, departure from, or halt at such and such a place, &c.

(3) Everything regarding the line of march and quarters.

(4) Report regarding the fighting, giving the conditions in every detail, the respective connection with other units in the neighbourhood, sketch showing the positions of units at the most important phases. These sketches should be as clear and minute as possible.

5. Any important matters that have occurred during the fighting. In filling in the report of an action in the diary, the hour at which occurrences took place should be entered with exactitude; the state of the weather, conditions of the ground and roads, and the presence of houses, &c., affecting units should also be noted.

6. What part of the front, &c., was occupied by the unit furnishing the diary, that is to say, whether the unit formed a piquet, was head of the advanced guard or the main body, &c.

7. Changes in personnel, killed and wounded, &c., giving the name and rank in the case of officers, and only the number in the case of the rank and file or animals.

8. Description of quarters during a halt.

9. Construction of field works.

10. Any other matters of importance which may occur day by day.

The following points should be borne in mind in order to carry out the requirements of "B":—

(1) Everything regarding arms ammunition, tools, material, clothing, and equipment.

(2) In what way organization and regulations have stood the test of operations.

(3) Everything regarding the reserve (men and horses) supply and sanitation.

(4) All points regarding education and discipline.

(5) Action taken at times of emergency, such as the collection of a heavy indemnity from the inhabitants of the enemy's country.

(6) All orders issued by the general commanding, orders by units, and from other authorities, reports made, detailed information of all kinds, lists of casualties, lists of expenditure of arms and ammunition, reports from outposts, &c., must be entered in the diaries. Matters of a confidential nature will be entered later if, on account of their confidential character, they cannot be entered at once.

(7) On these diaries the date, the hour, and the name of the place should be clearly entered, and the commander or chief of the staff of the units should examine, and will sign at the end of each day's record.

(8) On demobilization the diaries will be closed, and the duplicate will be sent to the War Department, the original being kept with the unit. The War Department, after extracting the necessary information, will pass the duplicate to the General Staff, where it will be preserved in the library.

(9) All the above regulations—viz., from (1) to (8)—will be written in at the beginning of each war diary.

INDEX.

A.

ADVANCED GUARDS, 479, 495.

ADVANCED TRENCHES AT PORT ARTHUR, source of weakness, 453.

AKASAKA-YAMA ATTACKED, 401–3; evacuated, 404; 468–9.

AMMUNITION, expenditure of, 80 (note), 227, 228, 270, 322, 324–5, 337.

AMMUNITION, supply of, 43, 142, 210–1, 356, 373; artillery cease fire for want of, 227, 228, 285, 302; abandoned by Russians, 315; 600 rounds carried, 346; 517–8, 525; cavalry, 531, 545; amount carried by infantry, 667, 668.

ANONYMITY OF JAPANESE SOLDIERS, 180.

ARTILLERY, field, Japanese, *at battle of Mukden*, 97, 113, 116, 117, 151, observation and signalling, 151–2; 185, 200; cover, 216; massed, 217, runs short of ammunition, 227, 228; receives kanjo, 229–30; *At Port Arthur, see* Artillery, siege; order of battle, 455–6. Co-operation, 516; fires at night, 38; First Army, concentrated, 242; under one command, 304, rapid fire, 333; fire towards sound 264, fires on own infantry 267, expenditure of ammunition 270, shift position at night 272–3, 275; finds road too bad, 276; escort protects, 276; cover made in action, 281, 293; sandbags carried, 282 (note); six batteries in line, 293; 560–623, views on indirect laying, 561, 584, 593–4; gun pits 561, massing *v.* dispersal 562, 583, 591, 614; signalling, 563, 593, 607; ranging, 563, 596, 607; high-explosive shell, 564, 581–2, 600; Hijikata battery, 566–7; data as to gun and ammunition, 567–8, 588; want of mobility, 568–9, 589; personnel, 589, 622; superiority of personnel to Russian, 570, 587; shrapnel, 573, 598–600; transmission of orders, 574, 591; field glasses, 574; tactics, 575–7, 606; danger of movement under fire, 577–8, 595, 619–20; gallop, 578; support of infantry, 579; cover, 580, 594–5, 608, 620; screens, 581; disposal of wagons, 581, 595, 609; casualties, 582–3; night firing, 584, 601, 605; summary, 585–6; shields, 589, 607; equipment and harness, 590; organization, 590–1, 621; ammunition columns, 592; aiming posts, 595; range-finder, 596; use of cover by detachments, 597; at battle of Mukden, 603–23; half-covered position, 606; elevating gear, 608; in pursuit, 611; four-gun batteries, 614–5; tactical points, 616–20; artillery duel, 617–8; second line of wagons, 622; care of material, 622.

ARTILLERY, field, Russian, *at battle of Mukden*, good practice, 200; good service in retreat, 215; reckless firing, 216; surprise Japanese cavalry, 282; invisible, 286; held in reserve, 297. Dispersal of guns, 563, 584; ranging, 564, 570–1, 596–7, 606; data as to gun and ammunition, 567–8, 587; shrapnel, 572, 606; observation of fire, 573; alternative positions, 577; cover, 580, 594; organization, 592; indirect laying, 593; small effect of fire, 609–10; capture of, 612; Q.L. not Q.F., 614. Night-firing, 44, 303, 309.

ARTILLERY FIRE, small effect of, 154–5, 164, 165, 167, 179, 216, 268, 270, 582–3, 609–10.

ARTILLERY, heavy, Japanese, observing station, 5; 413, 456; order of battle, 456; *at battle of Mukden*, 90, 92, 95, 96, 102, 107, 110, 115, 117, 157, 185, 204, 207, 234, 235, 296, 302, 304, 309, 311, 610–1.

Artillery, heavy, Russian, *at battle of Mukden*, 203, 216.

Artillery, horse, Japanese, improvised, 549; none with First Army, 601.

Artillery, mountain, Japanese, 52; *at battle of Mukden*, 83, 95 (note), 113, 116, 117, 151; brought up to silence machine guns, 153–4; co-operation with infantry, 159, 217, 289, 291; description, 384; 439, 457–8, 462; Russian opinion, 489; used as howitzers, 565; 585, 589, 595, 612–3, 620–1; batteries available, 620.

Artillery, naval, at siege of Port Arthur, 374, 376.

Artillery, siege, Japanese, number of guns at Port Arthur, 361; additions, 363, 364, 366; 377, 388; 395, 404, 408; numbers at commencement of siege, 414, 424; 433; employment on 19th September, 439–40; co-operation with infantry, 445; order of battle, 456; 458, 473.

Attack between two divisions stopped by cross-fire, 222.

Attack, formations, 177; fails on account of insufficient artillery preparation, 204; less loss when moving, 209; flank, 210; frontal, 212–3; 285; remarks, 343–5. *See* Infantry formations.

Attack, infantry, 501–19; characteristics, 502; front, 502; deployment, 503–4; examples, 505–12; formations, 512; co-operation, 515; communication, 518. Stopped at 700 and 800 yards, 201; at 450 yards, 204; remarks on opening fire and dangerous zone, 344.

B.

Balloon, 28, 91, 165, 187, 626.

Bands, 353.

Base at Dalny, 385.

Batteries, 377, 392.

Bayonet fighting, 12, 15, 46, 47; *at battle of Mukden*, 122, 136, 138, 139, 141, 215; short duration, 345.

Boer tactics, 152.

Boots, 674.

C.

Canteen, 385–6.

Cart, transport, condemned, 176.

Case shot, not carried, 601.

Casualties, comparison, when moving and when halted, 209, 507; shell and rifle fire, 215, 507, 565, 582–3, 588, 598, 609.

Casualties, Japanese, Second Japanese Army, 19 (note); *at Hei-kou-tai*, 48, 50, gun and rifle fire, 53. *At battle of Mukden*, 102, 103, 113, 117, 122, 136, 143; *Second Army*, tables, 145–7, 154; loss from artillery fire, 164; 166, 172, 173; less when moving than halted, 209; 8th Division, 215; Third Army, 227; First Army, 252, 255, 267, 271, 285, 291; 2nd Division, 294; 12th Division, 322, 325, 337; during investment of *Port Arthur*, 359, 361; at siege, 364, 366, 368, 369; August, 376, 387; October, 394, 398; at 203-Metre Hill, 404, 437; 407, 408, 415; at Ta and Hsiao Ku Shan, 417, 420, 423; in August, 425; in October, 449, 451, 452; November, 466, 467; December, 472.

Casualties, Russian, *at battle of Mukden*, 143, 144.

Cavalry Brigade, 1st, 2, 18, 22; engineers with, 23; at Hei-kou-tai, 33; raid, 61–5; 66–82; 480, 481, 482; conceals Third Army, 87; composition, 89 (note), 134; effect of raids, 90–1; *at battle of Mukden*, 92, 94, 95, 96, 98, 99, sends in information, 100; joins Third Army, 222; joins Cavalry Division, 223.

Cavalry Brigade, 2nd, *at battle of Mukden*, 220; stops 25 Russian squadrons, 222; joins Cavalry Division, 223; early action, 231–2; opposed to Russian cavalry, 476; 479, 480, 481.

Cavalry Division, Japanese, formed, 223; 224, 225, 226, 232, 483.

Cavalry, divisional, Japanese, 18, 21, 35, 36, 66–82. *At the battle of Mukden*, 100, 108, 124, 127, sent to garrison a village, 170; used up as orderlies, 214; 257, 261; surprised by artillery, 282; 296, 311 (note), 333; 536.

Cavalry, Japanese, excellent infantry, 179; training, 231; numbers, 231; at siege of *Port Arthur*, 361, 366. Ammunition, 531; machine guns, 531, 549; signalling, 531; transport, 532; reconnaissance, 534; dismounted work, 534; feeding, 534, 548; remounts, 535; shock action, 535–6; divisional, 536; suitability of country, 535, 536, 537; personnel, 537–8, 546; horses, 538–9, 547; as horse masters, 543; opinion on armament, 545; wastage, 547; shoeing, 549; raids, 551–7; night operations, 557–9; Russian notes on, 487–8, 494, 498; report on, by Captain Jardine 526–41, by Colonel Birkbeck 542–59, Sir Ian Hamilton on, 528–9; organization, 529–30, 546; telephones, 530; pioneer equipment, 530; saddle, 530, 548; equipment, 530–1, 547–8.

Cavalry, Russian, storm village, 43; in rear during *battle of Mukden*, 92; 220, 221, 222, 225; in action, 232–3; charge infantry, 316; reconnaissance 474–7, dismounted action 475, criticism, 477; engages Japanese cavalry, 480, 481, 482; tactics recommended for, 488; comparison with Japanese, 540.

Chang-tan, attack on, at battle of Mukden, 508–12.

Chien Nien-yu-pao, attack on, 186–8.

Chien Shan, capture of, 351–2; counter-attack on, 353–4.

Chi-kuan Shan (East), attack on, 393–4, 399, blown up, 409; attack on, 442–56; description, 449; final attack, 464–66.

Chinese Wall at Port Arthur, 396, 399, 400, 466.

Civil Governor, duties, 652–7.

Climate of Manchuria, 22.

Clothing, for cold weather, 342.

Clothing, Japanese, 665, 673–6, system of supply, 673; winter, 674; khaki, 676.

Colours, carried, 530; Russian, captured, 252; 290.

Communicating, front to rear, 518, 574, 591.

Communication, line of, First Army, at Mukden, 296.

Containing attacks, 84, 211, 518.

Cooking utensils, Japanese, 664.

Co-operation, between units, 515; infantry and artillery, 159, 214; not waited for, 217, 218, 270, 291.

Co-operation of artillery and infantry, 445, 448, 453, 516, 617.

Cossacks, 59.

Counter-attacks, 111, 138, 144, 166, 222, 223, 224, 226, 227; successful Russian, 290, 308, 309.

Countermining, 462, 464.

Court-martial, 660.

Cover for guns, 580, 624; made during action, 158, 197; at night, 216.

Crime, statistics, 661.

Cyclists, 495.

D.

Daily life of soldier, 662–5.

Dalny, occupied, 348; covered by 11th Division, 349; cleared of mines, 360; looted, 371; as base, 385.

Dead used as cover, 271.

Despatch magazines, 673.

Disembarkation, in Saghalien, 485, 486, 6th and 11th Divisions, 348.

Division, Guard, *at battle of Mukden*, 243, 244, 245, 246, 249, 250, 251, 252, 256–7.

Division, 1st, occupies Liu-shu-tun, 348; 351, 355, 378, 397; leaves Port Arthur, 413; operations, 13th to 22nd August, 419; 432, 446; order of battle, 455; 471.

Division, 2nd, at Hei-kou-tai, 14, 43, 46, 47; *at battle of Mukden* 260–94, composition, 261; casualties, 294.

Division, 3rd, 1, 2, 17; *at Hei-kou-tai*, 28, 33, 36, 44; *at battle of Mukden*, in reserve, 89, 90; sent to the Second Army, 110; shifted to the left, 115, 118, 119, 128; attack on Yu-hung-tun, 137–43; 202.

Division, 4th, 18; *at battle of Mukden*, 89, 96, 97, 99, 101, 102, 105; transferred to Fourth Army, 110, 133; 111, 116; returns of Second Army, 124; order of battle, 132; attack on Hsiao Kuei-hsing-pu, 134.

Division, 5th, *at Hei-kou-tai*, 14, 18 (note), 37, 40, 43, 45, 47; casualties, 50; detailed description of attack, 51, 505–7; *at battle of Mukden*, 89, 95, 97, 99, 100, 103, 104, 111, 113, 116, 119, 124, 125, 127; order of battle, 132, 149; detailed operations, 148–80.

Division, 6th, disembarks, 348; 1, 2, 6, 18, at Hei-kou-tai, 28.

Division, 7th, arrives, 366, 398, 459; at 203-Metre Hill, 400–3; leaves Port Arthur, 413; order of battle, 459; 471; *at battle of Mukden*, attacked in flank, 226.

Division, 8th, 14, 21, 23, *at Hei-kou-tai*, 29, 31, 32, 47, 56; casualties, 50; *at battle of Mukden*, 89, 96, 97, 98, 101, 103, 105, 110, 114, 117, 119; moves to the left, 126; 127, 128; order of battle, 133, 182; detailed operations, 181–218; phases of the battle, 183; attacks on Yang-shih-tun and Kan-kuan-tun, 198–206; sent north, 206; attack on Chang-tan, 508–12.

Division, 9th, arrives, 354; 355, 380; leaves Port Arthur, 413; 19th–31st August, 421–5, 446; order of battle, 455; *at battle of Mukden*, 115, 128, 202; makes flank march, 223, 225; casualties, 227; receives a kanjo, 229.

Division, 11th, disembarks, 348; 349, 351, 355, 356, 378; leaves Port Arthur, 413; attack of Ta and Hsiao Ku Shan, 416–8; fails in attack of East Chi-kuan Shan, 421; 446; order of battle, 455; sent to the east, 86; joins Fifth Army, 87.

Division, 12th, at battle of Mukden, 295–347; joined by reserve brigade, 234; composition, 296; abandons the pursuit, 337; casualties, 337; movements of 2nd line transport, 339.

Division, 14th, arrives, 483.

Drafts, system of, 479; to complete units, 21.

Drunkenness, 665.

Dug-outs, 4.

E.

Electric alarm wires, 422.

Engineers, 23, 42; *at battle of Mukden*, 96, 97, 98, 103, 104, 108, 114, 119, 136, 140, 141; losses, 145–6, 195, 269, 306, 317, 358; additional, *at Port Arthur*, 366; 375; reinforcements, 396, 397–8; 458, 460, 499, 508, 509, 514, 523, function of divisional engineer, 632; duties of, 642; at siege, 644.

Entrenching tools carried, 638–9, 667, 668.

Entrenchments, new Russian pattern, 270; diagram of trench, 279; on Shu-kou Shan, 301 and Map 66, 307, 308, at Pien-niu-lu-pu, 312, on the Sha Ho, 3–5, 6, 7, contrast of Russian and Japanese, 19, 41, 51; Russian, 155, 188, 198–9; Japanese under fire, 212; Third Army entrenches in June 1905, 481; dug under fire, 491; 501, 502, 506, 517; at night, 524.

Equipment, infantry, notes on, 346–7.

Erh-lung Shan, attack on, 390–1, 392–3, 394, mines exploded, 397, 398, 399, 400, captured, 407; attack on, 445; final operations, 461–3; Map 79; 466.

Extensions, infantry, 152, 186, 187, 189–90, 201, 203, 208, 308, 320, 332, 502, 506, 507, 511, 513.

F.

Fan Ho, 287, 329, 331.

Field fortification, Russian, *at Mukden*, 213–4; Russian defence works, 624–8; at Nan Shan, conspicuous, 624, passive defence, 625; Shou-shan-pu, 625–6; Liao-yang, 626–7. Sir W. G. Nicholson's remarks, 627–8; 635–8; Tieh-ling, 636; invisibility, 637; Sha-to-tzu, 638. *See also* Entrenchments, Obstacles, Hand-grenades, Japanese defence works.

Fifth Japanese Army, formed, 87; 92; composition, 235 (note); 241, 242, 243, 245, 247, 253, 256, 258, 262, 274, 276, 277.

Fire, opened by Russians at 1,200–800 yards, 515, by Japanese at 1,000–800 yards, 515.

First Japanese Army, *at the battle of Mukden*, 234–59; composition, 234; position, 239; orders, 240; covers 25 miles, 245; pursuit, 248; casualties, 252, 255; rest, 253; comments, 255–9; operations of 2nd Division, 260–94; the pursuit, 275; operations of the 12th Division, 295–347; line of communication, 296.

Flags, 380, 391, 424, 431, 435, 448, 472.

Flank, attacks, 211.

Flank march, at battle of Mukden, 223, 225.

Fleet, Japanese, does not co-operate in attack on Port Arthur forts, 441.

Fleet, Russian, bombards troops, 351, 353, 354, 357, 417.

Forage, 338.

Fort Kuropatkin, description of, 426–7; 374, 378, 380; capture, 381; 386; attack on 19th August, 421; recaptured by Russians, 422; capture of, 426–31; artillery action, 439–41.

Fougasses, 467.

Four-gun field batteries, 614–5.

Fourth Japanese Army, 28; composition, *at battle of Mukden*, 87, 235; 92, 95; in need of help, 109; 4th Division sent to it, 110, 123, 130; 164, 241, 247, 250, 251, 253, 254, 331.

Fu-shun, 279; attack on, 281.

G.

General Officer leads assault, 406.

Grippenberg, General. *See* Hei-kou-tai.

Gun platform, 382 (diagram).

"G" Work captured, 387–8, 392, 393–4; attack on, 443.

H.

Hand-grenades, 16, 42, 84, 122, 139, 141, 165, 265, 267, 290, 307, 308, 309, 346, 358, 367, 383, 406, 423, 431, 436, 451, 453, screens for protection, 462; petroleum, 465; 469, 501, 515, 523.

Hasegawa, Major, raid, 61–5.

Head-cover, value of, 83–4; 113, 188, 199; absence of, 214; 313, 321, 624, 631 (photograph 13), page 632. *See also* Loopholes.

Hei-kou-tai, battle of, 14, 28–53; description of ground, 30; casualties, 48, 50; Russians engaged, 48; Sir Ian Hamilton's account, 53–9; attack of 5th Division, 505–7.

High-explosive shell, 218, 228, 564–5, 568, 581–2, 600–1, 611.

Hijikata battery, 566–7, 614–5.

Holdall, blue cloth, 668.

Horsemanship, Japanese, 176, 543.

Horses of the Cavalry, 538–9; artillery, 589; stampede, 38; stand severe cold, 80.

Hospitals at Port Arthur, hit by shell, 406.

Howitzers, 28-cm., at Mukden, 95, 151; description, 382–3; 4·6-inch. 416.

Hsiao Kuei-hsing-pu, attack on, 134–6.

Hsiao Ku Shan, attack on, 387, 399; attack and capture of, 416–8.

Hsi Shan, attack on, 355–8.

Hun River, description, 163, 182.

I.

Ice broken by Russian artillery fire, 282.

Indirect laying, 12, 14, 265, 272, 281, 291, 292, 307, 314, 357, 373, 584, 604, 606, 625.

Infantry formations, 12, 15, 51–3; *at battle of Mukden*, 135, 138, 141, 152, 158, 177–8, 186, 187, 189, 194, 201, 203, 208–10, 266, 307, 332 (diagram); *at Port Arthur*, 367, 368, 373, 383, 391, 393, 402, 422, 443, 445, 452; crawling, 469; Russian notes on Japanese, 490–1, 494, 496–8; attack, 501–19; 506–7, 509, 512–3. *See* Attack, infantry.

Infantry, Japanese, equipment, 210; bad scouting, 329; kit, 383, 666–9; Sir Ian Hamilton's opinion, 561; Col. Hume's, 575; daily life of, 662–9.

Infantry, mounted, 398, 459; Japanese views on, 550.

Infantry, Russian, *at battle of Mukden*, led by mounted officers, 121, bad shooting, 152, 347; open fire at 1,500 yards, 201, 209; fire in rear of Japanese, 46; Sir Ian Hamilton's opinion, 561; bad shooting, 639.

Instructors, 615.

Invisibility, of late Russian field works, 637; 641–2; of Russian works at Mukden, 113, 172, 198, 213.

I-tzu Shan, sapping commenced, 471.

J.

Japanese defence works, 629–32 (photographs after page 632); main features, 630; 633–5; redoubts, 630, 635, 641; improvised cover, 640; villages, 640. *See also* Field works.

K.

Kachi-yama, 17.

Kanjo, 228, 229–30.

Kan-kuan-tun, attack on, 198.

Khaki, 676.

Kit, Japanese infantry, 667; blue holdal 668; in action, 668; weight carried, 669. *See also* Infantry, Japanese.

Kobu-yama, captured, 393–4; description, 450; 451, 452.

Kuan-tung Peninsula, operations in, 348–59; description, 350.

L.

Latrines, 663.

Liao River as line of communication, 479.

Liu-shu-tun, base of Second Army, 372.

Long-range fire, little used, 513, 515.

Loopholes, 8, 20. *See also* Head-cover.

M.

Machine guns, 5, 6, 7, 33, 45, 46, 56, 57; *at battle of Mukden*, 83, 98, 127, 135; mountain guns brought up to silence, 153–4; number per division, 234; 270, 271, 282, 288, 289, 306, 309, 311, 321, 346.

Machine guns, *at Port Arthur*, 357, 368, 375, 406, 434, 435, 436, 437, 439, 460, 461, 510, 511, 517; mountings, 526; cavalry, 531; 549; emplacements (photographs 8, 9 and 12), page 632.

Map, captured, 101; indifferent, 208, 322; 253; found on dead officer, 267.

Medical arrangements, *at battle of Mukden*, in 5th Division, 156, 159, 174; Chinese stretcher bearers, 205; remarks on, 343.

Metre Hill, 203-, 367–8, 382, 389; sapping, 394, 397; Japanese repulse, 400–3, 401 (sketch); capture of, 403–4; 405; attack on 20th September, 437; supposed tunnels, 437; description, 467; final operations, 469–71.

MINES, 367, 368, 369, 391, 392, 393, 397, 406, 408, 409, 427, 459, 461, 462, 463.

MISHCHENKO, Lieut.-General, raid, 13, 22, 23–8; at Hei-kou-tai, 35, 481, 482.

MIXTURE OF UNITS, 299.

MO-CHIA-PU, attack on, 165–72, 196–7.

MORTARS, grenade, 515, 523; *at battle of Mukden*, 108, 119, 134, 136, 165; description, 391, 451.

MORTARS, light, 399, 416.

"M" WORK, description, 450; captured, 472.

MUKDEN, battle of, operations of Second Japanese Army, 83–147; Oyama's plan, 86, 241, 255; description of ground, 93, 113, 181, 219, 236–8; first phase, 94; second phase, 97; criticism of the Second Army, 107–8; Russian defences, 113; third phase, 113; general reserve, 119 (note); the task of the Second Army, 130–2; detailed account of the attack on Hsiao Kuei-hsing-pu, 134–6; detailed account of the attack on Yu-hung-tun, 137–43; casualties, Second Army, 145–7; operations of the 5th Division, 148–80; operations of the 8th Division, 181–218; strength of units, 187 (note), 188, 215; operations of the Third Japanese Army, 219–30; flank marches, 223–5; casualties, Third Army, 227; operations of Japanese cavalry, 231–3; operations of the First Japanese Army, 234–59; Russian order of battle, 240; operations of the 2nd Division, 260–94; operations of the 12th Division, 295–347.

N.

NAGANUMA, Lieut.-Colonel, raid, 66–82.

NAKAMURA, Major-General, leads assault on fort, 466–7.

NAMAKO-YAMA, description, 434; captured, 381–2; attack on, 432; capture of, 434–5.

NAN SHAN, Russian losses at, 350.

NAVAL BRIGADE, 350, 374.

NIGHT OPERATIONS, 47, 49; *at the battle of Mukden*, 90, 101, 119, 121, 136, 140, 154, 171; Japanese lose their way, 205, 266; 211–2, 226–7, 274, artillery fire, 303, 306–8 (diagram), remarks, 344–6; 357; failure, 466–7; 489–90, 491, 500; general account, 520–5, diagram 522; examples, 523; by cavalry, 559; firing by artillery, 584, 601; 605.

NIU-CHIA-TUN, attack on, 24–6.

NORTH FORT, attacked, 393–4, 395, 396, 399, 400; captured, 406; 451; final attack, 459–61; Map 78.

"N" WORK, description, 450; captured, 472.

O.

OBSERVING STATION, 5, 7, 374, 404, 405, 440, 630 (photographs 10 and 11), 632.

OBSTACLES, 5, 7, 19; little used at Mukden, 100, 134, 188, 199; abattis and pits, 213; destruction of, 265, 266, 269, 301, 312, 313; wire cages, 313, 347; value of, 626, 627, 628, 630, 634, 637, 640–1.

ORDER OF BATTLE, Japanese, *at Hei-kou-tai*, 49; *at battle of Mukden*, Second Army, 132; Third Army, 221; *at Port Arthur*, 455–6, 458.

Order of battle, Russian, 21; *at Hei-kou-tai*, 48; *at battle of Mukden*, 143, 240, 297.

Orders, 74; at battle of Mukden, 88, 92, 94, 95, 101, 103; licence in carrying out, 104; 106, 107, 109, 112, 114, 115, 116, 123, 124, 125, 126, 129; transmission of, 214; 241, 248, 249, 261, 262, 263, 275, 278; before battle of Mukden, 297; 298, 304, 306, 310, 325, 390.

Outposts, 496.

Overhead cover, 396; (photograph 4) 632, 635.

P.

Pan-lung Shan (East), attack on, 374, 375, 376, 378; 396, 422–4.

Pan-lung Shan (West), attack on, 375, 376, 378, 422–4.

Pay in the field, 677.

Physical exercises, 662, 670–2.

Pien-niu-lu-pu captured, 306; described, 312.

Port Arthur, siege of, 348–473; garrison, 349–50, 362, 369, 377, 410; operations in Kuan-tung peninsula, 350–9; siege begins, 359 (*see* Casualties); epitome of operations, 360–9; description of defences, 362; diary of the siege, 370–415; general attack of 19th–26th August, 373–6; water supply cut, 381; general attack of 30th October, 392–4; general attack of 26th November, 399–400; attack on 203-Metre Hill, 400–4; East forts captured, 408–9; surrender, 409–13; well-fed appearance of garrison, 410, 412; summary, 413–5; supplies captured, 415; attack and capture of Ta Ku Shan and Hsiao Ku Shan, 416; operations, 13th to 22nd August, 419–20; 19th to 31st August, 421–5; capture of Fort Kuropatkin, 426–31; 19th to 22nd September, 432–8; employment of artillery, 19th September, 439–40; attack on Chi-kuan Shan works in October, 442–54; net results, 453; order of battle of Third Army, 455–6, 458; concluding operations, 457–73; assaults in November, 464–71.

Punishment, powers of, 660–1.

Putilov Hill, 1, 5.

"P" Work, captured, 393–4; description, 450; 452.

Q.

"Q" Work, attack, 399, 400, 451; description, 450; captured, 472.

R.

Raids, 551–7; Japanese, 59–65; 66–82; remarks on, 80; articles carried, 81. *See also* Mishchenko.

Railway, built by Russians, 28, 161, 162; blockhouses, 75; bridge destroyed, 75; line destroyed, 79.

Ranging, 563–4, 570–1, 573.

Rations, 338, 339; emergency, 347, 369; 384; 663.

Rear guards, Russian, 189.

Reconnaissance, Japanese, faulty, 203; misleading, 280; 283, 289; Japanese method, 491, 496; 502, 512; cavalry, 532–3.

Reinforcement, 136, 169, 201, 205; system of, 208, 209; 211.

Reports, 678–83.

Reserve regiments sent to L. of C. duty, 423.

Reserves, 99, 239, 517.

Revolver, not approved of, 345.

Rumours, false, 429.

Ruse, 44; camp fires, 310; rear-guard, 332.

Rushes, 98, 135, 136, 186, 187, 209, 210, 284, 291, 344, 504, 506, 507, 510, 514.

Russian Army, organization at beginning of 1905, 21.

"R" Work, description, 450; captured, 472.

S.

Saghalien, expedition to, 484–6.

Sandbags, used in attack, 93, 142, 185, 186, 197, 198, 212, carried by field artillery, 282 (note); 508, 511, 609, 640.

Sandepu, battle of. *See* Hei-kou-tai.

San gen, description, 120; attack on, 121.

Sanitary measures, absence of, 175; living underground, 343; in occupied districts, 653–5; in cantonments, 663.

Sapping, 379, 384, 389, 393, 394, 429, 437, 442, 443, 446, Map 76.

Scouts, 84, 190, no special trained, 533.

Searchlight, 2, 6, 374, 424, 425, 643.

Second Japanese Army, defensive line on the Sha Ho, 1–10; operations, 20th October to 29th January, and battle of Hei-kou-tai, 11–53; casualties, 19 (note) *at battle of Mukden*, 83–147; composition, 87; reserve, 90; strength, 107; 4th Division given to the Fourth Army, 110; extends to the left, 115; its task, 130–1; base, 372, 385; position at end of the war, 629.

Sha Ho, defensive line on, 1–10; description, 1, 2; 17–20.

Sha-to-tzu, attack on, 113, 116, 127, 128, 165–72, 197, 200, 202, 206.

Shelters, 3.

Shields, 379 (diagram), 380, 430, 436, 515, 589, 607, 643; sap shield, 646.

Shock tactics, 488, 527, 528, 535, 545.

Shrapnel, 567, 572; effect of, 598–600; 606.

Shui-shih-ying redoubts, capture of, 436–7.

Shu-kou Shan, entrenchments on, 301.

Siege park, 389.

Siege trenches, 396, 436–7; diagrams, 646–7; evolution of, 650–1.

Siege Works, 643–51.

Signalling, used at battle of Mukden, 227, 532, 563, 573, 593; introduced, 607.

Spies, bring false news, 221.

Staff Diaries, 678–83.

Sung-shu Shan, attack on, 390, 392–3, 394; guns silenced, 395; mines exploded, 397, 399, assault fails, 400, plan, 408, captured, 408; 452; Map 80; final operations, 463–4; 466; assault led by General Nakamura fails, 466–7.

Supply, 337–8; diary of movement of columns of 12th Division at battle of Mukden, 339–42; diagram, 340; by the River Liao, 479.

Surprise, 279, 280, 286, 359.

Swords, officers', 15.

T.

Tactics, Japanese, Russian notes on, 487–500. *See also* Infantry, Artillery, &c.

Tailors, 674.

Ta Ku Shan, attack and capture of, 415–8.

Tatsumi, Lieut.-General (8th Division), 30 (note), 44.

Telephone, cut, 99; 167, 187; not satisfactory, 214; 228; break down, 250, 440, 441; cavalry, 530; artillery, 591, 593, 604, 607.

Tents, 663.

Third Japanese Army, assembles at Hsiao-pei-ho, 84; *at battle of Mukden*, composition, 220, 361; 94, 99, 100, 103, 105, 107, 110, 114, 123, 130, 191, 196, 219–30; defeats 16th Russian Army Corps in open ground, 245; 253, 254; formed, 348, joined by 1st Reserve Brigade, 350; reinforcements, 354; for operations at Port Arthur, *see* Port Arthur; 7th Division arrives, 366; order of battle, 455–6; concluding operations, 478–83; line of communication, 479, 481; entrenches, 481, joined by 14th Division, 483.

Tieh-ling, defences, 237, movement on, 253; attack on, 293; entered, 293, 330, burning of, 329, 330.

Tinned rations, Russian, 162–3.

Tomioka, Colonel, detachment, 88, 96, 103, 105, 106, 111, 124; order of battle, 133.

Tramway, light, laid, 483.

Transports, protection of, 484.

Trench railways, 378.

Truce at battle of Mukden, used to facilitate retreat, 247–8.

U.

Umezawa Brigade *at the battle of Mukden*, 234, 243, 245, 246, 249, 251, 253, 254, 275, 296, 303, 327, 328, 329, 331.

V.

Valises left behind in action, 356, 373, 668.

Volley firing, Russians give up, 200; 497, 515.

W.

Wang-tai, attack on, 399, captured, 409.

Wan-pu-chieh, attack on, 280.

Weather, *at battle of Mukden*, 100, 104, 125, 129, 157, 171, table of temperature, 174; 191, 226, 238, 250, 264, 265, 316, 320, 337.

Wells, 663.

WHISTLE, not used, 505, 518.
WHITE FLAG, 321, 326.
WOUNDED picked up under fire, 153.
WOUNDS, at Mukden, classification, 147, 215.

Y.

YA-LU ARMY. *See* Fifth Japanese Army.
YANG-SHIH-TUN, attack on, 198.
YA-PA-TAI, attack on, 41.
YUEH-PU-TZU, attack on, 184–6.
YU-HUNG-TUN, description, 120, attack on, 121, 128, 137–43, 166, night attack formation, 522–3, 524.
YU TA SHAN, capture of, 378.


LIBRARY
MAY
1
1981
UNIVERSITY
OF TORONTO

Examination Papers—*continued.*

Regular Forces, Canadian Permanent Forces, Militia, Imperial Yeomanry, and Volunteers. 1903 May, 1904 May, Nov., 1905 Nov., 1906 May, Nov., 1907 May, Nov. Each 1*s.*
Militia. Competitive. 1891 to 1902. Various. Each 1*s.*
Militia, Imperial Yeomanry, and University Candidates. 1903 March, Sept., 1904 March, Sept., 1905 March, Sept., 1906 March, Oct., 1907 March, Oct. Each 1*s.*
Foreign Languages. Modern. 1896 April, Oct.; 1899, 1903, 1904, Oct.; 1905 July, Oct.; 1907 Oct. Each 1*s.*

EXPLOSIVES. Service. Treatise on. 1907. 1*s.* 6*d.*

FIELD SERVICE. Manual for:—

Artillery. Field. Brigade. 18-pr. Q.F. 3*d.*
Ditto. Royal. 1889. 1*s.*
Cavalry Regiment. 1907. 3*d.*
Infantry Battalion. 1907. 3*d.*
Infantry. Mounted. 1899. 3*d.*
Medical Services. 1899. 4*d.* (*Under revision*)
Post Office Corps. Army. 1888. 1*d.* (*Under revision*)
Ditto. Home Defence. 1893. 1*d.*

FIELD SERVICE POCKET BOOK. (Provisional). 1907. 1*s.*

FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS:—

Part I. Combined Training. 1905. 1*s.* (*Under revision*)
Ditto Amendments. May 1907. 1*d.*

FINANCIAL INSTRUCTIONS IN RELATION TO ARMY ACCOUNTS. 1903. (Provisional). 6*d.* (*Under revision*)

FOREIGN LANGUAGES, STUDY OF. Regulations. 2*d.*

FRANCO-GERMAN WAR, 1870-71. Translated from the German Official Account. Five vols. £6 11*s.* 6*d.*

Also separately, in Volumes in cloth, Sections in paper covers, and Plans unmounted:—

First Part—History of the War to the Downfall of the Empire—
Vol. 1 (Sec. 1 to 5). Outbreak of Hostilities to Battle of Gravelotte. £1 6*s.* (*Out of print*)
Vol. 2 (Sec. 6 to 9). Battle of Gravelotte to Downfall of Empire. £1 2*s.* (*Out of print*)

Second Part—History of the War against the Republic—
Vol. 1 (Sec. 10 to 13). Investment of Paris to Re-occupation of Orleans by the Germans. £1 6*s.*
Vol. 2 (Sec. 14 to 18). Events in Northern France from end of Nov. In North-west from beginning of Dec. Siege of Paris from commencement of Dec. to the Armistice; Operations in the South-east from middle of Nov. to middle of Jan. £1 6*s.*
Vol. 3 (Sec. 19 and 20). Events in South-east France from middle of Jan. to Termination of Hostilities. Rearward Communications. The Armistice. Homeward March and Occupation. Retrospect. £1 11*s.* 6*d.*

Section
1. Events in July. Plan. 3*s.*
2. Events to Eve of Battles of Wörth and Spicheren. 3rd edition. 3*s.* (*Out of print*)
3. Battles of Wörth and Spicheren. 3rd edition. 5*s.* (*Out of print*)
4. Advance of Third Army to the Moselle, &c. 2nd edition. 4*s.* (*Out of print*)
5. Operations near Metz on 15th, 16th, and 17th August. Battle of Vionville—Mars la Tour. 2nd edition. 6*s.* 6*d.*
6. Battle of Gravelotte—St. Privat. 5*s.* (*Out of print*)

Franco-German War—*continued.*

Section.

7. Advance of Third Army andof Army of the Meuse against Army of Chalons. 6*s.* (*Out of print*)
8. Battle of Sedan. 3*s.* (*Out of print*)
9. Proceedings on German Coast and before Fortresses in Alsace and Lorraine. Battle of Noisseville; General Review of War up to September. 4*s.* 6*d.*
10. Investment of Paris, Capture of Toul and Strassburg. 6*s.*
11. Events before Paris, and at other points of Theatre of War in Western France until end of October. 5*s.* 3*d.*
12. Last Engagements with French Army of the Rhine. Occurrences after fall of Strassburg and Metz to middle of November. 4*s.* 6*d.*
13. Occurrences on Theatre of War in Central France up to Re-occupation of Orleans by the Germans. 6*s.*
14. Measures for Investment of Paris up to middle of December. 4*s.*
15. Measures for Protecting the Investment of Paris and Occurrences before French Capital to commencement of 1871. 2*s.* 6*d.*
16. Proceedings of Second Army from commencement of 1871 until the Armistice. 3*s.* 6*d.*
17. Proceedings of First Army from commencement of 1871 until the Armistice. 3*s.*
18. Occurrences on South-eastern Theatre of War up to middle of January, 1871. Events before Paris from commencement of 1871 to the Armistice. 8*s.*
19. Occurrences on South-east Theatre of War from middle of January, 1871. Proceedings in rear of German Army and in Coast Provinces, from Nov., 1870, until the Armistice. 13*s.* 6*d.*
20. General Retrospect of War from beginning of Sept., 1870, to Cessation of Hostilities. Armistice and Peace Preliminaries. Return of German Army and Peace of Frankfort. The Occupation. The Telegraph, Post, Supply of Ammunition, Commissariat, Hospital Service, Divine Service, Military Justice, Recruitment, and Home Garrisons. Results. 5*s.*

Analytical Index. 1*s.* 6*d.*

Plans—

4. Battle of Colombey-Nouilly. 3*d.*
5A. Battle of Vionville—Mars la Tour. Position of Contending Forces at Noon. 3*d.*
5B. Battle of Vionville—Mars la Tour. Position of Contending Forces from 4 to 5 p.m. 3*d.*
9A. Battle of Sedan. Position of Contending Forces towards Noon. 3*d.*
9B. Battle of Sedan. Position of the Germans in the afternoon shortly before the end of the struggle. 3*d.*

GERMAN ARMY. Field Service Regns. 1900. 6*d.*

GERMAN FIELD ARTILLERY. Drill Regns. 1899. 1*s.* 6*d.*

GERMANY. The Campaign of 1866 in. With 22 Plans in portfolio. 1872 (Reprinted, 1907). 6*s.*
Ditto. Moltke's Projects for. 1*s.*

GUNNERY. Text Book of. Part I. 1907. 2*s.* 3*d.*

GUNS. Handbooks for:—

60-pr. B.L. Mark I. Land Service. 1907. Extracts from. 6*d.*
18-pr. Q.F. Land Service. 1907. Extracts from. 6*d.*
15-pr. B.L. Mark I. and Carriages, Marks I.*, II.*, III, and III*. Field Batteries. 1904. 1*s.*
15-pr. B.L. Marks II. to IV. and Carriage, Wagon, and Limber Mark IV. Field Batteries. 1904. 1*s.*
15-pr. Q.F. Field Batteries. 1905. 9*d.*
13-pr. Q.F. Land Service. 1907. Extracts from. 6*d.*
12-pr. of 12 cwt. A, Q.F. Land Service. 1903. 9*d.*
12-pr. B.L. of 6 cwt. Marks I. to IV. and IV*a*, and Carriages Marks I.*, I.** and II. Horse Artillery. 1905. 1*s.*
10-pr. Jointed B.L. Mule Equipment. 1904. 1*s.*
1-pr. Q.F., on Field Carriage. 1902. 1*s.* 6*d.*
9·45-inch B.L. Howitzer. 1906. 9*d.*

Guns. Handbooks for—*continued.*

9·2-inch B.L. Marks IX., X., XV. Land Service. 1906. 1*s.* 6*d.*
8-inch R.M.L. Howitzer of 70 cwt. Movable Armament and Armament of Works. Land Service. 1901. 2*s.*
6-inch B.L. and B.L.C. Guns, Mountings, &c. 1904. 1*s.* 6*d.*
6-inch Q.F. Land Service. 1903. 1*s.*
5·4-inch B.L. Howitzer. Mark I. 1902. 1*s.* 6*d.*
5-inch B.L. Marks I.—V. 1904. 9*d.*
5-inch B.L. Marks IV.—V. Land Service. 1903. 1*s.* 6*d.*
5-inch B.L. Howitzer. 1905. 1*s.*
4·7-inch Q.F. Fixed Armaments. Land Service. 1904. 1*s.*
4·7-inch Q.F.B. (Mark IV*) on Travelling Carriage. Land Service. 1904. 1*s.*
2·95-inch Q.F. Mountain. Mark I. Mule Equipment. 1906. 1*s.* 6*d.*
·303-inch and ·303-inch Converted Maxim Machine (Magazine Rifle Chamber), on Carriages, M.G., Cavalry, Infantry, Parapet; Tripod and Cone Mountings. 1907. 1*s.*
0·303-inch Nordenfelt 3-barrel and Gardner 2-barrel converted from 0·4-inch and 0·45-inch M.H. Chamber, Magazine Rifle Chamber, on Carriages. 1900. 9*d.*

HISTORICAL RECORDS OF THE BRITISH ARMY:—
Horse Guards; 17th Dragoons (Lancers). Each 5*s.*
Dragoon Guards, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th. Each 4*s.*
Dragoons, 1st, 3rd, 6th, 7th, 14th, 15th, and 16th. Each 4*s.*
Ditto 9th, 12th, and 13th. Each 3*s.*
Marine Corps. 3*s.*
Foot, 1st. 6*s.*
Do. 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 34th, 36th, 39th, 46th, 53rd, 67th, 71st, 72nd, 73rd, 74th, 86th, 87th, and 92nd. Each 4*s.*
Do. 14th, 56th, 61st, 70th, and 88th. Each 3*s.*

HISTORIES, SHORT, OF THE TERRITORIAL REGIMENTS OF THE BRITISH ARMY. 67 numbers, each 1*d.* In one volume, 5*s.*
Ditto. The Scots Guards. 1*d.*

HORSE AND STABLE MANAGEMENT. Manual 1904. 4*d.*

HOSTILITIES WITHOUT DECLARATION OF WAR, FROM 1700 TO 1870. 2*s.*

HYDRAULICS FOR GARRISON ARTILLERY, Manual of. 1895. 4*s.*. 6*d.*

INFANTRY TRAINING. 1905. 1*s.*

INFANTRY. Mounted. Training. 1906. 6*d.*

INSTITUTES. Garrison and Regimental. Rules for the Management of. 1907. 1*d.*

INTELLIGENCE DUTIES IN THE FIELD. Regns. for. 1904. 2*d.*

JAPANESE ARMY MANUALS. INFANTRY TRAINING. Part II. (Provisional). 1907. THE COMBAT. 3*d.*

KING'S REGULATIONS AND ORDERS FOR THE ARMY. 1908. 1*s.* 6*d.*

KIT PLATES:—
Artillery. Royal—
(1.) Horse and Field. Kit in Barrack Room. 1903. 2*d.*
(2.) Ditto. Kit laid out for Inspection. 1903. 2*d.* (*Under revision*)
(6.) Garrison. Kit laid out for Inspection. 1904. 2*d.*
(10.) Ditto. Kit in Barrack Room. 1904. 2*d.*
Cavalry. 1891. 1*d.*
Engineers. Royal—
No. 1. Dismounted. Detail of Shelf and Bedding. 1908. 1*d.*
No. 2. Dismounted. Full Kit laid out for Inspection in Barrack Room. 1908. 1*d.*
No. 3. Dismounted. Field Kit laid out for Inspection on Parade. 1899. 1*d.*
No. 4. Mounted. Full Kit laid out for Inspection in Barrack Room. 1899. 1*d.*

Kit Plates—*continued.*

Engineers. Royal—*continued.*
No. 5. Mounted. Detail of Shelf and Bedding, New pattern. 1899. 1*d*
No. 6. Driver, with pair of Horses. Field Kit laid out for Inspection on Parade, including Articles carried in Valise on Baggage Wagon. 1899. 1*d.*
No. 7. Driver, with pair of Horses. Peace Marching Order. Kit laid out for Inspection on Parade. 1896. 1*d.*
No. 8. Dismounted. Field Kit laid out for Inspection on Parade. 1898. 1*d.*
Infantry—
No. 1. Kit in Barrack Room. 1905. 2*d.*
No. 2. Kit laid out for Inspection. 1905. 2*d.*
Highland. 1884. 1*d.*

LAW. Military. Manual of. 1907. 2*s.*

LAW FOR THE RESERVE FORCES AND MILITIA. Manual of. 1886. 1*s.* 6*d.*

MAGAZINES AND CARE OF WAR MATÉRIEL. Regulations for. 1908. 9*d.*

MANŒUVRES. Notes on. 1898. 2*s.*

MAP PROJECTIONS. A Sketch of the Subject of. 1902. 4*d.*

MAP READING AND FIELD SKETCHING. Manual. 1906. 1*s.* 3*d.* *And see* Schools, Army.

MECHANISM AS APPLIED TO ARTILLERY. Notes on. Second edition. 1902. 1*s.*

MEDICAL CORPS. Royal Army:—
Admission to. Regns. for. May 1, 1907. 1*d.*
Manual. 1904. *Reprinted* 1906. 9*d.* (*Under revision*)
Training. Extract from. Part. II. Drills and Exercises. 1908. 3*d.*
Standing Orders. 1907. 1*s.*

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT. Army. Index to Appendices of Reports from 1859 to 1896. 3*d.*

MEDICAL ORGANIZATION OF FOREIGN ARMIES. (Chiefly for War). 1902. 1*s.*

MEDICAL SERVICE. Army. Regulations. 1906. 6*d.*

MEDICAL SERVICES. Army. Advisory Board for. The Treatment of Venereal Disease and Scabies. First Report. 1904. 1*s.* 6*d.*; Second Report. 1905. 2*s.*; Third Report. 1905. 1*s.*; Final Report. 1906. 6*d.*

MEDICAL SERVICES OF FOREIGN ARMIES. Handbook of. Part I. France. 6*d.*

MEKOMETER. Handbook. 1904. 6*d.*

MILITIA Regns. 1904. Provisional. 1*s.*

MOBILIZATION Regns. 1906. 4*d.*

MOTOR RESERVE. ARMY. Information regarding Appointment, Promotion, and Conditions of Service. 1*d.*

MUSKETRY EXERCISES. 1904. Provisional. 3*d.* (*Under revision*)

MUSKETRY REGULATIONS. 1905. 1*s.*

NUMBER OF TROOPS TO THE YARD in the Principal Battles since 1850. Memo. on. With opinions of Modern Authorities on limits of extension at the present day. 1884. 9*d.*

NURSING IN THE ARMY. Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service. Reprinted from "The British Medical Journal." 1905. 1*d.*

OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS. Special A.O., March 16, 1908. 1*d.*

OPTICAL MANUAL or Handbook of Instructions for the guidance of Surgeons. Third edition. 1885. 1*s.* 6*d.*

OPTICS. Notes on. 6*d.*

ORDNANCE COLLEGE (*and see* Artillery College):—
Advanced Classes. Reports on. Various. Each 1*s.*
Ordnance Courses. Reports on. Various. Each 1*s.*
Regulations. 1907. 2*d.*

ORDNANCE CORPS. Army. Standing Orders. 1906. 6*d.*

ORDNANCE. SERVICE. Treatise on. Sixth edition. 1904. With Volume of Plates. 10*s.* (*Under revision*)
Ditto. Amendments. 2*d.*

ORDNANCE SERVICES. ARMY. Regns. 1907. Part I. 9*d.*

PATHOLOGICAL SPECIMENS in the Museum of the Army Medical Department, Netley. Descriptive Catalogue of. Third Edition. Vol. I. By Sir W. Aitken, M.D. 1892. 5*s.*

PLACE-NAMES OCCURRING ON FOREIGN MAPS. Rules for the Transliteration of. 1906. 1*s.*

POSITION-FINDER. Handbook. 1904. 3*d.* (*Under revision*)

POSITION-FINDER. Application of, to Coast Batteries. Notes on. 1904. 3*d.*

PROCEDURE. Rules of. 1907. 4*d.*

PROJECTION, &c. Linear Perspective. A Text-Book for use of the R.M. Academy. Part I.—Text. Part II.—Plates. 1904. 6*s.*

PUBLICATIONS (RECENT) OF MILITARY INTEREST. List of. Issued Quarterly. 2*d.*

RAILWAY DISTANCES. Ireland. Handbook of. Third edition. 1884. 7*s.* 6*d.*

RANGE-FINDER Handbooks:—
Depression. For Elevated Batteries. Land Service. 1905. 4*d.*
Watkin. Regulations for Instruction in, and practice with. 1882. 1*s.*

RANGE-FINDING. FIELD. With Watkin Field Range-finder and Telemeter. Handbook. 1904. 6*d.*

RANGES. MINIATURE CARTRIDGE (·220 bore). Instructions for the Construction and Inspection of. (*In the press*)

RECRUITING FOR THE REGULAR ARMY, MILITIA, AND IMPERIAL YEOMANRY. Regulations. 1907. 6*d.*

REMOUNT MANUAL. 1906. 6*d.*

REQUISITIONING OF SUPPLIES, TRANSPORT, STORES, ANIMALS, LABOUR, &c., IN THE FIELD. Instructions for the. 1907. 1*d.*

RESERVE OF OFFICERS. Conditions of Service. 1903. 1*d.*

RHODESIA. Southern. Précis of Information concerning. Jan., 1899. 2*s.*

RIFLE RANGES. Care and Construction of. Instructions for. 1905. 3*d.*

RIFLES, &c. Cleaning of. Notes on the. 1907. 25 for 6*d.*

RUSSIAN MILITARY AND NAVAL TERMS. Dictionary of. 1906. 3*s.* 6*d.*

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR:—
Part I. 1906. 1*s.* 6*d.*
Case for Maps of the Complete Work. 9*d.*

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. Reports from British Officers attached to the Japanese Forces in the Field. In three Vols. (*not sold separately*). 21*s.*

SADDLES AND COLLARS, SORE BACKS AND SORE SHOULDERS. Manual of. Third edition. 1897. 1*s.* (*Under revision*)

"SAM-BROWNE" BELT, SCABBARD, AND SWORD KNOT. Specification and Drawings. 1899. 1*d.*

SANITATION IN ITS APPLICATION TO MILITARY LIFE. Manual of. 1907. 2*d.*

SCHOOLS. Army:—
Map Reading. Notes on. 3*d.* (*And see* Map Reading and Field Sketching).
Physiology. Elementary. Handbook. 1901. 1*d.*
Regulations. 1906. 4*d.*
School Hygiene. Handbook of. For Teachers. 6*d.*

Schools. Army—*continued.*
Singing in. Regns. for Teaching. 1901. 1*d.*
Standing Orders for Inspectors, Examiners, and Teachers. 1906. 6*d.*
Technical Terms, with Definitions, and of Words of Frequent Occurrence in Army Orders. Lists of. For use in. 1906. 2*d.*
Type Exercises of Extracts from Regimental Orders for use of Candidates for Third-class Certificates of Education. 1900. 3*d.*

SCOUTS. Training and use of. Lecture by Col. F. C. Carter. 1905. 2*d.*

SCREWS. Standard Leading. Provision of, for Screw-cutting Lathes. Report of Committee. 1905. 1*s.*

SEVASTOPOL. Siege of. 1854–55. 3 vols., with Case of Maps and Plans. Half Mor., £5 4*s.* Cloth, £4 4*s.*
Or separately:—Vol. I. Engineer Operations. £1 6*s.*; Vol. II. Ditto. With Case of Maps and Plans. £2 10*s.*; Vol. III. Artillery Operations. 10*s.*

SEWAGE. Practical Treatment of. The latest development of. 1903. 6*d.*

SIEGE OPERATIONS in the Campaign against France, 1870-71. (*Von Tiedemann*). Translated. 4*s.* 6*d.*

SIGNALLING. Training Manual. 1907. 6*d.*

SMALL ARMS. Text Book. 1904. 2*s.* 6*d.*

SMALL WARS. Their Principles and Practice. Third Edition. 1906. 4*s.*

SOMALILAND. Military Report on. 1907. Vol. I. Geographical, Descriptive, and Historical. 2*s.*
Ditto. Operations in. 1901-04. Official History. Vol. I. 3*s.*; Vol. II. 4*s.*

SOUTH AFRICAN WAR, 1899-1902:—
Medical Arrangements. 7*s.* 6*d.*
Surgical Cases Noted. 7*s.* 6*d.*
Railways. 4*s.*
Telegraph Operations. 10*s.*
Voluntary Organisations in aid of the Sick and Wounded. Report of the Central British Red Cross Committee on. 1902. 3*s.*

SPECIAL RESERVE:—
SCHEME FOR THE PROVISION, ORGANIZATION, AND TRAINING OF THE SPECIAL RESERVE required to supplement the Regular Army, and the Application of the Scheme to the existing Militia. (Special A.O., Dec. 23, 1907.) 2*d.*
SYLLABUS OF TRAINING ON ENLISTMENT. 1907. ROYAL ARTILLERY, ROYAL ENGINEERS, AND INFANTRY. (Issued with the Special A.O., Dec., 1907, regarding the Organization of the Special Reserve.) 2*d.*

STAFF COLLEGE. Regulations. 1905. 2*d.*

STAFF. General. Duties of. (*Von Schellendorff*). Fourth Edition. 1905. (*Reprinted*, 1908.) 5*s.*

STATIONS OF UNITS OF REGULAR, MILITIA, YEOMANRY, AND VOLUNTEER FORCES. Issued Quarterly. 2*d.*

STATUTES relating to the War Office and to the Army. 1880. 5*s.*

STATUTORY POWERS of the Secretary of State, Ordnance Branch. 1879. 5*s.*

STEAM ENGINES AND BOILERS. Management of. Notes and Memoranda. 1897. 1*d.*

STORES used in H.M. Service. Priced Vocabulary of. Land Service Stores, Naval Ordnance Stores, and Stores common to Land and Naval Services. 1906. Part I. 1*s.* 9*d.* Part II. 3*s.* 6*d.*

SUDAN ALMANAC. 1908. Compiled in the Intelligence Department, Cairo. 1*s.*

SUDAN. The Anglo-Egyptian. A Compendium prepared by Officers of the Sudan Government:—
Vol. I. Geographical, Descriptive, and Historical (*with Eighty-two Illustrations*). 10*s.*
Vol. II. Routes. 7*s.* 6*d.* (*Not containing Chapter VII., Supplement* (*A*).)
Ditto. In Separate Chapters. 1*s.* each:—
I. and II., *Nil.* III. North-Eastern Sudan. IV. Eastern Sudan. V. Central Sudan. VI. South-Eastern Sudan. VII. Bahr-el-Ghazal. VIII. Kordofan. IX. North-Western Sudan.
Ditto. Chapter VII. Supplement (A). Bahr-el-Ghazal. Additional Routes. 1*s.*

SUDAN CAMPAIGN. History of the. In two parts, with Case of Maps. 1890. 15*s.*

SUPPLY, TRANSPORT, AND BARRACK SERVICES. Regulations. 1898. 9*d.*

SURVEYING. Topographical and Geographical. Text Book of. 1905. 3*s.* 6*d.*
Ditto. Appendix XI. Tables for the Projection of Graticules. 4*d.*
SURVEYS (Government) of the Principal Countries. Notes on. Supplement. A Guide to Recent Large Scale Maps, including both Surveys and Compilations, together with a List of some Large Scale Atlases. 1899. 5*s.* 6*d.*
SWEDEN AND NORWAY. Armies of. Handbook. 1901. 1*s.*
SWISS ARMY. Handbook. 1898. 6*d.*
TACTICAL STUDIES of the Battles of Columbey-Nouilly and Vionville. 4*s* 6*d.*
TACTICS. Modern. Précis of. Second Edition. 1896. 3*s.* (*Out of print*)
TELEGRAPH. Army. Field Telegraphs. Manual of Instruction in. 1897 3*s.* (*Out of print*)
TELEGRAPH LINES. FIELD. Instruction in Laying and Maintaining. 1907. 6*d.*
TELEGRAPHS IN WAR. Regulations for Working. 1897. 1*d.*
TELESCOPIC SIGHTS
TER

PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY

BRIEF
D
0055410
v.2

01-810-152

UTL AT DOWNSVIEW
D RANGE BAY SHLF POS ITEM C
39 10 02 14 08 024 7